called. The larger States claimed that all the land within their chartered boundaries should belong to them. The smaller States insisted that the western regions, so far as they were unoccupied, should belong as a common property to the whole country. After much exciting controversy, which more than once threatened the existence of the confederacy, this question was settled by a concession to the confederacy, by the larger States, of a great part of the unsettled territory claimed by them.

These obstacles not only obstructed and delayed the formation of a confederacy, until they were overcome by the absolute necessity oi' union and co-operation in resisting the efforts of Great Britain to preserve her sovereignty, but they made the Articles of Confederation a most imperfect instrument. While the war lasted, it sufficed tolerably well for its purpose; and one reason for this was that Congress took whatever measures seemed necessary, without any careful observance of the limits imposed by the articles; and the people seeing the necessity made no opposition. But when peace came, it may be said that the Articles of Confederation broke down. The reason was, that the general jealousy of a central government had withheld from it powers absolutely necessary to its existence. It had, indeed, no power of self-protection, no power of compulsion, no power of carrying into effect its own resolves. They could raise no money, and no army. They could appoint ambassadors, but could pay them nothing. They could conclude treaties, but only advise the execution of them. It was but the semblance of a government, with little of its substance.

For all this, the Articles of Confederation must be regarded as the nearest approach to a national government that the temper of the people at that time made possible. They were a step in that direction, and an important step; but it was only one step towards that result.

The Articles of Confederation did not even purport to make of us a nation. If they are studied, they will prove the earnest desire of some at least of those who drew them, that we might become a nation. But they stopped so far short of this as to form of the States only a confederacy. These articles were skilfully drawn, and gave to the central government all the power which the States could then be induced to part with. Some semblance something indeed of the substance of national power- was given; although there was no regular legislative, executive, or judicial department. Probably all the power was given to Congress that it was thought necessary that it should possess to do the work that lay before it. This work it did, well and thoroughly; for while the thirteen States were held together by the presence of a common enemy, a common

war, and a common necessity, the Articles of Confederation sufficed to make that war triumphant; but they sufficed for this, because the sagacity and singleness of purpose of the men who wielded the powers of government, the patriotism of the people, and the wisdom and constancy of Washington, supplied so far at least as was needed for success - all deficiencies.

Then came peace, and it was soon apparent that the want of unity in the nation, and of power in the government and its organs, not only prevented the deep wounds of the war from healing, but seemed even to aggravate all the mischiefs which followed, and made the first years of peace no years of returning prosperity. The central government, no longer sustained and invigorated by the war, found itself utterly unable to prevent or to avenge insults and outrages to our flag: it could not even repel the incursion of the savages on our borders; it could not pay the interest of our national debt; it had no credit, no force, no vital energy, and it may well be said to have died of inherent weakness; for in 1787 it abrogated its own functions, declared its inability to act as the government of a nation, and it appealed to the ultimate source of all political power, the people of the whole country. And then came the convention of 1787. When it met, there was in that assembly as much of sagacity, of varied intellectual accomplishment and resource, and of earnest devotion to duty, as ever co-operated in a great work. And with all these mingled as little of folly and weakness, as little personal ambition, as little self-seeking of any kind, and as little of the disturbing force which these ignoble qualities would exert, as was possible under the conditions of humanity.

If, in saying that the old Articles of Confederation carried this country successfully through the war of independence, I give them high praise, I believe that I give them still higher when I say that they made the national Constitution possible. These articles familiarized the minds of the whole country with the idea of united action and a central government. They proved indisputably the immense advantages which might be obtained thereby; and they proved as certainly that to secure all these advantages it was absolutely necessary that the nation should have a greater unity than they gave to it, and the central government more power. Aided and illustrated by the course of events, they produced a general impression, especially among leading minds, everywhere, that there might be a stricter national unity, and a stronger central government, without absorbing or imperilling those State rights which were deservedly dear to the people of every State. Thus it was that this jealous love for the sovereign rights of the several States yielded slowly, reluctantly, and only step by step, to the inevitable

necessity for closer union. This jealousy was, at the beginning, paramount and extreme. It was not suppressed and overcome, but moderated until it stood in just equilibrium with the prevailing sense of the need and the good of a national existence and a national government. Then these two sentiments, or principles, met and co-operated; and the result was, the Constitution of the United States, formed in the manner to be stated in the next section. And this, I again declare, I regard not merely as the best which could then have been made, but as in itself good, and very good, and the best for the good of the whole nation which could have been made, by any men, under any circumstances.

I do not consider that this constitution came into being in itself perfect, and in itself able to go forward for ever, the instrument of a great nation's growth, prosperity, and happiness, with no more help, with no new influences to bear upon it and give to it added life and energy and efficiency. I mean no such thing. It needed more, a vast deal more, before it could become - what I think it is to be a permanent instrument of the greatest, the highest, and the completest political good.

The problem to be solved in the establishment of this government, or, as it may be better said, in the formation of this nation, was to create the best possible form of a republican government by the perfect reconciliation of the two elements of central power and reserved rights.

In other words of the same meaning, the problem was to create a system of government which should arm the central power with all the force which it could usefully exert, and yet leave to all whom it gathered within its wide embrace, the utmost possible freedom for self-government, and the strongest assurance that this freedom should be guarded but not weakened, protected and not impaired.

This was done by the Constitution, as far as written words could do it. For after all our experience, at this day no words could mend that constitution in this respect; none could make this balance of forces more perfect. But another thing could be done, and remained to be done. It was to fix the meaning of this constitution by practical construction. To fasten on the public mind the conviction, and fill with it the public heart, that our constitution meant, on the one hand, a preservation of State rights, and on the other, indissoluble national unity; and to root this conviction into the public life firmly, so that no storm could shake it, and so that no devastating force could rend it away. It may not be possible to prevent these two elements from sometimes, during the ages that will come, rising separately into undue prominence. At one time, or by one body or class, the national unity may be urged until it threatens consolidation, and

at another time the principle of State rights may again assert itself too strongly. But it may be hoped that their reconciliation is hereafter to be so established, not by the written constitution only, but by the constitution of the public sentiment and the public will, that it will stand, even as our continent stands upon its rocky base, no more to be moved from its foundation than our continent is moved by the two great oceans which beat upon its shores.

SECTION III.

THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

As the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation became apparent, and the need of concerted action was felt, efforts were made in that direction. Thus, in 1785, Virginia and Maryland appointed commissioners to form some agreement concerning the navigation of the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, and the Chesapeake Bay. These commissioners met at Alexandria, and found they could do little good unless some provision could be made for a general tariff of duties upon imports, and they reported the need of this to the legislature of Virginia. Whereupon that State, on the 21st of January, 1786, appointed commissioners, "who were to meet such as might be appointed by the other States in the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial relations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States such an act relative to this great object as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress assembled effectually to provide for the same."

The appointment of commissioners for this purpose was notified to the other States; but only four others, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, responded by the appointment of commissioners. In September, 1786, commissioners from these five States met at Annapolis. All that they did, however, was to lay before Congress and the several States a report, in which they recommend that all the States should appoint commissioners, to meet in convention at Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May, 1787, "to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by

them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same."

The reasons assigned for bringing the subject before a convention especially chosen for that purpose, rather than leaving it to Congress, were, "that in the latter body it might be too much interrupted by the ordinary business before them, and would, besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry individuals who were disqualified by the constitution or laws of particular States, or restrained by peculiar circumstances from a seat in that assembly."

Little do the people of this country know, difficult will it be for them to believe, the condition of public affairs and public opinion at that time. But all of us ought to know it, for it may help us to value more that constitution, which, under Divine Providence, was the instrument by which safety from these perils was at last attained. That we may better understand what these perils were, let me give extracts from some of the letters written at that time by some of our ablest and wisest men. John Jay writes to Washington, on the 16th March, 1786: "Experience has pointed out errors in our national government which call for correction, and which threaten to blast the fruit we expected from our tree of liberty. The convention proposed by Virginia may do some good, and would perhaps do more, if it comprehended more objects. An opinion begins to prevail that a general convention for revising the Articles of Confederation would be expedient. Whether the people are yet ripe for such a measure, or whether the system proposed to be attained by it is only to be expected from calamity and commotion, is difficult to ascertain. I think we are in a delicate situation, and a variety of considerations and circumstances give me uneasiness. It is in contemplation to take measures for forming a general convention. The plan is not matured. If it should be well considered, and take effect, I am fervent in my wishes that it may comport with the line of life you have marked out for yourself, to favor your country with your councils on such an important and single occasion. [ suggest this merely as a hint for consideration."

On the 27th of June he writes: "Our affairs seem to lead to some crisis, some revolution, something that I cannot foresee or conjecture. I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war. Then, we had a fixed object, and though the means and time of obtaining it were often problematical, yet I did firmly believe that we should ultimately succeed, because I did firmly believe that justice was with us. The case is now altered, we are going and doing wrong, and therefore I look forward to evils and calamities, but without being able to guess at the instrument, nature, or meas