In trespass to try title to land, even though a tract of land claimed by adverse possession was not within Act March 25, 1891 (Laws 1891, p. 76, c. 57), providing that land owned by one person entirely surrounded by tracts owned or fenced by another shall not be considered inclosed by the fence inclosing the circumscribing tract, and possession by the owner of the circumscribing tract of the interior tract is not peaceable and adverse possession within Rev. St. 1895, art. 3343, providing for the recovery of lands held by another peaceably and adversely, within 10 years after the accrual of the cause of action, unless the interior tract be separated by a fence, or one-tenth of it be cultivated, and also providing that possession of land belonging to another by a person owning 5,000 acres or more of land inclosed by a fence in connection therewith shall not be peaceable and adverse possession within Rev. St. 1895, art. 3343, unless the land so belonging to another be separated by a fence from the adjoining lands, or one-tenth thereof be cultivated, the land owned by defend ant being less than 5,000 acres, and the land claimed by plaintiff not being entirely surrounded by the land owned by defendant, and there being evidence tending to show that defendant had been in possession of a part of the tract long enough to bring it within the 10-year statute of limitations, it was error to refuse to charge on the statute. Sellman v. Daniel (Tex.) 110 S. W. 81.

PEACEABLE ENTRY

In the amendment added in 1879, extending the remedy of forcible entry given by Code 1907, § 4262, to cases where there was a peaceable entry, the "peaceable entry" intended is an intrusion, though peaceable, upon plaintiff's prior actual possession. Self v. Comer, 52 South. 336, 337, 166 Ala. 68.

PEACEABLE POSSESSION

According to Rev. St. 1895, art. 3348, "peaceable possession" is such as is continuous and not interrupted by adverse suit to recover the estate. White v. Pingenot, 90 S. W. 672, 674, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 641.

Quiet occupation, under claim of title, is "peaceable possession," within P. L. 1870, p. 20, providing that a person in peaceable possession of lands may sue in chancery to settle a disputed title thereto. Powell v. Mayo, 24 N. J. Eq. 178, 181.

One in peaceable possession under a claim of ownership, as distinguished from possession which is disputed, is within the statute authorizing one in "peaceable posses

title, and the fact that the right to the possession is disputed does not defeat the right to sue; but where the possession, as distinguished from the right to it, is disputed, the suit will not lie. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Rouse (Ala.) 57 South. 706, 707.

The word "peaceable," as used in an answer in a suit to quiet title, in which answer defendant denies that complainant is in the peaceable possession of the land involved in the suit, is used to contradistinguish peaceable possession from disputed or contested possession under claim of ownership. Southern R. Co. v. Hall, 41 South. 135, 136, 145 Ala. 224 (citing Adler v. Sullivan, 22 South. 87, 115 Ala. 587).

"If the possession has been uninterrupted, of necessity it has been 'peaceable.' If it has been interrupted, of necessity it has not been peaceable. The words are therefore interchangeable and synonymous in the Montecito pleading of prescriptive title." Valley Water Co. v. Santa Barbara, 77 Pac. 1113, 1119, 144 Cal. 578 (citing American Co. v. Bradford, 27 Cal. 360; Chauvet v. Hill, 28 Pac. 1066, 93 Cal. 407; Smith v. Hawkins, 42 Pac. 453, 110 Cal. 122).

"Peaceable possession," in the statute authorizing the maintenance of a bill to quiet title to real property where complainant is in peaceable possession of the lands, is not a possession which is peaceable as to third persons, but only peaceable as to the defendant, and, as to the defendant, that it is a possession undisturbed by any act of the defendant in or upon the locus in quo for which the defendant would be suable in an action by which the title to the property could be determined. Bradley v. McPherson (N. J.) 58 Atl. 105, 106.

Under Code 1896, § 809, providing that any person in "peaceable possession" of land, etc., may maintain a suit to quiet title to the and is sustained where it is shown that comland, it was held, that a bill to quiet title to plainants were in the "peaceable possession" of the land at the time of filing the bill, and such a showing makes out a prima facie case. George E. Wood Lumber Co. v. Williams, 47 South. 202, 203, 157 Ala. 73.

Peaceable and undisturbed possession means actual and immediate possession, such possession as a man has of the house in which he lives or the field he tills or the land whereon he pastures his cattle. The words "peaceable" and "undisturbed," when applied to such possession, convey a clear meaning. Chezum v. Campbell, 85 Pac. 48, 50, 42 Wash. 560, 7 Ann. Cas. 921.

PEACOCK FEATHERS

Dutiable as ornamental feathers, see Ornamental Feathers.

PEARL

Certain drilled pearls of exceptionally large size and fine quality were imported together, arranged in collections according to size, the largest in the center. It appeared that these collections had not been selected for a special piece of jewelry, but that the pearls were to be sold separately on their individual merits, and that they had not been advanced to a special value beyond the aggregate amount of their individual values by an assortment and selection that fitted them for immediate transformation into a necklace or string of pearls. Held that, under the similitude clause in the tariff act, they bear a closer resemblance to "pearls in their natural state not strung or set" than to "pearls set or strung." Neresheimer & Co. v. United States, 136 Fed. 86, 88, 68 C. C. A. 654.

Loose drilled pearls, unset and unstrung, however carefully matched or desirable for a necklace, are dutiable at 10 per cent. ad

valorem under the tariff act, as "pearls in their natural state, not strung or set," and are not classifiable by similitude as Jewelry, including "pearls set or strung," because at some time, or from time to time previous to importation, such pearls had been strung temporarily for purposes of display. United States v. Citroen, 32 Sup. Ct. 259, 260, 223 U. S. 407, 56 L. Ed. 486.

Half pearls, consisting of the better part of the true pearl, from which blemishes or flaws have been removed by sawing or splitting, and which are not adapted for stringing, but are chiefly used for jewelry settings, are dutiable by similitude, under the paragraph of the tariff act, covering "pearls in their natural state, not strung or set." United States v. Hahn, 135 Fed. 349, 68 C. C. A. 130. Drilled pearls, which had been assembled and matched abroad and were ordered to be made into a necklace in New York, but had never been strung as a necklace, except temporarily, for purposes of display, are not "jewelry" under the tariff act, but are dutiable either directly or by similitude as "pearls in their natural state." United States v. Tiffany & Co., 172 Fed. 300, 301.

Pearls which, though they had been tentatively worn as a necklace abroad, were imported loose and were increased by the addition of others after importation for completion into a necklace, are not dutiable as "jewelry," under the tariff act, but as "pearls in their natural state," by similitude. Citroen v. United States, 166 Fed. 693, 697, 92 C. C.

A. 365.

PEARL BEADS

The term "pearl beads," as understood in trade, does not include genuine pearls drilled, but refers to articles of glass made to

imitate pearls. United States v. *American Gem & Pearl Co., 142 Fed. 283, 284.

PECULIAR

Whilst the word "peculiar" sometimes has an offensive meaning, yet its natural and usual meaning is particular or special. St. Louis, M. & S. E. R. Co. v. Continental Brick Co., 96 S. W. 1011, 1015, 198 Mo. 698. Special synonymous

An instruction, in an action for damages for change of grade of a street, that the jury should assess plaintiff's damage at the excess of the market value immediately before the grading was commenced, over the market value thereof immediately after the grading was finished, less the value "of any special benefits which are peculiar" to the property, is not erroneous for the use of the word "peculiar," which is simply synonymous with the word "special." Powell v. City of Columbia, 134 S. W. 76, 77, 154 Mo. App. 239.

PECUNIARY

*

PECUNIARY ABILITY

The term "pecuniarily able," used with reference to the financial condition of a proposed purchaser procured by an agent of the vendor, does not mean that such purchaser must necessarily have all the money in his pocketbook or to his credit at the bank, but that he is able to command the necessary money to close the deal on reasonable notice, time be limited. McCabe v. Jones, 124 N. W. or within the time limited by the vendor, if a 486, 487, 141 Wis. 540. PECUNIARY AID

"Pecuniary aid" for which recovery may be had for wrongful death means everything that can be of value, and in the case of minor children includes the reasonable pecuniary value of the nurture, care, and education, if any, they would have received from decedent during their minority, had he lived. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Williams (Tex.) 117 S. W. 1043, 1047.

In an action for death, the court charged the jury to determine the probable amount and value of the "pecuniary aid," if any, which decedent would probably have "contributed" to plaintiffs after his death, if he had not been killed, and to allow the present pecuniary value thereof. The court also charged the jury to allow decedent's children in addition the pecuniary value of any counsel and advice which they would probably have received but for decedent's wrongful death. Held, that the word "contributed" indicates that the "pecuniary aid" referred to meant something more tangible than counsel and advice, and that the instruction was therefore not objectionable as permitting a double recovery as to the children. International & G. N. R. Co. v. White (Tex.) 120 S. W. 958, 960.

PECUNIARY BENEFIT

West Jersey & S. R. Co., 71 Atl. 253, 254, 76 N. J. Law, 602, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 16 Ann. Cas. 929 (citing Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471, 475).

PECUNIARY INJURY

In an action by the widow, children, and mother of one negligently killed, held, that an instruction that they could recover such sum as would represent the present worth of the pecuniary benefits plaintiffs could reasonably expect that decedent would have contributed in the future, had he lived, to be apportioned among plaintiffs as they were entitled to it, was not erroneous as authorizing the mother to recover beyond her life expectancy. Held, further, that instructions that plaintiffs could recover the present worth of the pecuniary benefits they could reasonably expect that decedent would have contributed; that "pecuniary benefits" meant, not only money, but everything that could be valued in money; that in the case of plaintiff children it included the reasonable pecuniary value of the nurture, care, and training they would have received during minority, had he lived; and that they could not recover for grief, sorrow, or loss of society, affection, or companionship-were not objectionable as allowing recovery for loss of care, nurture and training having no pecuniary value. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Wallace, 115 S. W. 302, 303, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 127.

PECUNIARY DAMAGE

"Pecuniary damages" are those which can be accurately estimated as loss of wages, cost of medical attendance, etc. L. W. Pomerene Co. v. White, 97 N. W. 232, 234, 70 Neb. 171.

The word "pecuniary," as used in a statute providing for the recovery of "pecuniary damages" resulting from the death of a relative, is used in distinction to those injuries to the affections and sentiments which arise from the death of relatives and which, though most painful and grievous to be borne, cannot be measured or recompensed by money. This term also excludes those losses which result from the deprivation of the society and companionship of relatives which are equally incapable of being defined by any recognized measure of value. But infant children, however, sustain a loss from the death of their parents, and especially their mother, of a different kind. She owes them the duty of nurture, and of an intellectual, moral, and physical training, and such instruction can only proceed from a mother. Carter v.

"Pecuniary injury,' resulting from death of another, means a deprivation of reasonable expectation of a pecuniary advantage, which would have resulted by a continuance of the life of the deceased." Un

ary injury" resulting from death of a rela

tive, damages may be allowed in case of children for the deprivation of the care which "they could naturally expect from the continuance of their mother's life." Carter v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 71 Atl. 253, 76 N. J. Law, 602, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 16 Ann. Cas. Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151, 929 (quoting and adopting a definition in 158).

Loss of the attentions and kindness of children to parents might, under some circumstances, be a "pecuniary injury." Of course, loss of income or loss of estate would be pecuniary injuries. So would be the loss of a reasonable prospect of additional income If a son had setand estate in the future. tled an annuity during his own life upon his parents, his death would be a pecuniary loss to them as well as to his wife and children. Generally, where there exists a reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit to one from the continuing life of another, whether arising from legal or family relations, the untimely extinction of that life is a "pecuniary injury." McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 43 Atl. 29, 30, 92 Me. 454.

The "pecuniary injury resulting from death" recoverable under the New Jersey statute is nothing more than the deprivation of a reasonable expectation of the pecuniary advantage which would have resulted by a continuance of the life of the deceased. The pecuniary injury resulting from the death of a minor child is the lost value of the child's

prospective services to the parent during minority. Surgical expenses incurred by the parent in consequence of the injury causing death are not recoverable. Hutchinson v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 170 Fed. 615, 616.

The word "solatium," as used by the courts in stating that for a particular injury solatium will be allowed, means "a compensation as a soothing to the affections or wounded feelings, and for loss of the comfort and social pleasure there is in the association between members of a family. Solatium is sentiment, love, or affection, as distinguished from a property loss." The declaration in Rev. St. 1899, § 2866, that in an action for a death the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just with reference "to the necessary injuries resulting from" such death, is equivalent to limiting the re

PECUNIARY LOSS

The word "pecuniary," as used in a statute authorizing recovery for pecuniary loss, is not restricted to loss of money, or of things purchasable by money. Carter v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 71 Atl. 253, 254, 76 N. J. Law, 602, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128, 16 Ann. Cas. 929.

In an action for death, brought by decedent's widow and minor children, plaintiffs may, under proper allegations and proof, re cover for the loss of advice and counsel of decedent, though such loss is not a pecuniary loss within the statute restricting the right of recovery to the pecuniary injury sustained, since the only pecuniary loss within the statute is the loss of maintenance and support. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Davenport (Tex.) 110 S. W. 150, 154.

Plaintiff contracting for certain repairs upon a house owned by his wife procured a bond from a surety company to himself, to which the wife was not a party, conditioned to indemnify him for any pecuniary loss from breach of any of the terms of the contractor's agreement, and afterwards paid judgments obtained on subcontractors' liens. Held, that he had sustained "pecuniary loss" within the terms of the bond. Taylor v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 S. W. 1096, 161 Mo. App. 293.

the trustees to the principal, who conducted Where an academy was farmed out by it under their supervision, they reserving all of their powers under the charter, the rental which they received from the principal, and which was applied by them to erecting buildings and improving the grounds of the institution, without any personal gain to themselves, was not a "pecuniary profit," within the meaning of Laws 1896, p. 797, c. 908, § 4, subd. 7, which provides for the taxation of educational institutions if any officer thereof shall be entitled to receive pecuniary profit therefrom other than reasonable compensation for services rendered in effecting its educational purposes. People v. Mezger, 90 N. Y. Supp. 488, 490, 98 App. Div. 237.

A will contained bequests to "St. Vincent's Hospital" and "Old Men's Home." It was not questioned but that the testator by the term “Old Men's Home" meant St. Benedict's Home for the Aged. Neither the hospital nor the home was incorporated, but each was merely a charitable enterprise conducted by the Sisters of St. Benedict, a corporation organized not for pecuniary profit. Held, that since the bequest was in effect to the corporation, and merely specified the particular enterprises to which the testator wished it devoted, it was a bequest to a corporation organized under the chapter relating to corporations not for pecuniary profit, within the meaning of Code, § 3270, providing that no bequest to such corporations shall be valid in excess of one-fourth of testator's estate, if a spouse, child, or parent survive the testator. In re Ihmes' Estate, 134 N. W. 429, 430, 154 Iowa, 20.

PED

wood's Dictionary on Etymology, is “a panA "ped" in Norfolk, according to Wedgnier or wicker basket; a pedder or peddler; a packman; one who carries on his back Record-Press, 150 S. W. 814, 815, 150 Ky. 634. goods for sale." Citizens' Bank v. Crittenden PEDDLER

See, also, Hawker; Itinerant Vendor. A "peddler” is defined as one who travels Eaton v. Peoabout, retailing small wares. ple, 104 Pac. 407, 408, 46 Colo. 361.