fire. No distress signal was transmitted. The vessel's speed was increased from about 13 knots to about 16 or 17 knots and the course changed to 280° T. At about 0215 the Finnpulp came within 3 mile of the Yarmouth Castle, made a starboard turn, and stopped. The Yarmouth Castle was broadside to the Finnpulp and at this time towering flames were seen on the Yarmouth Castle forward of the stack and engulfing the bridge area. The Finnpulp's port lifeboat had been cleared and was lowered into the water. The starboard gangway was lowered and a lifeboat from the Yarmouth Castle containing the Yarmouth Castle's master came alongside. The Master of the Finnpulp was told by someone in the lifeboat that the Yarmouth Castle had about 600 persons on board and lifeboats were needed to rescue these people. The passengers and some of the crew in the lifeboat came aboard the Finnpulp and the rest of the crew in the lifeboat headed back to the Yarmouth Castle. The Finnpulp's starboard boat was then lowered and both boats proceeded to rescue passengers from the Yarmouth Castle. Two other lifeboats from the Yarmouth Castle were in the vicinity and the people from these boats later came on board the Finnpulp. The two Finnish lifeboats proceeded to take passengers and crew from the Yarmouth Castle and finally the vessel took on board 51 pasengers and 41 crew. Two of the Yarmouth Castle lifeboats were later hoisted on board the Finnpulp. The Finnpulp remained in the vicinity until the Yarmouth Castle sank at 0603 and then proceeded to Nassau, Bahamas, where the survivors were placed ashore. One badly burned survivor was removed from the MV Finnpulp by Coast Guard helicopter.

SS Bahama Star.-The SS Bahama Star was proceeding in the Northwest Providence Channel at a speed of 14 knots on course 101° T. At about 0205 hours the mate on watch on the Bahama Star advised the Master that he could see Great Stirrup Light. In keeping with his routine, the Master looked out of the porthole, observed the light and at the same time observed an orange glow on the horizon on the port bow. The Master came to the bridge, observed a vessel on fire and ordered the helmsman, "Come left and steer for that ship". The Bahama Star arrived alongside the starboard side of the Yarmouth Castle at about 0225. Enroute a blinker light from the Yarmouth Castle was observed; however, no actual message was read or understood. Two or three lifeboats were at this time passed and hailed. These boats were from the Yarmouth Castle. The Yarmouth Castle was afire from her stack forward, including her bridge and radio shack, through all decks to the main deck. The forecastle head was not burning nor was there fire aft. Fourteen boats were placed in the water from the Bahama Star. These lifeboats proceeded to take passengers and crew from the Yarmouth Castle, completing rescue efforts at approximately 0415 hours. The Bahama Star remained in the vicinity until the Yarmouth Castle sank at 0603 and upon release by the Coast Guard proceeded to Nassau, Bahamas, where survivors were placed ashore. The Bahama Star took on board 240 passengers and 133 crew. Twelve passengers, badly burned, were evacuated to Nassau from the SS Bahama Star by Coast Guard helicopter.

22. At 0154 the MV Finnpulp advised Coast Guard Radio, Miami, of a vessel on fire. This information was relayed from the Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center to the Coast Guard Air Station, Miami, Florida, by telephone at 0204. The first aircraft was airborne at 0236 and was followed by three others at 0300, 0302 and 0332, respectively. The first helicopter was airborne at 0322 hours, followed by another at 0412 and a third at 0657. Illumination of the scene was commenced at 0343. At 0513 the first of the twelve injured passengers transported to Nassau was hoisted from the SS Bahama Star. Search of the area was conducted throughout the day with the last helicopter departing the area at 1651 and the last aircraft departing at 1745.

23. There was no noticeable list to the vessel during the night prior to the casualty. After the fire broke out, the vessel heading was altered to place the prevailing wind on the starboard side and the vessel was stopped. As time elapsed a gradual list developed to the port side and the vessel was down by the head. By about 0300 the list appeared to be approximately 4 to 5 degrees. When the vessel was completely abandoned about 0400 the list was estimated to have increased to about 7 or 8 degrees and the sea was observed entering the forward open cargo side port on the port side. The list continued to increase to port until the vessel quickly rolled over, bottom up, and sank at 0603.

24. The radio room, the motorboat fitted with radio-telegraph installation, and the lifeboat portable radio apparatus stowed in the chart room were all located

within the same relative area on the vessel. Accordingly, when the fire broke out in this area, these three independent means of transmitting radio messages for assistance were, within a very short time of each other, unavailable for use. 25. The sprinkler system alarm sounded on the bridge and in the engineroom during the fire. The Chief Engineer testified that when he was on D deck he observed the sprinkler system gauges and noted that the sprinkler system in zone 2 on the boat deck and zone 3 on the promenade deck was operating.

26. Room 610 was located on the Main Deck [referred as Upper C deck on original construction plans] on the inboard side of the port passageway and immediately forward of the boiler room uptake. The steel galley vent trunk on the forward side separates the room from the forward passenger stairwell. On the starboard side of the room was a ladies toilet. The boiler room was below and above was a men's toilet on the promenade deck and over that was another toilet on the boat deck. At the forward and after ends of this room were natural ventilation ducts which extend vertically from this room to the top of the superstructure. These ducts also served the two toilet rooms above and opened directly into those rooms. Additionally, a mechanical exhaust duct, previously described, served these rooms. Room 610 had been built as a toilet room and was of steel construction, and when the sprinkler system was installed in 1947 no sprinkler head served this room. At some later date the room had been converted to a ship's hostess stateroom, but no sprinkler head was installed. In October 1965 the room was dismantled and insulation, paneling and equipment removed. Testimony by Roderick Smith, the Second Steward, and several other crew members indicated that on the night of the fire nothing was in the room with the possible exception of a vacuum cleaner and a mop. Testimony by the hostess, Ruth Wright, and Charles Agero, the gift shop operator, indicated that they entered the unlocked room the evening of the fire to look at some mattresses that were stored inside. Their testimony indicated that in the room were about five mattresses, a couple of damaged chairs, pieces of scrap paneling, a vacuum cleaner. and other miscellaneous items. A jury rigged electric cable stretched across the room from which hung a large naked light bulb and socket with bare wire connections and it was indicated that the light was on when they entered and left. Further testimony indicated that arrangements had been made with the stewards to secure one of these mattresses from this room to be put on Mr. Agero's bunk that night. Mr. Agero stated that later that night when he visited his stateroom his bunk had been fitted with a mattress.

27. The greatest loss of life was determined to have occurred on the boat deck. Fifty-two of the passengers and crew missing and presumed dead were assigned staterooms on this deck; twenty-two were assigned staterooms on the promenade deck; and thirteen were assigned staterooms on the main deck. Two of the passengers known dead were assigned staterooms on the boat deck and the third was assigned a stateroom on the main deck:

28. Testimony of several witnesses who occupied outside staterooms on the night of the fire indicated that they could not open the windows and shutters in their staterooms.

CONCLUSIONS

1. That the fire originated in room 610, on the main deck, originally a toilet space, containing a number of combustible items including mattresses, discarded bulkhead paneling and broken chairs. The fire smoldered and increased in intensity for an unknown period of time.

2. That the source of ignition of the fire could not be determined, but could be attributed to anyone or a combination of the following:

(a) Malfunction of the lighting circuit in room 610 which had been jury rigged.

(b) Sparks entering room 610 through the natural ventilation ducts during blowing of boiler tubes.

(c) Unintentional or careless acts of persons entering room 610 during the evening of 12 November 1965, such as failure to extinguish a cigarette: placing of mattresses so that they came in contact with the jury rigged lighting circuit; etc.

3. That the proximate cause of the debacle was failure of early detection of the fire in a ship with combustible materials in her structure. When the fire escaped room 610, the wooden interior and inflammable paint together with the chimney effect of the forward stairway permitted a rapid, uncontrolled spread of fire and smoke to the overhead of the boat deck and forward passageways.

Contributing to the rapid spread was the mechanical exhaust system connecting room 610 with the toilet spaces on the port side of the main deck.

4. That contributing to the failure of early detection was the inadequate control of the security patrol in not knowing that he was not following the prescribed route and thereby increasing the possibility of a fire going undetected. A further contributing factor was the absence of a sprinkler head in a room containing combustible materials.

5. That the magnitude of loss of life stemmed from failure of early use of the general alarm or the public address system and failure of windows and shutters on outside staterooms to be maintained in a condition so they could be easily opened.

6. That the general alarm did not ring during the casualty.

7. That an attempt to sound the general alarm was not made before the Master returned from the scene of the fire to the bridge. Failure of the alarm on any subsequent attempt is ascribed to the fact that the general alarm was a one circuit system and fire damage to any portion would place the complete circuit out of operation.

8. That the lack of pressure at fire hydrants forward on the vessel is ascribed to the fact that more valves were opened throughout the ship than the fire pumps could service. Contributing to this deficiency was the open valve from the fire main to the swimming pool.

9. That the installed sprinkler system was in operation, but was ineffective in reducing a fire of this magnitude.

10. That the sprinkler system is of value only in early detection and extinguishment of small fires in their early stages within the area of sprinkler heads. It is of little value in hidden spaces such as overhead ceiling spaces, behind paneling, etc., or where an advanced fire has developed before the sprinkler system comes into action.

11. That with the possible exception of the sliding fire screen door in the port passageway aft of room 610 there is no evidence that any fire doors in the vessel were closed.

12. That the Master and ship's officers who were searching for the fire and ultimately arrived at the scene failed to take firm and positive action to organize the crew to isolate and combat the fire or to awaken and evacuate passengers in the area.

13. That the decision of the Master to leave his ship to allegedly go to the rescue vessel to assure the sending of the distress signal demonstrates negligence, abandonment of command responsibility, and an overall failure to approach and cope with the difficulties attending the accomplishment of a task of this order of magnitude.

14. That the emergency squad was unable to obtain gear from the emergency squad locker outside the radio room on the sun deck due to the delayed alert and the rapid spread of fire in the area.

15. That the organization of the vessel for fighting a fire as evidenced by the station bill was adequate; however, the organization was not implemented upon first discovery of the fire or subsequently thereto and prior to its getting out of control. When the fire was out of control those members of the crew remaining on board and performing as individuals performed adequately.

16. That the organization of the vessel for abandon ship, as evidenced by the station bill, was adequate and in view of the extent of the fire at the time the abandon ship signal was given, all accessible boats were utilized and there was no loss of life as a result of abandon ship procedures.

17. That a progressive list developed to port as a result of the accumulation of water on the several decks from the sprinkler system, open fire hydrants, and probably sanitary lines damaged during progression of the fire. As this list progressed the open side ports became awash and, as the testimony indicated that no watertight doors other than three doors in the boiler and machinery spaces were closed, the sea flooded the vessel amplifying the list and the vessel rolled over and sank.

18. That the inspection performed by the American Bureau of Shipping for the Passenger Vessel Safety Certificate was proper and adequate. The vessel was equipped in accordance with the SOLAS, 1960, requirements with the single exception of inflatable life rafts, and the board received no evidence of significant failure or deficiency.

19. That the inspection performed by the Coast Guard for the Examination of Foreign Passenger Vessel Certificate was proper and adequate to verify that

the vessel was in compliance with her Passenger Vessel Safety Certificate and that her lifesaving and firefighting equipment was satisfactory.

20. That the rescue effort of the SS Bahama Star and the MV Finnpulp was performed in an exemplary manner and in keeping with the highest traditions of the sea.

21. That over half of the persons who are missing and presumed dead were assigned staterooms on the boat deck and their loss is attributed to the rapid rise of smoke, heat and fire in the forward staircase reaching the closed overhead of the staircase on the boat deck and rapidly spreading horizontally preventing passengers exiting through the passageways.

22. That the board had difficulty, and was unable to correlate fully the observed and estimated times of reported events into a chronological sequence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a copy of this record of investigation be forwarded to the Government of the Republic of Panama for information, study and such action as deemed appropriate looking to preventing a reoccurence of such a casualty and for improving the safety of life at sea.

2. That, although the record indicates there are no U.S. flag passenger vessels operating on the high seas with combustible material in their structure, it is recommended that the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, institute a study looking to federal legislation to require that any other American flag passenger vessels fitted with passenger berthing spaces and built prior to 27 May 1936, be made to conform to the requirements for use of incombustible material in their structure as applicable to passenger vessels built subsequent to that date.

3. That the Commandant, through the U.S. representatives to the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization [IMCO], seek to amend the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, to require all signatory governments to upgrade passenger vessels which contain large amounts of combustible material in their construction to obtain an acceptable fire safety standard.

4. That in the interim period the Commandant give consideration to the following suggestions for improving safety of existing passenger vessels of type construction and service similar to the SS Yarmouth Castle, and that these be the basis of discussion looking to bilateral agreements with foreign governments whose flag vessels transport passengers from U.S. ports:

(a) During the nighttime, watchmen should make complete rounds of all accessible areas of the vessel every 20 minutes.

(b) An independent alarm system from the bridge should be provided serving the emergency squad berthing spaces for the purpose of alterting them at the first sign of an emergency.

(c) All fire screen doors, except normally closed doors, should be capable of release from a control station on the bridge and also at the doors themselves. The doors should be capable of automatically closing upon failure of the control system.

(d) Steel fire screen bulkheads should be provided with incombustible insulation to provide adequate fire barriers.

(e) All exposed paneling in passageway bulkheads that provide escape routes from passenger and crew staterooms should be of incombustible material.

(f) All stairwells should be trunked in with incombustible paneling and fitted with fire screen doors to enclose the area.

(g) All ventilation ducts that pass through fire zone bulkheads should be provided with automatic fused fire dampers.

(h) The sprinkler system should cover all interior combustible spaces accessible to passengers and crew including spaces where combustible material might be stowed.

(i) A loudspeaker communication system should be provided to all passenger and crew areas.

(j) All emergency means of escape available, such as stateroom windows and portholes, should be kept in good operable condition.

(k) Vital communications systems such as general alarm circuits, loudspeaker system, etc., should be installed clear of high fire hazard areas and/ or insulated against early damage.

(1) Pressure should be maintained on the fire main system at all times. (m) On all overnight voyages on vessels equipped with berthing areas a fire and boat drill, including muster of passengers, should be held at starting or shortly thereafter.

(n) Consideration be given to the adequacy of communication among officers, crew and passengers concerning matters pertaining to safety of life at sea.

5. That the Commandant, through the U.S. representatives to IMCO, seek to revise the construction standards of new passenger vessels prescribed in the 1960 SOLAS to require the maximum use of incombustible material, as opposed to reliance on sprinklers and detecting systems in conjunction with partially combustible construction.

6. That the Commandant give consideration to implementing letters of commendation to those vessels and personnel who performed in the rescue operation in the highest tradition of the sea. This will be the subject of separate correspondence from the board.

LOUIS M. THAYER,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chairman.

J. B. MCCARTY,

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Member.

WILLIAM KESLER, Jr.,

Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, Member and Recorder. The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Frank Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation, Department of State.

Mr. Loy, we will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF FRANK E. LOY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM K. MILLER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND ALLAN MENDELSOHN, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Mr. Loy. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have a short statement. Before I commence I would like to advise you that I am accompanied today on my right by Mr. William K. Miller, the Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, Department of State, and on my left, by Mr. Allan Mendelsohn, of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have both of them here.

Mr. Loy. Mr. Chairman, the bills on which we have been asked to testify, S. 1351, S. 2417, H.R. 10327, and the two new bills, relate to the regulation of ocean cruises from U.S. ports, passenger ship safety, and the financial responsibility of passenger ship operators.

The Department of State is glad to have the opportunity to comment on this proposed legislation and on the problem of safety of passenger ships. We are concerned, deeply concerned, as I believe everyone in this room is, with the problem of safety of passenger ships at sea, particularly fire safety, and we have been working with the other agencies of the executive branch to develop an effective approach to the problem. In this, we believe we have succeeded.

We favor and support the two bills which the administration has proposed; we would oppose the other three bills at this time, either because of certain features which we consider objectionable or because we think the two new bills will accomplish the objective better.

First I would like to comment on the bills which we do not at present support.