of the law. The former cannot be done, while to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact, or state of things, upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. Samuelson v. State, 95 S. W. 1012, 1016, 116 Tenn. 470, 115 Am. St. Rep. 805 (citing appeal of Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County Com'rs, 1 Ohio St. 88; State v. Barringer, 14 S. E. 781, 110 N. C. 525; Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N. E. 79, 156 Mass. 57; Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N. E. 577, 140 Mass. 485; In re Nightingale, 11 Pick. [28 Mass.] 168; Commissioners of Easton v. Covey, 22 Atl. 266, 74 Md. 262; In re Flaherty, 38 Pac. 981, 105 Cal. 558, 27 L. R. A. 529; Debardelaben v. State, 42 S. W. 684, 99 Tenn. 649).

"To declare what a law is or has been is a 'judicial power'; to declare what it shall be is 'legislative."" Act July 6, 1905 (Pub. Acts 1905, p. 413, c. 217), which limits the recovery in a suit against an administrator for the statutory penalty for failing to file an inventory does not invade the judicial province nor interfere with, dictate to or coerce the judicial department. Atwood v. Bucking

ham, 62 Atl. 616, 618, 78 Conn. 423 (citing Dash v. Van Kleeck [N. Y.] 7 Johns, 477, 498, 5 Am. Dec. 291).

The board of supervisors of a county, in passing a resolution reviving the distinction between town and county poor, pursuant to Laws 1896, p. 176, c. 225, § 134, and appqrtioning among the town the taxes for the support of poor, pursuant to sections 9, 10 (page 139), discharges "legislative functions," so that its acts cannot be reviewed by certiorari. People ex rel. Allen v. Board of Sup'rs of Westchester County, 99 N. Y. Supp. 348, 349, 113 App. Div. 773 (citing People v. Board of Sup'rs of Queens County, 30 N. E. 488, 131 N. Y. 468; People ex rel. O'Connor v. Board of Sup'rs of Queens County, 47 N. E. 790, 153 N. Y. 370).

The power to determine what persons and property shall be taxed belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, and, whether exercised by the Legislature itself or delegated to a municipal corporation, is strictly a "legislative power." Risley v. Utica, 173 Fed. 502, 507 (citing New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. Ed. 607; United States ex rel. Ranger v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392, 25 L. Ed. 225; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. Ed. 197).

The "legislative power" of the territory

of Oklahoma extended to all rightful subjects or legislation pertaining to local self-govern

ment when not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and when the exercise of such power did not in any way interfere with the supreme right of Congress to control its governmental affairs. Territory v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 99 Pac. 911, 914, 22 Okl. 890.

A statute authorized a city to enlarge or contract its boundaries by ordinance defining the territory, and provided that any person interested might by certain procedure apply to the district court, which should determine the reasonableness of the alteration. Held, that the statute was not objectionable St. 1889, p. 358, c. 247, providing that on the ground that it conferred "legislative new territory may be annexed to any town power" on the court. "To legislate is to make by the filing of a petition describing the teror enact a law or laws." Webster's Dict. ritory desired to be annexed and a favorable "Legislative power" is, therefore, the power vote at the election called pursuant to the peto make laws, and incidentally to repeal tition, thus leaving the determination of the them. But the power to determine, in a given boundaries of the annexed territory to the incase, presented by parties having property habitants, is not for this reason invalid as or other rights at stake, and independent of a delegation of "legislative authority," since, the exercise of any enacting power, whether under Const. art. 11, § 6, forbidding the Lega municipal corporation, professing to legislature to create or provide for the organizaislate under incidental or general authority, has exercised such authority in accordance with the condition of the grant, relates, not to the power of legislation, but to the manner of its exercise, and is itself judicial. New Orleans & N. W. R. Co. v. Town of Vidalia, 42 South. 139, 143, 117 La. 561 (citing Callen v. City of Junction City, 23 Pac. 652, 43 Kan. 627, 7 L. R. A. 736; Forsythe v. Hammond, 40 N. E. 267, 41 N. E. 950, 142 Ind. 505, 30 L. R. A. 576; Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405, 1 Wash. 98, 8 L. R. A. 106; In re Incorporation of Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N. W. 1033, 93 Wis. 616, 33 L. R. A. 638; Wahoo v. Dickinson, 36 N. W. 813, 23 Neb. 426; Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 58 Fed. 774).

tion of municipal corporations by any other than general laws, fixing the boundaries of towns is not a legislative function. People v. Town of Ontario, 84 Pac. 205, 207, 148 Cal.

625.

While it is one of the settled maxims in constitutional law that the "power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated" by that department to any other body or authority, this does not prevent legislative functions, which are merely ministerial or executive in their character, from being delegated by that branch of the government to other departments or to bodies created by it for that purpose. Laws 1905, p. 275, c. 163, creating a board for the purpose of procuring the erection of a capitol building

and authorizing such board to procure the erection of a building adopt plans and specifications, etc., is not unconstitutional as a delegation of "legislative power." Davenport v. Elrod, 107 N. W. 833, 835, 20 S. D. 567.

LEGISLATURE

See House of Legislature. Member of Legislature, see Member. The word "Legislature," as used in Const. U. S. art. 1, § 4, providing that the time, place, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof, but that Congress may make or alter such regulations does not mean simply the members who compose the Legislature, but refers to the lawmaking body or power of the state, as established by the state Constitution, and which in this state, under the referendum Const. art. 3, § 1, includes the people, and hence Sess. Laws 1909, c. 223, dividing the state into congressional districts, is subject to the referendum vote of the people the same as any other law passed by the Legislature. State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley, 127 N. W. 848, 849, 26 S. D. 5.

A "legislator" is one who makes laws for a state or community. Burke v. Wood, 162 Fed. 533, 538.

LEGITIMACY

LEGITIMATE

"Legitimate" means lawful; lawfully begotten; born in wedlock; of lawful birth; a legitimate heir. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. E. 1012, 1013, 35 Ind. App. 662 (quoting and adopting definitions in Webst. Dict.; Cent. Dict.).

The term "legitimate," in Laws 1895, c. 570, providing for the incorporation of associations for the improvement of the breed of horses and for the establishment of a state racing commission, and authorizing the commission to issue licenses for running races and for the revocation of licenses, if for any reason the continuance thereof shall not be conducive to the interests of "legitimate" racing, is used in its broad and not technical sense, and means good or proper and not merely unlawful. People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Commission, 103 N. Y. Supp. 955, 961, 57 Misc. Rep. 331. LEGITIMATE CHILD

mann v. Zachmann, 66 N. E. 256, 257, 201 Ill. 380, 94 Am. St. Rep. 180 (citing 5 Cyc. p. 626; Coke, Litt. 344a; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420, 72 Am. Dec. 644; quoting and adopting definition in 1 Bl. Comm. 446).

A child born after marriage, during wedlock, and within the usual period of gestation, after the husband has had opportu

nity to have begotten it, is conclusively presumed to be "legitimate." Buckner's Adm'r v. Buckner, 87 S. W. 776, 777, 120 Ky. 596. LEGITIMATE ISSUE

Under Act Cong. Feb. 28, 1891, c. 383, 26 Stat. 794, § 5, in amendment of Act Cong. Feb. 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388, providing that for the purpose of determining the descent of land to the heirs of any deceased Indian allottee of land, whenever any male and female Indian shall have cohabited together as husband and wife according to the custom of Indian life, the issue of such cohabitation shall be, for the purpose aforesaid, taken to be the legitimate issue of the Indians so living together, and that every Indian child, otherwise illegitimate, shall for that purpose be taken to be the legitimate issue of the father, the illegitimate children of an allottee are entitled to inherit and share in the lands allotted to their father the same though they were legitimate children, and the children of a deceased illegitimate child are entitled to the share of their deceased parent.

as

In re House's Heirs, 112 N. W. 27, 29, 132 Wis. 212.

LEGITIMATE PURPOSE

The term "legitimate purpose," as applied to the acts of a municipal corporation, means such a purpose as is authorized by the municipal charter. Vaughn v. Village of Greencastle, 78 S. W. 50, 51, 104 Mo. App. 206.

The creation of so-called treasury stock and disposition of it upon the representation that it was fully paid and nonassessable, and at a price inferentially below par, for the purpose of providing working capital for a corporation, is not a "legitimate corporate purpose," within the act concerning corporations (revision of 1896), granting power to corporations to purchase shares of their own capital stock, if such purchase is for a legitimate corporate purpose, but not otherwise. Knickerbocker Importation Co. V. State Board of Assessors, 65 Atl. 913, 914, 74 N. J. Law, 583, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 885.

Child as including, see Child-Children LEGITIMATE TITLE (In Statutes).

"A legitimate child' is he that is born in lawful wedlock or within a competent time afterward." A child born 20 days after its mother was divorced from one husband, whose whereabouts were not shown, and 15 days after her marriage to another man, who recognized the child as his offspring, will be presumed to be his legitimate child. Zach

In the provision of the protocol of the treaty of the Guadalupe Hidalgo that Mexican "grants" in the ceded territory shall preserve their legal value, and that the grantees may cause "their legitimate titles" to be acknowledged, the terms "grants" and "legitimate titles" are not restricted to absolute perfect grants made prior to the treaty, but include also equitable titles which, if there

had been no change of sovereignty, would have become perfect or could have been made perfect if the proper steps had been taken. The words "legitimate titles" mean titles that are comprehended in the term "grants," and since the term "grants," as employed in treaties, embraces all character of titles, equitable or legal, it reflects the sense and meaning in which the term "legitimate titles" was intended to be employed. State v. Russell, 85 S. W. 288, 293, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 13; Haynes v. State (Tex.) 85 S. W. 1029, 1039.

LEGITIMATION

While "adoption," properly considered, refers to persons who are strangers in blood, "legitimation" refers to persons where the blood relation exists. The verb "adopts," in Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, c. 59, art. 2, § 36, providing that the father of an illegitimate child, by acknowledging it as his own, etc., thereby "adopts" it as such, is used in the sense of "legitimates." Allison v. Bryan, 97 Pac. 282, 283, 21 Okl. 557, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (quoting Blythe v. Ayres, 31 Pac. 915, 96 Cal. 532, 19 L. R. A. 40, and citing Bouvier, Black, Anderson, and Rapalje Law Dictionaries).

LEMON

As fruit, see Fruit.

As goods, wares, and merchandise, see
Goods.

LEND-LENT

punctuation or anything to indicate that the testator intended to differentiate the two parcels of property in reference to the quantity of the estate. Held, that as "lend" may be construed as synonymous with give, devise, or bequeath, unless it is manifest that a different meaning was intended, the testator must be held to have referred to all the property devised his daughter in the residuary clause. Faison v. Moore, 75 S. E. 993, 160 N. C. 148.

LENSE

It is necessary that "lenses" should be both ground and polished in order to be brought within the provision of the Tariff Act for "lenses ground and polish

ed to a spherical, cylindrical or prismatic form"; and, where they have been brought to such form by molding, they are not within that provision. United States v. Robinson, 140 Fed. 968, 969.

LESS

See More or Less; Not Less Than.

In an action under Laws 1907, p. 495, c. 254, defining the liabilities of railroads for injuries to employés, for the death of a brakeman, the use of the words "less or greater," instead of the statutory words "slighter or greater," in determining decedent's negligence as a contributing cause in comparison with that attributable to the railroad, was not erroneous, as the word "less" conveyed

See Money Lent; Money Loaned and In- the idea conveyed by the word "slighter" as vested.

Rev. St. c. 48, § 64, providing that premiums for building association loans shall consist of a percentage charged on the amount lent in addition to interest, and section 65, providing that the monthly interest shall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent. per annum, mean by the words "loan" and "lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the sum actually advanced. Tibbetts v. Deering Loan & Building Ass'n, 72 Atl. 162, 165, 104 Me. 404.

As give

Under Revisal 1905, § 1578, converting estates tail into estates in fee simple, a will whereby the testator "lends" land to his grandson and his lawful heirs of the body forever conveys an estate in fee simple. Sessoms v. Sessoms, 56 S. E. 687, 688, 144 N. C. 121 (citing Cox v. Marks, 27 N. C. 361; King v. Utley, 85 N. C. 59; Edgerton v. Aycock, 31 S. E. 382, 123 N. C. 134; Hinson v. Pickett [S. C.] 1 Hill Eq. 35).

A clause of a will bequeathed two separate parcels of land to the daughter of the testator, and, on her death, to her heirs and to her issue if living in fee simple, otherwise, "all the real estate loaned her to be divided between" certain persons. There was no

used in the statute. Boucher v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 123 N. W. 913, 914, 141 Wis. 160.

LESS NOTE

Where a will gave a legacy, less a note held by the testator against the legatee, interest was properly charged on the note up to the time of the probate of the will, Rev. Codes, § 4770, requiring the language of a will to be given its ordinary meaning, and the words "less a note" would, in ordinary busi ness transactions, refer to the debt as a whole, and not the sum mentioned as the

principal only. In re Beck's Estate, 121 Pac. 784, 789, 44 Mont. 561.

LESSENED CAPACITY

In a personal injury action, an instruction that the jury, in assessing damages, might consider the bodily and mental pain endured by the injured party, loss of time, and inability to work and earn money, and her diminished capacity for labor, etc., was not erroneous as permitting double damages for the same cause; "inability to work" meaning the total suspension of the power to work, and "diminished capacity to labor" meaning lessening, without totally destroying, the power to labor, and "inability" meaning without ability, and "lessened capacity" meaning that

partial ability remains. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Maxwell (Tex.) 128 S. W. 160, 166.

LESSER OFFENSE

A "lessee" of a store building, who assumes entire control of a room connected therewith, is the "lessee and occupant" of such room within the law forbidding gaming. Ford v. State, 38 South. 229, 230, 86 Miss. 123.

As contractor

See Contractor.

As owner

See Owner.

As purchaser for valuable considera

tion

See Purchaser for Valuable Consideration.

Under a count of a presentment for selling liquor without a license, in violation of Acts 1899, c. 161, § 1, to constitute which offense a single sale is sufficient, defendant cannot, there being no evidence of any specific sale. so as to authorize a conviction of the offense charged, be convicted of violation of Acts 1909, c. 479, § 16, making it an offense to exercise the privilege of retail liquor dealer without first paying the taxes prescribed for exercise thereof, though he has a United States revenue license to retail liquor, made by the act (page 1743) prima facie evidence that he is in the retail liquor business; the LESSOR offense denounced by the act of 1909, though having a lighter punishment prescribed, not being a lesser offense than, and included in, the offense denounced by the act of 1899, within Shannon's Code, §§ 7085, 7195, permitting, on an indictment for an offense admitting, or consisting, of different degrees, a con- The term "let" is usually applied to leasviction of a lower degree of the offense than es and conveyances of real estate and conthat charged, or of any offense necessarily in-tains the idea of a grant, and when the parcluded in that charged. Brinkley v. State, 145 S. W. 161, 162, 125 Tenn. 445.

LESSEE

LET

See Owner.

See Agree to Let.

ties have used it as the operative word applied to a transfer of timber rights and contracts passing such interest for 91 years and more, by fair interpretation and considerA petition in summary proceedings for ing the nature of the interest, the parties the possession of land, alleging that the pe-lantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. could only have intended an assignment. Attitioner is the "lessee" and landlord thereof, is not a sufficient compliance with Code Civ. Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C. 368, 23 L. Proc. § 2235, requiring the petition to state R. A. (N. S.) 223, 125 Am. St. Rep. 550, 15

the interest of the petitioner in the premises. The statement that the petitioner was the "lessee" and "landlord" is the assertion mere

Ann. Cas. 363.

As allow or permit

Where defendant, who had an option to ly of an interest and not a description of purchase certain property, represented to such interest. Ferber v. Apfel, 99 N. Y. plaintiff that they were to be "let in on the Supp. 215, 216, 113 App. Div. 720 (citing Ka-ground floor" with certain specified excepzis v. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App. Div. 636; Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228; Engle, Heller Co. v. Henry Elias Brewing Co., 75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Potter v. New York Baptist Mission Society, 52 N. Y. Supp. 294, 23 Misc. Rep. 671; Ross v. Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683; Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38 Misc. Rep. 790).

tions, it meant that they were to come into the purchase upon the same terms and conditions that he had made with the holder of the property, save as particularly specified. Kroll v. Coach, 78 Pac. 397, 399, 45 Or. 459. As demise, grant, or lease

The term "let" contemplates the relation of landlord and tenant. It is defined as "to A covenant to pay to the lessees and give leave to; to permit; to grant the use of their assigns, on the termination of the lease, realty for a compensation correlative to hire; to lease or hire out for compensation." a compensation for buildings and improvements put on the demised land during the Land, into possession of which one enters unterm of the lease was not to be restricted to der a contract to purchase, is not "let" to buildings put on the land by the lessees, but him, within a statute making it forcible dewould include buildings put on it by subten-tainer to willfully hold over without force ants or assigns of the lessees. posite were the true construction of the word "lessees" in this covenant, the covenant in the earlier part of the lease that the said "lessees" shall have a right of way, and the covenant to "warrant and defend," would have to be restricted in the same way. Hollywood v. First Parish in Brockton, 78 N. E. 124, 125, 192 Mass. 269.

If the op

after the termination of the time for which

the property was "let" after demand for possession. Francis v. Holmes, 118 S. W. 881, 883, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 608.

"The mere use of the words 'lease' and 'let,' in a contract of letting, does not necessarily create a lease as distinguished from a license;" but an instrument by which one contracted to let and another to take the ex

clusive right to maintain stands for the sale | definition in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. of candies at a race park, also a storeroom [78 U. S.] 516, 20 L. Ed. 33). under the tracks providing the period of "letting" and the amount and times of payment of rent, is a lease and not a license. man v. Atlantic Amusement Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 222, 223, 65 Misc. Rep. 25.

LET FOR HIRE

Mehl

As used in an ordinance providing for the payment of a license by owners of vebicles used or let for hire, the term "letting for hire" was intended to apply to cases where persons, the hirers, took temporary possession of the wagon and team. Swetman v. City of Covington (Ky.) 82 S. W. 386.

LETTING

See Public Letting; Subletting.

LETTER

A license to keep a dramshop is not a "letter patent," which can be tested or vacated by quo warranto. Hargett v. Bell, 46 S. E. 749, 750, 134 N. C. 394.

LETTERS TESTAMENTARY

See Entitled to Letters Testamentary.

"Letters testamentary" are of two kinds, "domiciliary letters" and "ancillary letters"; the first being issued at the place of the testator's domicile, and the latter at some place, other than domicile, where personalty of the testator is found. Such letters depend upon the situs of such personalty, and do not authorize the administrator or representative to perform any act or to reduce to possession personalty not within territorial authority of the court where issued. Lockwood v. Unit

See Not to the Letter; Threatening Let- ed States Steel Corporation, 138 N. Y. Supp.

ter.

As memorandum

See Memorandum.

As public document

See Public Document.

As solicitation

See Solicit.

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION See Ancillary Letters; Domiciliary ters.

LETTERS OF CREDIT

725, 727, 153 App. Div. 655.

LEVEE

"Levees" keep out the water. Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 70 S. W. 721, 724, 170 Mo. 240, 60 L. R. A. 190, 94 Am. St. Rep. 727.

"A levee' is a space adjacent to a navigable water where vessels may approach and Let-land to unload and receive passengers and freight, and where articles of freight may be left for loading on the vessels, or after they have been unloaded until they can be taken away." Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Dailey, 78 N. E. 790, 793, 222 III. 427 (quoting and adopting definition in Farnham, Water & Water Rights, § 145a).

A "letter of credit" is a letter containing a general or special request to pay the bearer or person named money, or sell him some commodity on credit, or give him something of value, and look to the writer of the letter for recompense, and which partakes of the nature of a negotiable instrument. Liggett v. Levy, 136 S. W. 299, 301, 233 Mo. 590, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 70.

LETTERS PATENT

"Letters patent' are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the persons therein named as patentees, but as public franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them as such inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right to make and use, and vend to others to be used, their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress." Monaghan v. City of Indianapolis, 76 N. E. 424, 425, 37 Ind. App. 280 (quoting and adopting

The word "levee," as used in the West and South, means a landing place for vessels for the delivery of merchandise, and, as incident thereto, for the temporary storage of the merchandise. In other words, a public landing. Louisville & N. R.. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 81 N. E. 983, 989, 76 Ohio St. 481.

That a tract of land bordering a river was designated as a steamboat landing on a plat and was dedicated to public use shows it to be a "levee." Betcher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 124 N. W. 1096, 1097, 110 Minn. 228.

Where a strip of land lying along the margin of a navigable stream was included in the plat of a city and dedicated to the public by the use of the word "levee" written thereon, and several streets opened upon this tract, and many lots had no other means of ingress and egress, except over and along it, its dedication included its use as a street, as well as a landing place for boats. Alpine v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 75 Pac. 73, 74, 68 Kan. 207, 64 L. R. A. 85, 1 Ann. Cas. 452.

Mc