XIV. CHAPTER public made her much less formidable as an adversary than she had seemed to be a year or two before. 1799. Even apart from these considerations of policy, the late wrongs and insults of the French rankled deeply in ardent bosoms. Among a large part of the more intelligent and better-educated people—and of such the Federal party was composed-that attachment for France which had sprung so suddenly into existence cotemporaneously with the French alliance, and which the early progress of the French Revolution had raised to a high pitch of enthusiasm, had begun to be replaced by a feeling compounded of old traditional prejudices against the French, and of that horror, dread, and detestation which the atrocities of the Revolution, the overbearing insolence of the Republic, and, in particular, the abolition of the Christian worship, had combined to excite. It began to be argued, and with a good deal of plausibility, that the French alliance had never been of any advantage to America; that, so far from having secured our independence, as the French and their partisans alleged, it had, in fact, by arousing in Great Britain a bitter spirit of national jealousy, operated to protract a contest which, but for the interference of France, would have been much sooner ended, and without leaving behind it such deep traces as it had of anger and hate. France, so it was argued, had originally espoused our cause, not from any love to us, but from desire to injure Great Britain. Indeed, proofs of her selfishness in this respect, derived from the French archives, had been brought over by Genet, and made public with the very view of proving that America owed no debt of gratitude to the fallen monarchy. New force was given by these documents to the old suspicions that, in the negotiation of the treaty of peace, France had played us false in the matter of the fisheries XIV. and the Western boundary. It was even endeavored to CHAPTER reflect back the recent insolence and bad faith of Talleyrand and the Directory upon Vergennes and Louis XVI., 1799. who seem (however some might have thought otherwise) always to have conducted toward the United States with candor and generosity. It was also endeavored to trace back that French influence, so conspicuous in the United States within the last few years, to a still earlier period; and the journals of the old confederation were quoted to show that the famous instructions to the American commissioners for negotiating peace, to submit themselves in all things to the direction of France, had been carried against New England by the votes of Virginia and the South. Subserviency to France, which it was thus attempted to fix upon Virginia even at that early day, lay at the bottom, so it was argued, of the whole opposition to the Federal government, and nothing would effectually serve to counteract and destroy it except war with the French republic; or, if the people could not be brought to that, a continuance in the existing position of commercial non-intercourse and resistance to aggressions. This position, as must be evident at a single glance, was a very different one from that occupied by Adams and the Federal party at the commencement of his administration. It was going quite as far against France, and for very similar reasons too, as the opposition had been inclined to go against England; a complete abandonment, in fact, of that system of neutrality which Washington had proclaimed, and upon which Adams had insisted, as at once the right and the true policy of America. Because a portion of the Federalists had changed their views, was Adams obliged to change with. them? Was he, as a party political expedient, to assume the terrible responsibility of plunging the nation XIV. CHAPTER public made her much less formidable as an adversary than she had seemed to be a year or two before. 1799. Even apart from these considerations of policy, the late wrongs and insults of the French rankled deeply in ardent bosoms. Among a large part of the more intelligent and better-educated people—and of such the Federal party was composed-that attachment for France which had sprung so suddenly into existence cotemporaneously with the French alliance, and which the early progress of the French Revolution had raised to a high pitch of enthusiasm, had begun to be replaced by a feeling compounded of old traditional prejudices against the French, and of that horror, dread, and detestation which the atrocities of the Revolution, the overbearing insolence of the Republic, and, in particular, the abolition of the Christian worship, had combined to excite. It began to be argued, and with a good deal of plausibility, that the French alliance had never been of any advantage to America; that, so far from having secured our independence, as the French and their partisans alleged, it had, in fact, by arousing in Great Britain a bitter spirit of national jealousy, operated to protract a contest which, but for the interference of France, would have been much sooner ended, and without leaving behind it such deep traces as it had of anger and hate. France, so it was argued, had originally espoused our cause, not from any love to us, but from desire to injure Great Britain. Indeed, proofs of her selfishness in this respect, derived from the French archives, had been brought over by Genet, and made public with the very view of proving that America owed no debt of gratitude to the fallen monarchy. New force was given by these documents to the old suspicions that, in the negotiation of the treaty of peace, France had played us false in the matter of the fisheries XIV. and the Western boundary. It was even endeavored to CHAPTER reflect back the recent insolence and bad faith of Talleyrand and the Directory upon Vergennes and Louis XVI., 1799. who seem (however some might have thought otherwise) always to have conducted toward the United States with candor and generosity. It was also endeavored to trace back that French influence, so conspicuous in the United States within the last few years, to a still earlier period; and the journals of the old confederation were quoted to show that the famous instructions to the American commissioners for negotiating peace, to submit themselves in all things to the direction of France, had been carried against New England by the votes of Virginia and the South. Subserviency to France, which it was thus attempted to fix upon Virginia even at that early day, lay at the bottom, so it was argued, of the whole opposition to the Federal government, and nothing would effectually serve to counteract and destroy it except war with the French republic; or, if the people could not be brought to that, a continuance in the existing position of commercial non-intercourse and resistance to aggressions. This position, as must be evident at a single glance, was a very different one from that occupied by Adams and the Federal party at the commencement of his ad ministration. It was going quite as far against France, and for very similar reasons too, as the opposition had been inclined to go against England; a complete abandonment, in fact, of that system of neutrality which Washington had proclaimed, and upon which Adams had insisted, as at once the right and the true policy of America. Because a portion of the Federalists had changed their views, was Adams obliged to change with them? Was he, as a party political expedient, to assume the terrible responsibility of plunging the nation CHAPTER into all the sufferings, expenses, and dangers of a war? XIV. Even as a party expedient, was the policy of protracting 1799. the dispute with France so certain? All the considerations already suggested as motives for the nomination of Murray would weigh equally strong in favor of proceeding with the mission. How little to be relied upon the recent outbursts of Federal feeling really were, was apparent in the result of the Pennsylvania election, just concluded, in which M'Kean had been elected governor by twenty-eight thousand votes to twenty-three thousand for Ross, the Federal candidate. Nor did there seem any great force in the reasons urged for delaying the mission. The harder pressed the Directory were, the more likely they would be to treat. And even in case the Republic should fall, there would be no harm, as Adams suggested, to have envoys present on the spot to welcome the restoration of the ancient monarchy. So fluctuating, in fact, were the chances of war, that before the envoys reached France, the fortunes of the Republic had begun again to ascend. Had negotiation been unprovided for, the speedy European peace that followed would have left America to fight alone; or, that being out of the question, as it would have been, to accept such terms as France might choose to dictate. The wisdom of the mission being thus justified, as well on general considerations as by the actual result, it will not take long to dispose of the imputations against its author, freely thrown out at the time, and which have so often since been reiterated. The principal of these imputations are, jealousy of Hamilton, to whom a war would be likely to bring great addition of influence and reputation, and the hope, by appeasing the hostility of the opposition, to secure his own re-election. Give to these motives all the force which, under the circum |