Statement of Case. [55 Wash. of its maintenance, unless it be shown by competent evidence, attaining a higher degree than conjecture evidence, that he has suffered an injury because of it. So, whether the testimony was offered to prove that, because other horses had been frightened, the inference that the Wilkies' horse had been also frightened could be drawn therefrom, or to charge respondent with notice, it was properly rejected, for notice is immaterial unless negligence is proven. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. RUDKIN, C. J., FULLERTON, GOSE, and MORRIS, JJ., concur. [No. 8374. Department One. October 23, 1909.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Frank J. Scougale et al., Plaintiff, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT MANDAMUS-WHEN LIES-CHANGE OF VENUE-REMEDY BY APPEAL. The remedy by appeal is inadequate, and mandamus lies to correct an improper change of venue; since the supreme court cannot assume that jurisdiction will be assumed in the wrong county; nor on appeal from a judgment in such county, direct a trial in the proper county. VENUE-CHANGE-TRANSITORY ACTION. An action to establish and enforce a trust in real and personal property is transitory, as the decree acts in personam, and the venue is properly changed to the county of defendants' residence. Application filed in the supreme court, September 28, 1909, for a writ of mandate directing the superior court for Pierce county, Shackleford, J., to proceed with the trial of a cause, after granting a change of venue on application of the defendants. Writ denied. Fogg & Fogg and Jesse Thomas, for relators. 'Reported in 104 Pac. 607. GOSE, J.—The relators brought an action, in the superior court of Pierce county, against Dominic Cavalero and wife and Norval McGhie and wife, as defendants. The com plaint, in substance, states that, in the fall of 1906, the relator Frank J. Scougale held options for the purchase of the standing timber on certain tracts of land in Pierce county; that he induced the defendants to take a one-third interest each therein; that the relator thereupon, at the instance of the defendants, closed the options, purchased other adjoining timber land in fee, paying therefor with money furnished by the defendants; that the title was taken in the name of the Gig Harbor Timber Company; that each of the parties owned a one-third interest in the joint adventure, the defendants to be paid for the relator's interest by a sale of the logs; that the defendants, in violation of their agreement with the relator to cut and remove the timber from the land upon which the options were obtained, permitted the options to expire without doing so, to the damage of the relators in the sum of $42,000; that the defendants now deny that the relators have any interest in either the land or the timber, and have procured contracts extending the time for removing the timber in the name of defendant Cavalero or his son. The relators prayed, (1) that their title be established to an undivided one-third interest in the land and timber; (2) that the land and timber be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties according to their several interests; and (3) for a judgment for damages. Thereupon the defendants in due form applied to the court for a change of venue to Snohomish county, the place of their residence. The relators resisted the application, on the ground that the title to real and personal property was involved, and the action was local, under the provisions of our code, Bal. Code, § 4852 (P. C. § 308). This objection was overruled, and the application allowed. The relators thereupon applied to this court for a writ of mandate, directing the court below to proceed with the trial of the cause, basing their right to the writ upon the same grounds urged in the court below against granting the application. The respondent demurred to the application, and first urges that the relators have an adequate remedy by appeal, and that mandamus does not lie. This view is not sustainable. If the change of venue was erroneously made, we cannot presume that the superior court of Snohomish county will assume to exercise jurisdiction; nor could we, upon an appeal from that court, direct the superior court of Pierce county to proceed with the trial. The remedy by appeal is therefore inadequate. State ex rel. Wyman etc. Co. v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875, 111 Am. St. 915, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568; State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 875, 111 Am. St. 925, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395. The respondent next urges that the action is transitory. In its final analysis the purpose of the action, aside from the question of damages, is to establish and enforce a trust in real and personal property. In such cases the decree acts in personam, and the action is a transitory one. State ex rel. Campbell v. Superior Court, 7 Wash. 306, 34 Pac. 1103; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 3 L. Ed. 181; LeBreton v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 27, 4 Pac. 777. The writ will be denied. RUDKIN, C. J., FULLERTON, CHADWICK, and MORRIS, JJ., concur. Oct. 1909] Opinion Per CHADWICK, J. [No. 8042. Department One. October 25, 1909.] WILLIAM A. DENNEY, Appellant, v. NORTHWESTERN CREDIT ASSOCIATION et al., Respondents.1 LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIBEL PER SE-CREDIT REPORTS. The report of a mercantile agency is not libelous per se, where it simply gave plaintiff a rating which is stated not to be a credit rating, but that the agency preferred to furnish information upon application at the office; since the words are to be considered in their natural sense, are innocent without the aid of special knowledge, and do not imply malice, or hold the party up to public ridicule or involve moral turpitude. SAME CREDIT REPORT TO COERCE PAYMENT. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that such a publication was made to extort money or coerce payment of a debt held by the agency for collection so as to make the same libelous per se, within the rule allowing a recovery in the case of publications showing blackmail on their face. SAME SPECIAL DAMAGES-PLEADING. In order to render such a publication actionable, the words not being libelous per se, the special damages resulting from loss of credit must be specifically set out, showing the names of parties refusing credit or withdrawing custom, or that it is impossible to do so. Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered March 8, 1909, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for libel. Affirmed. A. A. Howell, for appellant. Gordon & Remann, for respondents Andrews et al. CHADWICK, J.-We are asked to determine the sufficiency of the complaint in this action. It is alleged, in substance, that the defendant, the Northwestern Credit Association, maintains a collection agency and had for collection an account against plaintiff; that a part of its business was to give a commercial rating to individuals and firms; that the 'Reported in 104 Pac. 769. Opinion Per CHADWICK, J. [55 Wash. Northwestern Credit Association published a book called the Northwestern Credit Book, also called the Confidential Credit Reference Book, which is distributed among its subscribers in the cities of Tacoma and Seattle, and that, among others, the name of plaintiff appears therein as follows: "C". Wm. A. Denney, 3415 N. 26th st."; that a key appeared in the book a part of which is as follows: "A Key to Rating. 'A', Generally prompt. 'B', Good, somewhat slow. 'C', Inquire at office; it must be distinctly understood that this does not indicate a credit rating, but the information we have is such that in justice to the party and the association we prefer to furnish it upon application;" that such publication was false and libelous and wilfully published by defendant association, being aided and assisted by the other defendants, for the purpose of coercing payment of a disputed account. Plaintiff further alleges that he has been refused credit and injured in his feeling and reputation, for all of which he claims general damages. The trial court evidently sustained the demurrer of the several defendants upon the theory that the words published were not actionable per se and, for the want of an allegation of special damages, the complaint did not state a cause of action. The general rule is that all words alleged to be libelous should be considered by the court in their natural and obvious sense unless they be ambiguous. Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac. 747. The office of the innuendo in pleading is to apply the libel to a person, or to connect such person with a place or thing of evil repute, and cannot be relied on to make words otherwise unobjectionable the basis of a recovery. 25 Cyc. 449-450; Newell, Slander & Libel, p. 619; Odgers, Libel and Slander, p. 106 et seq.; Townshend, Slander and Libel, § 335. In all charges of this kind, it is the duty of the court to regard the words spoken or written as might a stranger to the parties, and if they be in themselves, and without the aid of the innuendo, otherwise innocent, and if they do not in |