change will come under consideration. And there is also an advantage in the greater permanence which is gained, if to the members of one of these bodies a longer term of office is given, as is the case with our Senate.

There is still another reason. It was deemed desirable to give a portion of executive power, or rather a direct check upon the executive power, to the legislative body. And this could be done more safely and more conveniently if there were two bodies, one smaller and more permanent than the other, and by this permanence further removed from the passions or prejudices of the hour and the fluctuations of public opinion; and to this smaller body was given this restraint over the executive

SECTION VI.

OF THE SENATE.

The Senate is composed of two senators from each State; and each senator has one vote.

It has equal and concurrent power with the House in all the common topics of legislation, excepting that the seventh section of the first article declares that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." This provision is undoubtedly copied from the British Parliament. There only the House of Commons can originate money bills, as they are called. How this usage, which has now become a settled rule, grew up, is not certainly known: but probably from the fact that the House of Commons itself began by the calling together by the King of persons from the boroughs, cities and counties, when he wanted supplies of money from them. In our constitution, this privilege of originating a measure which would tax the people was given exclusively to the representatives, because that body came directly, and most recently, from the people. Perhaps an additional reason was found in the wish to balance the two Houses properly. As the Senate must concur with the President in making war and peace, and so may be said to have hold of the sword of the nation, it was thought well to give to the representatives the exclusive power to originate money bills, and thus to give them a stronger hold upon the nation's purse. In Great Britain, the lords can do nothing with a money bill but accept or reject it. Our Senate, however, may propose amendments, as in other

bills.

The senators are not chosen directly by the people of a State, but by the legislature; thus making another difference between them and the representatives. The constitution does not prescribe the manner in which senators should be chosen; but, as it was obviously desirable that there should be some uniformity in this respect, it was provided by a law approved July 25th, 1866, that the legislatures of the several States should elect senators in the following manner: Each House, by a viva voce vote of each member present, shall name a person for senator, on the second Tuesday after the meeting and organization thereof. On the day following, both Houses shall meet in assembly. If the same person has received a majority of all the votes cast in each House, he shall be declared duly elected senator; if not, the assembly shall proceed to choose a person by a viva voce vote, and if that person shall receive a majority of all votes of the joint assembly, a majority of the members of each House being present, he shall be declared duly elected. If no senator is elected on the first day, the joint assembly shall meet and take at least one vote each day, until an election is secured. When a vacancy shall occur during the session of a legislature, the same proceedings shall be held on the second Tuesday after notice of such vacancy shall be received.

The only objection to this method is, that it puts it in the power of a majority of either House to prevent an election, by staying away from the assembly. The constitution does not declare whether the governor of each State must approve the election, as in the case of common bills; but usage seems to have settled that his approval is not necessary, and consequently that he cannot invalidate the election by withholding his approval.

Senators are elected for six years; and are divided, by senatorial act, into classes, one-third, or as nearly that as is practicable, going out every two years; care being taken that the two senators from each State shall go out in different years.

This term of six years was a compromise between extreme views: some of those who framed the constitution wishing them to retain office during good behavior,—that is, for life, unless they misbehaved; others saw no reason why they should retain office longer than the representatives. But the desire to give to the Senate more stability and permanence prevailed, and so the term of six years was adopted.

We have seen that the Senate, if not a sharer in the executive power, holds at least a most important check upon it, inasmuch as the President can take but few important measures without the advice and consent of the Senate. Only with it can he appoint ambassadors, consuls, and other public ministers, and judges of the Supreme Court. Congress may by law vest the appointment of

inferior offices as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and have done so to some extent.

The President alone, as the supreme executive of the nation, can make treaties with foreign States and powers. But the treaty is not valid unless two-thirds of the senators present when the vote is taken concur. As the Senate thus seems to partake of the executive power, so it seems to partake of the judicial power, in that it sits as a supreme court for the trial of impeachments. That topic, however, will be treated of in its own section.

POWER AS TO THEIR OWN MEMBERS.

Each House is the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. This would seem to be a power of judgment over the right of any person to become a member. Generally, if this right comes into question, it is by the petition or remonstrance of some other person who claims to be a member, thus giving rise to what is called a "contested election." When such a case occurs, it is investigated according to the rules of the House to which contestants claim to belong. This is usually, or perhaps always, done through a committee, who ascertain the facts, and report them to the House, which then proceeds to adjudge the question. The power to expel a member is given by the clause immediately following. The question may be asked, If either House of Congress exercises either the power of admission or the power of expulsion wantonly and wrongfully, what is the remedy? The answer is, There is no remedy. Some court, or body, or tribunal, must decide all questions without appeal, or there would be no final decision. This final power is given to each House upon these questions. A wrongful decision would be, in this respect, like the verdict of acquittal by a jury of a person charged with crime, and proved beyond all rational question to be guilty. If the jury see fit to say he is not guilty, he must go free, and the verdict cannot be annulled or questioned. In Massachusetts, where each house of the legislature has this power, a mai was expelled for misbehavior from the House of Representatives. He carried the case to the Supreme Court; but that body decided that they had no power over the decision of the House.

SECTION VII.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Representatives are chosen by the people of the several States. They are apportioned among the States according to the number of

people in each State, and this number is ascertained by the national census, of which more will be said presently. The second section of the first clause of the constitution provides that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand; that an enumeration of the people shall be made within three years after the first meeting of Congress; that each State shall have at least one representative; and that, until an enumeration is made, New Hampshire shall be entitled to three; Massachusetts, eight; Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, one; Connecticut, five; New York, six; New Jersey, four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, six; Virginia, ten; North Carolina, five; South Carolina, five; and Georgia, three. Sixty-five in all. The present number is two hundred and ninety-two. A table will be given presently, one column of which, giving the number of representatives to each State, shows that four of the thirty-seven States have but one representative each, while New York has thirty-three.

SECTION VIII.

PRIVILEGES OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.

FREEDOM FROM ARREST.

The first paragraph of the sixth section of the first clause of the constitution contains a provision which is very easily misunderstood as to its ground and purpose. The provision is, that senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same. This provision is undoubtedly imitated from a rule of the British Parliament. There it grew up as a personal privilege, which, in the days when arrest for debt was allowed and practised far more than it is now, was of great value.

But this provision was not inserted in our constitution on the same ground, although it has the same effect. It was intended to secure to the nation the services of its servants, when employed in attending to its business, from hinderance or interruption from the pecuniary claims of individual creditors. It does not relieve the members from the necessity of answering in person when they have committed some public wrong, for the public interest requires that all men should be amenable to the law in such case; but they cannot be arrested for debt, nor taken on execution for debt.

NOT TO BE QUESTIONED ELSEWHERE FOR SPEECH IN EITHER

HOUSE.

The last clause of this same paragraph provides that they shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate in either House. This, also, is not intended merely as a personal privilege to the members; but to secure to them, for the public good, the most perfect freedom of discussion and debate. Nor is it intended to authorize or sanction any abuse of this power, by permitting members to indulge, without check or fear of punishment, in personal vituperation, or in malignant slander, or in giving credit and wide diffusion to statements and allegations which they know to be false. It is said that members shall not be questioned for speech or debate "in any other place." But, then, in that place, when such malignity expresses itself, it may be questioned, and should be questioned. This is one of those powers which must be given; for the public good imperatively demands it, however liable to abuse it may be. Surely the wise framers of our constitution were not mistaken in believing that the sense of honor and of duty of each House would suffice to prevent any frequent or extreme misuse of the right of debate, even if the sense of personal decency did not suffice to restrain members.

SECTION IX.

POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE.

The clause of the constitution which relates to this subject gives power to Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." Every part of this clause, and almost every word of it, has given rise to much discussion, and presented questions not without their difficulty We will first consider

COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS.

It is obvious that such a power is absolutely necessary to our holding any distinct place among the nations. It is probable that some commerce existed among different tribes and races from the earliest dawn of civilization. With the growth of civilization commerce grew, and in recent times it has reached an enormous extent.

It seems to be an appointed means of bringing nations together, and