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SECOND DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1898.

plaint. Referring to the prayer of the com- | plaint, we find that it demands judgment: First. Construing a will and declaring the rights and powers of the executors and of several, but not all, of the defendants as the persons interested in the estate under the provisions of the will. Second. The removal of the executors for misconduct, and the appointment of a trustee in their place. 1 Third. The reconveyance by one of the defendants of real property which is claimed to have been unlawfully transferred by the executors, and conveyed to her in fraud of the rights of the other persons interested in 1 the estate Fourth. The compulsory cancellation, by a barik, of a mortgage on such real estate, as a cloud on the title, and which was executed to it by one of the defendants, to whom the same was thus unlawfully transferred. Fifth. An account by one of the executors for the value of certain permanent fixtures removed by her and appropriated to her own use. Clearly, such a union of causes of action in the same complaint is not within or permitted by the provisions of section 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They do not belong to the same class; they do not all affect all the parties to the action; they do not arise out of the same transaction, nor are they connected with the same subject of action. (Arkenburgh v. Wiggins, 13 App. Div. 96.) I think the judgment should be affirmed.

In the Matter of the Final Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Mary A. Johnson, as Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of John Tighe, Deceased. Decree of the surrogate affirmed, with costs.- Appeal from a decree of the surrogate of Westchester county, made on the 15th day of May, 1897, which settled the account of the executrix, charging her with certain sums of money in her hands and directing their payment; and also enjoining said executrix from acting under the last will and testament of the deceased.-

HATCH, J.: We agree in the main with the determination made by the learned surrogate, and for the most part concur in the reasons assigned by him for such determination in the opinion rendered by him. The executrix cannot complain if she has been charged with more money than she has received, and has not been credited with all of the sums paid out by her. In the several accounts rendered by her, each one contradicts the other, and they were presented finally in such a confused state that it was with great difficulty the items were separated for which she was entitled to credit from those for which she was not so entitled. The evidence permits of charging her with sums in addition to those charged by the surrogate, and perhaps might warrant the deduction of some iteins with which she has been charged. But, upon the whole record, we are of opinion that the learned surrogate has arrived at as correct an adjustment of the account as the executrix is entitled to. We think, therefore, that his determination in this respect should be confirmed. This results in an affirmance of the decree, unless the surrogate has committed some error in finding the existence of a contract to board and care for the deceased at a specific sum, or has committed error in his rulings upon the hearing Errors respecting both questions are claimed by the appellant to have been committed. So far as the first question is concerned, and which subject constituted the main issue, the attitude of each does not admit of doubt. The executrix claimed to be allowed for the care and maintenance of the deceased, based upon a

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specific contract for payment at the rate of twenty dollars a month. This contract she sought to establish by the testimony of her husband, who gave evidence from which the surrogate might have found that such was the contract. Upon the part of the contestants. they also relied upon a specific contract for the performance of the same service at a much less rate; and in support of their contention they produced upon the trial a contract in writing, signed by the executrix, in which she specified the compensation she was to receive for the care and maintenance of the deceased. This testimony was regarded by the learned surrogate as practically conclusive of the question at issue, and in the construction which he placed thereon we fully agree. It is, therefore, evident that, so far as testimony was offered for the purpose of showing the value of the service rendered by the executrix in the care and maintenance of the deceased, it was entirely immaterial, as the executrix, if entitled at all. was so entitled by virtue of a specific contract, and the contestants defeated such claim by proving another. It, therefore, follows that the objections which were interposed and sustained by the surrogate to proof of the value of the service were entirely immaterial, as the executrix did not claim to recover upon the basis of a quantum meruit. This statement is sufficient to answer the objection against the ruling of the surrogate striking out the testimony of Dr. Becker. But if it were otherwise, such ruling can be upheld. The testimony of the physician was to the effect that all the information he had given and of which he was possessed was acquired by him in attending the deceased in his professional capacity. The testimony was, therefore, clearly inadmissible under section 834 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor does section 836 of the Code relieve the party from such rule. Its provisions are:

But a physician or surgeon may upon a trial or examination disclose any informa tion as to the mental or physical condition of a patient who is deceased, which he acquired in attending such patients professionally, except confidential communications and such facts as would tend to disgrace the memory of the patient, when the provisions of section 834 have been expressly waived on such trial or examination by the personal representatives of the deceased patient." It does not appear in this record that the personal representatives or any of them either gave or offered to give such express waiver, and there was no offer so to do after the surrogate had ruled thereon. It is, therefore, apparent that such ruling by the surrogate was correct. Matter of Murphy, 85 Hun, 575.) If, as urged, the physician was still competent to testify as to the value of nursing the deceased during his illness, it is sufficient for us to say that the testimony in this respect, and the testimony which was clearly inadmissible, was so intermingled together that one was not readily separable from the other. And

if the executrix had desired that such testimony be retained in the case, she should have asked therefor, and pointed the same out with sufficient definiteness so that the surrogate's attention might have been called thereto. No such attempt was made and no such relief was asked; consequently such question, if otherwise material, is not now presented. The offer of the executrix, to prove that her written receipt, given to Mr. Purdy, which contained her contract to care for the deceased, was not read to or understood by her when she signed the same, was properly rejected. It fell within section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pro

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duction of the contract was by a third party, in no wise interested in the transaction which resulted in its execution, and the transaction was had in the presence of the deceased, and she cannot now be heard to give evidence tending to modify or vary its terms. (Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y. 316.) So far as objection made, that the executrix should be allowed for expenditures made by her upon the real estate, is concerned, we agree with the surrogate. The will is not contained in the record, but it is stated therein by the surrogate that its terms were such as only gave to the executrix a naked power of sale. This did not have the effect of vesting her with its possession or control beyond the exercise of the power. It was a mere naked power and nothing else. Besides, the estate of the testator was in the hands of a committee, who, it must be assumed, in the absence of proof, took charge of the real property. In respect of the executrix's expenditures in connection therewith, if they be of such a character as creates an equitable claim, the court has power to make an allowance therefor upon a sale of the property. The rule, therefore, which authorizes allowances for expenditures for the care and preservation of real property which comes into the possession of the executor, | and which he is bound in the discharge of his duties to care for and preserve, has no application to this case. The decree of the surrogate in respect to the charges made against the executrix seems to be no more onerous than is just, as her course of conduct in treating the trust fund as her own, and expending it accordingly, invited and required such a result. It follows that the decree of the surrogate should be affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent.

Howard Thornton, as Receiver of the Beveridge Brewing Company, Respondent, v. Margaret R. Williams, as Administratrix, etc., of Charles E. Williams, Deceased, Appellant. -Judgment modified by deducting therefrom the sum of $1,337.50, and, as thus modified, affirmed, without costs.- Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of Orange county on the 6th day of December, 1897, upon the report of a referee, to whom the plaintiff's claim had been duly referred by the consent of the parties and with the approval of the surrogate.

PER CURIAM: The plaintiff's claim grows out of the dealings of the defendant's intestate, Charles E. Williams, with the property of the Beveridge Brewing Company, in which corporation, from about 1885 until his death, in 1895, he was a large stockholder, and of which he acted for a long time as general manager and superintendent. As presented to the administratrix the amount of the claim was $34,474.11, being a balance obtained by deducting total credits to the amount of $58,235.50 from total debits to the amount of $92,709.61, in an account prepared by the receiver, and designed to state the transactions which had occurred between the corporation and Mr. Williams during the period mentioned. In this account Mr. Williams was credited by the receiver with $5,000 a year salary for more than ten years. The referee refused to allow the defendant anything as thus payable to Mr. Williams on account of salary, there being no evidence in the minutes of the corporation (all of which were produced upon the trial) that he was entitled to compensation at the rate of $5,000 a year, or any compensation at all. The amount awarded by the referee to the plaintiff is, therefore, upwards of $50,000 more than

The

the plaintiff originally claimed ($85,858.38). The indebtedness of Mr. Williams to the Beveridge Brewing Company is evidenced chielly in two ways: (1) By the ledger of the corporation, containing the account of Mr. Williams from January 28, 1885, to May 2, 1889, which has been verified by comparing the items with the entries in the cash books of the company, with which they have been found to correspond; and (2) by checks of the corporation drawn by Mr. Williams to his own order or for his own benefit. justice of the plaintiff's claim to the extent of the items on the ledger account does not seem to be seriously disputed on this appeal. Objection is made, however, to charges aggregating $18,768, which do not appear as against Mr. Williams in the account books of the corporation. We think the correctness and propriety of these charges must be deemed sufficiently established by the production of the checks and the testimony of Mr. William G. Hunter, who was bookkeeper for the Beveridge Brewing Company, to this effect: "Mr. Williams did not keep any bank account in his own name that I know of. He paid all all his bills that were paid by check by giving a check of the Beveridge Brewing Company. He would pay small bills out of the cash drawer and make a memorandum at the time he paid them. Afterwards, he would draw a check for the amount of the memorandum to his own order, and deposit such check to the credit of the company. That course of business was kept up all the time until Mr. Williams' death." An error appears to have been made, however, in charging the defendant with $272 as per memorandum, which appears in the record as Exhibit 11, in the absence of any proof that a check for that amount was drawn by Mr. Williams and deposited to the credit of the corporation. The account of the defendant's intestate was also entitled to be credited with the three per cent dividend of August, 1885, amounting to $1,065.50, as appears by the ledger, which the minutes show to have been duly declared. The minutes, however, do not support the claim to a ten per cent dividend in the following year. If such a dividend was actually paid to other stockholders, his proportionate share thereof should be credited to Mr. Williams, but not otherwise. It seems to us that the question whether this dividend was made or not, is one which could be determined beyond a reasonable possibility or error upon proper proof. If any wrong has been done to the appellant in this respect she can apply at the Special Term for relief. The judgment should be modified by deducting therefrom the sum of these two items ($1,337.50), and as thus modified should be affirmed. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent. Nathan Tisch, an Infant, by Marcus Tisch, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Isaac Hirsch and Benjamin Hirsch, Composing the Firm of Isaac Hirsch & Son, Appellants.Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.- Appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury, and from an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial.

PER CURIAM: This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendants. The defendants' negligence is claimed to consist in the fact that they failed in their duty by furnishing an unsafe appliance for the use of an employee. The defendants occupied certain floors in premises leased by them at 114 and 116 Greene street, in the borough of Manhattan, where they carried on the must lin underwear business. In the premises so

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occupied was a hatchway, through which ¦ ran an elevator from the ground to the top | floor of the building, which was six stories in height. Upon the sixth floor the elevator shaft was protected, when the elevator was not at that floor, by a wooden bar, weighing about twenty pounds, which, when down, was suspended on the inside of the shaft and held in place by a screw. This screw had a head upon one end, passed through a hole in the bar, which hole was somewhat larger than the screw, and entered the wood which formed a part of the side of the elevator shaft. Upon the other side of the shaft was a hasp, which projected from its side about two inches, and into which the bar was raised and placed, constituting a barrier to the opening into the shaft. The screw which held the bar in place entered the wood some inches; and in the course of the operation of the bar in putting it up and letting it down it would become loosened. and in time the hole had worn so that the orifice for the screw was considerably enlarged. It was from time to time tightened by driving the screw further into the wood, or by putting pieces of wood in the hole in order to fill it up. Upon one occasion it had come entirely out and fallen down; but usually it was kept in place either by turning the screw, causing it to go in further, or by driving it in. The accident happened, as described by the plaintiff, in this wise: He was directed by a fellow-workman, who was running the elevator and had started down. to close the opening by putting up the bar. He states: When I went there I took it out --the bar with one hand I had on top of it and the other under it, and I went to put it right into the catch. I was guiding it in the catch, and, instead of guiding it in the catch, it went on the outside. When the bar went down and I went over it, the bar did not come off the hook. It swung down. It swung down and hung by this screw." The plaintiff fell on top of the descending elevator and sustained serious injuries. It is evident that this bar and the contrivance for holding it in place were quite simple and quite easily operated. The plaintiff was a boy seventeen years of age, and it does not appear but that he was, in all respects, competent in strength and otherwise to handle the bar and place it in the hasp. The specific act of negligence with which he defendants are sought to be charged consists in permitting the screw which held the bar to become loose and thus allow a play of the bar, which permitted it in its descent to pass outside instead of into the hasp. It is evident to a demonstration that in the use of this bar it was absolutely essential that there should be enough space upon the screw for the bar to play sufficiently to permit it to pass outside of the hasp: otherwise it could not be operated at all. This is clearly indicated by the method of operation. When the bar was down it hung inside of the door of the shaft. The operator reached in, lifted it up, carried it above the hasp, and then let it down. It is clear, therefore, that the screw holding one end of the bar permanently could not be so tight that, when raised, the bar would come in a direct line with the hasp; for, otherwise, there was no method by which it could be gotten above the hasp so that it might fit in. Consequently, a person making use of it, having carried it above the hasp, was bound to notice that it must be directed into the particular space by his act, else it would or might pass outside, as it was constructed for that purpose. At the time of the accident, the screw did not give way. It does not, therefore, present a case

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where the plaintiff was precipitated into the shaft by a sudden giving way of the bar. On the contrary, the only specified negligence consists in the fact that there was so much play to the screw as to carry the bar outside of the hasp, and that by reason of it the plaintiff lost his balance and fell in It is, therefore, perfectly clear that whether the screw was looser at some times than it was at others, or whether it might have been made tighter and still have performed its office, there is nothing in the evidence to show that at this particular time it passed any further beyond the hasp than it was expected to pass in its ordinary operation. The failure of the plaintiff was in omitting to properly guide it into position; and because he failed to do this, and thereby lost his balance, is not sufficient upon which to found negligence against the defendants in failing to provide a suitable appliance. We are unable to find anything in this case in which the defendants omitted any duty that was devolved upon them. This was a simple appliance, necessarily con tructed so as to play more or less at its secure end, and when in use depended for its accuracy of entrance into the hasp upon the act of the operator, and not upon the particular method of fastening at its stationary end. We are, therefore, led to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a cause of action against the defendants. The judg ment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent. Estella A. Thurber, Respondent, y. The Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Association of America, Appellant.-Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.- Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of a jury at Trial Term, and from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial. -

CULLEN, J.: This action is brought to recover on a policy insuring the plaintiff's husband against death or disability by accident, in the sum of $5,000. The evidence showed that on October 30, 1896, the deceased, then living in the city of New York, while about retiring to bed, fell and inflicted an injury on one of his testicles. From this injury he was confined for some weeks to his room, and a part of the time to his bed; though it appears that on November second he went down town to his business, and on November third-election day - he went out to vote. The deceased, having made a claim against the defendant for his injury, was visited on November seventh by Dr. Lyon, the physi cian of the company, who found him in his room out of bed. The deceased showed the physician the injury, which did not seem to be of a very serious character, and his claim against the company was adjusted at the compensation allowed for a week's disability. On November twenty-ninth the deceased went to Cleveland, Ohio, on business. The cashier of the hotel in Cleveland, where the deceased became a guest, knew him intimately. He testifies that on the thirtieth the deceased complained of an attack of bronchitis, and witness observed that his throat was very much swollen. The deceased took to his bed and was attended by a physician and had the services of a trained nurse. He died on December third. While ill, the deceased telegraphed to a member of his family in New York that he was laid up with a bad cold. The attendant physician testifies that the insured was suffering from pneumonia and bronchitis, and that he died from heart failure, caused by those diseases. The nurse testified to the same effect. No complaint as

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to the injury to his testicle or as to suffering any pain therefrom was made by the deceased to the physician, to the nurse or to his friend, the clerk of the hotel. The body of the deceased was taken from Cleveland to Auburn, in this State, where the funeral was held. There an autopsy was made by a physician, then two and one-half years past graduation. Some months later, at the instance of the defendant, another autopsy was had, at which were present the defendant's physician, who made the first autopsy, and Dr. Van Giesen, of New York, all of whom testified on the trial. It seems to be conceded by all the physicians, both those who were present at the post mortem examinations and the physician who attended the insured in Cleveland, that in case of pneumonia there must be some consolidation of the lungs. All the experts attending the autopsy agree that no consolidation of the lungs was found. They did discover a passive congestion of the lungs, some dilatation and also some fatty degeneration of the heart. As to the extent of this degeneration, and as to whether it involved other organs than the heart, there was some disagreement between the experts. The physician who attended the deceased in New York at the time of the injury to his testicle was not called as a witness. The only testimony to connect the injury to the testicle with the death of the insured was that of the physician who made the first post mortem. He does not trace the connection directly through any inflammation proceeding from the injured part to the vital organs, and thus causing death, nor to the presence of septic fever or any disease of that character. Practically, he testifies that the cause of death was a weak heart and shock, and that the shock was occasioned by the injury to the testicle. The physician of the defendant testifies that it would be impossible that the injury could have caused the death. The evidence of Dr. Van Giesen, an expert of high standing, is to the effect that there was no consolidation of the lungs, and that the fatty condition of the heart and other organs was not abnormal, considering the age and habits of the deceased, and that this condition alone was not sufficient to have caused death. But we find nothing in his testimony that connects the death of the insured with the physical injury. Of course, in questions of the character involved in this case, laymen must bow with much deference to the opinions and judgments of experts. At the same time not every hypothesis or theory which the speculations of any physician may suggest is sufficient evidence to carry a case to the jury. The testimony of the witness who made the first autopsy for the plaintiff is that the causal connection between the injury and the death was through the condition of shock which he assumes the injury must have occasioned. But there is no evidence that the deceased, at any time after the accident, was in a serious state of shock. The physician who attended him at the time of the accident is not called, and the physician who attended him in his fatal illness testified to nothing of the sort. After meeting with the accident, the deceased apparently recovers, and is able to attend to his business, proceeds on quite a journey, and, when taken ill, makes no complaint of his previous injury. In the face of these facts, and without any evidence to show that the deceased was suffering under a condition of shock, it seems to us sheer speculation to connect the death with the injury to the testicle. As we read the evidence of this physician, he seems to have but little more foundation for his hypothesis that the physical injury caused

the death than his failure to find anything else that did cause it. This hardly reaches the certainty of proof which is a requisite to impose liability on the defendant. Of course, it is possible that the hypothesis that the witness has adopted is the true one, but suffice it to say it has not been sufficiently verified by the attendant facts to justify its acceptance as proved. On the evidence as the case stood at its close, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint. The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent.

Peter Wilhelm, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn, Queens County and Suburban Railroad Company, Appellant.-Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of $5,000 in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial.

GOODRICH, P. J.: On October 15, 1895, the father of the plaintiff was owner of and was driving a furniture van out of Wallabout street, Brooklyn, across Broadway, intending to go into Moore street. The plaintiff, who was then twenty-two years of age, was riding on the tailboard of the van. The defendant operated a trolley on Broadway. One of its cars collided with the rear wheel of the van. breaking the axle and throwing the plaintiff violently to the ground and giving him a severe shock. His head was cut so that it bled. He was picked up by his father and was confined for some time to his bed where it was found that blood was issuing from one of his ears. The attending physician recommended his removal to the hospital. There is evidence tending to show that for some months after the accident the plaintiff did no regular work, but sometimes went out with and assisted his father; that he acted queerly; that when he went to bed he could not remain there long, wanted to go out somewhere in the night, and once, about midnight, ran into the street with only his shirt on; that he tried to jump into the flour bins used in a baker's shop, and that he appeared at times frightened without any reason, and would get into his mother's bed, apparently for protection. There was evidence that the plaintiff was, and also that he was not, very much addicted to the use of liquor. He was sent to St. Catharine's Hospital on August 12, 1896, nearly a year after the accident. As to the reason of his being sent there, the evidence is contradictory, some tending to show that it was on account of a condition resulting from his fall, some that he was suffering from alcoholism or from sunstroke, but there is evidence sufficient to justify a finding either way. One of the doctors testified that the plaintiff spoke of seeing snakes and animals that were blue in color and that bit him, and another testified that he had symptoms of acute mania from alcoholism. These are probably euphemistic words for characterizing delirium tremens. In a few days, on August eighteenth, it became apparent that he was suffering with mania, and he was transferred to the Kings County Hospital, where he remained till November twenty-ninth. At the time of the trial he appeared to be in an impaired mental and physical condition, and though present in court, he was not called as a witness. The testimony required the submission to the jury of three questions of fact, substantially as follows: First, was the father of the plaintiff, who was driving the van, guilty of negligence contributing to the collision? Second, was the defendant guilty of negligence causing the collision? Third, did

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SECOND DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1898.

the condition of the plaintiff result from the injuries caused by the shock received at the time of the collision, or did it result from alcoholism or sunstroke, independently of the fall? A careful study of the testimony impresses my own mind with the very contradictory character of the evidence. Indeed, I am not clear whether or not the jury came to the correct conclusion when they found all of these disputed questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff. With this effect created upon my own mind it is not hard for me to believe that the jury had similar difficulty. Such a condition of affairs rendered the submission of the controversy to the jury pre-eminently proper. They have found for the plaintiff on all the questions, and their verdict is not to be disturbed. The defendant contends that there were three admissions of expert medical testimony which constitute reversible error. I think the evidence was properly admitted. The only other question to be considered is the amount of the verdict. If the plaintiff's condition resulted solely from the fall, the verdict is not excessive. The court instructed the jury upon this point, that the plaintiff "cannot recover damages for any illness or incapacity that is not the result of those injuries. If you find that his present condition is due to insolation or alcoholism, either one or both of those and not to these injuries, he cannot recover any damages." The judgment and order must be affirmed.

In the Matter of the Application of Seymour D. Thompson for Admission to the Bar.-Application granted.

In the Matter of the Application of James H Power for Admission to the Bar.- Application granted.

In the Matter of the Application of Volney T. Hoggatt for Admission to the Bar.- Matter referred back to the committee on character for further investigation.

Laura Louise Todd et al., Plaintiffs, v. Clarence F. Todd et al., Defendants.- Motion to vacate order denied, on condition that notice of any application made in pursuance of the leave hitherto granted by this court be served on W. E. Kisselburgh, Jr., attorney for the purchaser.

The People of the State of New York ex rel. James Eckerson and Others, Respondents, v Charles H. Zundel and Others, as Assessors of the Town of Haverstraw, Appellants.--| Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. All concurred. Maggie A. Ward, Respondent, v. Joseph B. Tompkins, Appellant.-Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion to set aside order of examination granted, with ten dollars costs, on the ground that the affidavit on which the order was granted shows that the defendant's residence was in the county of New York, and that, therefore, the order directing his attendance in Kings county for examination was unauthorized by the Code. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent.

Esther De Puy, Respondent, v. William L. Kann, Appellant. Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event, unless within twenty days the plaintiff stipulates to reduce recovery of damages to $750, and extra allowance proportionately, in which case the judgment, as modified, is unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, J., absent. Zephyrinus A. Lowrey, Respondent, v. Douglass R. Satterlee and Elizabeth K. Satterlee, Composing the Firm of D. R. Satterlee & Co., as Attorneys in Fact for the Underwriters at The Lloyds of New York City, Appellants Rushton Peabody, Respondent, v. Douglass R. Satterlee and Elizabeth K. Satterlee, Composing the Firm of D. R. Satterlee & Co., as

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Attorneys in Fact for the Underwriters at The Lloyds of New York City, Appellants.Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. The Kings County Traction Company, Appellant. Case settled by the parties and consent for discontinuance filed. In the Matter of the Application of Frederick M. Matthews for Admission to the Bar.- Application granted.

Marie Parisot, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, Appellant.Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event, unless within twenty days plaintiff stipulates to reduce recovery of damages to the sum of $7,000, and extra allowance proportionately, in which case, the judgment, as modified, is unanimously affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. Bartlett, J., dissented only as to the extent of the reduction of the recovery, which he thought too great. William M. Dickerson, Respondent, v. Amasa A. Petty, Appellant.- Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred.

Emil Bender and Another. Respondents, v. Max Baar and Another. Appellants.- Judgment modified by declaring the assignment void only as to plaintiffs, and as modified affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent. Horace H. Chittenden, as Assignee, etc.. Appellant, v. Isaac E Gates and Others, Respondents. Motion to stay execution of judgment pending appeal to the Court of Appeals granted, on condition that within twenty days plaintiff deposits in the People's Trust Company, to the credit of this action, the sum of $2,500, the same, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to be applied in payment of the judgment heretofore recovered against the plaintiff, in case the said judgment be affirmed by the Court of Ap: peals in whole or in part, or the appeal therefrom be dismissed. In case of failure to comply with said condition, then the motion to stay proceedings is denied and stay hitherto granted vacated, with ten dollars costs.

Julius Manheim, Respondent, v. Michael Seitz, Appellant. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Woodward, J., absent. Mary C. Naylor, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, Appellant.— Appeal dismissed, without costs, by consent. Amelia Frederick, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, Appellant.-- Appeal dismissed, without costs, by consent. Andrew Peterson, as Administrator, etc., of Lillian Peterson, Deceased, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, Appellant.-Appeal dismissed, without costs, by consent.

In the Matter of the Application of Wilbur F. Hendrix, for Admission to the Bar.- Application granted.

Edwin B. Meeks, as Executor, etc.. Respondent, v. Catharine L. Meeks, Appellant, and Others, Respondents.- Order modified so as to direct that the respondents and the guardian ad litem recover their costs, to be paid out of the fund.

The People of the State of New York ex rel. Jacob Schehr, Appellant, v. Patrick J. Gleason and Others. Constituting the Board of Fire Commissioners of Long Island City, Respondents - Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, on opinion in People ex rel. Lee v. Gleason (ante, p. 357). All concurred.

Stephen Ryder. Appellant, v. John Adykes and Others, Respondents.- Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred, except Hatch, J., absent.

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