estate, nothing that can be assigned by him to any other; because the lessor may determine his will, and put him out. But every estate at will, is at the will of both parties, Ibid. landlord and tenant; so that either of them may determine his will, and quit his connexions with the other.

Yet this must be understood with some restrictions. For if the tenant at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe, or before it is reaped, puts him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free ingress, egress and regress, to cut and carry away the profits. But it is otherwise, where the tenant himself determines the will; for, in this case, the landlord, shall have the profits of the land.

An estate at will may be determined by the express declaration of the lessor, of which he must give notice to the lessee, or by giving a deed or lease for years, to commence immediately, or by the desertion of the tenant, his making an assignment of the estate to another, or by his committing waste. So the death of either party is a determination of the estate.

The law is, however, careful that no sudden determination of the will, by one party, shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. (3)

(3) The old tenancy at will being attended with many inconveniences, the inclination of the English courts has, of late, been against the construing demises, where there is not any certain term mentioned, to be tenancies at will; and it has been considered as more advantageous to the parties, that such demises should be construed to be tenancies from year to year, so long as both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved; in which case neither party can determine the tenancy without reasonable notice to the other. Selw. 626. 2 Bl. Com. 147.

Ibid. 145, 140.

1bid. 146.

Ibid

TITLE XCVII.

4 Bl. Com. 150.

Selw. 925.

2 Esp. Dig. 240.

Selw.925.

Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531.

LIBEL.

A LIBEL, taken in its largest and most extensive sense, signifies any writing, picture or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency. It usually signifies a malicious defamation of any person, made public by either printing, writing, signs or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.

1. Of libels, considered as civil injuries.

2. Of libels considered as offences against the peace.

I. Of libels considered as civil injuries.

An action on the case is maintainable against any person, who falsely and maliciously publishes any libel against another.

Slander by libel differs only from slander by words in this, that it is delivered in writing, printing, &c. But the offence of a libel is more heinous, as its circulation of the slander is more extensive, and derives, too, an additional degree of malignity from its being done with premeditation.

As, therefore, there is a difference between the malignity and injurious consequences of slanderous words spoken or written, the one being sudden and fleeting, the other permanent, deliberate and disseminated with greater ease; many words which, if spoken, would not be actionable, are actionable if published in the way of a libel.

Hence the word swindler, if spoken of another, (unless it be spoken in relation to his trade or business) is not

actionable; but if it be published in the way of a libel, it is actionable.

J'Anson v. Stuart,

1 T. R. 748.

Villers v. Monsley,

Hence, also, the publication of a letter, containing some verses, in which plaintiff was called an itchy old 2 Wils. 403. toad, was deemed a libel.

So the publication of a letter, in which plaintiff was Bell v. Stone,

stated to be one of the most infernal villains that ever disgraced human nature, has been holden actionable, without proof of special damage.

1 Bos. and T’ul. 331.

1 Esp. N. P. C. 28. Kenyon, C. J.

A fair and candid comment on a place of public entertainment, in a news-paper, is not a libel. So a fair, plain, unvarnished account of the proceed- 1 Bos. and Pul. 525. ings of a court of justice, is not a libel, but a highly coloured account of such proceedings, mixed up with insinuations of perjury, cannot be justified.

So a false or scandalous matter contained in a petition to a committee of a legislature, or in articles of the peace exhibited to justices of the peace, or in any other proceedings in a regular court of justice, will not make the complaint amount to a libel.

7 East. 493.

Selw. 926.

Delany v. Jones,

Although that which is written may be injurious to the character of another, yet if done bona fide, or with a 4 Esp. N. P. C. 191. view of investigating a fact, in which the party making it is interested, it is not held libellous. Hence, where an advertisement was published by the defendant, at the instigation of A. the plaintiff's wife, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the plaintiff had another wife living when he married A.; it was holden, that although the advertisement might impute bigamy to the plaintiff, yet having been published under such authority, and with such a view, it was not libellous.

A defamatory writing, expressing one or two letters of a name, in such a manner, that from what goes before and follows after, it must needs be understood to signify such a particular person, in the plain, obvious and natural construction of the whole, and would be perfect nonsense if strained to any other meaning, is as properly a libel as

Selw. 927.

Ibid.

Zenobio v. Axtell, 6 T. R. 162.

Selw. 929.

Ibid.

Ibid. 930.

R. v. Almon, 5. Burr. 2686.

Selw. 930.

Per Cur. in

4 Mass. Rep. 108.

if it had expressed the whole name at large; for it brings the utmost contempt upon the law to suffer its justice to be eluded by such trifling evasions.

This is a transitory action, and consequently the venue may be laid in any county.

If the libel be written in a foreign language, the original should first be set forth in the declaration, and then the translation.

The general issue in this action is not guilty.

If the matter of the libel be true, the defendant may plead it in justification.

The libel must be produced and read, and it must be proved that it was published by the defendant.

If it be proved that the libel was bought in the shop of a bookseller, of a person acting in the shop as the servant of the bookseller, this will be prima facie evidence of a publication by the bookseller, inasmuch as he has the profits of the shop, and is, therefore, answerable for the consequences.

If the libel be in a foreign language, in which case, as it has already been observed, the libel must be set forth in the declaration, both in the original language, and in an English translation, further proof will be necessary.

II. Of libels considered as offences against the peace. The cause why libellous publications are offences Commonw. v. Clap, against the state, is their direct tendency to a breach of the public peace, by provoking the parties injured, and their friends and families to acts of revenge, which it would not be easy to restrain, were offences of this kind not severely punished. And every day's experience will justify the law in attributing to libels that tendency, which renders the publication of them an offence against the state. The essence of the offence consists in the malice of the publication, or the intent to defame the reputation of another. In the definition of a libel, as an offence against law, it is not considered whether the

publication be true or fale; because a man may maliciously publish the truth against another, with the intent to defame his character: and if the publication be true, the tendency of it to inflame the passions, and to excite revenge, is not diminished, but may, sometimes, be strengthened.

The inference is therefore very clear, that the defendant cannot justify himself for publishing a libel, merely by proving the truth of the publication.

If the law admitted the truth of the words to be a justification, the effect would be a greater injury to the party libelled. He is not a party to the prosecution, nor is he put on his defence; and the evidence, at the trial, might more cruelly defame his character, than the original libel. Although the truth of the words is no justification in a criminal prosecution for a libel, yet the defendant may repel the charge, by proving that the publication was for a justifiable purpose, and not malicious, nor with the intent to defame any man. And there may be cases, where the defendant, having proved the purpose justifiable, may give in evidence the truth of the words, when such evidence will tend to negative the malice and intent to defame.

Upon this principle, a man may apply, by complaint, to the legislature, to remove an unworthy officer; and if the complaint be true, and made with the honest intention of giving useful information, and not maliciously, or with intent to defame, the complaint will not be a libel.

Ibid.

And when any man shall consent to be a candidate for a public office, conferred by the election of the people, he must be considered as putting his character in issue, so far as it may respect his fitness and qualifications for the office. And publications of the truth, on this subject, with the honest intention of informing the people, are not a libel. For it would be unreasonable to conclude, that the publication of truths, which it is the intent of

Ibid. 169.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.