the court held that the occasion was privi leged.(c) III. OF STATUTORY APOLOGIES. 1. Any defendant may give evidence, in mitigation of damages, of his having made or offered an apology(i) Either before action; (ii) Or as soon as possible after action, if the action was commenced before he had time to do so. Provided that he has with his statement of defence delivered to the plaintiff a notice of his intention to give such evidence.(d) 2. The defendant in an action for libel against a public newspaper, or other periodical publication, may make a good defence to such action (i) By inserting in his own paper, at his earliest opportunity, an apology. [Or, if his own paper is published less often (ii) By showing that the libel was published— (6.) Without gross negligence, and (iii) By paying into court sufficient amends for the injury sustained by the plaintiff.(e) [NOTE. By 51 & 52 Vict. c 64, s. 5, where (c) Podmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & E. 382. (e) Ibid, s. 2. actions for damages in respect of the same libel. $ QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY, 1. Whether there has been a publication of the libel. 3. Whether, (if it is a report, or criticism in a paper,) it 4. Whether, (if the judge holds the occasion privileged,) it was published with actual malice. 5. Whether, (if justified,) it is true. 6. Whether, (if money is paid into court,) the sum so paid in is sufficient. § QUESTIONS FOR THE JUDGE. 1. Whether the alleged libel is capable of bearing the meaning ascribed to it.(b) 2. Whether the occasion is privileged.(c) OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. § CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN. 1. By indictment; 2. By information, filed in the Queen's Bench Division, by leave of the court.(d) No criminal prosecution can be commenced against any proprietor, editor, or any person responsible for the publication of a newspaper for any libel contained therein without the order of a judge at chambers. (e) (a) 32 Geo. 3, c. 60, s. 1. (b) Sturt v. Blogg, 10 Q. B. 908. (c) Cooke v. Wildes, 5 E. & B. 378. (d) The judges of the present day are strongly opposed to granting a criminal information, unless the person libelled is the holder of a public office: see Reg. v. Labouchere, 12 Q. B. D. 320. (e) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 8. $ PUNISHMENT 1. Where the publisher does not know the libel to be false; Fine, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.(f) 2. Where the publisher knows the libel to be false; Fine, and imprisonment not exceeding two years.(g) [The crime is a misdemeanor, not triable at quarter sessions.] § An indictment will only lie for libel, and not for slander. Except 1. Where it is seditious; 2. Where it is blasphemous ;(h) 3. Where it directly tends to a breach of the peace ;() [As a challenge to fight a duel. 4. Where uttered against, and in the presence of a magistrate in the execution of his office.(k) S DEFENCES 1. The defendant may show that the libel is true; Provided he also shews that it is for the public benefit that it should be published.(1) [NOTE. At common law it was no defence to show that the libel was true; and hence the maxim, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel.”] 2. The defendant may shew (i) That the publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge; and (ii) That the publishing did not arise from want of due care, or caution, on his part. (m) (f) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 4. (g) Ibid. s. 5. (h) R. v. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607. (i) R. v. Phillips, 6 East 464. (k) R. v. Pocock, 2 St. 1,157; Ex parte Duke of Marlborough, 5 Q. B. 955 ; R. v. Weltje, 2 Camp. 242. (1) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6. (m) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7. PART VI. OF BREACHES OF DUTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON. CHAPTER I. NEGLIGENT PERSONAL CONDUCT. Where one by want of reasonable care in his own personal conduct causes damage to the person, or property (real or personal) of another, he is liable to compensate that other for the loss. For example. If Jones were to hit out recklessly, right and left, with his fists, in a crowd, and so were to wound Smith, he would be liable to Smith for the injury. § PROFESSIONAL MEN AND SKILLED WORKMEN ARE BOUND TO USE― 1. Reasonable care. 2. Reasonable diligence. 3. A reasonable and competent degree of skill. In proportion to the character of the work which each professes to undertake. (a) [NOTE. Contributory negligence. The remarks on contributory negligence (ante, p. 225) apply equally to this chapter.] (a) Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P. 479; Seare v. Prentice, 8 East. 352. CHAPTER II. OF FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS. SA FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION, for which an action will lie, must be 1. A false statement (b), which may be either a (i) Suggestio falsi; or a (ii) Suppressio veri.(c) 2. Made with a knowledge of its untruth.(d) [Or (i) With no belief in its truth.(e) Or (ii) In a reckless ignorance of its untruth.(ƒ) } 3. Made with the intention that another should act upon it.(g) [NOTE. But a bare lie, without any fraudulent intent, is not actionable.(h)] 4. Acted upon by that other. 5. Resulting, from being so acted on, in damage to that other.(?) [NOTE. A person making a fraudulent representation Illustration. Joseph Freeman represented to Messrs. (b) Ashlin v. White, Holt. 387. (c) Horsfall v. Thomas, 31 L. J. Ex. 322; Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 371. (d) Ormrod v. Huth, 14 M. & W. 651. (e) Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 415. (f) Jarrett v. Kennedy, 6 C. B. 319; Reese River Silver Mining Company v. Smith, L. R. 4 H. L. 64. (g) Thom v. Bigland, 8 Ex. 725. (h) Behn v. Kemble, 7 C. B. N. S. 260. (i) Forster v. Charles, 7 Bing. 105. |