Ibid Ibid. Fbid. 170. the people to know, should be an offence against their laws. And every man, holding a public elective office, may be considered as within this principle; for as a re-election is the only way constituents can manifest their approbation of his conduct, it is to be presumed, that he is consenting to a re-election, if he does not disclaim it. For every good man would wish the approbation of his constituents for meritorious conduct. For the same reason, the publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers, or candidates for public offices, is an offence most dangerous to the people, and deserves punishment; because the people may be deceived, and reject the best citizens, to their great injury, and it may be to the loss of their liberties. But the publication of a libel maliciously and with intent to defame, whether it be true or not, is clearly an offence against law, on sound principles; which must be adhered to so long as the restraint of all tendencies to the breach of the public peace, and to private animosity and revenge, is salutary to the commonwealth, TITLE XCVIII. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. 1. LIMITATION of real actions. 2. Limitation of personal actions. 3. Of the exceptions in the statute of 1786, c. 52, and what will save a bar thereof. 4. Limitation of actions against executors and adminis trators. 5. Limitation of actions grounded on penal statutes. 6. Limitation of actions against sheriffs for the misconduct of their deputies. 7. Limitation of writs of review. 8. Limitation of writs of error. I. Limitation of real actions. 1. WRIT OF RIGHT. No person shall sue or maintain any writ of right, or make any prescription, title, or claim, to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or to any rents, annuities, or portions issuing therefrom, upon the possession or seizin of his or their ancestor or predecessor, beyond the term of three score years next before the teste of the same writ. 2. WRIT OF ENTRY UPON DISSEIZIN, &c. No person shall sue, have, or maintain any writ of entry upon disseizin done to any of his ancestors or predecessors; or any action possessory upon the possession of any of his ancestors or predecessors, for any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, unless the ancestor or predecessor, under whom the demandant shall claim, shall have been seized or possessed of the lands, tenements, or heredita Stat. 1786, c. 13, s. 1. Ibid, s. 2. Ibid. s. 3. Ibid. s. 4. At what time a per son may make an entry. Rights of persons under certain disabilities, saved. ments demanded within fifty years next before the teste of the same writ, or bringing such action. 3. ACTION UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN SEIZIN, &C. No person or body corporate or politic shall sue for, have, or maintain any action for any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, upon his or their own seizin or possession therein, above thirty years next before the teste of the same writ. 4. FORMEDON, &c. All writs of formedon in descender, formedon in remainder, formedon in reverter, of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments whatsoever, shall be commenced and brought within twenty years next after the title or cause of action first descended, and at no time after the said twenty years. And no person, unless by judgment of law, shall make any entry into any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, but within twenty years next after his right or title first descended or accrued to the same; and in default thereof, such person so not entering, and his heirs shall be utterly excluded and disabled from making such entry thereunto: Provided always, that when any person that shall be entitled to any of the writs of formedon aforesaid; or to make an entry into lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall, at the time the said right or title first descended, accrued or fell, be within the age of twenty-one years, feme-covert, noncompos, imprisoned, or beyond seas, or without the limits of the United States, then such person may bring such suit, or make such entry, at any time within ten years after the expiration of the said twenty years, and not afterwards. II. Limitation of personal actions. 1. DEBT ON BOND. We have no statute limiting the time within which such action must be brought; but to such action there is a common law limitation, grounded on a presumption of the bond having been paid. If a bond has lain dormant for twenty years, or more, without payment of any interest, or any demand having been made, or any circumstances to account for the acquiescence, this will be evidence sufficient, of itself, for a jury to presume that the bond has been satisfied, and will entitle the defendant to a verdict under the plea of "payment at the day.” But where a bond has lain dormant for a less time than twenty years, some other evidence than the mere length of time must be given, in order to raise the presumption, that the bond has been satisfied; such as having settled an account in the intermediate time, without any notice having been taken of such a demand, &c. The slightest evidence will be sufficient; but it is essentially necessary that some evidence of this kind should be given. Selw. 496. Ibid. Oswald v. Legli, For where to debt on bond, defendant pleaded payment, and it did not appear that there had been any demand 1 T. R. 270. made on the bond for nineteen years and a half, this circumstance alone was holden to be insufficient to raise the presumption of payment. Searle v. Ld. Barring 2 Stra. 826. A receipt for interest, within twenty years, indorsed on a bond by the obligee, (although the time when such ton, receipt was written and signed does not appear other- 2 L. Raym. 1370, S. C. wise than by the indorsement,) may be given in evidence to rebut the presumption. But where similar evidence of the indorsement of the Turner v. Crisp, receipt of the interest was tendered, but appeared to be 2 Stra. 827. after the twenty years elapsed, it was rejected as inadmissible evidence. For in the preceding case, the indorsement was admitted, because it appeared to have been made at a time, when it could not have been thought necessary to encounter the presumption; but this was made after the presumption had occured. 2. DEBT, grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty, and actions of debt for the arrearages of rent, may be brought at any time within six years next after the cause of such actions, and not after. Stat. 1785, c. 52, s. 1. Freeman v. Stacey, 1 Esp. Dig. 269. Jones v. Pope, 1 Saund. 37. Stat. 1786, c. 52, s. 1. Catling v. Skoulding, 6 T. R. 189. 2 Mass. Rep. 217. The above provision is copied from a similar provision of an English statute, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, as to which it has been decided. 1. That it only extends to rent due on a parol demise; for arrears due on an indenture of lease are not within the statute. 2. Neither is it pleadable to any thing but simple con tracts. For in debt against a sheriff, for money levied under an execution, he cannot plead the statute; for though it is not a record till the writ is returned, yet it is founded on a record, and hath a near relation to it. 3. ASSUMPSIT. Actions of account and upon the case, other than such accounts as concern the trade of merchandize between merchant and merchant, their factors or servants, may be brought at any time within six years next after the cause of such action, and not after.(1) Upon the statute of James, it has been decided, that if there be a mutual account of any sort, between the plaintiff and defendant, for any item of which credit has been given within six years, that is evidence of an acknowledgement of there being such an open account between the parties, and of a promise to pay the balance, so as to take the case out of the statute. The propriety of the above decision was recognized in Cogswell v. Dolliver, and Sewall J. said, "there being evidence of subsisting accounts between the parties, every new additional charge by one party revives the account of the other party, and is evidence from which the law implies a promise of adjustment, and for the payment of the balance as it shall appear." And per Sedgwick, J. "if any of the articles charged in an account were sold and delivered within six years preceding the commence (1) The statute of limitations of another state cannot be pleaded in bar of an action commenced here, by inhabitants of such other state, upon a promissory note executed there by the defendants, citizens of this state. 2 Mass. Rep. 84. |