striction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts as to subject matter, amount, or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for redress. Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for municipal purposes, and to regulate their local government. As respects the administration of justice, it may establish one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts, one system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion. Convenience, if not necessity, often requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with the power of a State to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it this right. We think it is not denied or taken away by anything in the Constitution of the United States, including the amendments thereto.

"We might go still further, and say, with undoubted truth, that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its methods of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This would not, of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. If every person residing or being in either portion of the State should be accorded the equal protection of the laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For, as before said, it has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances."

Perceiving no error in the record touching any Federal question, the judgment is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissent from the opinion so far as it relates to the ordinances in question.

HARTMAN v. BUTTERFIELD LUMBER COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 44. Argued November 7, 1905.-Decided November 27, 1905.

A homesteader, after obtaining his patent, conveyed to a lumber company all the standing timber on the land and other rights therein pursuant to a contract made prior to the issuing of the patent; subsequently he conveyed all his interest in the land to one who thereupon claimed the timber on the ground that the prior conveyance was void as violative of the land laws and land policy of the United States. Held, that:

When the patent issues to a homesteader the full legal title passes to the patentee and he may do with the land that which he sees fit.

An executed contract, voluntarily executed, without fraud or duress, is binding and cannot be repudiated by the party who executed it, and one whose interest in land is acquired subsequently to a conveyance thereof by the owner has no higher right to question the conveyance than the grantor had.

Although the grantee of the timber might not have been able to enforce the contract because void as made in violation of the land laws of the United States, the conveyance having been voluntarily made after the issuing of the patent, could not be attacked on that ground by the grantor or his subsequent grantee. Whether the Government itself could challenge the conveyance not decided.

IN December, 1892, Esau Harness received a patent from the United States for 160 acres of land in Lincoln County, Mississippi. On January 28, 1893, he conveyed to the Norwood and Butterfield Company all the pine timber on the land "and a right of way through and across the land for roads, trams or railroads 100 feet wide." This instrument was filed

Statement of the Case.

199 U. S.

for record February 10, and the complainant below (defendant in error here) subsequently obtained a deed from the Norwood and Butterfield Company. On January 30, 1893, the patentee conveyed his entire interest in the land as security for supplies and merchandise to be furnished by Hartman, the plaintiff in error (defendant below), during the year 1893. This deed was filed for record January 31, 1893. On December 14, 1894, the trustee therein named sold and conveyed the land to Hartman.

This suit was brought in the Chancery Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi, to establish the prior right of the complainant to the timber and right of way. The bill charged that the defendant had actual notice of the conveyance from the patentee to the Norwood and Butterfield Company when he accepted the trust deed from the patentee, and therefore that he was subordinated in right to those claiming under the first conveyance, although it was not placed on record until after the execution and record of the deed of trust. It appeared in the testimony that prior to the patent the patentee had contracted with the Norwood and Butterfield Company to convey to it the timber and right of way. He himself testified that he had made such a contract, both before and after he had received the patent. The Supreme Court of the State, deciding in favor of the complainant, 82 Mississippi, 494, considered the effect of the contract made before the patent upon the validity of the subsequent conveyance to the Norwood and Butterfield Company, saying:

"We are driven to the conclusion that the decree of the court below must have been the result of an opinion that the agreement between Esau Harness and the grantor of appellant that, in consideration of the advance money to perfect his homestead entry and get his patent, Esau would sell the timber on the land in controversy, was against the public policy and void, and made void also the subsequent sale of the timber to reimburse for that advance. We are not in accord with that view. Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 2290, 2291, 2296 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp.

1389, 1390, 1398), with Gould & Tucker's notes, vol. 1, p. 537. On the testimony we cannot escape the conviction that the appellee had such notice as should put any reasonable man on inquiry, which would have disclosed the existence of the conveyance of the timber and right of way by Esau to the grantor of appellants.

"Reversed, and decree here in accordance with the prayer of the bill."

Mr. P. Z. Jones for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Holmes Conrad for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

For the purposes of this case it may be conceded that the contract made before the patent was, by virtue of the policy of the United States as disclosed in its statutes, void, and could not have been enforced by the Norwood and Butterfield Company, but the contract was not inherently vicious or immoral. It was simply void because in conflict with the Federal statutes. Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U. S. 483. When the patent issued the full legal title passed to the patentee. He could do with the land that which he saw fit, sell or give it away, and if he voluntarily conveyed it he could not thereafter repudiate the conveyance. He may well have thought that having received money from the company to enable him to pay for the land. it was equitable that he should convey that interest which he had agreed to convey. At any rate, he had a right to exercise a choice in the matter, and having exercised it he at least cannot complain. Whether the Government could challenge the conveyance we need not determine, for if it had any right to interfere, it has not chosen to do so. It is generally true that an executed contract, voluntarily executed, without fraud or duress, is binding and cannot be repudiated by the party who executed it. In Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 497, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the court, thus stated the law:

VOL. CXCIX- 22

"It is well settled by the authorities that the defense of the statute of frauds cannot be set up against an executed contract. Dodge v. Crandall, 30 N. Y. 294, 304; Brown v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 117 N. Y. 266, 273; Madden v. Floyd, 69 Alabama, 221, 225; Gordon, Rankin & Co. v. Tweedy, 71 Alabama, 202, 214; Huntley v. Huntley, 114 U. S. 394, 400; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 116. This rule proceeds and rests upon the principle that there is no rule of law which prevents a party from performing a promise which could not be legally enforced, or which will permit a party, morally but not legally bound to do a certain act or thing, upon the act or thing being done, to recall it to the prejudice of the promisee, on the plea that the promise, while still executory, could not by reason of some technical rule of law have been enforced by action.' Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285, 291." St. Louis Hay &c. Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159, 163.

It is also well settled that one whose interest in land is acquired subsequently to a conveyance thereof by the owner has no higher right to question the conveyance than the grantor had. This does not conflict with the rule that a conveyance fraudulent against creditors may be set aside at their instance; for their rights exist prior to the conveyance, or if not, the conveyance was made with the purpose on the part of the grantor of defrauding them out of debts subsequently contracted. Nothing of that kind appears here. Hartman, at the time of the conveyance, had no claim against the patentee. The conveyance was not made with the purpose of subsequently contracting a debt and defrauding him out of payment thereof. His trust deed was executed after the conveyance to the Norwood and Butterfield Company and for the purpose of securing debts thereafter to be contracted, and he took with knowledge of the conveyance.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi was right, and it is

Affirmed.