ment of the suit, they will draw after them the articles beyond six years, so as to exempt them from the operation of the statute." If there be a promise to pay the debt after the six years have elapsed, this will prevent the statute from running, so as to be a bar to plaintiff's action; for this is a revival of the assumpsit, and no new consideration is required, the plea admitting a cause of action before the six years.(2) Where the cause of action is to arise from an executory consideration, as some act to be performed, and a promise to pay in consequence of it, there "never promised within six years," is not the proper plea; for the assumpsit does not arise till the consideration is performed, which may be long after the promise made: in such case therefore, the plea should be, that "the cause of action did not accrue within six years. In all cases where money is to be recovered back, where paid by mistake, or for a consideration which happens to fail, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the money paid, for from that time the right to recover it accrues; but where there has been any fraud, there the statute will not run.(3) (2) Not only an express promise, but a mere acknowledgement of the debt as existing, will be sufficient to take the case out of the statute. Selw. 122. See also Bryan v. Horseman, 4 East's R. 599. (3) In Bree v. Holbeck, Doug. 630. Defendant was administrator to his uncle W. H., and found, among his papers, a mortgage deed for twelve hundred pounds, which he assigned, for that sum, to the plaintiff. It afterwards appeared, that the mortgage deed was a forgery, though unknown to defendant when he made the assignment. This transaction had taken place more than six years before the bringing of this action, which was to recover back the twelve hundred pounds so paid, to which defendant had pleaded the statute of limitations; and it was adjudged to be a good bar, (though contended, that it should only commence from the time that the fraud was discovered, which was within the six years;) particularly as no fraud appeared in defendant, as that he 1 Esp. Dig. 155, 156. Ibid. 161. Ibid. 162. Stat, 1786, c. 52, s. 5. Ibid. s. 1. 2 Esp. Dig. 361. Stat. 1786, c. 52, s. 1. 3 Bac. Abr. 506. Stat. 1786, c. 52, s. 1. Saunders v. Edwards, 1 Sid. 95. Our statute has made an express exception in favour of notes attested by one or more witnesses. It enacts, that nothing therein contained shall extend to bar any action brought upon any note, in writing, made and signed by any person or persons, and attested by one or more witnesses, whereby such person or persons shall promise to pay any other person or persons, any sum of money, mentioned in such note, but all actions upon such note or notes, brought by the original promisee, his executor or administrator, may be maintained, as if the act had never been made. 4. TRESPASS, DETINUE AND REPLEVIN, for goods or cattle, and actions of trespass, quare clausum fregit, may be brought at any time within six years next after the cause of such actions, and not after. 5. TROVER is also limited to six years. The statute begins to run from the time of the conversion, for then the cause of action accrues. 6. ASSAULT, BATTERY, WOUNDING, IMPRISONMENT, or any of them, must be brought within three years next after the cause of action. If a man brings trespass for beating his servant, “by which he lost his service," this is not such an action as is within this branch of the statute, being founded on the special damage. 7. SLANDER for words must be brought within two years next after the words spoken. Upon the statute of James, it has been held, that it does not extend to cases in which the special damage is the gist of the action. This distinction, however, must be observed, that where the words are themselves actionable, there the damages shall be held to refer to the words themselves, and not to any special damage, and in such case the statute is a good bar. But where the words knew of the forgery, which would have made a difference; or had he covenanted for the goodness of the title, which, in this case, he had not done. are not actionable without special damage, there the statute of limitations is no bar; for the action is for the special damage arising from the words, and not for the words themselves. III. Of the exceptions in the statute of 1786, c. 52, and what will save a bar thereof. Stat 1786, c. 52, s. 4. Infants, femes covert, persons imprisoned, States, or non compos, The act is no bar to any infant, feme covert, person imprisoned, or beyond sea, without any of the United States, or non compos mentis, from bringing their actions within the term limited by the act, reckoning from the out any of the United time that such impediment shall be removed. And if not barred. any person against whom there shall be any cause of suit, who, at the time the same accrued, was without the limits of the commonwealth, and did not leave property or estate therein that could, by the common and ordinary process of law, be attached; then the person to bring such suit, may commence the same within the period limited by the act, after such person's return into the commonwealth. (4) So where a promissory note is attested by a subscribing witness, and an action is brought upon it by the original promissee, his executor or administrator, such note is not barred by the statute. So by statute, if, upon any action, judgment be given for the plaintiff, and the same be reversed for error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and for matter alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be given against the plaintiff, "that he take nothing by his plaint, writ, or bill;" in all such cases, the party plaintiff, his executor or administrator, as the case shall require, may commence a new action or suit, from time to time, within a year after such judgment reversed, or such judgment given against the plaintiff, and not after. (4) A debtor's return into this government, must be such a return as will enable his creditor, using reasonable diligence, to arrest his body as security. White v. Bailey, 3 Mass. Rep. 271. Ibid. s. 5. An,attested promis Stat. 1786, c. 52, s. 1. In what cases a new action may be brought, notwith standing the statute. Stat. 1793, c. 75, s. 2. Ibid. s. 3. Actions by and against executors and administrators. Stat. 1791, c. 23, s. 1. So by an additional act, any action of the case or of debt, grounded upon any lending or contract, or for arrearages of rent, which shall be duly commenced, and in which the writ purchased therefor has failed of a sufficient service or return, by any unavoidable accident, or by the default, negligence or defect of any officer to whom such writ shall be duly directed, or when such writ shall be abated, or the action thereby commenced shall be avoided by demurrer, or otherwise, for informality of proceedings, then the plaintiff or plaintiffs, or his or her executor or administrator, may commence another action upon the same demand, and shall thereby barely save the limitation thereof. Provided, that such second action shall be duly commenced, by declaring in the same aforesaid, and pursued at the next court of common pleas of the county, in which trial of the cause may be had, or within three months next after the court, whereto such former writ was or shall be returnable, or wherein judgment of abatement, or other avoidance of such suit, shall happen, and not afterwards. Furthermore, by the same statute, any action of the case, or of debt, grounded upon any lending or contract, or for arrearages of rent, which might have been, or which may be sued and prosecuted, by or against any person deceased, or who shall decease, at the time of his or her decease, or within thirty days next preceding, may be commenced, by declaring in the same as aforesaid, and sued by or against the executor or administrator of such deceased person, within two years after the grant of letters testamentary or of administration, and not afterwards, if otherwise barred by the statute. IV. Limitation of actions against exccutors and administrators. No executor or administrator shall be held to answer to any suit that shall be commenced against him in that capacity, unless the same shall be commenced within the term of four years from the time of his accepting that trust. Provided, that he give notice of his appointment in the manner prescribed by law. (5) (5) By statute 1788, c. 66, s. 3. the limitation of actions against executors and administrators, in that capacity, is three years. This section, so far as it regards such limitation, is repealed by statute 1791, c. 28. It may, however, be proper to notice in this place, the fourth section of the statute of 1788, which provides, "that when any certain demand against any person deceased, arising from covenant, contract or agreement, shall commence and be in force, after the said term of three years, and which could not, by virtue of such covenant, contract or agreement, (although known) be claimed until after the said term, in such case, the claimant may, at any time within the said term of three years, file such future demand at the office of the probate court, where administration was granted, or the will was approved; and such probate shall direct the executor or administrator to retain in his hands assets (if sufficient there be) to answer said demand, unless the heirs to such estate, or devisees thereof, or some one or more of them, shall give good and sufficient security, in the opinion of the judge of probate, for such executor or administrator to respond such demand. And when security is so given, such executor or administrator shall not be allowed to retain in his hands assets for the purpose aforesaid; the estate of said deceased shall, however, be liable in the hands of the said heirs or devisees, or their heirs or assigns, to answer the said demand." The fifth section of the same statute has further enacted, "that where certain demands against the estate of any person deceased, arise, by virtue of any covenant, contract or agreement, that could not be claimed until after the said term of three years, (such covenant, contract or agreement not being in full force during said term) the claimant in such case, unless he shall have filed the same in the probate court as aforesaid, may have his remedy against those who inherit the estate of such person, or devisees thereof, against whom the demand lies, if such claim be made within one year from the time of its becoming due, and not against the executor or administrator." After the above provisions follows a proviso, "that nothing in the act shall operate to bar any action that may be commenced against an executor or administrator, with the will annexed, for the recovery of a legacy, bequest, gift or annuity, arising, accruing or becoming due, by virtue of any last will and testament, but the |