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the lands of which she died seized and which were not disposed of by her last will and testament for his life as tenant thereof by the curtesy; provided, that if the wife, at her death, shall leave issue by any former husband, to whom the estate might descend, such issue shall take the same discharged from the right of the surviving husband to hold the same as tenant by the curtesy." (See Dower and Curtesy in the chapter on Real Property.)

Insurance of husband, etc.-The statutes of Wisconsin provide that "any married woman may, in her own name or in the name of a third person as her trustee, with his assent, cause to be insured for her sole use the life of her husband, son or other person, for any definite period or for the natural life of such person; and any person, whether her husband or not, effecting any insurance on his own life or on the life of another may cause the same to be made payable or assign the policy to a married woman or to any person in trust for her or her benefit; and every such policy, when expressed to be for the benefit of or assigned or made payable to any married woman or any such trustee, shall be the sole and separate property of such married woman and shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of her children, and in case of her surviving the period or term of such policy the amount of the insurance shall be payable to her or her trustee for her own use and benefit, free from the control, disposition or claims of her husband and of the person effecting or assigning such insurance and from the claims of their respective representatives and creditors. But if the annual premium on any such policy shall exceed the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars and is paid by any person with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premium so paid in excess of said sum with interest thereon, shall inure to the benefit of such creditors, subject, however, to the statute of limitations. The amount of any such insurance may be made payable, in case of the death of such married woman before the period at which it becomes due, to her children or to their guardian for their use, if under age, or to any other person as shall be provided in the policy. In such case the receipt of such married woman or of such children, or of their guardian, if minors, shall discharge the insurance corporation from all further liability therefor. The provisions of this section shall apply to all insurance on lives effected before the passage of these statutes."

This section of the Wisconsin statutes was before the Supreme Court in a recent important case, and the court decided thereunder as follows: "Insurance on the life of any person for the benefit of a married woman cannot be reached by her creditors or those of any other person." Also that the person taking out such insurance cannot change the beneficiary. "A policy of life insurance upon the life of any person payable to a married woman, with no provision therein as to the beneficiary in case she shall not survive to take, belongs to her children if she has any surviving her, with the same freedom from interference by creditors or others as in case of the first beneficiary." "A married woman may, without her husband's consent, take out a policy of insurance on his life for her own benefit, or for such benefit and that of her children." "A policy of insurance taken out upon any life for the benefit of a married woman, nothing being said as to who shall be the beneficiary in case she shall not survive to take at the maturity of the policy, vests a contingent right in the insurance fund in her, which is her sole and separate property, free from control and disposition by her husband or the person taking out the insurance, and beyond the reach of the creditors of any one. Such a policy vests in the children of the married woman a contingent right to the insurance, safe from disturbance by her or any other person, or by such children, prior to the maturity of the policy and the funds reaching their hands. The right of the children does not contemplate a joint enjoyment of the insurance fund by them and their mother. It is a mere right to the fund in case the mother does not survive to receive the same, there being no other disposition thereof provided in the policy. A policy of insurance of the character mentioned, with the added element providing for a disposition of the insurance fund upon the contingency of the wife not surviving to receive the same, vests in the wife the same right in all respects as if such secondary disposition were not made. . . . . . The policy and its proceeds are free from all interferences save lapses and forfeitures mentioned, militating against the proceeds thereof, upon the time arriving and circumstances occurring named as conditions precedent to the maturity of the contract in her favor, vesting in her with the right to personal possession of the fund as her separate property, leaving the same then subject to her obligations the same as any other portion of her estate,'

It was also decided under the statute that the policy could not be assigned, even with the consent of the person insured and the beneficiary, and that creditors of the person insured or of the married woman cannot reach the policy. To enable such policies to be assigned a law passed by the legislature in 1903 provides that "any married woman may, with the written consent of the person effecting the insurance, assign, incumber or dispose of any right, title or interest she may have in, to or under any policy of life insurance, whether on the life of herself or of her husband, or of any other person, and whether such policy be expressed to be for the benefit of or assigned or made payable to such married woman, or any trustee for her, in the same manner and with like effect as if she we unmarried." The decision above referred to was made shortly before this law was passed, and therefor insofar as this law provides otherwise, the decision has no effect. (See the chapter on Insurance.)

CHAPTER IX.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Definition, origin and purpose.-The Statute of Frauds, commonly so called, was passed in England during the reign of Charles II, (April 16, 1677). It required that the contracts enumerated therein must be evidenced by a writing. It was entitled an "act for the prevention of fraud and perjuries". Previous to this time, for instance, conveyances of land in fee or for life could be made by livery of seisin, while estates for less than life (leaseholds) could be created and transferred by parol; in fact, contracts of greatest moment required no writing. This resulted in frauds and perjuries and a subversion of justice, to remedy which the Statute of Frauds was passed. The original English statute made contracts not executed according to its provisions non-enforceable by not allowing oral proof to prove their execution, but our statutes usually make the entire transaction absolutely void. The Statute of Frauds has been re-enacted, substantially, in this and other states of the Union. However, the provisions of no two of the statutes are exactly alike, a fact which must be constantly borne in mind when referring to similar statutes as authority for construction.

Below are given those provisions now in force in this state which especially relate to business law, together with explanations of the same:

AS TO REALTY:

R. S. 2302. No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared unless by act or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

"No estate or interest in lands".-The statute applies only to estates or interests in land. The difference between this and a license must be borne in mind. A license is an authority to do an act or series of acts upon the land of the person granting the license, without conferring on the licensee any estate in the land. This authority is revocable at will. Thus, a parol license to flow the lands of another may be given and justifies acts done under it until revoked. A contract to enter upon land and work mines and search for ore is not a contract for an interest in land. An oral agreement giving permission to draw logs across the land of another is a mere license and valid until revoked. When one person selects lands and contracts with another to purchase and hold them in his own name, and when they are sold, the net profits are to be divided between them in consideration of services, this is not within the statute. The sale of crops, with the right to harvest them, is probably not the sale of an interest in land in this state. A contract for the sale of standing timber must be in writing; still, one who has made a parol contract for its purchase and cut it with the sanction of the owner, is not a trespasser for so doing, and the title passes to the purchaser after possession has been taken. An oral agreement to drain mines is not within the statute. The interest of a mortgagee is not an interest in lands within the meaning of the statute. A lien may pass without writing. A right of way or easement, whether a freehold or for a fixed term, cannot be created by parol, and a parol contract giving the right to take water from a certain ditch for a period of one year is void. An oral contract to pay for the services of a person by the conveyance of land is void. An oral agreement to execute a written agreement for the conveyance of lands is within the statute. A parol contract extending the time of a written option on land is void. An oral promise to devise and bequeath real estate and personal property, in consideration for services to be rendered, is within the statute as to real estate and being indivisible, is wholly void. This, however, does not prevent a recovery for the value of the services actually rendered.

"Trust".-A parol trust in land is not an actual nullity, but is void only at the election of the trustee. If he accepts

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