is done by this rule, because Congress may review and reverse its own decisions whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The facts stated by the Comptroller in his letter of May 21, in relation to the evidence on which his former report was founded, are matters for his consideration, and not mine; and it is unnecessary, therefore, for me to say any thing on that point.

To the SECRETARY of War.

R. B. TANEY.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

May 31, 1832.

SIR: I have examined the statement of General Gratiot and the papers which accompany it, relating to the contracts made with Bolitha Laws, for the delivery of bricks and for masonry at Fort Monroe.

By the act of July 16, 1798, all contracts of this description ought to be deposited with the Comptroller; and the contracts in question were, 1 presume, deposited as the law requires. The act of March 3, 1817, directs that all accounts whatever, in which the United States are concerned shall be settled and adjusted at the Treasury Department, and the officers by whom the different accounts are to be settled are pointed out in the law. I am not aware of any act of Congress which excepts contracts of the description of those before me from the provision in the 4th section of the act of 1817, which makes it the duty of the Third Auditor to receive "generally all accounts of the War Department, other than those provided for." If there is any act of Congress which makes special provision for the settlement of claims like those now preferred, and thereby exempts them from the operation of the law above mentioned, I would be glad to be referred to it. But, in the absence of any such act of Congress, I do not perceive. how the case can regularly be brought before you in its present condition. It appears that no settlement of the account, on either contract, has been nade at the Treasury by the proper officer; and, until that is done, and a um found and reported to be due to him, you cannot be called on to order payment of the claim, or any part of it.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

R. B. TANEY.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, May 31, 1832. SIR: General McNeil's application for a pension is made under the act of July 11, 1812.

This law directs that if any officer, non-commissioned officer, &c., shall De disabled while in the line of his duty, "he shall be placed on the list of Envalids of the United States, at such rate of pension and under such regulations as are or may be directed by law," and then proceeds to limit the pension which may be allowed to the party. It does not fix the amount to which he shall be entitled, but declares that it shall not exceed certain amounts mentioned in the law.

As this act of Congress gives the party a right to a pension "at such

rate and under such regulations as are or may be directed by law," and does not prescribe the manner in which the rate is to be fixed, nor the particular regulation under which he shall be entitled to be placed on the rol of pensions, we must look for some other act of Congress to guide us in this respect. And the only act of Congress then in force, to which this law can be supposed to refer, is the act of March 16, 1802. It is very clear that the act of 1812 cannot be construed to refer to the law of April 25, 1808 which placed invalids who had then been disabled, and who had received their wounds after the revolutionary war, on the same footing with the reve lutionary pensioners. And I understand the uniform construction given to the act of 1812 has been, that it referred to the provisions of the act of 1802, to ascertain the rate of pension, and the regulations by which the party was to become entitled to it. I think this construction is the true one. and as no subsequent law has provided different regulations, or a different mode of fixing the amount of the pension, the provisions of the act of 1803 must, in these particulars, govern in all cases which arise under the act of

1812.

The act of 1802 directs that the party shall be placed on the list of invalids "at such rate of pay and under such regulations as may be directed by the President of the United States for the time being." This law vests in the President the power to prescribe the "regulations" upon which a party may be placed on the pension lists, as well as the rate of pay to be allowed him, provided the amount does not exceed the rates limited by the act of Congress. It is to the regulations and rate of pay thus to be prescribed by the President, that the act of 1812 refers as being then directed by law; and, consequently, it rests with the President to prescribe the regulations under which a person is to be admitted as a pensioner, and also the rate of pay in all cases which arise under the act of 1812, as well as in those under the act of 1802.

As the President may prescribe the "regulations" under which a party shall be placed on the pension-list, no one is legally entitled to be placed there in opposition to any regulation which he may think proper to make on the subject. The order of April 18, 1829, was an exercise of the power thus vested in the President; and since that regulation was made, and while it remains in force, no one who is in the receipt of pay or emolument as an officer of the army can be placed on the pension-list.

The case of General McNeil, however, is not embraced in this order. But it does not follow that he has an absolute right to be placed on the pension-roll; for it still remains with the President to decide whether he will apply the same regulation to all civil officers, or to any of them, or to what description. He may apply it, if he thinks proper, to civil officers receiving a certain amount of income from their offices, and exempt from its operation those whose allowances are less. And where his regulations do not exclude the party from the roll, he may fix the rate of pay as low as he thinks proper, taking care not to exceed the limits fixed by the act of Congress.

The result of the principles above stated, when applied to the case of General McNeil, is this: He has no absolute legal right to be placed on the pension-list. It rests with the President to prescribe the regulations on this subject, which shall be applied to persons holding civil offices. If these regulations shall exclude General McNeil, he cannot be placed on the pensionlist. If they do not exclude him, or if the President should see fit to make any regulations in relation to persons holding civil offices of profit, then

General McNeil will be entitled to be placed on the pension roll. But, in that event, it will still be for the President to determine upon the rate of pay to be allowed to him as a pensioner.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

R. B. TANEY.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

May 31, 1832.

SIR: The claim of Mrs. Coxe and her son, upon which you have called for my opinion, presents, in one respect, a new casc. Mr. Coxe, it appears, is the first of our consuls to the Barbary States who has died while in office, and his widow and family have been obliged to return home at their own expense; and Mrs. Coxe presents a claim against the Government for these xpenses.

Under the act of May 1, 1810, there can be no outfit allowed to a consul, or is there any authority given to pay his expenses home; but, by the ractice of the Government, it has been usual to consider him in office, and herefore entitled to his salary, after leaving his station, for a time sufficient o enable him to return home. And as it was desirable that some certain eriod of time should be fixed on, in order to avoid the necessity of a parcular examination in every case, three months appear to have been adoptd as a reasonable time in such cases, and accounts have, I understand, een settled accordingly.

If, therefore, Mr. Coxe had lived to return with his family, he would have een entitled to three months' pay after leaving his station. This interpretion of the law of May 1, 1810, appears to me to be a reasonable and just ne. His salary goes on while the consul is performing his outward voyre, and there seems to be no ground for denying it to him on his return. e is, however, during that period of time, rendering no service; and the lowance of the salary for three months after leaving his station is evintly made to enable him to return to his own country; and, as his term office is construed to endure for that purpose, although he is not discharng any of its functions, it would seem that the same principle may with ual propriety be applied to the case of his widow; and three months' salary, om the time of his death, may be paid to her, in order to enable her to rern with her family. This, I think, is not only an equitable construction the law, but one which, from the nature of the public service in which diplomatic agent is engaged, is called for by the principles of justice; and would be a severe and harsh construction of it to deny, after his death, to is widow and family, those means of coming again to their home which ould have been offered to them by the public if he had lived. But I do ot think more can be allowed for their expenses than the usual salary for ree months.

The funeral expenses appear to me to be a fair item of charge on the and for the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse. The act of May 1810, gives the consul at Tripoli two thousand dollars per annum, as a ompensation "for his personal expenses and services," but does not forbid e allowance of expenses other than personal. And, indeed, the language sed in the law necessarily implies that other expenses are contemplated, d are to be allowed. And as the consuls to the Barbary States are di

plomatic agents of this Government, they are entitled to be repaid, out of the appropriation to defray the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse, such incidental expenses as are usually allowed in the case of other diplomatic agents; and, as the funeral expenses of such officers, when they have died abroad, have been borne by the public, I see no reason why it should no be done in the case of Mr. Coxe. Indeed, the honor and dignity of the Government require that the funeral of its representative in a foreign coun try should be decently and properly attended to.

The incidental and contingent expenses of the consulate which occurred after the death of Mr. Coxe, if properly vouched, ought, I think, also to be paid by the Government, as it is a part of the expenses of foreign intercourse and, although the money was not paid by a consul regularly appointed, yet if it were paid by one who was acting in that character and discharging its duties, and if the expenses were proper to be incurred, and were incurred for the public service, they ought to be repaid, and appear to me to be a lawful charge on the contingent fund above mentioned.

The salary claimed by Charles J. Coxe, during the time he acted as cosul, may, I think, be legally paid to him as salary. The law of May 1 1810, gives the salary to the consul for his personal services and expenses If, after the death of Mr. Coxe, his son performed the services and incurred the expenses of a residence there, and his acts have been recognised by the Government, I do not perceive why he should not receive the compens tion fixed by law for such services. He was de facto consul for the time, and the public received the benefit. What services he performed, or had to perform, I have not the means of knowing; and the opinion I express is founded on the presumption that he rendered faithfully whatever services a consul duly appointed would have rendered for the time, and that the Government have adopted his acts in that character. The practice of the Government sanctions this opinion, as appears by the papers before me; and in several instances similar to this, since the law of 1810, the salary bas been paid. I refer to the cases of Mr. Folsom, in 1818 and 1819: Mr Heap, in 1823 and 1824; Mr. Simpson, in 1820 and 1821; and Mr. Hog son, in 1819.

The public interest requires that the duties of the office should be dis charged by some one; and where, upon the death of the consul, a person who is in possession of the papers of the consulate, enters on the discharge of its duties, and fulfils them to the satisfaction of the Government, I do L perceive why he should not be recognised as consul for the time he acted as such, and performed the services to the public; and, if he is so recog nised, the law of Congress entitles him to his salary.

To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

R. B. TANEY.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
June 9, 1832

SIR: In answer to your letter of the 18th May last, I have the honor t state, that, under the act of 2d March, 1831, where lands have been acquire by the United States according to the provisions of that law, no person has a right to cut or remove timber from such lands, upon the ground of any pre emption claim set up by him, until his title to the land claimed is eithe

acknowledged by the Government, or maintained by the judgment of the court. The person, therefore, who cut and removed the timber for the purpose of building the vessel mentioned in your letter, may be prosecuted under the first section of the act above mentioned. But the vessel built of the timber improperly cut and carried away, cannot be libelled under the second section, unless she takes on board timber contrary to the provisions of that section. In other words, the vessel built of timber unlawfully taken from the lands of the United States would be liable to be proceeded against, under the second section of the law, in those cases only where the libel could be sustained against any other vessel if employed in the like manner. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

To the U. S. DISTRICT ATTORNEY,

Key West, Florida.

R. B. TANEY.

ANNAPOLIS, June 18, 1832.

SIR: I am sorry that any delay or embarrassment should occur in carrying on the works at Norfolk. But as the appropriation now stands in the law, I do not see how the difficulty can be overcome, unless the Drawbridge Company will accept the proposition you have made to them.

The act of Congress requires me to express an opinion whether the compary can give a good title to the United States. I think that an agreement to remove the bridge and stop the road would be inconsistent with the purposes for which the charter was granted; and that such a control is not within the legitimate power of the corporation, under the charter as it stands. Entertaining this opinion, it is of course my duty to express it. The Virginia Legislature would, I have no doubt, grant the necessary power to the corporation; but, until the Drawbridge Company are possessed of this power, I do not perceive how the money can be paid, under the very strict and specific terms used in the law making the appropriation.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

R. B. TANEY.

ANNAPOLIS, July 2, 1832.

SIR: I proceed to express my opinion on the questions you have referred to me, by the direction of the President, in the case of Mr. John S. Stiles. 1. The contract was for the delivery of navy bread in Baltimore, to be made of fine flour and "cross middlings" in equal proportions. It appears from the evidence, that at the time the contract was made no particular quality of flour was legally designated as "cross middlings," either in the District of Columbia or at Baltimore. Under such circumstances, as the contract was to be performed in Baltimore, 1 think that the flour which was generally understood in the trade in that city to be "cross middlings" must be regarded as the flour called for by the contract; and bread made of equal proportions of the flour known in the Baltimore inspection as "fine," and that generally known in the trade as "cross middlings," would be a compliance with the contract.

2. The contract does not require that the precise quantity of each of