Argument for Appellant. 199 U. S. and John A. Benson, Henry P. Dimond, and Joost H. Schneider, charging them with a conspiracy, under Rev. Stat. sec. 5440, "to defraud the United States out of the possession and use of and the title to, divers large tracts of the public lands of the United States." All of the defendants except Schneider are residents of San Francisco, California. Upon a complaint made, based upon such indictment, before a United States Commissioner for the Northern District of California, Hyde was arrested under Rev. Stat. sec. 1014, taken before a Commissioner and held to bail to answer the indictment in the sum of $50,000, and in default thereof was committed to the custody of the defendant Shine to await the order of the District Judge for his removal to the District of Columbia, or until he should be discharged by due course of law. Upon such order of removal being issued, United States v. Hyde, 132 Fed. Rep. 545, appellant presented his petition to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, praying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and for his discharge from imprisonment, which were denied, and this appeal taken. Mr. William B. Hornblower and Mr. Charles C. Cole for appellant in this case. Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. J. C. Campbell, with whom Mr. Charles Page and Mr. Samuel Knight were on the brief, for appellant in No. 410, argued simultaneously herewith.1 Section 1014, Rev. Stat., does not authorize a removal to the District of Columbia. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655; Goode v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, 98; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154: In re Dana, 7 Ben. 1; In re Buell, 3 Dillon, 116; In re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 889; United States v. Haskins, 3 Sawyer, 262. It is locally inapplicable to the District of Columbia. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, Fed. Cas. No. 302a; Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; Cissel v. McDonald, 16 Blatchf. 150; United States v. Ames, 95 Fed. Rep. 453. As to the word "district" and how it is used see 9 Am. 1 Dimond v. Shine, see p. 88, post. 199 U. S. Argument for Appellant. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 661; Kelley v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441; Un. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 524; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 180. No general act is applicable to the District of Columbia where there is a specific act in force upon the same subject. In re Kirk, 3 Mackey, 116. As to effect of the act of June 22, 1874, see Re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 901; Cong. Rec., 43d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 81, and p. 1303; and Sen. Rep. 658. A person who commits a crime in the District of Columbia may be tried in the District where he is found or is first brought. §730, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Carr, 3 Sawyer, 302; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157, 182. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction of the offense charged. § 5440, Rev. Stat. The conspiracy became complete in California or Oregon and not in the District of Columbia. Under § 730, Rev. Stat., appellant should be tried in California where he was apprehended. United States v. Bird, 1 Spr. 299; Dist. Col. Code, § 1, 31 Stat. 1189. And if appellant could be tried anywhere else § 1014 does not authorize his removal to the District of Columbia. The same rule applies to cases of extradition. In re Baldwin, 29 N. W. Rep. 482; Carter v. Barlow, 74 N. W. Rep. 745; Ex parte Johnson, 167 U. S. 120; Re Tivnan, 5 Best & Sm. 645; 1 Kent Com., 10th ed., 186; Wharton, 7th ed., 2960; Moore on Extradition, § 367. Under this statute the conspiracy is the offense and the overt acts are no part thereof. United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 192, 204; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539, 546; Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464; McKenna v. United States, 127 Fed. Rep. 88; Gantt v. United States, 108 Fed. Rep. 61; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145; United States v. Lancaster, 4 Fed. Rep. 896; United States v. Gardiner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829; United States v. Green, 115 Fed. Rep. 343, 351; United States v. Donan, 11 Blatchf. 168. VOL. CXCIX-5 Argument for Appellant. 199 U. S. If an overt act was necessary to complete the crime the courts in the District of Columbia would not have jurisdiction as the statute of limitation runs from the commission of the first overt act which was over three years before the indictment. United States v. Owen, 32 Fed. Rep. 134; United States v. McCord, 72 Fed. Rep. 159; § 1044, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33. See also Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464; United States v. Newton, 52 Fed. Rep. 275; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145; United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed. Rep. 754. United States v. Green, 115 Fed. Rep. 343, distinguished. The venue of the alleged conspiracy is improperly laid in the District of Columbia. United States v. Rindskopf, 6 Biss. 259; act of March 2, 1874, 14 Stat. 471; § 731, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 202; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Fed. Rep. 452; see also Commonwealth v. Mactoon, 101 Massachusetts, 1; Shaftsbury v. Graham, Skinner, 32; Smith v. Cranshaw, 2 Rolle, 258; Regina v. Best, 1 Salk. 174; King v. Brisac, 4 East Rep. 164. The courts of the District of Columbia have no jurisdiction. of a bare conspiracy committed in California, not to commit a crime, but where the conspiracy itself is the only crime. charged. The venue must be not where the conspiracy was but where the result was put in execution. As the indictment was found in a court not having jurisdiction of the offense it cannot constitute the basis for removal proceedings. The alleged act of conspiracy was committed, if at all, prior to the going into effect of the District Code. See cases, supra, and as to a law not having a retrospective operation see Dodge v. Bank, 109 Fed. Rep. 726; Dewart v. Purdy, 29 Pa. St. 113; 31 Stat. 5, 1189, 1199, 1436. The indictment is void for not concluding "against the peace and Government of the United States" as required by statute. 2 Stat. 115. It is the duty of the court to look into the indictment, and if it charges no offense against the United States, or is so es 199 U.S. Argument for Appellant. sentially and fundamentally defective that a conviction could not be sustained the petitioner should be discharged. Re Buell, 3 Dillon, 116; United States v. Fowkes, 49 Fed. Rep. 50; Re Corning, 51 Fed. Rep. 205; Re Terrell, 51 Fed. Rep. 213; Re Green, 52 Fed. Rep. 104; Stewart v. United States, 119 Fed. Rep. 89; United States v. Lee, 84 Fed. Rep. 626; Re Connors, 111 Fed. Rep. 734; Re Huntington, 68 Fed. Rep. 881; Re Doig, 4 Fed. Rep. 193; Re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257; Greene v. Henkel, 183 U.S. 249. Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73, distinguished. The sufficiency of the charge of a crime is jurisdictional. In re Nielson, 131 U. S. 176; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731; In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 423; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276. The removal of appellant to the District of Columbia would be a violation of his constitutional right to be tried where the alleged offense was committed. Const. U. S., Art. III, § 2 cl. 3, and Amend. VI; Story's Comm. § 1775; Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 83; United States v. Burr, Fed. Cas. No. 14,693. § 731, Rev. Stat., does not aid the prosecution. Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283; 12 Cycl. Law & Pro. 239, nor does § 731 apply to the District of Columbia. The indictment charges no offense against the United States. A patent granting public lands, although procured by irregularities or fraud, can not be questioned collaterally, but only by direct proceedings on behalf of the Government to avoid the patent. The patents of the State surrendered to the United States conveyed a legal title which, until attacked directly by the State of California, was good, and so long as the patents remained unassailed the State had no equitable title in the land and the United States got a good title to the land surrendered and was not defrauded. O'Connor v. Trasher, 56 California, 499; Doll v. Meador, 16 California, 295, 325; Thomas v. Lawler, 53 California, 405; Gale v. Best, 78 California, 235; Turner v. Donelly, 70 California, 597, 604; Moore v. Wilkinson, 13 California, 478, 488; Yount v. Howell, 14 California, Argument for Appellant. 199 U. S. 465; Miller v. Dale, 44 California, 562, 577; Kentfield v. Hayes, 57 California, 409; Plummer v. Brown, 70 California, 544; Chapman v. Quinn, 56 California, 278; Irvine v. Taibal, 105 California, 242; Dreyfus v. Badger, 108 California, 58, 64; Quicksilver Co. v. Habeshaw, 132 California, 115; Phillips v. Carter, 135 California, 604; Saunders v. La Parissina, 125 California, 159, 165; Harrington v. Goldsmith, 13 California, 169. And see especially Marshall v. Bank, 115 California, 330; Colorado Coal Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307; United States v. Cal. & Ore. Land Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 496; S. C., 148 U. S. 31; United States v. Winona &c. R. R. Co., 165 U. S. 463, 478; United States v. Chi., M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 198 U. S. 385; People v. Swift, 96 California, 168; United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 30 Stat. 34; 26 Stat. 1095; 31 Stat. 1614. Even though the facts stated might show a conspiracy to defraud a State they cannot by a mere allegation to that effect be converted into a conspiracy to defraud the United States. United States v. Crafton, 4 Dillon, 145; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 207. The Federal Government was not defrauded as no injury has resulted from appellant's action. Fraud without resulting injury is not actionable. Irons v. Reyburn, 11 Arkansas, 378; Otis v. Raymond, 3 Connecticut, 413; Skrine v. Simmons, 11 Georgia, 401; Lieveking v. Leitzler, 31 Indiana, 131; Wharf v. Roberts, 88 Illinois, 426; Hale v. Philbrick, 47 Iowa, 217; Brown v. Blunt, 72 Maine, 415; Fuller v. Hodgdon, 25 Maine, 243; Morgan v. Bliss, 2 Massachusetts, 111; Johnson v. Seymour, 79 Michigan, 156; Alden v. Wright, 47 Minnesota, 225; Lorenson v. Kansas City Co., 44 Nebraska, 99; Weaver v. Wallace, 9 N. J. L. 251; Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Aron v. Delastro, 13 N. Y. Supp. 372; Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379; Marshall v. Hubbard, 117 U. S. 415. The evidence before the commissioner proved that there was no probable cause for believing him to be guilty and habeas corpus and certiorari should have been granted and petitioner discharged. That would have been in accordance with the Pe |