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crime which, if not applicable to prosecutions Chittenden Power Company, and the Rutbefore a justice, would not divest the justice land City Electric Company consolidated of jurisdiction, but Code Civ. Proc. § 187, with the Vermont Internal Improvement permitting the use of any suitable mode of Company. Section 2 provided that all the procedure, would apply. People v. Palermo charter rights, powers, etc., conferred upon Land & Water Co., 89 Pac. 723, 725, 4 Cal. the five companies should be conferred upon App. 717. the Rutland Railway, Light & Power Company. Held, that the word "persons" used in section 800 included previously existing corporations, as well as natural persons; and when Act No. 303 became a law the Rutland Railway, Light & Power Company became a corporation by special act, making the charter fee, which should have been deposited when the bill was introduced, belong to the state, but if it was not deposited when the bill was introduced the state might thereafter collect it by a suit against the consolidated company. State v. Rutland Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Atl. 252, 254, 85 Vt. 91.

Proprietor of restaurant

Rev. St. c. 23, § 68, relating to ways, provides that when a way is changed in grade by a road commissioner or "person authorized," to the injury of an abutting owner, he may apply in writing to the municipal officers for an assessment of damages occasioned thereby to be paid by the town. Chapter 53, § 19, relating to street railroads, provides that such road shall be constructed and maintained in such manner and upon such grades as the municipal officers of the towns where they are located may direct, and when, in the judgment of such corporation, it shall be necessary to alter the grade of any road, the alteration shall be made at the expense of the corporation in accordance with the directions of the municipal officers. Held, that the two sections should be construed together, and under Rev. St. c. 1, § 6, rules 2 and 14, by which the word "person" may include a corporation and singular words include plural, where a grade was established by municipal officers at the request of a railroad company, it must be deemed to have been done by a "person authorized" within the meaning of section 68, and though section 68 provides that the damages shall be assessed by the municipal officers to be paid by the town, and section 19 that the alterations shall be at the expense of the corporation, yet the word "expense" in section 19 will include the damages to landowners, which, if paid by the town, are a part of the expense of the alteration, and are recoverable by the town from the railroad corpora- | 720. tion. Hurley v. Inhabitants of South Thomaston, 74 Atl. 734, 736, 105 Me. 301.

The proprietor of a restaurant is a "person" and his restaurant is a "place" within the city of Denver within the purview of Denver Ordinance 1902, No. 102, § 1, providing that no person shall, within the limits of the city, sell or give away intoxicating liquors to be drunk upon the premises where sold or at any place. Scanlon v. City of Denver, 88 Pac. 156, 157, 38 Colo. 401.

Public or municipal corporation

V. S. 21, provides that the word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies corporate and political. Gokey v. Boston & M. R. Co., 130 Fed. 994, 995.

The word "person," as provided by Ky. St. § 457, may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, societies, communities, and the public generally. Commonwealth v. Adams Exp. Co., 97 S. W. 386, 387, 123 Kỵ.

A municipality is not a "person" or "corporation," within Rev. Laws, c. 171, § 2, as Acts 1898, No. 19, as originally enacted, amended by St. 1907, c. 375, which makes referred to "any body or persons" seeking in-persons and corporations liable for negligent corporation, etc., but as revised and re-enact- death. Donahue v. City of Newburyport, 98 ed by P. S. 800, provided that "persons" seek- N. E. 1081, 1082, 211 Mass. 561, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 742. ing incorporation by a special act of the General Assembly should, before the bill was introduced for that purpose, deposit as provided the fee therein specified. P. S. 26 permits the word "persons" to be applied to bodies corporate and politic. In 1896 the People's Gas Light Company, the Rutland Street Railway Company, the Vermont Internal Improvement Company, and the Chittenden Power Company filed with the Secretary of State an agreement for consolidation, the consolidated company being styled the Rutland Railway, Light & Power Company, and all the property being turned over to it, but it had never paid any charter fee. Acts 1908, No. 303, § 1, legalizes all acts and contracts whereby the Rutland Street Railway Company, the People's Gas Light Company, the

Code 1896, § 27, provides that personal representatives may recover for decedent's death, caused by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person or persons, or corporation. Section 1 provides that the use of the word "person," used in the Code, “includes a corporation as well as natural persons." Held, that the personal representative of a person injured by a city sewer ditch had a cause of action against the city. City of Anniston v. Ivey, 44 South. 48, 49, 151 Ala. 392.

The city granting the right to a corporation to operate an interurban railway on its streets is a proper plaintiff in an action, in virtue of the statute (Gen. St. 1901, § 5150), authorizing it to be brought by a person

claiming an interest adverse to the franchise, | notice given, or demand made by the county, which is its subject, as a municipal corpora- without explanation, conveys no information tion is a "person" within the meaning of the whatever to the bearer or reader, as to the word as there used. City of Olathe v. Mis- particular individual through or by whom the souri & K. I. Ry. Co., 96 Pac. 42, 43, 78 Kan. act, notice, or demand, is alleged to have 193. been effected, so that an allegation, in an in

Although a "municipal corporation" has delegated to it certain powers of government, it is only in reference to those delegated powers that it will be regarded as a govern

ment. In reference to all of its transactions, such as affect its ownership of property in buying, selling, or granting, and in reference to all matters of contract it must be looked upon and treated as a private person, and its contracts construed in the same manner and with like effect as those of natural persons. Davoust v. City of Alameda, 84 Pac. 760, 761, 149 Cal. 69, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536, 9 Ann. Cas. 847.

"The Regents of the University of Idaho," created a corporation by the laws of the territory and the Constitution of the state, is a public corporation and an agency of the state, and as such is not subject to garnishment in the absence of a statute clearly evincing the purpose of the Legislature to subject public corporations to such process; and the general provision that any "person" may be garnished is not sufficient for that purpose, although the word "person" is expressly defined by the statutes as including a corporation; such provisions being generally construed as restricted to private or business corporations. Moscow Hardware Co. v. Colson, 158 Fed. 199, 201.

Code Civ. Proc. § 1391, providing that, on the return of an unsatisfied execution on a judgment for necessaries, the court shall grant an order for execution against the salary or wages of the judgment debtor, and it shall be the duty of any "person or corporation" to whom the execution shall be presented, and who shall be indebted to the judgment debtor, to pay over to the officer the amount of the debt, does not authorize the institution of the supplementary proceedings therein provided for against a municipal corporation to reach the salary of a police officer. Rosenstock v. City of New York, 91 N. Y. Supp. 737, 739, 101 App. Div. 9; Chapman & Co. v. Same, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1090, 101 App. Div. 607.

Same-County

Each organized county is a body corporate, and as such deemed to be a "person," within Const. art. 6, § 2, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Harris v. Stearns, 97 N. W. 361, 362, 17 S. D. 439.

"A county may, for some purposes, be considered a 'person' in law, but it is a corporate person which can speak and act only through its appropriate officers and agents." Hence an allegation that an act was done or

dictment against a county treasurer for embezzlement, that the county had demanded the funds, was wholly insufficient. McKinney, 106 N. W. 931, 933, 130 Iowa, 370.

State v.

Rev. St. 1898, § 661, provides that no execution shall issue on a judgment against a county except on leave of court, obtained after the time when the town treasurers should by law have made returns of taxes. Other statutory provisions contemplate the collection of judgments against counties by the levy of a tax. Section 2902 makes a judgment a lien on the real property of every "person" against whom such judgment shall be rendered and docketed. Held, that a judgment against a county is not a lien on land bought in by the county for taxes, notwithstanding the provision of Rev. St. 1898, § 2902, that the word "person" shall extend and be applicable to bodies corporate unless plainly inapplicable. Buell v. Arnold, 102 N. W. 338, 340, 124 Wis. 65, 4 Ann. Cas. 100. Same-State

Code 1899, c. 31, § 25, requiring the owner of property sold for taxes to tender to the claimant of the tax title the taxes and interest required to be refunded, relates to "persons," and does not apply to the state. State v. Harman, 50 S. E. 828, 830, 57 W. Va. 447.

Dispensary commissioners and the manager thereof are officers of the state, and are not, as such, suable under Civ. Code 1895, § 3871, giving a parent a right of action against any person selling spirituous liquor to his minor son. Fowler v. Rome Dispensary, 62 S. E. 660, 663, 5 Ga. App. 36.

The word "person," in Rev. St. U. S. §§ 3140, 3232, 3244, providing that every person selling or offering for sale distilled spirits shall be regarded as a retail dealer in liquors and must pay the special tax imposed, and declaring that the word "person" shall When not otherwise distinctly expressed be construed to mean and include a partnership, association, company, or corporation, includes the dispensing and selling agents of the state, which in the exercise of its sovereign power has taken charge of the business of selling intoxicating liquors, and the United States may exact in such case a license tax prescribed by Internal Revenue Laws for dealers in intoxicating liquors. State of South Carolina v. United States, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 111, 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. Ed. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 737.

Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1a, cls. 6, 19, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 545, which define "persons" as including corporations and "corporations" as meaning "all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of

private corporations not possessed by individ- tion, etc., the court, in proceedings to assess uals or partnerships," a state is a person, damages and benefits for the change of the and under section 64b (5) is entitled to priority for a debt due it from the estate of a bankrupt which is given priority by its own insolvency law. In re Western Implement Co., 166 Fed. 576, 582.

Laws 1905, p. 370, c. 175, in amendment of Code Civ. Proc. § 1391, authorizing an execution against the wages or salary of the judgment debtor, and making it the duty of any person or corporation, municipal or otherwise, to whom the execution shall be presented, and who shall be indebted to the judgment debtor, to pay over to the officer the amount of the debt, does not authorize the issuance of an execution against the salary of a state officer; the state being neither a person nor a corporation nor a municipal corporation. Osterhoudt v. Keith, 117 N. Y. Supp. 809, 810, 133 App. Div. 83.

The champerty act (1 Rev. St. p. 739 [1st Ed.] p. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, § 147) provides that "every grant of land shall be absolutely void, if at the time of the delivery thereof, such lands shall be in the actual possession of a person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor." Section 5 of the statutory construction law (Laws 1892, p. 1487, c. 677) provides that "the term 'person' includes a corporation and a joint-stock association," and when used to designate a party whose property may be the subject of any offense, the term "person" also includes the state. Held, that the state could therefore only be included as a "person" when the statute relates to any of its property which may be the subject of an offense, and hence the champerty act does not apply to the possession of the state, and that, if the forest commission could be regarded as in actual possession for the state, it would not render the statute applicable as it is no more a "person" than is the state. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 109 N. Y. Supp. 547, 125 App. Div. 333; Id., 88 N. E. 753, 760, 195 N.

Y. 303.

Same-United States

The United States is not a "person" within the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563. Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 174 Fed. 385, 387, 98 C. C. A. 603.

Selectmen

Under Gen. St. 1902, § 2067, authorizing persons interested in altering highways to remonstrate against the report of the committee assessing benefits and damages, and empowering the court to order a jury and "grant relief to the person or persons making such application," when construed in connection with section 2070, providing that, if the report of the jury shall not increase the damages allowed or diminish the assessment of benefits, the court shall order the applicant for the jury to pay the costs of the applica

grade of a highway, may not order a jury to make a reassessment of damages and benefits on the application of the town by its selectmen; the selectmen not being referred to by the words "person or persons," in the quoted clause. Selectmen of Town of Montville v. Alpha Mills Co., 81 Atl. 1051, 1052, 85 Conn. 1.

Women

A woman is a "person" within the contemplation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1, and entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Carrithers v. City of Shelbyville, 104 S. W. 744, 745, 126 Ky. 769, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 421 (citing Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. 385).

PERSON AGGRIEVED

See Aggrieved.

PERSON APPEARING OF RECORD AS

OWNER

See Owner of Record.

PERSON ARRIVING IN THE UNITED

STATES

Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 2, Free List, par. 697, 30 Stat. 202, provides for “personal effects of persons arriving in the United States," with a proviso relating to "residents of the United States returning from abroad." Held, that the first provision is only for immigrants, and that the proviso concerns Americans only. United States v. Bernays, 158 Fed. 792, 794, 86 C. C. A. 52. PERSON ASSESSED

See, also, Assess.

Assignors in a common-law assignment for the benefit of creditors to the assignee in trust to pay preferred claims including taxes are the "persons assessed" for taxes within Rev. Laws 1902, c. 13, § 32, authorizing a tax collector to collect a tax by action against the "persons assessed," and they are properly made parties defendant in an action for taxes as the persons primarily liable therefor. Boston v. Turner, 87 N. E. 634, 637, 201 Mass. 190 (citing Ricker v. Brook, 29 N. E. 534, 155 Mass. 400). PERSON AUTHORIZED

See Authorized by Law; Authorized Per

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cards are "persons losing," within the meaning of Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, c. 38, § 132, which provides that any person who shall at any time or sitting by playing at cards lose to any person so playing any money amounting to $10, and shall pay the same, may sue and recover the money by action in assumpsit. Zellers v. White, 70 N. E. 669, 672, 208 Ill. 518, 100 Am. St. Rep. 243. PERSON MAKING ENTRY

One who makes an entry of coal lands avowedly for his own use and benefit is "the person who made such entry," within the meaning of the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat. at L. 287, chap. 244, § 2, providing for the repayment of the purchase price in case of subsequent cancellation, although he made the entry at the instance of a corporation, with its money and for its benefit. States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 32 Sup. Ct. 617, 619, 225 U. S. 219, 56 L. Ed. 1063. PERSON NAMED ON ITS FACE

United

Person to whom it is issued synonymous, see Person to Whom Issued. PERSON OF AFRICAN DESCENT See African Descent.

PERSON OF COLOR

See Colored Person..

PERSON OF THE FAMILY

The word "person," as used in Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 570, providing for service of a summons by leaving a copy of the petition and writ at defendant's usual place of abode

PERSON HOLDING STOCK AS TRUS- with some person of his family, is synon

TEE

Rev. St. § 5152, providing that persons holding stock in national banks as trustees shall not be personally liable as stockholders, applies to every one holding stock as trustee, and a father who, as trustee for his children, invested funds belonging to them in such stock, is not personally liable for an assessment thereon, although the fund invested arose from an investment of his own money previously made by him in their be half. Fowler v. Gowing, 165 Fed. 891, 892, 91 C. C. A. 569.

PERSON IN CHARGE

See Charge.

PERSON INJURED

See Injured Person.

PERSON IN PARENTAL RELATION See Parental Relation.

PERSON INTERESTED

See Interest.

Other person interested, see Other. PERSON LOSING

All those who have lost more than they have won during a sitting by playing at

ymous with the word "member" as used in a return showing that a copy of the writ and petition was left with a member of defendant's family. The words may be used interchangeably. One could not be a person of a family without being a member nor could he be a member without being a person. Colter v. Luke, 108 S. W. 608, 609, 129 Mo. App. 702.

Where, in an action for divorce, the complaint alleged that plaintiff and defendant had been living together as husband and wife until the day before the suit was commenced, and implied that, though prior thereto the parties had a joint residence in M. county, such residence had been severed, and that the plaintiff had the custody of the minor children, an order authorizing service of process on the defendant, temporarily residing without the state, by publication, was not objectionable by reason of the fact that the affidavit did not negative the possibility of substituted service by delivering a copy to some person of defendant's family, above the age of 14 years, at his dwelling house or usual place of abode. Then when a suit for a divorce has been commenced, it must be inferred that the marital relations have been interrupted, and, the defendant being tempo

rarily absent, the plaintiff and the children, | PERSON WHO PERFORMS LABOR occupying the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the defendant, are not "persons of the family" within the meaning of the term as used, in the statute. McFarlane v. Cornelius, 73 Pac. 325, 327, 328, 43 Or. 513.

PERSON OF INDIAN BLOOD

See Indian.

PERSON OF INDIAN DESCENT
See Indians by Descent

PERSON OF ORDINARY CARE

See Ordinary Care.

PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND
See Unsound Mind.
PERSON PRIMARILY LIABLE
See Primarily Liable.

PERSON TO WHOM ISSUED

The phrase "person to whom it is issued," as used in a commutation ticket containing a stipulation that if it should be offered by any other than the person to whom it is issued it would be forfeited and taken up by the conductor, is synonymous with "person named on its face." Colton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 77 Atl. 1020, 80 N. J. Law, 592.

PERSON WHO BUILDS

1

The phrase "person who built it," contained in the statute providing that the owner of a building lot might rest one-half of the building wall on his neighbor's land and that the neighbor should have the right thereafter to make it a wall in common by paying one-half of the value to the "person who built it," means the owner, whether he became such by building the wall in person or hiring it done by another, or by purchasing it with the lot after it is built. Southworth v. Perring, 82 Pac. 785, 787, 71 Kan. 755, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 114 Am. St. Rep. 527 (citing Thomson v. Curtis, 28 Iowa, 229).

In the statute which grants a lien to "every person who shall perform labor" upon a mine and provides that "every laborer or materialman" claiming under the act shall take certain steps to perfect his lien, the phrase "person who shall perform labor," etc., applies to ordinary laborers who perform actual, visible toil with their hands or muscles, other kinds of service not being expressly mentioned, and does not embrace superintendents or managers. Durkheimer v. Copperopolis Copper Co., 104 Pac. 895, 896, 55 Or. 37.

PERSON WHO WOULD INHERIT AS HEIR

Testator devised certain property to defendant for life, and, on his death, to his child or children and their heirs, and, in case of defendant's death without leaving a child or children or descendants, to such persons as would under the laws of Maryland inherit the same as the heirs of defendant had he died intestate. Held, that the phrase "such persons as would inherit as heirs" had the same effect as if the limitation over had been to defendant's heirs, and hence defendant acquired the fee under the rule in Shelley's Case. Cook v. Councilman, 72 A. 404, 109 Md. 622.

PERSON WITHIN THE STATE
See Within the Jurisdiction.
PERSONAL

The adjective "personal" is defined by Webster as pertaining to the external or bodily appearance. It is defined in the Century Dictionary as things of or pertaining to the person. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Zwirtz, 73 Pac. 941, 942, 13 Okl. 411.

PERSONAL ACTION

An action under an act authorizing the recovery of money paid and lost on a wager, for money lost and paid on a bet on the result of an election, is a "personal action"

PERSON WHO MAKES, ALTERS, OR and survives the death of plaintiff. Motlow

REPAIRS

A statute providing that a "person who makes, alters, or repairs" any article of personal property, or who, by labor or skill, improves such article, may have a special lien thereon, and may retain possession until his charges are paid, creates a lien in favor of a bailee for hire, to whom property is delivered in the way of his trade or occupation, and who by his labor and skill imparts additional value thereto, but does not create a lien in favor of a person who performs services with reference to personal property in his possession as a mere servant. Michaelson v. Fish, 81 Pac. 661, 662, 1 Cal. App. 116.

PERSON WHO MANAGES

See Manager.

v. Johnson, 44 South. 42, 151 Ala. 276.

Mandamus is a "personal action," within Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p. 787, c. 105, § 2, declaring that all personal actions, with specified exceptions, shall survive, and is a "suit at law," within Const. art. 4, § 26, providing that no suit at law shall abate at the death of any party, where the cause of action survives. State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. (Del.) 80 Atl. 350, 351.

Where a tenant's property was sold under an agreement that the proceeds should be deposited in a bank for the purpose of satisfying the landlord's and other claims out of them, an equitable proceeding by the landlord to satisfy his claim out of the deposit, in which the bank, the tenant, and other claim

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