amount of that contract long prior to the act. The substitution of Hawkins, and now of Coryell, in execution of that contract, is not a new pledge of the funds or credit of the Government, but an arrangement to save past expenditures by the consummation of an old and continuing contract. This contract was not transferable at the pleasure of Hawkins alone, without the consent of the Government. The alleged transfer of the contract of Hawkins to Russell is a nullity; the Government is not bound to recognise the act, but is authorized to consider it a nullity, and treat it as such. The persons authorized to concur, on the part of Hawkins, with the Government, are his legal representatives-that is to say, his executors or administrators. To find these, we must look to the place of his domicil. His domicil was, I understand, in the State of New York; there his property lay, and there his family, his wife, and children resided during his life and at the time of his death. He is understood to have left a will in New York, by which he appointed executors. These executors, when they shall have qualified, are the persons authorized to enter into the negotiation which the Government is disposed to make. The administration granted on Hawkins's estate in Alabama seems to have been irregular, according to the extracts from the laws of that State which have been furnished to me. But, I presume, there would be no difficulty in effecting a revocation of these letters, on presenting the will to the court which granted them, and an offer to qualify under it on the part of the executors, or any one authorized by them to administer there with the will annexed. Perhaps the court would revoke these letters on the presentation of the will simply; they ought, I think, to do so. I think the Government would be authorized to dislodge all intruders from their grounds by force, if necessary, and give possession to the new substituted contractor. I understand the Government to be aware that this new substitution will discharge Hawkins's sureties, unless there be some arrangement to prevent it. I have the honor, &c., &c., To the SECRETARY OF WAR. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: The gentlemen of the administration here (with the exception of Mr. Crawford, who is too much indisposed to attend to business) concur n the opinion that you may, with perfect propriety, order a settlement with Messrs. Bowie and Kurtz, acting for the owners of the ship Alleany, for freight from Algiers to Gibraltar; because the law-officers of he Government, and Congress, so far as they have acted, have never de. ied that the owners of the ship were entitled to a reasonable freight. They think, however, that the sums, or either of them, proposed by any ommittee of Congress, could not be assumed safely as a criterion of such reight; because the proposition of a committee is not a decision of Conress; and because, with the unlimited power which that body had over he whole subject, it is not improbable that considerations of liberality, mingled themselves in the allowance of the sum, which were foreign to the strict question of freight. They think that the President may allow the freight, because it is a legal right; but they think that the freight allowed must be a reasonable freight merely, because more would pass the legal limit. This allowance to be on the relinquishment of further claim of the Government. "I have the honor, &c., &c., 2 SIR: On the subject of Mr. Steele's letter, which has this moment been referred to me, you will observe that the effect of my opinion in the case of the Olive Branch, is, simply, that the case is to be considered as an importation of goods from a foreign port or place, within the meaning of our law to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage. If the vessel, therefore, has in all respects complied with the various requisitions of that law applicable to such an importation, no forfeiture has been in curred, but the duties only are due. If she has failed to comply with any requisition of that law, (as, from her pretence of a voyage simply from territory of the United States, was to have been fairly presumed a priori the penalty or forfeiture prescribed attaches to her case for such failure The papers, as requested, are returned. I have the honor, &c., &c., WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: After the opinion I had the honor to express to you in the case General Armstrong on the 25th January last, there can remain no questi of law in the case; the only question which can remain is one of fact, wit: "Was the General's excursion to Canada by the direction or ord of the President?" I do not to state it as necessary to the clai F that the President should have been the first to propose it: this wou have been futile. It is immaterial who proposed it; if the Preside adopted the measure, and it was done by his desire, I should consider t expression of such desire as equivalent to a written order, and the cla as well founded. I understand General Armstrong to state that, before undertook this journey, the measure was discussed between himself, Gallatin, and the President, and adopted by the President as a meas useful to the public. The President, therefore, as I understand it, did merely acquiesce in the measure as one gratifying to General Armstron excusing his absence from the department, and accepting the offer of voluntary services, but adopted it, and required it, as a measure, "if necessary, at least useful" to the public service. Taking this constructi of the statement as correct, and the statement itself as founded on acd rate recollection, (as I presume you intend I shall,) the claim is, in my opinion, well founded. I have the honor, &c., &c., To the SECRETARY of War. WM. WIRT. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: In the case of Messrs. Bowie and Kurtz, in which I had the honor to report you the opinion of the administration on the 24th ultimo, so far as the gentlemen composing it could be consulted, and in which they concurred in the opinion that Messrs. Bowie and Kurtz were entitled to a reasonable freight for the voyage from Algiers to Gibraltar: Mr. Bowie has called on me, by the desire of Mr. Pleasonton, under the construction of a sentence in your letter to Mr. Brent, to know what measure is to be assumed as that of a reasonable freight in this instance. The question, I presume, can be settled only by those who have this knowledge; that is to say, commercial gentlemen, or rather by evidence to be derived from them. I submit to you the propriety, therefore, of instructing the Auditor to refer himself to the head of the department to which the question belongs, (the Department of State,) who will of course, I presume, appeal to the best source of information to ascertain the measire of a reasonable freight on the voyage in question. I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, To the PRESIDENT of the United States. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, October 27, 1821. SIR: I am of opinion that the 6th section of the act of the 1st May 520, ❝in addition to the several acts for the establishment and regulaof the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments," did not look to ntracts then existing, and which had received the sanction of Congress appropriations made towards fulfilling them; but was intended merely prohibit the origination of a new subject of expense by a future conct; and that, consequently, this act does not prohibit the making a conet in completion of a former contract which had been made, and was bsisting at the date of the act. I see no objection, therefore, to your claring the contract with Hawkins forfeited, and, if you choose, prosefing the parties for a breach of it; and making a new contract with Coryell for the completion of the works at Mobile. Yours, very respectfully, To the SECRETARY OF WAR. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY General, SIR: In compliance with your note of last evening, I proceed to give you my opinion at this time, on the separate clain of Mrs. Charlotte Thornton of London, on the Northumberland estate, which is the subject of the agreement between yourself and Messrs. Stith and Lomax Virginia. Colonel Presley Thornton, the husband of this lady, by his last will and testament, dated 29th March, 1763, and recorded in Northumberland county court on the 14th May, 1770, devises as follows: "I give and be queath all my estate, both real and personal, except the several legacies and bequests that I shall hereafter make in this my will, to be equally divided between my two sons, Peter Presley and Presley Thornton." In a subsequent part of the will he has this bequest: "I leave to my dearly beloved wife, Charlotte Thornton, during her widowhood, the use of my dwelling-house and furniture, and all the offices and their furniture, with the garden thereunto adjoining; my chariot and four horses, and her choice of eight of my slaves. And my will is, that she, my said wife. shall have full liberty to make use of what provisions she chooses from my estate for her own table, and for the support of the said eight slaves and four horses; and that she shall be further allowed one hundred and fifty pounds current money, for her support, out of the profits of my estate which said sum of one hundred and fifty pounds is to be paid to her ann ally, during her widowhood, and the whole to be taken in lieu of her dower. On the 16th November, 1771, a written agreement was entered into be tween Peter Presley, then of age, and John Tayloe and Francis Thorn ton, guardians of Presley, whereby it was agreed to make a division the whole estate, real and personal, between the two sons; and, amen various other stipulations, it was agreed in relation to the annuity of M Thornton, that the part of the estate which was allotted to Presley shou pay it until he came of age; after which it was to be paid in equal me ties by the two sons. Annexed to this agreement was a division of th slaves made under it; and the whole was recorded in Northumberla county court 12th March, 1773. The division of the land does not appear, except that by the agreeme of the 16th November, 1771, it was stipulated that the part of the la whereon the dwelling-house and offices stood should be allotted to Pr ley. This, I presume, is the Northumberland-house tract; besides whic Presley received in his share a tract of land in Culpepper county, centar ing, by estimation, four thousand acres. To Peter Presley was allotted tract called Bay Quarter, adjoining the Northumberland-house tract, a another tract in Culpepper county, containing, by estimation, three the sand seven hundred and two acres; and other lands both in Northu berland and Culpepper. The division of the land was, I presume. writing, and has been recorded. I have nothing before me to show, w certainty, what either son received. On the death of Peter Presley Thornton, his estate passed wholly Winifred, his sister of the whole blood, who intermarried with John Cocke; and on 20th January, 1791, Presley exchanged with Cocke a wife his Culpepper lands for their Bay Quarter tract before mentioned. On the 9th July, 1792, Cocke and wife convey all their real estate Presley Thornton, in trust, among other things, to secure the payment their moiety of the annuity to Mrs. Thornton; this deed, with the privy examination of Mrs. Cocke, are duly recorded in the Northumberland county court on the day of its date. It seems never to have been doubted by the guardians of the two sons, during their minority, or by the sons themselves, or their representatives, that the annuity of Mrs. Thornton constituted a charge on the whole estate left by the testator. In regard to the estate derived by Cocke and wife from Peter Presley in 1801, when they were portioning their daughters out of the real estate, they expressly encumbered each part of the land conveyed for this purpose with its proportion of the annuity; and to these deeds not only Cocke and wife, but also Presley Thornton, their trustee, are parties; and, besides this, they took separate bonds from the sons-in-law as further security for the payment of their proportions of the annuity. In the bill filed by Mrs. Thornton, in the court of chancery of Virginia, to recover the arrears of this annuity, she is understood to admit that it was duly paid on the part of both the sons to the year 1784. In the record of her suit, there is evidence of the payment of Peter Presley's part to her attorney in fact, (Presley,) in the year 1787; and the representatives of Peter Presley, in their answers in that case, assert that they will be able to prove the punctual payment of his moiety of it, either to Presley Thornton, her agent, or to deputies appointed by him, so late down as 1804, when, being informed that she was dead, they declined paying any more. Whether any payments were made of Presley's moiety since the year 1784, does not appear. Original letters from Mrs. Thornton to Presley, in the years 1797 and 1798, have been shown me, in which she complains of the non-payment, states her necessities, and presses for remittances. On 22d March, 1797, Presley Thornton and wife, for the consideration of sixteen thousand pounds, sell and convey to Sharp Delany, of Philaadelphia, the Northumberland-house tract, with the adjoining Bay QuarEr tract. On the death of Sharp Delany indebted to the United States, is heirs, on the 10th November, 1800, convey this land to his sureties n his collector's bond, in trust, and with a power; under which, on the 2d June, 1809, these sureties convey to the United States. In 1808 Mrs. Thornton filed her bill to recover the arrears of her an-ty; and there being no part of the estate of her husband remaining nd forthcoming to meet her claim, except the lands, she seeks to charge on them. The question is, Whether they are liable to the claim? 1. The charge is on the profits of the estate-that is, of the whole este; and, by the direction that the annuity should be paid to her annuly. it is manifest that the testator's calculation was that the annuity uld be paid out of the yearly profits of the estate. Courts of equity, owever, have given to this word "profits" a larger sense, where it is ecessary to give effect to the main intention of the testator; thus, porons given to daughters, and directed to be raised out of the rents and rofits of an estate, as soon as conveniently could be, the devise was ereed to authorize a sale, because portions means marriage portions; and e daughters being marriageable at the death of the testator, the main urpose of the testator could not be satisfied but by a sale. I am aware at subsequent decisions have narrowed this ground very much; yet, iking them all together, I consider the word profits by no means of so |