and now daily prevented it from securing to passengers a free and uninterrupted passage from and to its station and to arriving and departing trains; and that by such acts of the defendants great and substantial damages were inflicted upon plaintiff's property different in kind and degree from that suffered by the general public, incapable of computation and which could not be compensated at law.

It was further averred in the bill that the defendants asserted the right-and acted upon that claim and assertionto enter the station of the plaintiff at all times in such numbers as suited their purposes, to remain there and occupy such portions of the station as they saw fit in soliciting the custom of incoming passengers regardless of the consent or the regulations of the plaintiff or the use to which its property is lawfully devoted, and to the prejudice of its duties and business as a common carrier, and by their actions largely deprived the plaintiff of the control of its property, to its irreparable loss and damage.

Alleging that its rights could not be effectively protected except by the decree of a court of equity, the plaintiff prayed that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from "entering the station" of the plaintiff "for the purpose of soliciting the custom of incoming passengers for cabs, carriages, express wagons or hotels, respectively; and that the occupation of the sidewalk and street abutting the main entrance of your orator's said station by said defendants for the purpose of soliciting custom of passengers for their said cabs, carriages, express wagons and hotels be decreed to be a nuisance to your orator and damaging to its property; and that said defendants and each of them and all persons acting in concert with them, whose names are unknown to your orator, may be perpetually enjoined from congregating singly or in larger numbers upon the said sidewalk at the main or any other entrance of your orator's said station for the purpose of plying their respective vocations as hackmen, cabmen, expressmen or hotel runners, and from interfering with or soliciting the custom of any of the passengers

upon the sidewalk adjoining said station at any main or other entrance to said station; and that your orator may have such other and further relief in the premises as the nature of its case may require and to your honors shall seem meet."

The defendants filed an answer putting in issue the material allegations of the bill, and insisting upon their legal right to have their vehicles in the public street in front of the company's station, and to go upon the plaintiff's depot grounds or into its station as well as to stand upon the sidewalk in front of the main entrance to the station for the purpose of soliciting the business of incoming or outgoing passengers.

A motion for an injunction against the defendants was heard upon the pleadings and upon affidavits filed by the respective parties. The Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction to the effect that the defendants and all persons claiming to act under their authority, direction or control, or to whom notice of the court's order or injunction should come, refrain "from entering the passenger station of complainant at the corner of Adams and Canal streets in the city of Chicago, to solicit custom of the incoming passengers for cabs, carriages, express wagons or hotels, and do absolutely desist and refrain from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to or about such entrances to said passenger station and from soliciting the custom of passengers for cabs, carriages, express wagons or hotels until the further order of the court in the premises."

The defendants appealed from that order and it was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, except the last clause thereof, which was modified by restraining the defendants "from congregating upon the sidewalks in front of, adjacent to, or about the entrance of the appellee company's passenger station and from there soliciting the custom of passengers, so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and employés." Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 120 Fed. Rep. 215. Subsequently, a final decree was passed in the Circuit Court in conformity with the above order of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Argument for Petitioners.

199 U. S.

That decree, upon appeal by the defendants, was affirmed in the latter court and the case is now before this court upon writ of certiorari sued out by the defendants.

Mr. Richard J. Cooney, with whom Mr. James R. Ward was on the brief, for petitioners:

The petitioners are licensed hackmen and expressmen of the city of Chicago, and are common carriers of passengers and baggage and of express. They are carrying on their vocation under the ordinances of Chicago, and are governed by the municipal law of Chicago. Art. V, ch. 24, Hurd's Stat. Ill., p. 62, § 1, cls. 9, 42.

No corporation or individual can acquire an exclusive right to their use for merely private purposes, and the ordinance must be reasonable, not oppressive, or such as will create a monopoly or grant special privileges or are in their nature class legislation, and must not be against public policy; if so, they are void. The ordinances must operate impartially, and they cannot discriminate between the same class, and they must be uniform and apply to all alike. Trotier v. Chicago, 33 Ill. App. 206; Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Illinois, 430; Chicago Dock Company v. Garrity, 115 Illinois, 155; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Illinois, 405; Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Illinois, 90; Kinmundy v. Mahan, et al., 72 Illinois, 462; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 Illinois, 28; Danville v. Noone, 103 Ill. App. 290. See ordinances Rev. Code Chicago, § 498; Lindsay v. Anniston, 27 L. R. A. 436.

This being the case the use of the street with the consent and acquiescence of the municipal authorities cannot be enjoined at the suit of an abutting property owner. Doane v. Elevated R. R. Co., 165 Illinois, 510; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Illinois, 279; Stetson v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 75 Illinois, 74; Petterson v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 75 Illinois, 588; Burlington & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGinniss, 79 Illinois, 269; Peoria & R. I. Co. v. Shertz, 84 Illinois, 135; Penn. L. Ins. Co. v. Heiss, 141 Illinois, 35; Corcoran v. Chicago and Madison R. R.

199 U. S.

Argument for Petitioners.

Co., 149 Illinois, 291; White v. Elevated R. R. Co., 154 Illinois, 620; P. C. C. & St. L. Co. v Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Truesdale v. Grape Sugar Co., 101 Illinois, 561; Dunning v. Aurora, 40 Illinois, 480; Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Illinois, 67; White v. Elevated Railroad Co., 154 Illinois, 626; County of Cook v. G. W. R. R. Co., 119 Illinois, 218; Tibbets v. W. & St. Ry. Co., 54 Ill. App. 108; Chicago v. Union Building Assn., 102 Illinois, 380; Clark v. Donaldson, 104 Illinois, 639; Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, 136 Illinois, 119; Hessing v. Scott, 107 Illinois, 600; Miller v. Webster, 62 N. W. Rep. 648. The above citations apply to corporations as well as private individuals. Gen. Electric R. R. Co. v. Chicago St. R. R. Co., 66 Ill. App. 362; Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Illinois, 289; § 12, Art. II, Const. Illinois, 1870; Hurd's Stat., 1901, 72, 1385, 1378, 1381.

The ordinances of the city of Chicago passed in pursuance of the authority delegated to it by the legislative department of the State, have the effect of a statute passed by the general assembly. Water Works v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 481.

The respondent in coming into the State of Illinois seeking to do business here, owes obedience to the constitution and the laws of the State, and the ordinances of the city of Chicago, enacted in pursuance thereof, and is answerable thereto for acts of nonfeasance or of misfeasance committed in said city. St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 102; Chi. & Mil. Ry. Co. v. Sloan, 169 U. S. 137.

To permit the respondent to exercise the power and privilege and enjoy an immunity denied to other common carriers, would be beyond the power of the general assembly and in violation of § 22, Art. IV, Illinois Constitution. Noel v. The People, 127 Illinois, 594; Horwich v. Walker, 205 Illinois, 495.

The title to the sidewalks and the fee of the streets and control thereof, at the entrance to and abutting the Union Passenger Station of the Pennsylvania Company, are vested exclusively in the city of Chicago, for public use. Penn. Co. v. Chicago, 181 Illinois, 296; Barnes v. Dist. of Col., 91 U. S. 547.

Argument for Petitioners.

199 U. S.

The respondent devotes its property to a use in which the public has an interest, and subjects its property to be controlled by such regulations as may be "prescribed by law," by the legislative authorities of the State and the city. Cutting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 84; Brass v. Stoesser, 153 U. S. 400; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 531; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 112; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Willenborg, 117 Illinois, 209.

The Pennsylvania Company could not lawfully under the constitution and laws of the State of Illinois, exclude from its station in Chicago, duly licensed cabmen, and so discriminate against them as to derive a profit from the maintenance of a monopoly given to the Parmelee Company. Neither is a court of equity open to the litigant whose acts are violations of law, and opposed to public policy and the organic and statute law of the State, and who seeks its sanction and aid to enforce a contract ultra vires, and maintain a monopoly. Hack Company v. Sootsam, 84 Michigan, 194; Union R. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Montana, 419; McConnell v. Hays, 92 Kentucky, 465; Union Co. v. Dohn, 153 Indiana, 10; Cravens v. Rogers, 101 Missouri, 246; Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Alabama, 267.

The relation of carrier and passenger is not involved in this case, nor is it exercised upon this record, but the exercise of police power and the authority to prevent and regulate monopolies and regulate sidewalks and traffic on the same are involved, attributes of State's sovereignty which belong exclusively to the State and its political subdivisions and agents. United States v. Knight, 156 U. S. 11; Barnes v. Dist. of Col., 91 U. S. 547; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 63; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139.

If respondent is injured, for which it has a right to complain, it has an adequate remedy at law, and where respondent has an adequate remedy at law relief in equity will not be granted. Richards v. Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co., 124 Illinois, 516; Railroad Co. v. Drake, 148 Illinois, 226; Railroad Co. v. Scott, 132 Illinois, 429; Railroad Co. v. Robbins, 159 Illinois, 598;