named herein, add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act." The act of 1864, which was an amendment of the act of 1862, in section 22 preserved the right of Congress to at any time "alter, amend, or repeal this act." It also, in section 9, gave express authority to the company to maintain ferries or construct bridges over the Missouri River. The mortgage of 1865 was foreclosed, and the present appellant, the Union Pacific Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Utah, became the purchaser. The contention now is that as this mortgage antedated the act of 1871, the purchaser at the foreclosure thereof took the property freed from any burdens or obligations imposed by that act. It held the bridge as a part of its line, under no obligations to permit its use by any other company.

We shall not stop to inquire whether this foreclosure and sale was anything more than a reorganization under the form of a judicial proceeding, nor whether if it were in all respects a bona fide sale to an independent third party such sale took the property out of the jurisdiction of Congress, and prevented that body from further legislation in aid of the purpose of the act, "namely, to promote the public interest and welfare." The question before us is whether an amendment to the act, purely administrative in the character of the burdens imposed, aimed to promote the public interest and welfare, enacted while the title to the property remained in the original company a corporation chartered by Congress, which preserves intact all the pecuniary rights of the company, and whose privileges are accepted and acted upon by the company, is denuded of vitality by a sale to a new company under foreclosure of a mortgage executed prior to such legislation. That question must be answered in the negative.

The first transcontinental railroad, to wit, the Union Pacific Railroad, was a great public undertaking. Private capital was believed to be and was, in fact, unwilling to attempt it. Congress felt that the public interest required its construction. It sought to interest private capital in the enterprise, and be

lieved that the work could be better done through the instrumentality of a corporation. At the same time it became practically the sponsor for the enterprise by large donations of Government credit and public lands. In so doing it was not seeking to aid a purely private enterprise. What it did was in furtherance of the public interests, and it reserved to itself the right to alter, amend, or repeal the act in so far as was necessary to promote those interests, limiting its action by the single proviso that due regard must be had to the rights of the company. Every one who purchased the bonds of the company or gave it credit did so with full knowledge that this was a quasi-national enterprise, and that if deemed necessary by Congress the interests of the public might be promoted by additional legislation in so far as the pecuniary rights of the company and its creditors were not sacrificed. The construction of the bridge, doing away as it did with the delay and annoyance of transportation across the river by a ferry, added largely not merely to the value of the entire property, but also to the great convenience of the traveling and shipping public. The act giving authority for a large issue of bonds, thereby insuring the immediate construction of the bridge, was accompanied by a proviso that upon reasonable compensation the use of the bridge should be accorded to other companies. Availing itself of the privileges conferred the company accepted the amendment in its entirety and is bound by its terms as fully as though it had embodied them in a contract. So long as the full facilities of the Union Pacific Company were not interfered with thereby, and a reasonable compensation was paid therefor, it cannot in any just sense be held that its rights were not duly regarded. And it cannot be tolerated that a private individual or a state corporation can, by the purchase at a judicial sale of the property, strike down all the legislation of Congress passed subsequently to the mortgage for the promotion of the public interests. We cannot assent to the contention that the present owner of the property holds it free from obedience to all such legislation. Now, as before

the foreclosure and sale, the public interests are to be regarded, and not simply private purposes, wishes or prejudices.

One thing more requires notice. It is contended that the terms of the decree are too broad; that they give to the Mason City Company not merely the use of the bridge and its approaches, including therein connections with western roads terminating at Omaha, but also the use of all side or spur tracks connecting the Union Pacific Railroad with private industries, and the track extending northward from the main line of the Union Pacific to the old ferry crossing. On the argument counsel for the appellee stated that his company made no claim to a right to use these tracks. If the language of the decree is open to this misconstruction it should be corrected, and the Circuit Court may make such correction on proper application.

Decree affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA took no part in the decision of this

case.

NEDERLAND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, v. MEINERT.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 11. Argued October 18, 1905.-Decided November 6, 1905.

Promptness of payment of life insurance premiums is essential and although forfeitures are not generally regarded with favor they are necessary and should be fairly enforced in regard to such payments. A statute requiring notice of time of payment of premium and effect of non-payment thereof should not be construed so as to make it a trap for either the company or the assured.

Where the assured has received the statutory notice, containing in the words of the statute a statement as to the effect of non-payment of the premium, the fact that a mistaken additional statement as to the forfeiture of the policy by reason of such non-payment, was contained in the notice is not such a failure to comply with the terms of the statute as will prevent a forfeiture of the policy where it appears that after default the assured received another notice in regard thereto, had an opportunity to reinstate the policy by payment of the premium, within a specified time according to the policy, but made no payment for over three years, and did not ask for any extension of time, and the company had noted the forfeiture on its books.

MRS. MEINERT, the plaintiff below, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana her amended complaint, by leave of court, against the petitioner, the insurance company, to recover $5,000 on a certain policy of insurance for that sum on the life of her deceased husband, William Meinert. She obtained judgment on the trial before a judge without a jury, which was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 127 Fed. Rep. 651. This court allowed a writ of certiorari to review that judgment and the case is now here upon the return to that writ.

The material facts are the following: The company, on the fifth day of March, 1896, issued the policy in suit in consideration of the payment of quarterly premiums of $25.25, each on or before the fifth days of March, June, September and December in each year for five years; after that the payments were to be $64.25 for the following fourteen years or until the previous death of the insured, should his death occur before the expiration of the specified period. Four quarterly payments of $25.25 each were made, the last one having been made on or before December 5, 1896. No other instalment of premium was ever paid. The assured died on the twenty-fourth day of March, 1900. Over three years and three months had passed, therefore, since the last payment of any premium. Meinert, up to the time of his death, lived at Evansville, Ind.

On the fifteenth day of February, 1897, the company sent him by mail a written notice as follows:

"Nederland Life Insurance Co. (Ld.).

"Established in Amsterdam, (Holland), 1858.

"United States Branch, 874 Broadway, New York City. "Pursuant to Chapter 690 of the Insurance Law of 1892 of the State of New York, you are hereby notified that the quarterly premium of $25.25 on policy No. 58,021 will fall due on the 5th day of March, 1897, if the policy be then in force. The conditions of your policy provide that unless such premium shall be paid at the United States Branch Office of the company, or to a person authorized to collect such premium holding the company's receipt therefor, by or before that date, the policy and all payments thereon will be forfeited and void, except as to the right to a cash surrender value or paid-up policy.

"If payment is made to the company directly it can be done. by valid draft, check, postal or express money order made out to the order of the United States Branch of the Nederland Life Insurance Co. (Ld.)."

This notice was duly received by the assured February 16, 1897.

On Saturday, April 3, 1897, the company sent him by mail another notice, as follows:

"Nederland Life Insurance Co., Limited. "Established 1858, Amsterdam, Holland,

"United States Branch, 874 Broadway, New York.

"William Meinert,

"New York, April 3, 1897.

"217 Law Ave., Evansville, Ind.

"Dear Sir: The premium on your policy which fell due on the 5th March has not been paid and the policy is therefore