to the consequence of a failure to pay, as contained in the notice, would be exactly the same, if the words above referred to had been omitted, because the statute provides that the assured shall, nevertheless, have thirty days after mailing the notice before a forfeiture can be asserted. There can be no doubt that the premium did become due on the fifth of March, and the thirty days' extension simply permitted a payment within that time to save a forfeiture.

Now whether the statement in the notice were incorrect because of a failure to state accurately the conditions of the policy, or because of a failure to tell the assured the subsequent provisions in the statute as to forfeiture, is not in either case material, so long as the notice follows the statute, and if it do that it is good, even though it contains such a mistake as is set forth herein. The purpose of the statute was to prevent a forfeiture by the non-payment of the premium when due, because of inadvertence or forgetfulness, and when the assured receives the very notice required by the statute its purpose is fulfilled, although the notice contains in another respect such a mistake as does this notice. It is most unreasonable to hold that a statement of the consequence of the failure to pay the premium when due, mistakenly attributed in the notice to a provision in the policy, should be held fatal, when the same statement, without attributing it to a provision in the policy, would be a fulfillment of the requirements of the statute. In either case there would be an error as to the time of forfeiture, but there would also be a correct statement, in the very words of the statute, of the time the premium was payable, its amount and where it could be paid. In such case to assume that an injury might follow is, as we think, to assume an ignorance or carelessness on the part of the assured, which is unreasonable as well as improbable. A spark of intelligence on the part of the assured would prompt him to refer to his policy and he would then see the mistake of fact made in the notice as to the length of the time he had in which to pay in order to prevent a forfeiture. If he thought the notice rightly stated the fact as

to forfeiture, the natural result would be greater care to pay or some application to extend the time of payment on or before the day when the payment became due. Of that day he had the ample notice provided in the statute. It is scarcely possible to imagine any injury resulting from this error, although extraordinary and wonderful things do sometimes occur. Courts, however, cannot proceed upon the theory that policyholders are non compotes mentis, and that the natural result of such a mistake of fact upon a person of ordinary intelligence cannot be assumed in the case of a holder of a policy of insurance. It cannot reasonably be assumed that the assured might be betrayed into not doing at all what the notice tells him must be done on or before a certain day in order to save a forfeiture, because the notice omits to tell him of the extended time before the forfeiture can really be enforced, nor can such failure be anticipated as the result of the mistake. So long as the assured has in fact the notice required by law we are of opinion that such a mistake, as was made in this case, is immaterial.

The cases from the New York courts do not decide contrary to our decision herein. In Phelan v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 113 N. Y. 147, the notice was not like the one in this case. The notice spoken of there, it was held, did not comply with the statute, because it was not given in its words, and the language actually used was held by the majority of the court to be so far from complying with the statute in a material manner as to render it of no use. The court said that the notice, instead of saying that the policy would become forfeited and void, said that "members neglecting so to pay are carrying their own risks," and that the latter words, while they might be comprehensive to those versed in the language of insurers and accustomed to their phraseology, were not the language of the statute and did not embody the notice which the statute required.

The other case, Schad v. Security Mutual Life Association, 155 N. Y. 640, affirmed without any opinion the decision of the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reported in 11 App. Div. 487, where it was held that a statement that in case of the non-payment of the premium when it became due the policy would cease to be in force, did not comply with the notice required by the statute, that if the premium was not paid when due the policy and all payments thereon would become forfeited and void.

In McDougall v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, 135 N. Y. 551, it was held that where the policy was out of the ordinary form a notice, which did not follow literally the words of the statute, but contained a statement reminding the assured of the time and place when and where to make any payments required by the terms of the contract, the amount thereof, and the effect of non-payment was sufficient.

A statute of this kind should not be construed so as to make it a trap for either side. Forfeitures, though generally not regarded with favor by courts of equity, yet are necessary, and should be fairly enforced, in cases of life insurance. Promptness of payment is essential in such business. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 30.

Where, therefore, the assured has in truth received notice (as provided by statute) of the time of payment of the premium, its amount and where it can be paid, and a statement is made in the words of the statute itself as to the effect of non-payment, a mistaken additional statement like the one made here ought not to be held a failure to comply with the terms of the statute and thus prevent a forfeiture which the assured evidently contemplated.

We are aware of the case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dingley, 93 Fed. Rep. 153, but we cannot agree with the views therein expressed.

The case before us shows no evidence of any injury to the assured on account of the notice. He received, as the record shows, another notice on the fifth of April, informing him that his policy was forfeited, but that it could be reinstated by the simple payment of the premium within ten days there

after. He made no acknowledgment of the receipt of the notice, failed to pay the premium and asked no extension of time. Finally, on the twenty-second day of April, the forfeiture was noted on the books of the company. We think that the statute was complied with and that the forfeiture was legal.

The judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana must be reversed and the cause remanded to the latter court with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.

Reversed.

CORKRAN OIL AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v.

ARNAUDET.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 22. Argued October 24, 25, 1905.-Decided November 13, 1905.

A petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court of the State is too late to raise Federal questions in that court unless the petition is entertained and the point passed on.

Although title may be claimed in the state court under a Federal statute, if the decision of that court rests on a ground independent of that statute, and involving no Federal question the writ of error will be dismissed.

THIS was a petitory action commenced by the Corkran Oil and Development Company in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court for the parish of Acadia, Louisiana, on the sixth day of December, A. D. 1901, against Laurent Arnaudet and others, to recover possession of certain real property. Plaintiff alleged that the land was claimed by Anthony Corkran during his lifetime, and by his heirs and legal representatives after his death, and that said claim, known as the "Corkran grant," was finally confirmed to Corkran's heirs and legal

representatives by an act of Congress of February 10, 1897, and a patent was issued to them in accordance with the act. That Corkran died in about the year 1819, and his succession was duly opened in St. Landry parish, where he resided, and where the property was situated, and that petitioner acquired title to said property from Corkran's heirs and descendants by acts of sale on various dates specified, said dates being subsequent to November 10, 1901. That neither Corkran and wife, nor any of his heirs, legal representatives or descendants, ever sold or disposed of their rights, title or interests in the land before the sales to petitioner, and petitioner was now the just, true and legal owner of the property. Notwithstanding which, defendants, without legal right or title and against petitioner's rights, had entered upon and now possessed and held said property and refused to deliver the same to petitioner as of right. The act of Congress referred to is as follows (29 Stat. 517, c. 213):

"CHAP. 213. An act to quiet title and possession with respect to certain unconfirmed and located private land claims in the State of Louisiana.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all the right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the lands situate in the State of Louisiana, known as the located but unconfirmed private land claims therein, aggregating about eighty thousand acres, and specifically described in the list or tabular statement accompanying the report, dated February nineteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, made by the surveyor general of Louisiana to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under a resolution of the United States Senate of December second, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, and which report and list were communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of the Interior on March eighth, eighteen hundred and eighty, as Senate Executive Document numbered one hundred and eleven, Forty-sixth Congress, second session, shall be, and the same are hereby, directed to be granted, released, and re