a remedy by writ of error or appeal, except in rare and exceptional
cases, and where, as in this case, nothing in the record discloses special
circumstances justifying a departure from the regular course, the writ
should be quashed and the petition dismissed. Riggins v. United
States, 547.
Rivers; application of constitutional prohibition against special legislation.
Although a river may, for purposes of transit and travel, be a highway, in
the prohibition in the constitution of South Carolina against special
legislation in regard to highways, that word is used in its ordinary
sense and the prohibition is inapplicable to water highways. Mani-
gault v. Springs, 473.
See STREETS AND SIDEWALKS.
HOMESTEAD CLAIMS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 6, 9;
REMOVAL OF Causes, 2.
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 17.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3.
To restrain public work until compensation is paid, where no property directly
appropriated.
A court of equity is not bound to enjoin a public work authorized by stat-
ute, until compensation is paid where no property is directly appro-
priated, especially where it is difficult to ascertain the damages, if any,
and the statute contains reasonable provisions for compensation.
Manigault v. Springs, 473.
INSOLVENCY.
See BANKRUPTCY;
NATIONAL BANKS, 1.
1. Forfeiture of policy for non-payment of premium.
Promptness of payment of life insurance premiums is essential and although
forfeitures are not generally regarded with favor they are necessary and
should be fairly enforced in regard to such payments. A statute re-
quiring notice of time of payment of premium and effect of non-payment
thereof should not be construed so as to make it a trap for either the
company or the assured. Nederland Life Ins. Co. v. Meinert, 171.
2. Sufficiency of notice of non-payment of premium-Mistake cured by subse-
quent notice.
Where the assured has received the statutory notice, containing in the words
of the statute a statement as to the effect of non-payment of the pre-
mium, the fact that a mistaken additional statement as to the forfeiture
of the policy, by reason of such non-payment, was contained in the
notice is not such a failure to comply with the terms of the statute as
will prevent a forfeiture of the policy where it appears that after de-
fault the assured received another notice in regard thereto, had an
opportunity to reinstate the policy by payment of the premium, within
a specified time according to the policy, but made no payment for over
three years, and did not ask for any extension of time, and the com-
pany had noted the forfeiture on its books. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST, 2.
1. Intoxicating liquors; effect of sale by State on operation of taxing power
of Federal Government.
A State may control the sale of liquor by the dispensary system adopted in
South Carolina, but when it does so it engages in ordinary private busi-
ness which is not, by the mere fact that it is being conducted by a State,
exempted from the operation of the taxing power of the National
Government. South Carolina v. United States, 437.
2. Liability of agents of State for internal revenue tax on sale of liquors.
Persons who sell liquor are not relieved from liability for the internal revenue
tax imposed by the Federal Government by the fact that they have no
interest in the profits of the business and are simply the agents of a
State which, in the exercise of its sovereign power, has taken charge of
the business of selling intoxicating liquor. They are persons within
the meaning of sections 3140, 3232 and 3244, Rev. Stat. Ib.
3. Exemption of state agencies from National taxation.
The exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities from National taxa-
tion is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental character,
and does not extend to those used by the State in carrying on an ordi-
nary private business. Ib.
4. Nature of tax on liquor.
The internal revenue tax on the sale of liquor is not a tax on property or
profits of a business but a charge on the business irrespective of the
property used therein, or the profits realized therefrom. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.
Validity not affected by technical objections to regularity of proceedings.
Proceedings had many years ago to convey title under Spanish laws are not
to be scrutinized with a view to discovering defects, and, if sufficient
under the Spanish system, they will not be upset on technical objec-
tions to their regularity even if such objections might have been suc-
cessfully urged in the forum where, and at the time when, the proceed-
ings were had. McGuire v. Blount, 142.
JURISDICTION.
A. OF THIS COURT.
1. Sufficiency of involution of Federal question in state court.
A petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court of the State is too late to
raise Federal questions in that court unless the petition is entertained
and the point passed on. Corkran Oil & Development Co. v. Arnaudet,
182; French v. Taylor, 274.
Although title may be claimed in the state court under a Federal statute,
if the decision of that court rests on a ground independent of that
statute, and involving no Federal question the writ of error will be dis-
missed. Corkran Oil & Development Co. v. Arnaudet, 182.
Where the vadility of a state revenue statute itself is not drawn in ques-
tion, but plaintiff in error contends that he was denied due process of
law because state officers acting thereunder did not fully comply with
the statute, only questions of local law and fact are involved and the
determination of the state court is not reviewable on writ of error by
this court. French v. Taylor, 274.
3. Existence of Federal question where decision of state court rested on con-
struction of state laws.
It is the power and duty of this court to determine for itself the existence
or non-existence of the contract, the obligation whereof is claimed to
have been impaired, and a Federal question may be involved, although
the state court may have rested its decision on the construction of
the constitution and laws of the State. Kies v. Lowrey, 233.
4. Sufficiency of certificate of presiding judge of state court as to Federal
question involved in decision, to give this court jurisdiction, where record
does not otherwise show it to exist.
A certificate of the presiding judge of the state court made after the decision
to the effect that a Federal question was considered and decided, can-
not confer jurisdiction on this court where the record does not other-
wise show it to exist. When the court makes such a certificate and
orders it to be attached to and form part of the record itself, it may be
sufficient to show that Federal questions were before the state court
decided by it so that this court may pass upon those questions which
are specified, but the statement that the plaintiff in error made a gen-
eral contention that the statute involved and proceedings thereunder
were an invasion of his private rights in violation of the Constitution
is too vague to raise any Federal question. Marvin v. Trout, 212.
5. On decision by state court as to bar of limitations against suit by receiver
of national bank to collect assessment on stock.
Where the state court has held that a suit to collect assessment by the re-
ceiver of a national bank under directions of the Comptroller of the
Currency is barred by a state statute of limitations, a Federal question
is involved and the writ of error will not be dismissed. Rankin v.
Barton, 228.
B. OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.
See JURISDICTION, C 6;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
1. Citizenship of plaintiffs; necessity for all being citizens of same State.
Where suit is brought in the district of defendant's residence by plaintiffs
who are citizens of other States than that of defendant, the Circuit Court
has jurisdiction although plaintiffs are not themselves citizens of the
same State. Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 252.
2. Sufficiency of averment of ground of jurisdiction.
Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked not only on the
ground of diverse citizenship but also on a constitutional question, the
mere averment of the latter is not sufficient if it is so wanting in merit
as to be frivolous and, under such circumstances, if an appeal and a
petition for certiorari are both pending, as in this case, the appeal will
be dismissed; but if the correctness of the decree on the general issue
should be considered the writ will be allowed and the record on appeal
treated as a return thereto. Farrell v. O'Brien, 89.
3. Of matters of probate of wills.
As the authority to make wills is derived from the State and the require-
ment of probate is but a regulation to make a will effective, matters of
pure probate, in the strict sense of the words, are not within the juris-
diction of courts of the United States. Ib.
Where a state law, statutory or customary, gives to the citizens of the
State, in an action or suit inter partes, the right to question at law the
probate of a will or to assail probate in a suit in equity the courts of the
United States in administering the rights of citizens of other States or
aliens will enforce such remedies. The action or suit inter partes, how-
ever, must relate to independent controversies and not to mere contro-
versies which may arise on an application to probate or a mere method
of procedure ancillary to the original procedure. Ib
The statutory procedure of the State of Washington, for probate of wills
relates to nuncupative wills as well as ordinary wills, and the authority
conferred on the courts to contest a will is a part of the probate pro-
cedure, and does not cause a contest to be a suit inter partes, and there-
fore the Circuit Court of the United States, in a case where jurisdiction
is based on diverse citizenship, is without jurisdiction to declare either
the non-existence of a nuncupative will or the nullity of the probate
thereof by the probate court. Ib.
Where the state statute provides that within a fixed period after its ad-
mission to probate interested parties may question the validity of a
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