A "levee" is a landing place for vessels, | LEVY (Of Taxes) or a dyke or breakwater. Sanborn v. Van Duyne, 96 N. W. 41, 44, 90 Minn. 215. As street See Street. LEVEE BOARD "Levy" is defined as "the amount accruing from a tax or execution." State ex rel. Ledwith v. Brian, 120 N. W. 916, 917, 84 Neb. 30. "Levy" is used variously, but, as applied to the determination of the amount or rate to As municipal corporation, see Municipal be charged, it is a legislative function, to be Corporation. LEVEE DISTRICT As citizen, see Citizen. exercised only by the state, or some infe- As municipal corporation, see Municipal County, 103 Pac. 126, 127, 80 Kan. 641. LEVEE DISTRICT DIRECTOR As county officer, see County Officer. LEVEE TAX A tax levied by a sanitary district organized under Act July 1, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 289), is not a "levee tax" within Act July 1, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 323), providing for a reduction in taxes, excepting "levee taxes," etc. People ex rel. Sanders v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 94 N. E. 14, 15, 248 Ill. 417; Same v. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co., 94 N. E. 16, 249 Ill. 175. LEVEL There is a distinction between the words "aim," "point," and "level." "Aim" expresses more than the other two words inasmuch as it denotes a direction towards some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction towards the whole objects themselves. We aim at a bird; we point a cannon against a wall; we level a cannon at a wall. Pointing is of course used with most propriety with reference to instruments that have points. It is likewise a less decisive action than either aiming or leveling. A stick or finger may be pointed at a person merely out of derision; but a blow is "leveled" or aimed with an expressed intent of committing an act of violence. Livingston v. State, 65 S. E. 812, 6 Ga. App. 805 (quoting Crabbe's English Synonyms). The word "levy," as applied to taxation, is given a variety of meanings, among which are: "To impose or assess"; "to impose, assess and collect under authority of law"; "to raise or collect by assessment"; "to charge a sum of money already ascertained against a person or property subject to the charge"; "to determine by vote the amount of tax to be raised"; "to fix the rate at which property is to be taxed." Gray v. Board of Sche Inspectors of Peoria, 83 N. E. 95, 98, 231 Ill. 63. The word "levy," as used in constitutional and statutory provisions that the county commissioners shall levy a tax in their respective counties for the support of public schools, and that county boards shall levy an annual tax on all the property in their respective counties, to be collected at the same time and by the same officers as other taxes, excludes from the act of levying any The duty to levy signification of creation. imposed on the board is therefore purely ministerial, and only imports that it should take such action as would result in the tax being placed on the auditor's books. The boards have no power to do anything more or less than require that the tax be entered. Dickson v. Burckmyer, 46 S. E. 343, 346, 67 S. C. 526. "Levied," with reference to taxes, means the extension of a tax against taxable property, since a tax cannot be said to be levied until it has been so extended. Pettibone v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 74 N. E. 387, 392, 215 Ill. 304. A tax cannot be said to be "levied" when it is only estimated, and the time for levying it has not arrived. The limitation on the power of the county board to contract for bridge building to cost a sum not greater than the amount of money on hand in the previous years and two-thirds of the levy of county bridge fund derived from a levy of the current year gives no authority to the board to take into account the levy of the current calendar year prior to the making of such levy. Until this is made, there is no levy of the current year. Clark v. Lancaster County, 96 N. W. 593, 599, 69 Neb. 717. "Three things are essential to a 'tax,' as that term is understood by our Constitu * By section 16 of P. L. 1903, p. 789, the commissioners are required each year to cause a tax to be "levied and assessed," etc., and to certify to the tax assessor, taxing board, or taxing officer the amount of tax required to be levied, assessed, and raised, and the said assessors, etc., shall assess said sums so directed to be assessed and certified upon all the persons and property liable, and the said tax shall be levied, assessed, and collected by the same officers, etc., and the tax so levied upon real estate shall be a lien thereon. Held, that throughout the section the word "levy" is used as referring to the administrative functions of taxation and not to the legislative function, the differences between which are pointed out in the case of Township of Bernards v. Allen, 61 N. J. Law, 228, at page 238, 39 Atl. 716, at page 719, also referred to in the dissenting opinion, 61 N. J. Law, 692, 41 Atl. 250; one of the judges using the phrase "levying taxes" as descriptive of the legislative function, while the other used it as referring to the administrative process of collecting the taxes. Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs, 58 Atl. 571, 586, 71 N. J. Law, 183. tion: First, the ascertainment of a sum cer- | book and collecting them. Union Trust Co. tain, or that can be rendered certain, to be of Maryland v. State, 81 Atl. 873, 874, 116 imposed on the collective body of taxpayers; Md. 368. second, a legal imposition of that sum as an obligation on the collective body of taxpayers; third, an apportionment of such sum among individual taxpayers so as to ascertain the part or share that each should bear. The first two acts above described, namely, the ascertainment of a sum to be imposed on the collective body of taxpayers and its imposition by a legislative declaration to that effect, are essentially legislative acts or acts proper directly to the lawmaking function of the government. *** The third act, namely, the apportionment of the whole sum imposed by way of tax on the collective body of taxpayers upon the separate individuals composing that body, is usually an administrative act performed under specific statutory directions, ascertaining the mode and time of its performance. * * * The word 'levy' is indifferently employed, as commonly used, to express either one of these processes separately or both collectively. A tax is said to be levied when the amount or rate to be imposed is fixed by law, for what is wanting to complete such levy is supplied by the standing tax laws, and consists in a course of administrative action. When the levying of a tax Provisions in the body of an act conferis spoken of as a legislative act, it is common-ring on parochial and municipal corporations ly understood to describe such action on the power to levy license taxes was within the part of the Legislature as would, with stand- title of the act "to levy, enforce, and collect ing tax laws, complete the legislative authoria license tax." Mayor and Council of Alexty requisite to enable the administrative de-andria v. White, 15 South. 15, 16, 46 La. partment to distribute and collect the tax. ** In other words, the tax directed to be levied must be so far imposed, in order to comply with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, that no further legislation will be necessary to enable its collection." Rice v. Shealy, 50 S. E. 868, 870, 71 S. C. 161 (quoting and adopting definition in Morton v. Comptroller General, 4 S. C. 430, 453). Ann. 449. As all necessary proceedings A city ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds dated in 1910 and payable in 1930, which provides that "there is hereby levied" on the taxable property of the city a specified sum, of which a certain amount is to pay the principal of the bonds and the balance to pay interest, of which sum a specified The power of the state tax commissioner amount shall be collected each year to and conferred by Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. including 1930, the amount collected each 81, § 150, requiring the commissioner to levy year over that required for interest to contaxes on shares of corporate stock and to stitute a sinking fund to the principal, complace a valuation on corporate stock for pur-plies with Laws 1907, c. 235, and Const. art. poses of assessment, is not affected by Laws 11, § 3, requiring cities issuing bonds, to pro1906, c. 404, amending article 81, § 22, and vide before, or at the time of doing so, for the fixing a tax for each $100 for a specified pur- collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pose, and directing the Comptroller to levy pay the interest as it falls due and to disthe taxes on corporate stock, since the func- charge the principal within 20 years, since tion of the Comptroller, under the act of "levy" in tax matters has various meanings 1906, is a purely ministerial act fully per-dependent on the context, and in this instance formed when he enters on his books the number of shares of stock liable to taxation, the corporation the stock of which is taxed, the rate of taxation, and extends the amount of the tax, and since the word "levy" as applied to taxes means in some cases to raise and exact by authority of government the amount of a tax to be raised, and in other cases the word is used with reference to the mere ministerial act of entering the taxes on the tax includes everything necessary to the collection of the tax. Borner v. City of Prescott, 136 N. W. 552, 554, 150 Wis. 197. Assess distinguished Assessment as including, see Assess. To "assess" a tax is to adjudge and determine what proportion of his property the taxpayer shall contribute to the public. To "levy" a tax is to make a record of this de termination, and to extend the assessment | 2195, defined as a "taking," which means to against the taxpayer's property. Chicago, gain control or possession of, in any way, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Klein, 71 N. W. 1069, 1071, a sheriff's deed, need not recite that a levy 52 Neb. 258. was made, for the recital of notice and other As used in Code Civ. Proc. § 325, requiring an adverse occupant to pay all the taxes which have been levied and assessed upon the land, the word "levied" refers to the act of the board of supervisors in making the "levy," and the word "assessed" refers to the act of the assessor in making the assessment. The statute does not require the payment of taxes assessed before the occupancy, and levied afterwards, but only such taxes as were both levied and assessed during the occupancy. Allen v. McKay, 52 Pac. 828, 829, 831, 120 Cal. 332. As collection formality shows that the land was taken, and hence a deed is prima facie correct although reciting an invalid levy, for that recital will be rejected as surplusage. Butler v. Imhoff, 142 S. W. 287, 288, 238 Mo. 584. In a notice of sale, reciting that the land was levied under a judgment rendered before a judge named, and that the levy mentioned was made by virtue of an order of sale, the contention that the words "levy" and “judgment" indicate an execution sale is not tenable, as under the Code judgment is the apt word in proceedings of an equitable nature, as well as in those which are strictly legal. Gray v. Eurich, 96 N. W. 343, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 194. Seizure under garnishment In our revenue laws the word "levy" is sometimes used in the sense of "raising" or "imposing," and not in the sense of "collecting" a tax by execution. In different places The word "levied," as used in Civ. Code in these laws the boards of county commis- 1895, § 2913, providing that a "thing hired is sioners are authorized to "levy," or lay, tax- not subject to sale under judgment obtained es, while the word "collect" is used to define subsequent to the contract of hire against the the power of the county treasurers to gather owner, but may be levied on, and a bond for in or receive money for taxes theretofore as-its forthcoming at the expiration of the time sessed by county assessors and levied by the boards. Parsons v. People, 76 Pac. 666, 669, 32 Colo. 221. for which it is hired may be demanded of the person hiring," is to be given its technical meaning (that is, an actual seizure of the property by a levying officer under a process); and the latter part of the section in relation to a forthcoming bond would have no application to a case where the property is seized under a garnishment which is not a technical "levy," within the meaning of the statute, though for some purposes a garnish The tonnage tax imposed on the use of foreign built yachts owned by citizens of the United States by Tariff Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 37, 36 Stat. 112, being a tax upon the privilege of use, is assessable to and collectible from the personal user, and the provision of the statute that such tax shall be lev-ment is treated as in effect a levy upon the ied and collected by the "collector of customs of the district nearest the residence of the managing owner" requires that, where the owner resides in one district, the collector of that district shall levy and collect the tax, and the attempted action of the collector of another district to that end is not a "levy" and will not support an action to recover the tax. United States v. Blair, 190 Fed. 372, 375 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, pp. 4101-4104). Special assessments The "levy" of special assessments for street improvements is the exercise of a species of the taxing power of the state, and not of the right of eminent domain. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. City of Hammond, 83 N. E. 244, 245, 170 Ind. 493. LEVY (Of Writs) See Equitable Levy. As a sheriff's deed to land sold under execution need recite only the names of the parties to the execution, the date when issued, and of the judgment, and other particulars recited in the execution, which necessarily includes the fact that notice was given, and as a "levy," is under Rev. St. 1909, § property. Southern Flour & Grain Co. v. Seizure under writ of replevin "The strict meaning of the word 'levy' is usually a seizure of the defendant's property." By the word "levy," as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 67f, 30 Stat. 565, making void all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens obtained through legal proceedings within four months prior to the bankruptcy of an insolvent defendant, seems to include any seizure of property in the bankrupt's possession and which he claims to own, and seems to cover a seizure on a writ of replevin in a suit to recover property sold and delivered on credit under a contract which the plaintiff claims a right to rescind for fraud. In re Weinger, Bergman & Co., 126 Fed. 875, 877. Constructive seizure As used in Rev. St. 1899, § 4043, providing that if a constable levy an execution, and a third party claim the property, he may take a bond of indemnity, the word "levy" means such levy, either actual or constructive, as the situation of the property permits. If it is already in the custody of the law, I for obscene libel. Hanson v. United States, because previously seized under a writ of at- 157 Fed. 749, 750, 85 C. C. A. 325. tachment, a levy or seizure under a subsequent execution in a mode adjudged to be sufficient to give a lien on the property and enable the officer to sell it is also sufficient to bring into operation the statutory provisions in regard to a demand for indemnity by the officer if notice is given of outside ownership. Smith ex rel. McElhaney v. Rogers, 73 S. W. 243, 244, 99 Mo. App. 252. Taking land In Georgia, a levy on land is made by the official entry thereof on the execution, and not by seizure. Keaton v. Farkas, 70 S. E. 1110, 1111, 136 Ga. 188. The object of a levy of execution is to bring the property within the custody of the law and prevent the judgment debtor from disposing of it to the prejudice of the creditor before sale can be made, and in case of real estate, on which the judgment is already a lien by docketing, the ordinary meaning of the word "levy" as used in section 6827 and elsewhere is inapplicable. Britannia Min. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 115 Pac. 46, 48, 43 Mont. 93. Seizure required "A levy' under an execution upon personal property is made by the officer having the writ seizing the property and taking it into his possession." People, to Use of Kenfield, v. Finch, 76 Pac. 1120, 1123, 19 Colo. App. 512. To constitute a levy there must be an actual or constructive seizure of property, and the property must be so far brought under the subjection of the officer that he can exercise control, and does assume to exercise con trol, by virtue of the writ; and the mere declaration of an intent to seize does not constitute a levy, but the officer must do some act for which he could be prosecuted as a trespasser, if it were not for the protection afforded by the writ. Dean v. State, 71 S. E. 597, 598, 9 Ga. App. 303. LEWD See, also, Lascivious. "'Lewd' is defined to mean given to the unlawful indulgence of lust; eager for sexual indulgence." Jamison v. State, 94 S. W. 675-678, 117 Tenn. 58 (quoting and adopting definition in United States v. Bebout, 28 Fed. 522). As used in Rev. St. § 3893, declaring every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or notices giving information for obtaining such publications, to be nonmailable matter, the words "obscene," "lewd," and "lascivious" signify that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, having the same meaning as is given them at common law in prosecutions The words "lewd and lascivious," as used in a statute providing that any person who shall unlawfully and feloniously commit any lewd and lascivious act, other than those constituting other crimes, on or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing the passions or sexual desires of such child, shall be guilty of a felony, do not limit the application of the section to an act attempted or committed between persons of opposite sexes. People v. Zuell, 82 Pac. 1128, 1129, 2 Cal. App. 59. LEWD HOUSE The words "ill fame" are synonymous with the word "lewd," as used in the statute, making it an offense to keep a lewd house, maintained as a lewd house is admissible and the reputation of a house being kept and evidence on a trial of a person charged with the offense. McConnell v. State, 58 S. E. 546, 547, 2 Ga. App. 445. A house may be a lewd house, within Pen. Code 1910, § 382, making it criminal for any person to maintain a lewd house or place for the practice of fornication and adultery, though the house may be devoted chiefly to the carrying on of some other vocation (such as boarding house or hotel), if lewd women are accustomed to frequent there and to carry on their practices. Fitzgerald v. State, 72 S. E. 541, 542, 10 Ga. App. 70. tween the two expressions "house of ill fame" There is no difference in meaning beand "lewd house or place for the practice of fornication or adultery." Cotton v. City of Atlanta, 73 S. E. 683, 684, 10 Ga. App. 397. LEWDNESS See Leading Life of Prostitution and "Lewdness is lustfulness and lascivious behavior; a synonym of unchastity, sensuality, and debauchery.” On a prosecution for keeping a house of ill fame, instructions that a house resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness was a house visited by persons of both sexes for the purpose of having sexual intercourse, or some other lewd purpose, and that lewdness was the unlawful indulgence of the animal desires, were correct. State v. Wilson, 99 N. W. 1060, 1061, 124 Iowa, 264. The Century Dictionary makes "lewdness" synonymous with "impurity," "unchastity," "licentiousness," "sensuality." In Commonwealth v. Wardell, 128 Mass. 54, 35 Am. Rep. 357, it was held that "lewdness” is the irregular indulgence of lust, whether public or private. "Lewdness," as used in the age of consent law (Acts 1901, p. 29, c. 19), which, after prohibiting carnal knowledge of a female over 12 and under 18 years of age, de clares that nothing contained in the act shall authorize a conviction when the female is at the time or before the carnal knowledge a bawd, lewd, or kept female, includes private as well as public unchastity. Jamison v. State, 94 S. W. 675, 678, 117 Tenn. 58. The term "lewdness," as used in Code, § 4939, prohibiting the keeping of a house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, means lustfulness, lecherous, lascivious, or libidinous conduct. As used in section 4938, declaring that if any man or woman not being married to each other lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, or if any man or woman married or unmarried is guilty of open and gross lewdness, and designedly makes an open and indecent or obscene exposure of his or her person, or of the person of another, every such person shall be imprisoned, etc., the term "lewdness" means open and public indecency tending to corrupt public morals, and not mere unlawful indulgence of the animal desires, so that where accused was indicted for conspiracy to induce certain females to commit the crime of lewdness, and no act was shown indicating illicit intercourse or anything more than a conspiracy to procure the girls' willing assent to a single act of intercourse, an instruction defining "lewdness" as the unlawful indulgence of the animal desires was misleading and erroneous. State v. Mitchell, 128 N. W. 378, 379, 149 Iowa, 362. See Party Liable; Primarily Liable; Secondarily Liable; Usually Liable. The word "liable" in a plea of contributory negligence, that plaintiff attempted to cross the road in front of the approaching automobile, when she knew that by so doing she was "liable" to be struck by the machine, does not mean "probably," but no more than "possibly." Terrill v. Walker, 59 South. 775, 776, 5 Ala. App. 535 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4110). A statute declaring that whoever commits an unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall be punished, etc., makes criminal any and all unnatural and lascivious acts with another person; and it is no de fense that the act was not an act of copulation, since copulation is not within the stat-ity, ute. Commonwealth v. Delano, 83 N. E. 406, 197 Mass. 166. Prostitution is the common "lewdness" of a woman for gain, or the offering of her person to indiscriminate intercourse with man, while "lewdness" is unlawful indulgence of the animal desire. State v. Porter, 107 N. W. 923, 924, 130 Iowa, 690. To convict of the crime of "lewd and lascivious cohabitation," denounced by section 2596, Rev. St. 1892, there must be proved both lewd and lascivious intercourse, and a living or dwelling together as though the conjugal relation existed between the parties. Where the proofs show a residing together of the parties, but are silent as to any lewd and lascivious intercourse between them, there can be no conviction of the crime. Whitehead v. State, 37 South. 302, 48 Fla. 64. "Lewd and lascivious association and cohabitation," as used in Code 1906, § 4358, means the living and cohabiting together of a man and a woman, not married to each other, in the same house, as husband and wife. State v. White, 66 S. E. 20, 66 W. Va. 45. The words "probable," "likely," and "liable" are synonymous when applied to the effects of a personal injury, each dealing | with reasonable probability, not with possibiland what may probably, or is likely or liable to, be the future result of a personal injury, is competent evidence to prove what is reasonably certain in the matter.. Hallum v. Village of Omro, 99 N. W. 1051, 1054, 122 Wis. 337. In Webster's Dictionary, the word "liable" is said to refer to a possible or probable happening which may not actually occur, as horses are liable to slip; even the sagacious are liable to make mistakes. The word, as used in an insurance policy, does not signify a perfected or fixed legal liability, but rather a condition out of which a legal liability may arise. The word as most frequently used does not necessarily exclude the idea of a contingency. State ex rel. Breeden v. Sheets, 72 Pac. 334, 335, 26 Utah, 105 (quoting and adopting definition in Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 52 N. E. 862, 178 Ill. 64). "The word 'liable' denotes something external which may befall us; 'subject' refers to evils which arise chiefly from internal necessity, and are likely to do so. Hence the former applies more to what is accidental; |