As for whether the cruise legislation proposed in the same message on transportation will fall prey to delay, languishing like the "new" maritime policy promised more than 15 months ago, is yet another matter. I, for one, hope that it will receive the prompt action it

merits.

Now, one may attribute the Maritime Administrator's use of the above-quoted term "adequate" to an emulation of his mentor, the distinguished Secretary of Defense, who feels that our merchant marine is adequate. But, let us examine the validity of the Administrator's judgment of adequacy in cruise ship safety standards in light of events of just the past several months.

Less than 3 months following the Maritime Administrator's testimony before our committee, the cruise of one of these vessels was described as follows in a travel brochure, and I quote:

Sail away *** to exotic, glamorous Nassau *** where Lady Luck is your companion-aboard the FUN SHIPS *** These will be the gayest, most carefree days and nights of your life.

On the afternoon of November 12, 1965-one of these "fun ships," the Panamanian-flag cruise ship SS Yarmouth Castle, a 38-year-old former U.S.-flag passenger vessel-left Miami, Fla., bound for Nassau with 376 passengers and a crew of various nationalities numbering 176. Unfortunately, "Lady Luck" was not aboard. Eight hours out from Miami and only 60 miles from Nassau the alluring "carefree days and nights" turned into a nightmare. The SS Yarmouth Castle became a blazing inferno. Only 5 hours later, this fast-burning "floating firetrap" sank in 400 fathoms of water, taking with it the lives of 88 passengers and 2 crew members, almost 90 percent of whom were American citizens.

This was the same Yarmouth Castle which a representative of the Department of Defense testifying before our committee last August classified as being one of four Panamanian-flag passenger ships considered to be, and I quote:

*** a significant asset in Department of Defense planning to satisfy emergency sealift requirements.

Then, less than 2 weeks ago on April 8-the Norwegian-flag cruise ship MS Viking Princess, operated by the Flagship Lines, Inc., out of Miami, Fla., caught fire during a Caribbean cruise and was turned into a blackened hulk. Passengers and crew were forced to abandon ship. Fortunately, the abandonment of this vessel was in an orderly and seamanlike manner, so that loss of life was minimized. Only two passengers died in this maritime tragedy.

Ironically and prophetically, a full-page advertisement in the trade newspaper Travel Weekly of August 3, 1965, by the operators of the Viking Princess contained the following statement, and I quote: "The Flagship Line is full of surprises." Well, the disastrous fire at sea which overtook the Viking Princess represents the second "surprise" to be experienced by unwary American cruise passengers within the brief period of 5 months.

Neither the Yarmouth Castle, which I described last August-and I would hesitate to name a ship again-I classified the Yarmouth Castle. and I quote, as "a shining example of a ship that was not in pro

condition to engage in cruise trade," nor the Viking Princess are strangers to Members of Congress. The Yarmouth Castle was mentioned with considerable frequency during the course of our hearings last August.

Similarly, the Viking Princess was cited with respect to operations under her former name, Riviera Prima, both on the matter of financial responsibility and safety. As recently as the end of January of this year, Commander Welliver, officer in charge of marine inspection, Miami, Fla., testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations that the Viking Princess had been delayed in her departure 2 days pending the correction of certain mechanical and maintenance deficiencies.

Now, although the Yarmouth Castle and the Viking Princess incidents were peculiar to the American cruise trade, they are not the only examples of marine disasters encountered by foreign-flag cruise ships. A little over 2 years ago, on December 19, 1963, the ill-fated 33-year-old SS Lakonia sailed from Southhampton, England, on a Christmas cruise. All but 21 of her passengers were British. That cruise was advertised in the following terms, and I quote:

Here is a holiday with all risks removed; here is a holiday you will remember and talk about, for the rest of your life. What are you hoping for? Above all, perhaps, freedom from worry and responsibility.

Well, it will certainly be well remembered but not for the removal of all risks and freedom from worry. Like the Yarmouth Castle, the SS Lakonia turned into a fiery floating coffin and sank off Madeira Island with a loss of 125 lives.

Many may try to discount the Lakonia disaster inasmuch as it did not occur while engaged in the American cruise trade. However, what is not too well known is the fact that from 1959 to 1961 this same vessel, operating under Dutch registry and the name Johan Van Oldenbarnevelt, did operate from U.S. ports and primarily from Miami, Fla. However, the operators were advised by the U.S. Coast Guard that they would have to install a fire detection or sprinkler system. Apparently, the operators chose not to incur this expense and withdrew her from our cruise trade after which she was sold to Greek interests and continued to operate as a cruise ship out of European ports. Therefore, but for the fact that the Lakonia was threatened by the possibility of being refused clearance from U.S. ports unless her safety standards were upgraded, the 125 lives lost in the 1963 disaster could very well have been American citizens.

These three incidents involving foreign-flag cruise ships, and particularly the incidents of the Yarmouth Castle and the Lakonia, have a great deal in common. Both the Yarmouth Castle and the Lakonia were old, outmoded ships. Both were sold for operation under certain foreign flags where they were able to take advantage of the so-called escape clause of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (commonly referred to as SOLAS) providing them with immunity from stricter safety standards and prolonging their substandard operations. Both were destroyed by fire at sea-the greatest fear of all seamen. Both sank with a heavy loss of life. And, finally, the reports of the investigating boards convened to look into the respective tragedies at sea have a marked similarity.

The primary cause cited for both the Yarmouth Castle and the Lakonia disasters was the failure of early detection of fire in a ship with combustible materials in her structure. The crews of both ships were found to be grossly negligent in failing to cope with the emergency. The master of the Yarmouth Castle, for example, was the first to leave the ship in the emergency, and the ship's emergency squad assigned to cope with such incidents could not even be mustered, let alone combat the fire. The passengers of both ships could not be alerted properly by either the general alarm or the loudspeaker system, since both failed shortly after the outbreak of fire. There was a lack of pressure on the fire hoses, because more valves than necessary were opened, including, I might add, the swimming pool valve on the Yarmouth Castle.

True, in the case of the Viking Princess, the reported gallantry and seamanship of her crew overcame some of these shortcomings and minimized the loss of life. But this in no way alters the fact that the Viking Princess also fell prey to that most terrifying disaster, fire at sea. Her now blackened and burnt-out hulk constitutes a floating monument to the potential danger that lies in wait for hundreds of American citizens who unsuspectingly patronize substandard foreignflag cruise ships operating out of our ports. Yet, even at this very moment other foreign-flag cruise ships presenting equal dangers to our citizens sail from our ports.

These two recent tragedies at sea-the Yarmouth Castle and the Viking Princess-spurred me to introduce in the House yesterday a third cruise bill. I now offer this bill for your consideration as possible amendment to the House-passed bill, H.R. 10327.

The CHAIRMAN. We will consider all of this legislation. You and I have no great pride of authorship in these matters. We want to have a bill that will meet the problem, regardless of where it originates. Mr. MAILLIARD. It is my hope that all these suggestions will be considered by this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. They all have the same objective.

Mr. MAILLIARD. A copy of the proposed amendment is attached to the statement that I have provided to each of the members.

The CHAIRMAN. We will put the completed bills in the record at the end of your statement.

Mr. MAILLIARD. You will observe that this proposed amendment contains much of the language found in H.R. 10327, concerning financial responsibility. More importantly, however, the amendment has been drafted to cover the subject of safety. This is accomplished by vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to issue licenses to foreign-flag cruise ships operating out of our ports. It requires that such cruise ships substantially comply with all reasonable safety standards applicable to similar vessels documented under the laws of the United States. Unless duly licensed, no foreign-flag cruise ship would be permitted to clear from a U.S. port transporting passengers on an ocean cruise.

The effectiveness of this control is demonstrated by the aforementioned experience with the former Lakonia when operating out of our ports under Dutch registry. This same proposal to refuse clearance to such vessels unless duly licensed can be found in a report on the Yar

mouth Castle disaster prepared at the request of our chairman, the Honorable Edward A. Garmatz, Democrat, of Maryland, by a group of distinguished maritime consultants.

This also I have furnished a copy of, a draft, which will soon appear as a House document, since it was approved by our committee only yesterday and reported to the House.

I have attached this report to each copy of my prepared statement furnished the members of this subcommittee. I recommend its use to this subcommittee in its deliberations over the subject of foreign-flag cruise ships. I should also like to point out, with respect to the measure of reasonableness of safety standards proposed in both my suggested amendment and new bill, the recommendations contained in this same consultants' report pertaining to existing ships may serve as a guideline.

However, despite the demonstrated need for such regulatory control over foreign-flag cruise ships, many witnesses will probably appear before you today and testify that we in Congress should not press for the application of stricter safety requirements. It will be alleged that this would contravene international treaties to which the United States is a party; more particularly, the International Conventions for Safety of Life at Sea.

However attractive this argument may be, none of the witnesses appearing before our committee last August satisfactorily disposed of the issues as to whether, in fact, such an expression of jurisdiction by the Congress would contravene international treaties. To the contrary, there was every indication from the testimony of some witnesses that ocean cruise trade generated from our shores could be embraced within the coastwise laws of the United States without violating international agreements, and that it is clearly within the power of the Congress to assert this jurisdiction.

My own view is in accord with this latter position, both because of the character of the trade and the overwhelming patronage by American citizens. This, of course, is an issue which this subcommittee may wish to dispose of during the course of these hearings.

Others will appear before you and argue that by directing this provision against foreign-flag cruise ships, we will be subject to the criticism of discriminatory treatment. Since American-flag passenger ships are required to adhere to higher safety standards, I see no real basis to support such a charge where only substantial and reasonable, not complete, compliance is sought of foreign-flag cruise ships.

However, if it would be more palatable, I would be perfectly agreeable to having the provision made applicable to all passenger ships. Moreover, as this may affect reciprocity, it is my personal view that vessel safety inspection statutes, which are intended to protect life and property and to minimize disaster at sea, should receive a liberal construction in the public interest. I may add parenthetically that there are court decisions which support that view stating that such statutes should be liberally construed. Certainly re is a demonstrated public interest in this matter.

There will be still others who will recommend measures. Some will provide for advertising that

ships are not subject to the same U.S. Coast Guard safety inspection required of our own passenger vessels. Unfortunately, if this approach of providing an advertised warning meets with a response similar to the warning printed on cigarette packages, I fear that it will not be too effective.

Still others have been and are now urging that we attempt to remedy this problem by asserting our influence to upgrade international safety standards through the offices of the International Maritime Consultative Organization, commonly called "IMCO." Our committee has been working along these lines. I, myself, attended a meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO in London, England, this past January and February.

As a result of that meeting, an extraordinary session of the Maritime Safety Committee has been scheduled to convene 2 weeks from now on May 3 to consider proposals to improve safety standards. But if the lessons of history mean anything, I, for one, am not overly optimistic about the matter receiving prompt and effective action. The wheels of progress in the area of international relations grind slow and fine. As pointed out in the report of our committee consultants on the Yarmouth Castle, it would take upwards of 5 years to implement safety provisions through IMCO, in all probability.

Signatory nations have been urged under prior conventions to consider the areas on all existing passenger ships with a view to improvements being made to provide increased safety where practicable and reasonable. Few, if any, have taken such action, and perhaps we should start looking upon this failure as an abrogation of the conventions in order to spur corrective measures. This has been suggested in our committee consultants report, since one of the primary aims and objectives of IMCO is, and I quote: "To assure that the highest possible standards of safety at sea are achieved."

Certainly the tragic sinking of the SS Lakonia and the SS Yarmouth Castle appear to sustain the conclusion that IMCO has simply condoned the existence of the serious shipboard fire hazards permitted by international agreement. Therefore, I urge that we not be beguiled into blindly accepting the international viewpoint that as a signatory nation to the SOLAS conventions we cannot and must not question the efficacy of international safety standards.

It is of interest to note that, when the U.S. delegation to the IMCO committee meeting in December 1964 cited the large percentage of American citizens traveling on foreign ships as a reason for its interest in this matter, the reaction was that the problem was a national one, rather than international. Then, as soon as cruise legislation has been proposed in Congress which would affect foreign passenger ships, this same matter of U.S. citizens traveling on foreign-flag passenger ships quickly became a matter of international interest.

I do not feel we should permit ourselves to be deterred by this chameleon attitude. International policy notwithstanding, the harsh and bitter experience of the Yarmouth Castle, Viking Princess, and Lakonia dictate a need for realistic insistence upon a measure of control.

Personally, I feel that there is not only a right but a duty upon the Members of Congress to insure that our citizens patronizing these for