lateral to the act contracted to be done, the contractee who employs him is liable.(c) II. OF THE LIABILITY OF THE MASTER TO THE SERVANT FOR NEGLIGENCE. § A master is bound to take all reasonable precautions for the safety of his servant.(d) § A master will be liable for all injuries happening to the servant in the course of the employment, 1. By reason of the master's negligence. Illustration. Roberts was a bricklayer in the employment of Smith. Smith had a scaffold put up, which was to his knowledge composed of rotten timbers. He sent Roberts to work on the scaffold, which gave way; and Roberts was thrown to the ground and injured. In an action by Roberts it was held that there was evidence to go to the jury of negligence on the part of Smith, which would make him liable for the injuries happening to the plaintiff.(e) 2. By reason of a failure to provide the protection enjoined by an Act of Parliament. Illustration. Clarke was a cotton-spinner at Manchester. Holmes was his under overlooker, and it was his duty to oil certain machinery, which Clarke was bound, under the Factory Acts, properly to fence. When Holmes entered Clarke's service, the mill-gearing was fenced by an iron guard; but subsequently this was broken, and had not been mended, though Clarke had promised Holmes that the (c) Hole v. Sitiingbourne and Sheerness Railway Company, 30 L. J. Ex. 81. (d) Williams v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258. (e) Roberts v. Smith, 2 H. & N. 213. repairs should be done. Whilst Holmes was oiling the machinery, his arm was caught by the machine, and torn off. In an action by him against his master, the latter was held to be liable.(a) 3. By reason of a failure to disclose any latent danger in the employment. Illustration. England was a contractor for the supply of beef for the use of the Royal Navy, and employed Davies to cut up certain carcasses, which he knew to be diseased and putrefying. Davies' hand became poisoned during the operation; in consequence of which he brought an action against England, and the court held that the latter was liable.(b) Unless (i) The servant has been guilty of contributory negligence. [See ante, p. 225.] (ii) The servant was acquainted with the danger, and took the employment with the attendant risks. Illustration. Woodley was at work on a side wall in a dark tunnel of the Metropolitan District Railway. There was just room for him to do his work between the wall and the trains, which passed every ten minutes. While reaching across the rail for a tool he had laid down, a train knocked him over, and injured him. In an action brought by him against the company, it was held that he could not recover; as a (a) Holmes v. Clarke, 31 L. J. Ex. 356. man, entering a dangerous employment, their " common employment." (d) Now by 2. By reason of the negligence of any (c) Woodley v. Metropolitan District Railway Company, 2 Ex. D. 384: see Membery v. Great Western Railway Company, 14 App. Cas. 179. (d) See Wriggett v. Fox, 11 Ex. 832; Bartonshill Coal Company v. Reid, 3 Macq. (H. L.) 296. (e) The original Act was only to continue in force until Dec. 31st, 1887, but its duration has since been extended until Dec. 31st, 1891. Further legislation on the subject is promised during the present session (1891). (f) See Paley v. Garnett, 16 Q. B. D. 52; Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685 (C. A.), where it was held by the majority of the court that the defence arising from the maxim, volenti non fit injuria, has not been affected by the Employers Liability Act, 1880. (g) See Baddeley v. Earl Granville, 19 Q. B. D. 423; Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647 (C. A.). 3. By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman, at the time of the injury, was bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or 4. 5. By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that behalf; or, By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer, who has the charge or control of any signal points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway, The workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal representatives of the workman, and any person entitled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer, as if the workman had not been a workman of, nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work. (a) Provided→→ 1. That the "defect" mentioned in s. 1 (1) arose from the negligence of the (a) A workman may expressly contract out of the statute, and his widow, suing for damages under Lord Campbell's Act, would be bound by such contract: Griffiths v. Earl Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357; 51 L. J. Q. B. 543. employer of the person appointed by him to superintend the work. (b) 2. That under s. 1 (4) the injury resulted from some defect in the rules or byelaws therein mentioned.(c) 3. That in any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which caused the injury, he had given notice to the employer or the superintendent. (d) 4. That the notice of the injury (e) was given within six weeks, and the action commenced within six months of occurrence of the accident.(ƒ) 5. Every action for recovery of compensation under this Act must be brought in a county court.(g)] III. OF THE MASTER'S RIGHT OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF TORTS COMMITTED AGAINST HIS SERVANT. § They are liable to the master in damages who wilfully interrupt the relation subsisting between master and servant, whereby the master suffers loss. 1. By procuring the servant to depart from the master's service. Illustration. Lumley was lessee and manager of the Queen's Theatre, and had engaged Johanna Wagner as a dramatic artiste to perform at his theatre for a certain time, and during that time not to sing elsewhere. Gye (b) Sect. 2 (1): see Kiddle v. Lovett, 16 Q. B. D. 605. (c) Sect. 2 (2). (d) Sect. 2 (3). (e) The notice must be in writing: Moyle v. Jenkins, 8 Q. B. D. 116. (f) Sect. 4. (g) Sect. 6. |