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PERSON CONCERNED

cards are "persons losing," within the meanSee Concern.

ing of Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, c. 38, $ 132,

which provides that any person who shall PERSON CONVICTED

at any time or sitting by playing at cards See Convicted-Conviction.

lose to any person so playing any money

amounting to $10, and shall pay the same, PERSON DEPENDENT

may sue and recover the money by action See Dependent.

in assumpsit. Zellers v. White, 70 N. E. PERSON DERIVING AN INTEREST

669, 672, 208 Ill. 518, 100 Am. St. Rep. 243. See Interest.

PERSON MAKING ENTRY

One who makes an entry of coal lands PERSON DIRECTLY INTERESTED

avowedly for his own use and benefit is See Directly Interested.

“the person who made such entry," within PERSON DOING BUSINESS

the meaning of the act of June 16, 1880 (21

Stat. at L. 287, chap. 244, $ 2, providing for See Doing Business.

the repayment of the purchase price in case PERSON DOING CONTRACT WORK of subsequent cancellation, although he made

The phrase "persons doing contract the entry at the instance of a corporation, work," within an ordinance levying an oc

with its money and for its benefit. United cupation tax upon such persons, is broader States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 32 Sup. Ct. than the word “contractors,” including, be- 617, 619, 225 U. S. 219, 56 L. Ed. 1063. sides them, all persons engaged in any kind PERSON NAMED ON ITS FACE of work, pursuant to a contract, express or

Person to whom it is issued synonymous, implied. In re Unger, 98 Pac. 999, 1000, 1

see Person to Whom Issued. Okl. Or. 222.

PERSON OF AFRICAN DESCENT
PERSON EXERCISING SUPERIN-
TENDENCE

See African Descent.
See Superintendence.

PERSON OF COLOR PERSON FLEEING FROM JUSTICE

See Colored Person.. See Flee from Justice.

PERSON OF THE FAMILY PERSON HAVING CUSTODY OR CON

The word "person," as used in Rev. St. TROL

Mo. 1899, § 570, providing for service of a See Control

summons by leaving a copy of the petition

and writ at defendant's usual place of abode PERSON HOLDING STOCK AS TRUS- with some person of his family, is synonTEE

ymous with the word "member" as used in Rev. St. § 5152, providing that persons a return showing that a copy of the writ and holding stock in national banks as trustees petition was left with a member of defendshall not be personally liable as stockholders, ant's family. The words may be used interapplies to every one holding stock as trus- changeably. One could not be a person of tee, and a father who, as trustee for his chil. a family without being a member nor could dren, invested funds belonging to them in he be a member without being a person. such stock, is not personally liable for an Colter v. Luke, 108 S. W. 608, 109, 129 Mo. assessment thereon, although the fund in- App. 702. vested arose from an investment of his own Where, in an action for divorce, the commoney previously made by him in their be plaint alleged that plaintiff and defendant half. Fowler v. Gowing, 165 Fed. 891, 892, had been living together as husband and wife 91 C. C. A. 569.

until the day before the suit was commenced, PERSON IN CHARGE

and implied that, though prior thereto the See Charge.

parties had a joint residence in M. county,

such residence had been severed, and that PERSON INJURED

the plaintiff had the custody of the minor See Injured Person.

children, an order authorizing service of pro

cess on the defendant, temporarily residing PERSON IN PARENTAL RELATION without the state, by publication, was not See Parental Relation.

objectionable by reason of the fact that the

affidavit did not negative the possibility of PERSON INTERESTED

substituted service by delivering a copy to See Interest.

some person of defendant's family, above the Other person interested, see Other. age of 14 years, at his dwelling house or

usual place of abode. Then when a suit for PERSON LOSING

a divorce has been commenced, it must be All those who have lost more than they inferred that the marital relations have been have won during a sitting by playing at interrupted, and, the defendant being tempo

rarily absent, the plaintiff and the children, / PERSON WHO PERFORMS LABOR occupying the dwelling house or usual place in the statute which grants a lien to "erof abode of the defendant, are not "persons ery person who shall perform labor" upon a of the family" within the meaning of the mine and provides that "every laborer or term as used in the statute. McFarlane v. materialman" claiming under the act shall Cornelius, 73 Pac. 325, 327, 328, 43 Or. 513.

take certain steps to perfect his lien, the

phrase "person who shall perform labor," PERSON OF INDIAN BLOOD

etc., applies to ordinary laborers who perSee Indian.

form actual, visible toil with their hands or

muscles, other kinds of service not being PERSON OF INDIAN DESCENT

expressly mentioned, and does not embrace See Indians by Descent

superintendents or managers. Durkheimer v.

Copperopolis Copper Co., 104 Pac. 895, 896, PERSON OF ORDINARY CARE

55 Or, 37. See Ordinary Care.

PERSON WHO WOULD INHERIT AS PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND

HEIR See Unsound Mind.

Testator devised certain property to de

fendant for life, and, on his death, to his PERSON PRIMARILY LIABLE

child or children and their heirs, and, in See Primarily Liable.

case of defendant's death without leaving a

child or children or descendants, to such perPERSON TO WHOM ISSUED

sons as would under the laws of Maryland inThe phrase "person to whom it is issued,” | herit the same as the heirs of defendant had as used in a commutation ticket containing a he died intestate. Held, that the phrase stipulation that if it should be offered by any such persons as would inherit as heirs" had other than the person to whom it is issued the same effect as if the limitation over had it would be forfeited and taken up by the been to defendant's heirs, and hence defendconductor, is synonymous with “person nam- ant acquired the fee under the rule in Sheled on its face." Colton v. Delaware, L. & ley's Case. Cook v. Councilman, 72 A. 404. W. R. Co., 77 Atl. 1020, 80 N. J. Law, 592. 109 Md. 622.

PERSON WHO BUILDS

PERSON WITHIN THE STATE 1 The phrase "person who built it,” con- ! See Within the Jurisdiction. tained in the statute providing that the owner of a building lot might rest one-half | PERSONAL of the building wall on his neighbor's land The adjective "personal" is defined by and that the neighbor should have the right | Webster as pertaining to the external or bodthereafter to make it a wall in common by ily appearance. It is defined in the Century paying one-half of the value to the “person Dictionary as things of or pertaining to the who built it,” means the owner, whether he person. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Zwirtz, became such by building the wall in person or 73 Pac. 941, 942, 13 Okl. 411. hiring it done by another, or by purchasing It with the lot after it is built. Southworth PERSONAL ACTION v. Perring, 82 Pac. 785, 787, 71 Kan. 755, 2 An action under an act authorizing the L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 114 Am. St. Rep. 527 (cit. recovery of money paid and lost on a wager, ing Thomson v. Curtis, 28 Iowa, 229). | for money lost and paid on a bet on the re

sult of an election, is a "personal action" PERSON WHO MAKES, ALTERS, OR

and survives the death of plaintiff. Motlow REPAIRS

V. Johnson, 44 South. 42, 151 Ala. 276. A statute providing that a "person who

Mandamus is a "personal action," within makes, alters, or repairs" any article of per

Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p. 787, c. sonal property, or who, by labor or skill,

105, $ 2, declaring that all personal actions, improves such article, may have a special lien thereon, and may retain possession until

with specified exceptions, sball survive, and his charges are paid, creates a lien in favor

is a “suit at law," within Const. art. 4, § 26, of a bailee for hire, to whom property is

providing that no suit at law shall abate at delivered in the way of his trade or occupa

the death of any party, where the cause of tion, and who by his labor and skill imparts

action survives. State V. Jessup & Moore additional value thereto, but does not create

Paper Co. (Del.) 80 Atl. 350, 351. a lien in favor of a person who performs serv Where a tenant's property was sold unices with reference to personal property in der an agreement that the proceeds should be his possession as a mere servant. Michael-deposited in a bank for the purpose of satisson v. Fish, 81 Pac. 661, 662, 1 Cal. App. 116. fying the landlord's and other claims out of

them, an equitable proceeding by the landlord PERSON WHO MANAGES

to satisfy his claim out of the deposit, in See Manager.

which the bank, the tenant, and other claim.

ants were made parties, was a “personal ac- , for business purposes, are not "baggage" tion,” and not one against the deposit, so when put by the agent into his trunk, and, in that it could be brought against all of defend the absence of a consent or custom of the ants in the county within which any of them railroad to accept such papers as "baggage," resided, under Code, $ 3501, requiring per- no damages can be recovered for their loss or sonal actions to be brought in a county in for delay in their shipment and delivery. which some of defendants actually reside. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Kean v. Rogers (Iowa) 118 N. W. 515, 517. Co., 37 South. 500, 85 Miss. 7, 67 L. R. A.

646, 107 Am. St. Rep. 265. PERSONAL AILMENT Confinement in childbirth is not a "per

Merchandise for sale is not within the sonal ailment" within the meaning of such a usual definition of "personal baggage,” nor provision in a contract of insurance. Rasicot within Rev. St. $ 2799, relating to the duty of v. Royal Neighbors of America, 108 Pac. persons arriving in the United States to de. 1048, 1053, 18 Idaho, 85, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) clare their personal baggage. United States 433, 138 Am. St. Rep. 180.

v. One Trunk, 175 Fed. 1012, 1015.

There seems to be no good reason why PERSONAL AND LAWFUL HEIR

an article for use at the end of the journey, Where a testator to prevent any trouble

or for the use of the traveler's wife, child, about the property which he might leave to his heirs at his death gave his wife a life should not fall within the definition of the

or other member of his immediate family, estate in all his real and personal property, term “personal baggage.” Kansas City Southwith power to dispose of any portion of the personalty that should suit her convenience, 88 Ark. 189, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850 (citing 3

ern Ry. Co. v. Skinner, 113 S. W. 1019, 1020, the residuary clause reading, “The balance of Hutch. on Carr. & 1246; Withey v. Pere Marall my estate, both personal and real, 1 give quette R. Co., 104 N. W. 773, 141 Mich. 412, 1 and bequeath to my dear children," naming L. R. A. [N. S.) 352, 113 Am. St. Rep. 533, 7 them, "and to their personal and lawful heirs,

Ann. Cas. 57). share and share alike," the words "personal and lawful heirs" are not equivalent to "heirs A carrier need not carry goods, articles, of the body begotten," so that the testator's furniture, etc., or anything not fairly to be children would only take a life estate, such regarded as "personal baggage” reasonably words no more indicating the bodies out of required for the convenience and comfort of which the heirs shall issue than if the word the passenger, as baggage, and may refuse to "personal” had been omitted, but that the carry such articles except as freight. Under testator intended to give the children named the customary methods for carrying freight, in the residuary clause an estate in fee in stage costumes, scenery, etc., making up the the real estate. Webbe v. Webbe, 84 N. E. paraphernalia of a traveling theatrical com1054, 1056, 234 Ill. 442, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) pany do not constitute the personal baggage 1079.

which a carrier impliedly contracts to carry

without additional compensation, and along PERSONAL BAGGAGE

with the passenger.

Saunders v. Southern See, also, Personal Luggage.

R. Co., 128 Fed. 15, 20, 21, 62 C. C. A. 523 The personal baggage of a passenger in- (citing and adopting Oakes v. Northern Pac. cludes jewelry carried for his personal use, R. Co., 26 Pac. 230, 20 Or, 392, 12 L. R. A. but not that carried for sale or for the use 318, 23 Am. St. Rep. 126; 3 Thomp. Neg. & of another. Brick v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 3417). Co., 58 S. E. 1073, 1074, 145 N. C. 203, 122 Am. St. Rep. 440, 13 Ann. Cas. 328.

PERSONAL CHATTEL The term “personal baggage” means

See Chattels Personal. whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to

PERSONAL COMMUNICATION the habits or wants of the particular class

A statute prohibiting testimony of a parto which he belongs, either with reference to ty in respect to any transaction or commu. the immediate necessities or to the ultimate nication by bim personally” with a deceased purposes of the journey. This includes not person does not forbid testimony of transaconly all articles of apparel, whether for use tions or communications between deceased or ornament, but also the gun case, or fish- and third persons in the witness' presence if ing apparatus of the sportsman; the easel of the witness did not participate therein and the artist on a sketching tour or the books they were not affected by his presence. Uaof the student or other articles of an analo- less the transactions or communications are gous character, the use of which is personal personal and had with the deceased by the to the traveler, and the taking of which has party either literally or in practical effect as arisen from the fact of his journeying. Mem- by participating in or influencing them, they oranda and papers in the possession of an do not fall under the prohibition of the statagent, but relating exclusively to the business ute. Wollman v. Rueble, 80 N. W. 919, 920, of his principal, and carried by him solely | 104 Wis. 603.

The word "personally," in St. 1893, 8 other simply from seeing and hearing him; 4212 (Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, 8 4509), especially as considered apart from the inproviding that no party shall be allowed to herent probability or lack of probability of testify in his own behalf in respect to any the particular thing he has testified to, and transaction or communication had personally apart from the corroboration or refutation by such party with a deceased person, etc., which his testimony has received during the is not limited to conversations had with a de progress of the trial. Western & A. R. Co. ceased, but includes any transaction or com- v. Henderson, 65 S. E. 48, 50, 6 Ga. App. munication had with a deceased person in- 385. dividually. Conklin v. Yates, 83 Pac. 910,

PERSONAL CREDIT 912, 16 Okl. 266.

Negotiable Instruments Law (Laws 1897, In an action by an administrator to re

p. 722, c. 612, & 20), requires that an instrucover money lent to defendant by decedent,

ment to be negotiable must contain an untestimony by defendant that money for pay

conditional promise or order to pay a sum ment of the debt was inclosed in an envelope,

certain in money, and section 22 defines an taken to the post office, and that certain steps

unconditional promise as therein used as: were there taken to have the postmaster reg

"An unqualified promise or order to pay is ister the letter and send it to decedent in a

unconditional within the meaning of this act, distant state, and also that in due time de

though coupled with: (1) An indication of a fendant received a writing acknowledging re

particular fund out of which reimbursement ceipt of the money, which writing was iden

is to be made, in a particular account to be tified and introduced in evidence was not in

debited with the amount; or (2) a statement competent, under Code Civ. Proc. $ 320 (Gen.

of the transaction which gives rise to the inSt. 1909, § 5914), providing that no party

strument. But an order or promise to pay shall testify in his own behalf in respect to

out of a particular fund is not unconditionany transaction or communication had per

al." It was claimed that the statute was but sonally by him with a decedent, where the

a codification of the former law, and that it adverse party is the administrator of such

was always the rule that it was essential to decedent; witness' acts not constituting a

negotiability that the "general credit” of the personal transaction or communication. Bry

maker be pledged to the obligation, the court an v. Palmer, 111 Pac. 443, 444, 83 Kan. 298,

says: “Many decisions and text-books are 21 Ann. Cas. 1214.

cited in support of this contention; and it Under Code, 8 4604, prohibiting testimo- must be conceded that they contain general ny of an interested witness concerning per broad statements of the rule and definitions sonal transactions or communications with a tending to sustain it. The facts upon which deceased person in an action against her ad the adjudications were had, however, were ministrator, evidence by plaintiff, in an ac- not analogous to those now before the court; tion to establish a note signed by his father and it will, we think, be found in all of them and stepmother as a claim against the lat. that the expressions 'general credit' and 'perter estate, that he gave the father an order sonal credit were used, not as indicating to obtain the note from the party in whose that the entire general or personal credit of custody it was, and that he afterwards saw the maker must be pledged to the obligation, it in his father's possession, and evidence of but rather to show that general or personal the father to the same effect, was admissible, credit must be pledged, as contradistinguishsince such evidence does not constitute "per-ed from limiting the liability to a particular sonal transactions" or "personal communica- or specific fund, which would make the obtions." Curd v. Wisser, 95 N. W. 266, 267, ligation in effect an assignment pro tanto of 120 Iowa, 743 (citing Gable v. Hainer, 49 N. the fund, and not a negotiable bill of obli. W. 1024, 83 Iowa, 457; Dysart v. Furrow, 57 gation of the maker." Hibbs v. Brown, 98 N. N. W. 644, 90 Iowa, 59; McElhenney v. Hen-Y. Supp. 353, 357, 112 App. Div. 214 (citing dricks, 48 N. W. 1056, 82 Iowa, 657; Walk- Laws 1894, p. 412, c. 235; Code Civ. Proc. $$ ley v. Clarke, 78 N. W. 70, 107 Iowa, 451). 1919–1924; In re Jones' Estate, 65 N. E. 570,

172 N. Y. 575, 60 L. R. A. 476; Westcott v. PERSONAL CREDIBILITY

Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, 19 Am. Rep. 300; People The expression “personal credibility," as ex rel. Winchester v. Coleman, 31 N. E. 96, used in Civ. Code, $ 5146, wbich provides that 133 N. Y. 279, 16 L. R. A. 183). in determining where the preponderance of evidence lies the personal credibility of wit

PERSONAL EFFECTS nesses may be considered so far as the same

"The words “personal effects' in a will, legitimately appears from the trial, means when not restricted by the context, mean that which would lead the jury to believe or everything embraced within the description disbelieve what the witness had said by rea- l 'personal property.'Gallagher v. McKeague, son of his appearance before them, his man- | 103 N. W. 233, 234, 125 Wis. 116, 110 Am. St. ner of conducting himself in their presence, Rep. 821. his manner of testifying, and those other nu Merchandise for sale is not within the merous and largely indescribable things usual definition of "personal effects," nor which make one man believe or disbelieve an-1 within Customs Administrative Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, 8 4, 26 Stat. 131, providing that, brought before an inferior tribunal in New except in case of "personal effects," no impor-York a few months ago, directly involved the tation of any merchandise shall be entered consideration of the right of circulating porwithout invoice. United States v. One Trunk, traits; and the question whether our law 175 Fed. 1012, 1015.

will recognize and protect the right to pri

vacy in this and in other respects must soon PERSONAL ESTATE

come before our courts for consideration. Of See Visible Personal Estate.

the desirability-indeed, of the necessityAny personal estate, see Any.

of some such protection, there can, it is bePERSONAL EXEMPTION

lieved, be no doubt the press is overstepping

in every direction the obvious bounds of pro. "Personal exemptions" from taxation are

priety and of decency. Gossip is no longer “such as have been by legislative enactment

the resource of the idle and of the vicious, granted either directly to persons or corpora

but has become a trade, which is pursued tions that are named in the acts thus grant

with industry, as well as effrontery. To sating them or granted to such persons or cor

isfy a prurient taste the details of sexual reporations as may comply with the require

lations are spread broadcast in the columns ments of such legislative enactment, and thus

of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, bring themselves within the granting clause

column upon column is filled with idle gosthereof, and by so doing make themselves the

sip, which can only be procured by intrubeneficiaries of such granting clause.” Grand

sion upon the domestic circle. The intensity Canyon R. Co. v. Treat, 95 Pac. 187, 189, 12

and complexity of life, attendant upon adAriz. 69.

vancing civilization, have rendered necessary PERSONAL FREIGHT

some retreat from the world, and man, under A contract to carry the “personal freight" the refining influence of culture, has become of certain parties between designated points more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude free of charge means freight owned by them and privacy have become more essential to individually, and is not too indefinite to be the individual; but modern enterprise and executed. Hurley V. Big Sandy & C. Ry. invention have, through invasions upon his Co., 125 S. W. 302, 304, 137 Ky. 216.

privacy, subjected him to mental pain and

| distress, far greater than could be inflicted PERSONAL HEIR

by mere bodily injury. Nor is the harm See Personal and Lawful Heir.

wrought by such invasions confined to the

suffering of those who may be made the subPERSONAL IMMUNITY

jects of journalistic or other enterprise. In The theory that every one has a right this, as in other branches of commerce, the to privacy, and that the same is a personal

supply creates the demand." This right to right, growing out of the inviolability of the

be let alone does entitle to relief one whose person, defined by Judge Cooley, in his work

picture has without his permission been on Torts (2d Ed. p. 29), as: “ 'Personal Im

printed in a mercantile advertisement, the munity. The i'ight to one's person may be

right going only so far as to protect the insaid to be a right of complete immunity, to

immunity, to dividual from bodily injury. Henry v. Cherbe let alone.” And that a person is entitled

ry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 99, 100, 30 R. I. 13, to relief at law or in equity for an invasion

24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, of the same is generally understood to have

18 Ann. Cas. 1006. been first publicly advanced in an article entitled “The Right to Privacy,” published in PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE 4 Harv. Law Rev. 193 (December, 1890), "Personal inconvenience" resulting from wherein some of the necessities for invoking physical disability belongs to the same class such relief are set out as follows: "Recent as pain and suffering. In an action by a inventions and business methods call atten-married woman for personal injuries, plaintion to the next step which must be taken for tiff may recover damages for physical or perthe protection of the person, and for secur- sonal inconvenience resulting from the injuing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls ry. In an action against a street railway for the right to be let alone.' Instantaneous injuries received by plaintiff through stepphotographs and newspaper enterprise have ping on an electrified metal plate on defendinvaded the sacred precincts of private and ant's car, allegations in the petition that as domestic life; and numerous mechanical de- a result of the injuries plaintiff's lower limbs vices threaten to make good the prediction were partially paralyzed, her nervous system that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be injured and diseased, and she suffered severe proclaimed from the housetops. For years pains, etc., and that as a result of the injury there has been a feeling that the law must she was for a considerable period of time afford some remedy for the unauthorized cir- confined to her bed and was unable to perculation of portraits of private persons, and form her household duties, etc., were broad the evil of the invasion of privacy by the enough to include damages on account of newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but re- physical inconvenience. McRae v. Metropolcently discussed by an able writer. The al- itan St. Ry. Co., 102 S. W. 1032, 1035, 125 leged facts of a somewhat notorious case, Mo. App. 562.

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