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"received of individuals for grain $365.68." The proceeds of the sale of the goods and chattels and of the grain is thus made to amount to $592.06. The amount of goods and chattels and of grain contained in the inventory and appraisement amounts only to $425.89. This shows that the executor had then received on account of grain $166.17 more than the amount at which it was appraised; and with this sum, erroneously entered at $164.17, he was charged in the account as settled by the court.

The natural inference from the face of the inventory and of the account as stated is that the charge is correct. And this inference is confirmed by the executor's book of account, in which he has charged himself with a much larger amount for grain appraised than appears upon the face of the inventory. The court below therefore very naturally, and upon that evidence alone it would seem very properly decided that the executor should be charged with the excess received for grain above the amount specified in the inventory. Nor did the solution of the difficulty suggested at the bar of this court, to wit, that the excess had been received from the tenants of the Snyder farm, and was not included in the inventory, satisfactorily account for the discrepancy. The receipts from this source prior to the date of the account were much less than the excess, and if the receipts from the homestead farm had been included, they were much greater. It is obvious moreover, from the face of the account, that the executor was attempting to show the deficiency in the estate received, as compared with the appraisement. He states that deficit at $61.85. With this object in view, he would not have included receipts from any other source than the items comprised in the inventory without a special mention of that fact. With this view of the evidence this court, upon the argument, was satisfied that the court below were right in making the allowance. It is nevertheless an error which is susceptible of demonstration from the evidence in the cause.

Among the items contained in the inventory on file is the following: "A. Godley and others, $174.62." No explanation is given of the nature or origin of the indebtedness. The executor, in his evidence, states that that item is "for grain hauled to Godley's mills before the testator died." On turning to a rough and more specific inventory of the estate, which was never filed, and which was put in evidence not by the executor but by the exceptant, the following items appear:

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and corresponding in amount with the item contained in the inventory on file, as "A. Godley and others, $174.62."

In the executor's book of account, among the credits of moneys received, are found the following entries:

66

1850. June 12, Cash from Samuel Vansyckle, appraised,
20, Received of Augustus Godley balance due
for grain, appraised,

1851. May 30, Cash of Forman Vanderbelt, appraised,
Also the following:

1850. June 20, Cash received for oats, appraised,

Aug. 2, Cash of A. Godley, for grain appraised,

1852. March 29, Cash of Charles Bartolette, for oats ap

praised,

Amounting to

$42.18

118.44

14.00

8.40

169.01

13.65

$365.68

These items were all received prior to the application by the executor to sell the real estate, and they constitute the precise amount with which the executor then charged himself as "received of individuals for grain." It is obvious, therefore, that the supposed discrepancy does not exist, and that the charge against the executor is erroneous. The whole difficulty has grown out of the defective character of the inventory, and exhibits in a striking point of view the impropriety of suffering such inventories to be filed. They are in direct contravention of the act of 1855. Nix. Dig. 561, § 49. They do not answer the design of the law. They fail to furnish to parties interested the very information which they were designed to supply. They often lead, as in this case, to useless litigation, imperil the rights of parties, impose upon courts the painful duty of groping for the truth in the dark, or of deciding by uncertain and unreliable tests of truth. The court below were misled entirely by the defects and virtual misrepresentations of the inventory, and this court was saved from falling into the same error mainly by exhibits offered on the part of the exceptant. In this case it is true the loss of the mistake would have fallen where it justly belonged, on the head of the party guilty of the negligence that occasioned it. But it falls, it is to be feared, too often upon unsuspecting heirs and confiding relatives, who are made the victims of the carelessness or fraud which covers up the real truth under the shelter of general and unintelligible inventories. I know that these inventories are frequently exhibited under the plea of economy, the executor retaining in his possession, as in this case, a more specific one. But that does not answer the design of the law. The parties interested are entitled to the information as well as the executor. It should be in their power, as well as in his, and should not be subject to the hazard of suppression or loss. I feel it my duty to protest earnestly against the practice, not only from the embarrassment it has occasioned in this particular case, but because I regard it as a fruitful source of litigation and as opening a wide door to fraud and injustice.

Justice requires that in all cases the requirements of the statute should be strictly complied with. . .

.1

1 Compare Craig v. McGehee, 16 Ala. 41; Arendale v. Smith, 107 Ga. 494; Estate of Fletcher, 83 Neb. 156; Pennington v. Newman, 36 Okl. 594.

As to when an administrator or executor can or cannot be charged with the full amount of an item in the inventory, see Estate of Taylor, 52 Cal. 477; Tell City Furniture Co. v. Stiles, 60 Miss. 849; Julian v. Abbott, 73 Mo. 580; Booker v. Armstrong, 93 Mo. 49; Harrington v. Keteltas, 92 N. Y. 40; Hobbs v. Craige, 1 Ired. 332; Lightcaps Appeal, 95 Pa. 455; Anderson v. Piercy, 20 W. Va. 282, 325; and see ante, p. 499,

note.

"The form in which the inventory is made out and presented to the surrogate, is exceptionable. It is not, strictly speaking, an inventory, but rather an abstract or compendium of one. One item is, 'Cash, bonds, notes, &c., $13,993.06. Another, 'Household goods and kitchen furniture, $298.00.' A third, 'Horses, cows, and swine, $268.00. This is a common mode, I believe, in some parts of the State. A particular list is made out in the first place, as the appraisement proceeds; but before it is sent to the office it is abbreviated so as simply to show gross amounts. This is done, as in the present case, without any intention of doing wrong; but the practice is not to be commended. Surrogates would do right to reject such papers as inventories. They often work injury to creditors and legatees, and sometimes involve executors and administrators in serious difficulty. In fact, it is almost impossible to settle any estate with intelligence and accuracy without other aids than they furnish." - Per Vroom C., in Vanmeter v. Jones, 2 Green H. W. 520, 538.

CHAPTER VIII.

INHERITANCE TAXES.

United States.

ESTATE TAX ACT, Sept. 8, 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat., p. 777. Sec. 201. That a tax (hereinafter in this title referred to as the tax), equal to the following percentages of the value of the net estate, to be determined as provided in section two hundred and three, is hereby imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage of this Act, whether a resident or nonresiIdent of the United States:

One per centum of the amount of such net estate not in excess of $50,000;

Two per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $50,000 and does not exceed $150,000;

Three per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $150,000 and does not exceed $250,000;

Four per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $250,000 and does not exceed $450,000;

Five per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $450,000 and does not exceed $1,000,000;

Six per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $1,000,000 and does not exceed $2,000,000;

Seven per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $2,000,000 and does not exceed $3,000,000;

Eight per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $3,000,000 and does not exceed $4,000,000;

Nine per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $4,000,000 and does not exceed $5,000,000; and

Ten per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds $5,000,000.

SEC. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:

(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate.

(b) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has

created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth. Any transfer of a material part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death without such a consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title; and (c) To the extent of the interest therein held jointly or as tenants in the entirety by the decedent and any other person, or deposited in banks or other institutions in their joint names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have belonged to the decedent.

For the purpose of this title stock in a domestic corporation · owned and held by a nonresident decedent shall be deemed property within the United States, and any property of which the decedent has made a transfer or with respect to which he has created a trust, within the meaning of subdivision (b) of this section, shall be deemed to be situated in the United States, if so situated either at the time of the transfer or the creation of the trust, or at the time of the decedent's death.

SEC. 203. That for the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined

(a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the gross estate

(1) Such amounts for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages, losses incurred during the settlement of the estate arising from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty, and from theft, when such losses are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, support during the settlement of the estate of those dependent upon the decedent, and such other charges against the estate, as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States, under which the estate is being administered; and

(2) An exemption of $50,000;

(b) In the case of a nonresident, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the time of his death is situated in the United States that proportion of the deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this section which the value of such part bears to the value of his entire gross estate, wherever situated. But no deductions shall be allowed in the case of a nonresident unless the executor includes in the return required to be filed under section two hundred and five the value at the time of his death of that part of the gross estate of the nonresident not situated in the United States.

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