Marianao, and connected with both points by rail. There was a refrigerator plant there which had been erected by Swift & Co., so that if the claimant regarded his contract as the supplement to that of Swift & Co., there was notice on the face of the earth that this point was supposed to be within their territory. The original advertisement for proposals, referred to by the claimant when he made his offer, spoke of "posts remote from the seacoast," a later one, also referred to, read "posts and camps in the interior of the island." Obviously the two phrases were used as meaning the same thing, and they may be considered in interpreting the word "interior" in the contract. Bradley v. Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown Steam Packet Co., 13 Pet. 89, 101; Stoops v. Smith, 100 Massachusetts, 63, 65, 66; Prouty v. Union Hardware Co., 176 Massachusetts, 155, 158; Bank of New Zealand v. Simpson, 1899-1900, App. Cas. 182; Bruce v. Moon, 57 So. Car. 60, 68, 69; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2465. When performance of the contract began in January, 1899, beef was not ordered of the claimant for this camp. On the twenty-sixth he protested, but not on the ground that Los Quemados was situated in the interior of the island. His complaint was that he was to furnish all the fresh beef except that furnished under Swift & Co.'s contract. The reply from the acting Commissary General, and the local Chief Commissary, was that his contract embraced camps in the interior, "and not seacoast points," thus showing how the contract was construed at that time. He does not appear to have suggested a different view, although he seems to have kept on trying to get what orders he could. During January and February beef was purchased from third parties. On February 21, he was notified that commissaries throughout the island had been instructed to call on him to furnish fresh beef under his contract whenever Swift & Co. could not do so under theirs, and he furnished beef for Los Quemados for the first thirteen days of March and was paid for it. But it will be observed that this action again was not on the ground that Los Quemados was a camp in the interior.

While insufficient to modify the contract in the sense of the claim first discussed, it was based on the willingness which the claimant had shown to furnish beef to that greater extent. Pursuant to the notice it would seem that he furnished beef to various points upon the coast.

is

On March 13 the call upon the claimant was stopped and he again protested. On May 4, the Secretary of War decided that the camp at Quemados was an interior post, but called the attention of the Commissary Department to the clause in the contract providing that it should be in force from January 5 to June 30, 1899, or such less time for any post as the Commissary of Subsistence might direct. Accordingly the Commissary General notified the claimant that "the suspension of the delivery of fresh beef under your contract hereby made to cover the life of the contract in so far as it relates to the post of Quemados." The claimant, of course, relies upon this construction of his contract so far as it favors. him, while he repudiates the attempt to terminate his rights under the last quoted clause. But this interpretation was after the event and was not accepted or acted upon otherwise than to give the notice just mentioned. As we have shown, the contemporary construction by the men on the spot was different, and seems to have been accepted by the claimant. Taking the instrument in connection with the facts that for camping purposes Quemados was Havana, and that, as between the parties, interior meant remote from the seacoast, we are of opinion that the United States did not promise to take beef from the claimant at that point.

Judgment affirmed.

199 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

CARROLL v. GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.

No. 50. Argued November 7, 8, 1905.-Decided November 27, 1905.

Section 1754 of the Iowa Code of 1897, prohibiting combinations of insurance companies as to rates, commissions, and manner of transacting business, is not unconstitutional as depriving the companies of their property or of their liberty of contract within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and the auditor of the State will not be enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the statute.

A company lawfully doing business in a State is no more bound by a general unconstitutional enactment than a citizen of that State.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles W. Mullan and Mr. Charles A. Clark, for appellant:

Sections 1754, 1755, 1756 and 1757 of the code of Iowa do not violate or infringe § 6, Art. I, Iowa const., as they operate equally upon every person within the relations and circumstances provided for, and the class of persons affected thereby is a natural and proper class for legislative purposes, and not arbitrarily created by the legislature. Cooley Const. Lim., 6th ed., 480; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 294; Minneapolis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 560; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 209; Kennedy v. Insurance Co., 165 Pa. St. 183.

The statute in question extends to and embraces equally all persons and corporations who fall within the classification, and is therefore valid under the state constitution. Barbier v. ConVOL. CXCIX-26

Argument for Appellant.

199 U. S.

nolly, 113 U. S. 27; Sutton v. State, 96 Tennessee, 696; Des Moines v. Bolton, 102 N. W. Rep. (Iowa), 1045; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 499; Iowa Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112; McAunich v. M. &c. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Morris v. Stout, 110 Iowa, 659.

The statute in this case does not contravene any of the provisions of § 30, Art. III, Iowa constitution. Smith v. Judge, 17 California, 554; French v. Teschemaker, 24 California, 544.

Nor does it violate or infringe § 10, Art. I of the Constitution of the United States, and it does not impair the obligation of any existing contract. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 603; Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 495; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 391; Central Land Co., v. Laidley 159 U. S. 109; Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 147; Water Works Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 439.

The Iowa statute does not deprive any person of liberty or property, and does not restrict or abridge the liberty of contract; nor does any provision of such statute in any manner violate or infringe any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; Arnot v. Pittston & Elmyra Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558; Cent. Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Illinois, 346; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Illinois, 268; Richardson v. Bull, 77 Michigan, 632; Santa Clara Co. v. Hayes, 79 California, 387; India Bagging Ass'n v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 339; People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251; Atty. Gen. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Missouri, 45; Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 334; Watson v. Harlem & N. Y. Nav. Co., 52 How. Prac. 348; Anderson v. Jett, 89 Kentucky, 375; Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473; Standard Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Texas, 650; Park & Sons Co. v. Druggists Ass'n, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1064; People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267; Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio

199 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

St. 320; Chapin v. Brown Bros., 83 Iowa, 156; DeWitt Wire Cloth Co. v. N. J. Wire Cloth Co., 14 N. Y. Supp. 277; United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; United States v. Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290; United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 228; Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 247; Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How. 434; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 90; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 326; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 176; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 166; Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 531; State v. Phipps, 50 Kansas, 609; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Mo. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.

Under the uniformity clauses of the Iowa constitution, a statute prescribing regulations for actions on insurance policies different from those on other contracts is valid. Christie v. Life Ins. Co., 82 Iowa, 360.

A method assessing railway companies different from the method of assessing other taxpayers is not invalid. Central Iowa R. R. Co. v. Board, 67 Iowa, 199. So also as to express and telegraph companies. U. S. Ex. Co. v. Ellison, 28 Iowa, 370. The statute establishing the liability of railroad companies to employés for negligence of co-employés is valid. McAunich v. M. & M. Ry. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Deppe v. Ry. Co., 36 Iowa, 52. Also one assessing state banks for taxation differently from national banks. Primghar State Bank v. Rerick, 64 N. W. Rep. 801. And see Martin v. Blattner, 86 Iowa, 286. This court will follow the construction of the state court in these matters. Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 163. See also Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 621; Kentucky R. R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; Magoun v. Ill. &c. Bank, 170 U. S. 283; Gulf &c. Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150.

The right of contract may be subjected to restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of the State. St. Louis &c. Ry. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbinson, 183