Receiving without entering in the books. Fraudulent falsification of the books. Making false statements, &c. No prosecution if there has been a disclosure in a civil action. For a director, public officer, or manager of such body or company, to receive or possess himself of any of the property of the company, &c., otherwise than in payment of a just debt or demand, and, with intent to defraud, to omit to make or have made a full and true entry thereof in the books and accounts of the company (e). For a director, manager, public officer, or member, with intent to defraud, to destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book, paper, writing, or valuable security, belonging to the body or company; or (b) to make or concur in making any false entry, or to omit or concur in omitting any material particular in any book of account or other document (ƒ). For a director, manager, or public officer to make, circulate, or publish, or concur in making, &c., any written statement or account which he knows to be false in any material particular, with intent to deceive or defraud any member, shareholder, or creditor of such body or company, or with intent to induce any person to become a shareholder or partner therein, or to intrust or advance any property to such body or company, or to enter into any security for the benefit thereof (g). With regard to these cases of embezzlement by bankers, merchants, attorneys, agents, or factors, trustees, directors, officers, or members of bodies corporate or public companies, the provisions as to which are contained in sects. 75 to 84 of the Larceny, Act, it is enacted that no person shall be convicted of any of these misdemeanors if he shall, at any time previously to his being charged with such misdemeanor, have disclosed the act on oath, in consequence of any action which shall have been bona fide instituted by any party (e) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. (f) Ibid. s. 83. aggrieved; or if he shall have first disclosed the same in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency (h). case of com For a director, officer, or contributory of a company Falsification in wound up under the Companies Act, 1862, to destroy, pany wound mutilate, alter, or falsify any books, papers, writings, up. or securities, or to make or be privy to making any false or fraudulent entry in any book or other document of the company, with intent to defraud or deceive any person, is a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years (). For an officer of a savings bank to receive any de- Savings banks. posit and not pay over the same is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both (k). (h) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 85. And also nothing in these sections shall entitle any person to refuse to answer a question in a civil proceeding on the ground that it tends to criminate himself.-s. 85. The criminal proceeding is not to deprive any party of his civil remedy, but the conviction is not to be evidence in such civil suit.-s. 86. (i) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. 166. (k) 26 & 27 Vict. c. 87, s. 9. False statements, returns, &c., by railway companies, v. 29 & 30 Vict. c. 108, ss. 15-17; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 119, s. 5; 34 & 35 Vict. c. 78, s. 10. CHAPTER III. FALSE PRETENCES. False pretences IT is difficult to correctly define the offence of obtaindistinguished from larceny. ing property by false pretences. In some cases, on the one hand, there seems little to distinguish it from larceny; and in others, to distinguish it from a mere non-criminal lie. The most intelligible distinction between false pretences and larceny has been thus set forth (1): "In larceny the owner of the thing stolen has no intention to part with his property therein to the person taking it, although he may intend to part with the possession; in false pretences the owner does intend to part with his property in the money or chattel, but it is obtained from him by fraud." The line between the two crimes is very narrow. Thus, A. intrusts B. with a parcel to carry to C. D. meets B. and alleges that he is C., whereupon B. gives him the parcel. It will be larceny if B. had not authority to pass the property; false pretences if he had (m). The difficulty of discriminating arises chiefly where there has been a constructive taking only, where the owner delivers the property, though the possession is obtained by fraud. The evil which might arise from this state of things is to some extent obviated by a provision that if upon an indictment for false pretences it is proved that the defendant obtained the property in such manner as to amount in law to larceny, he is not on that account to be acquitted (n). Therefore in cases of doubt it is better to indict for false pretences. () Arch. 374; v. White v. Garden, 10 C. B. 927. (n) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 88. The points to be proved on an indictment for false pretences are the following: i. The pretence and its falsity. ii. That the property or some part thereof was iii. The intent to defraud. be of an exist ing fact. i. The pretence must be wholly or in part of an Pretence must existing fact (o); for example, a false statement of one's name and circumstances in a begging letter. But a mere exaggeration will not suffice, as if a person actually in business pretends that he is doing a very good business (p); otherwise, if he were not doing any The fact must be an existing fact; within the act for a person to pretend that he will do something which he does not mean to do (r). But a promise to do a thing may involve a false pretence that the promisor has the power to do that thing; and for this an indictment will lie (s). business at all (q). therefore it is not Obtaining additional money by stating that a larger amount of goods is delivered than is known to be the case, is within the statute (t). But of course not every breach of warranty or false assertion at the time of a bargain will be treated as a false pretence (u); for example, if, in selling an article for a lump sum, the vendor makes a false representation as to the weight in order to induce the purchaser to conclude (0) "It may be laid down as a general rule of interpretation of the statute, that wherever a person fraudulently represents as an existing fact that which is not an existing fact, and so gets money, &c., that is an offence within the Act."-Arch. 515. (p) R. v. Williamson, 11 Cox, 328. (9) R. v. Crabb, 11 Cox, 85. (r) R. v. Lee, 9 Cox, 304. (s) R. v. Giles, 34 L. J. (M.C.) 50. (t) R. v. Ragg, 29 L. J. (M.C.) 86. The pretence, the bargain (a). However, it seems clear that a false representation respecting an alleged matter of definite fact knowingly made is a false pretence within the statute; even although the representation is merely as to the quality of the goods sold; as when the prosecutor was induced to purchase a chain on the representation that it was fifteen carat gold, whereas it was only six carat (y). But if the representation is only what is matter of opinion, and amounts merely to exaggerated praise, the party is not criminally liable; as where the defendant said his spoons were equal to Elkington's (z). The false pretence need not be expressed in words; how expressed. it will suffice if the pretence is signified in the conduct and acts of the party; for example, by obtaining goods upon giving in payment a cheque upon a banker with whom the defendant has no account, he believing that it would not be paid on presentation (a); or by a person, who was not a member of the university, obtaining goods fraudulently at Oxford through wearing a commoner's cap and gown (b). A false pretence made through an innocent agent is, of course, the same as if made by the defendant himself. Indictment for forgery. If the goods are obtained by means of a forged order, note, or other document, the party should be indicted for forgery, seeing that the punishment for that offence is much more severe. But the prisoner will not be acquitted for the false pretence on the ground that he might have been indicted for forgery (c). (x) R. v. Ridgway, 3 F. & F. 838. (y) R. v. Astley, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301; 40 L. J. (M.C.) 85. (z) R. v. Bryan, 26 L. J. (M.C.) 84. (a) R. v. Jackson, 3 Camp. 370; v. R. v. Hazelton, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 134; 44 L. J. (M.C.) 11. (b) R. v. Barnard, 7 C. & P. 784. (c) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 12. |