Even when on making the offer the proposer expressly promises to allow a certain time to the other party for acceptance, the offer may nevertheless be retracted in the interval if no consideration has been given for the promise" (the expression "consideration," in the words we have italicised, it should be observed, not being understood by Mr. Benjamin in the same sense as that in which it is viewed by other authors to whom we shall presently allude). In other words, to put what were probably the facts in Cooke v. Oxley in a short form, if, in the morning A. offers goods to B. for sale at a certain price, and gives him till four o'clock in the afternoon to make up his mind, yet A. may sell the goods to C. at any time before four o'clock, so long as B. has not accepted his offer.

As this proposition has been recognized as law on the strength of the cases we have cited in most of the English text books, we should have felt some hesitation in stating that, in our opinion, it is not one that recommends itself as being consonant with principles either of reason or justice, had it not been for the fact that American jurists of world-wide reputation have expressed themselves dissatisfied with it. Their dissatisfaction, indeed, has on some occasions only shown itself in efforts to explain away Cooke v. Oxley. "The criticisms which have been made upon the case of Cooke v. Oxley are sufficient to destroy its authority" (Kent's "Commentaries," ii., 477, note d, 12th edit.; see also Duer on "Marine Insurance," i., 117, 118). We confess that we agree with Mr. Benjamin (passim, 51-55) in thinking that these attempted evasions cannot be looked upon as satisfactory; but however that may be, it is certain that in Kent's "Commentaries" (ubi sup.) the decision in Cooke v. Oxley is expressly said to be "inconsistent with the good faith and justice of the case," whilst Mr. Story, in his work on "Contracts" (i., sect. 496), gives what appear to our mind conclusive reasons against it. We will endeavour to give the pith of the passage. After noticing the rule deducible from the principal case, the learned author proceeds :-"It would, however, seem to be more consonant with justice, and with the agreement of the parties, to enforce a different rule, and to hold that whenever an offer is made granting to a party a certain time within which he is to be entitled to decide as to whether he will accept it or not, the party making such offer is not at liberty to withdraw it before the lapse of the appointed time, unless by agreement with the other. The reason which is given, that the offer is without consideration and gratuitous until accepted, does not seem to be well founded. The consideration is the expectation or hope that the offer will be accepted, and that is sufficient legally to support the promise. The agreement is, therefore, to be looked upon as an engagement by the one party that he will not sell within a certain time, in consideration that the other party will consider the matter, and not give a refusal at once." The writer, in a note, then notices several American cases on the subject of consideration, and particularly that

of Train v. Gold (5 Pick. 384), in which it was said, "Any gain to the promisor or loss to the promisee, however trifling, is a sufficient consideration to support an express promise." (See on this point Cheale v. Kenward, 3 De G. & J. 27, 31; per Lord Chelmsford quoting Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309), and asking pertinently," In the case in question, if there were no consideration for the promise, what inducement could there be for the offerer to make his offer? It must be evident that he expected an advantage, or hoped it at least" (Ibid.). He then, after remarking that the law of France, Holland, and Scotland, founded on the civil law, is conformable to this view, concludes by giving his adhesion to the opinion of Professor Bell on the subject (" Inquiries into the Contract of Sale," 33, 34), to the effect that "it seems inconsistent with the plain principles of equity that a person who has been induced to rely on such an engagement (i.e. as those under notice), should have no remedy in case of disappointment. If, for example, a merchant propose to sell to another a cargo of sugar or of tobacco, and agree to give him a certain time to determine whether he will buy the goods or not, engaging not to dispose of them till the time has elapsed, and in the meanwhile to dispose of them, and disappoint the person to whom the promise has been made, who may have rejected an advantageous offer from another dealer, it seems unjust that for the disappointment thus occasioned there should be no remedy. The only answer to this in the English law appears to be that no one is entitled to rely on an unilateral engagement gratuitously made and without consideration. (See on this point the very recent case of The Great Northern Railway Company v. Witham, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 471.) But one cannot help feeling that a rule so different from what commonly happens in the intercourse of life, raises that inconsistency between law and justice which is sometimes complained of. The subtleties of lawyers never ought to interfere with the common sense and understanding of mankind; and the law is on a better footing where an engagement seriously made is by the law enforced, without regard to the motive from which it proceeds."

Sir J. Bacon, though, as we have before observed, according to the view he took of Dickinson v. Dodds, it became unnecessary for him to consider the point, seems, from some remarks which fell from him in giving judgment, to have been inclined to disagree with Cooke v. Oxley (see 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20, 21), and Lord Justice Mellish expressly refrained from giving any opinion as to the correctness of its doctrine (Id. 608). But of course any tribunal that was not of the very highest authority would be most unwilling to overrule a long series of authorities, whatever the reasons on which they were based. This is why we should like to see this subject finally settled by the House of Lords, for that House is not so strictly bound by authority as inferior Courts; and, indeed, in a recent important case (Bain v. Fothergill, 31 L. T. Rep.

N. S. 387), affirmed and disaffirmed cases as venerable in point of time as Cooke v. Oxley. Should, therefore, Dickinson v. Dodds come before them, we venture with some confidence to think that what is laid down by the jurists from whom we have quoted would be held by them to be more in accordance with modern ideas of justice than the narrow and technical theory of the old common law.Law Times.

The Month.

Legal Education. The demand for a very high legal education appears to be a good deal stronger with our American cousins than it is on this side of the water. An American legal contemporary states that a new course to occupy two years after graduation is to be furnished hereafter by the Yale Law School. The degree of Master of Law will be given to those passing the necessary examination at the end of the first year. No one who fails to take it will be allowed to study as a candidate for the higher degree. The studies of the new course will embrace general and comparative jurisprudence, Roman law, practice in the United States Courts, and in States having a civil code, admiralty law, administration of estates, ethics, forensic oratory, constitutional history, international law, political science and history, sociology, parliamentary law, conflict of laws, and other branches. Instruction will be given by several of the professors from the other departments of the College, as well as by the regular faculty of the Law School, and the course will be open to graduates of any law school, under certain conditions."

The New Rule for Service of Writs out of the Jurisdiction.-The theory of modern civilization is the unification of mankind. Enthusiasts love to think how by commerce, travel, interchange of international courtesies, fairs of the world, and the like, the barriers between nation and nation, the distrust between race and race, the power of evading justice by flight into foreign lands, are being steadily eliminated, and that the reign of universal law is approaching. All this may be true in the main; but, if it is, then great must be the force of temporary reaction. Extradition treaties are properly cited as proofs of international comity, of fixed resolution to uphold right and put down wrong. But at this moment we have no extradition treaty with the United States; and so the London rogues can safely abide in New York, and the New York rascals can find a secure retreat within a stone's-throw of the Mansion House. All this looks remarkably well for the cause of justice, the reign of peace, and the supremacy of law. Criminal jurisprudence being thus cleverly impeded by the controversies of statesman, civil jurisprudence must needs assume like fetters. If

a man incurs a debt in England, and then finds it congenial to his taste to seek a temporary home at the Lakes of Killarney, or at Oban, or at Arcachon, or at Lucerne, or at Florence, or at BadenBaden, or if he crosses the great waters and begins life anew in Philadelphia, or in Melbourne, why should not his creditor sue him where the debt was incurred, and be allowed to give him notice that he must come back to the place where he incurred the obligation if he has any reason for not paying it? Common sense teaches us thus much; and we hardly need trouble ourselves about what the jurists and the civilians have to say to this doctrine.

Before the Judicature Acts were passed, creditors here in England were somewhat hampered in bringing their debtors to book. But when the rules were issued, and Order XI. appeared in all its glory, justice began to look up, and runaway defendants were in sore trouble. Five rules had effected a "civil extradition," by means of which many a defaulter for debt or damages could be made to account. The plaintiff had only to swear an affidavit, showing that he had a good cause of action; that such cause of action had in some material part arisen within the jurisdiction; that he had traced his foe to a particular place; and, further, stating whether the defendant was a British subject or not; and, without further consideration or impediment, a Master would grant leave to issue the writ. So things went smoothly enough. Suddenly, however, a cloud appeared upon the horizon, coming from the north. The gentlemen on the other side of the Tweed rose in arms, as in the days of old, and almost threatened to repeal the Act of Anne, if the sacred Land of Cakes were not kept free from the invasion of the Southron and his writ of summons. Ireland followed suit; and "Repeal" and "Home Rule," for once, became cries of real import. It is true that the foreign Governments had acquiesced in the new order of things; and even the good people of Boulogne had not got up a petition to the House of Commons. Perhaps Continental Europe felt that Sandy and Pat would do the work well enough. If so, Europe was right; for Scotland and Ireland have prevailed, and the maxim, "Actor sequitur forum rei," has risen again in its ancient splendour. The Lord Chancellor has retreated; and the whole bench of Judges have yielded at the point of the sword. On June 26th the Act of surrender was signed, and it is to take effect on and after July 17th. Here is the text of the new rule:

66

'Whenever any action is brought in respect of any contract which is sought to be enforced or rescinded, dissolved, annulled, or otherwise affected in any such action, or for the breach, whereof damages or other relief are or is demanded in such action, where such contract was made or entered into within the jurisdiction, or whenever there has been a breach within the jurisdiction of any contract wherever made, the Judge, in exercising his discretion as to granting leave to serve such suit or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction, shall have regard to the amount or value of the

property in dispute or sought to be recovered, and to the existence in the place of residence of the defendant, if resident in Scotland or Ireland, of a local Court of limited jurisdiction having jurisdiction in the matter in question, and to the comparative cost and convenience of proceeding in England or in the place of such defendant's residence, and in all the above-mentioned cases no such leave is to be granted without an affidavit stating the particulars necessary for enabling the Judge to exercise his discretion in manner aforesaid, and all such other particulars (if any) as he may require to be shown."

We all know that there is nothing so difficult as to prove a negative, and that the next most arduous undertaking is to give information concerning matters of which it is impossible for the informant to know anything at all. According to the new rule, before a plaintiff can have his writ, he has to tell the Judge-for, henceforth, no person of less dignity than a Judge is to give leave -what local Courts there are of limited jurisdiction before which the defendant could be made to appear, and how much more or less it will cost to sue in such a Court than in the High Court of Justice. If the local Courts of the United Kingdom were all alike in authority and in expense, something might be said for the rule; for then the question would be reduced to one of mileage for witnesses. But all that English people and English solicitors know about Irish and Scotch small Courts is, that they are incomprehensible, and that the details of their authority, practice, and costs are as absolutely unknown here as are the like qualities in the Courts of Japan. The only way in which the information can be conveyed to the Judge will be by affidavit in each case by a writer to the signet, or solicitor in Ireland; and that sort of affidavit will very naturally bring a little grist to the mill of those who object to Order XI. as it now stands, while a direct loss will be inflicted on the English plaintiff. As regards the Continent, like particulars need not be obtained; but the Judge must have regard to the value of the property in dispute or sought to be recovered. As the long vacation is near at hand, and Her Majesty's Judges will soon be dispersed abroad in the pursuit of health, recreation, and adventure, we trust that their efforts to please the "dwellers outside the jurisdiction" will be appreciated, and that they will be welcomed in Scotland, Ireland, and on the Continent, as the authors of Order Number 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, June, 1876.-The Law Journal.

Legal Procedure in the Windward Islands.-A correspondent of the Times gives the following account of this interesting subject:"The laws throughout the islands of Vincent, Grenada, St. Lucia, and Tobago are in a state of the most extraordinary confusion. Originally drawn by unskilful hands, they have in some cases not been revised or consolidated for nearly fifty years. To add