LEGATEE

See General Legatee; Residuary Legatee; Sole Legatee; Specific Legatee. A "legatee" is a person to whom a legacy is given. Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W. 283, 286, 196 Mo. 587 (citing Black, Law tit. "Legatee").

Children

Where testator devises stock in trust for his daughter, one of the trustees being also an executor, and by another item directs that the executors shall hold it, together with other stock, the dividends of which are disDict.posed of by the will, until a designated time, in the meantime paying the dividends and profits to each of said "legatees," and provides that, if any of the legatees die before such time without children, the dividends so bequeathed to each legatee, as well as the stock, shall be distributed among his surviving children, the words "legatees" and "children" are used interchangeably, and, as to that item of the will, synonymously, so that the dividends are payable directly to the beneficiary of the trust, and not to the executors as trustees. Lamar v. Harris, 48 S. E. 932, 933, 121 Ga. 285.

Societies and corporations to whom legacies are given by a will are “legatees," within the meaning of a clause of the will providing that property of testatrix, not otherwise disposed of, shall be sold, and the money "paid to the legatees hereinbefore named." So, also, where the will provided that the property of testatrix otherwise undisposed of shall be sold, and proceeds paid to the “legatees hereinbefore named" in specified proportions, trustees previously named in the will and who are thereby given the legal title to the trust fund during the period of trust are "legatees," and as such take the legal title to whatever share of the property not otherwise disposed of the trust fund is entitled. Crawford v. Mound Grove Cemetery Ass'n, 75 N. E. 998, 1001, 218 Ill. 399.

As creditor

See Creditor.
Devisee

Devisee as including, see Devisee.

The terms "legatee" and "devisee" are more strictly interpreted as referring the Testator by olographic will, after having one to personalty and the other to realty, in bequeathed to his wife the homestead with the construction of statutes than in the confurniture, etc., together with a one-fourth in-struction of wills and deeds, and, where a terest in the residue after paying all be- deed describes the grantor as the only heir quests made, bequeathed the remaining three- and legatee of a certain person, the word fourths of the residue to his three other chil-"legatee" may be regarded as meaning devdren, and provided that, if any of the “lega- isee of land as well as donee of personalty. tees" died before testator's death, then the Weigel v. Green, 75 N. E. 913, 918, 218 Ill. legacy provided for him or her should be di- 227. vided equally among the residuary legatees. Held, that the word "legatees" was used in an ordinary nontechnical sense to include bequests of both real and personal property, and that, under the rule that the testator's intention, as disclosed by the language used, must control, such term included the bequest to the wife, and that on her predeceasing the testator her share became a part of the residue within the substitutionary clause. In re Henderson's Estate, 119 Pac. 496, 498, 161 Cal. 353.

A will provided that upon the death of the life tenant the remainder should be divided pro rata among the legatees named in the will. If the word "legatees" was intended to indicate the five persons named as such in the will, the entire estate could not be disposed of, and, if testator had so intended, he could easily have called them by name. In another clause providing for abatement of legacies, a certain process of proportion was ordained necessarily applicable only to the beneficiaries who survived testator. Held, that "legatees" should be construed to

"Legacy and devise" and "legatee and devisee" are often used as interchangeable phrases in wills and everyday conversation, and therefore courts would not feel fettered to any nice construction, where subject-matter or context shows the words were used interchangeably and as of the same import. But such popular and loose construction is hardly permissible in view of the statutory rule of hermeneutics. Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W. 283, 286, 196 Mo. 587.

Although the words "devise" and "devisee" properly and technically apply only to real estate, and the words "legacy" and "legatee" only to personal property, they have been made interchangeable by Ky. St. 1903, § 467, which provides that "the words legatee' and 'devisee' shall each be held to convey the same idea." Roberts v. Chenoweth (Ky.) 112 S. W. 625, 627, As heir

See Heirs.

As legal representative
See Legal Representative.

mean only those who survived testator, and LEGION

thus became legatees in the proper import of the term. In re Hoffman, 124 N. Y. Supp. 680, 681, 67 Misc. Rep. 334.

"League" and "legion" are of entirely different meanings; "league" being defined as "an alliance of persons," and "legion" as "a

military body or organization." People exposal to amend the Constitution is not "legisrel. Felter v. Rose, 80 N. E. 293, 295, 225 Ill. 496.

LEGISLATION

See Class Legislation; Exclusive Legislation; Expository Legislation; Municipal Legislation; Specially Named Legislation.

See, also, General Law; Special Law.

The Legislature at a special session has all the power it has at a regular session, except so far as restrained by the Constitution, and the limitation by article 3, § 40, providing that at such sessions there shall be no "legislation" on subjects not designated by the Governor, does not preclude the appointment of an investigating committee to obtain information for future use, even on a subject not submitted by the Governor; the well-defined word "legislation" having a meaning, and including only the enactment, Ex parte repeal, and amendment of laws. Wolters, 144 S. W. 531, 538, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 238 (Davidson, P. J., dissenting).

The word "legislation," as used in Const. §§ 76, 246, providing, respectively, that at a special session of the Legislature there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the call for the session except by vote of two-thirds of each House, and that no railroad shall have the benefit of any future legislation by general or special laws, refers to the enactment of statutes and is not descriptive of the processes by or through which laws are perfected by constituted authority, and hence such sections do not forbid the introduction of bills not within the subjects specially designated in the proclamation, unless the named proportion of the respective Houses sanction it. rel. Woodward v. Skeggs, 46 South. 268, 271,

154 Ala. 249.

State ex

lation," and the term "General Assembly" in article 14 does not include the Governor; and hence a bill proposing a constitutional amendment, and having appended to it no measures essentially legislative, need not be submitted to the Governor for his approval. Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 Atl. 538-543, 101 Md. 78, 4 Ann. Cas. 692.

When an incumbent of an office is removed by the action of the Legislature by abolishing the office or terminating his term, the officer is popularly said to be "legislated This colloquial term exout of office." presses with the precision of the logician the character of the removal. It is "legislation." People ex rel. Devery v. Coler, 65 N. E. 956, 959, 173 N. Y. 103.

LEGISLATIVE

The word "legislative" is applied to the organ or organs of government which makes the law. People v. Salsbury, 96 N. W. 936, 938-941, 134 Mich. 537 (citing Webst. Dict.).

LEGISLATIVE ACT

The filling of vacancies in a city council by the council is not a "legislative act," and therefore no aye and nay vote is necessary; Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8652, requiring the clerk of the common council to enter ayes and nayes on the passage of every ordinance and resolution applying only to legislative Wagner v. State ex rel. Walker, 91 N. acts. E. 1, 2, 173 Ind. 603.

The creation of reclamation districts and

the setting off of lands and the fixing of the boundaries of such districts are legislative acts, within the power of the Legislature, and the Legislature can neither be compelled to act or to refrain from acting, or controlled by any other power of government when it

has acted within constitutional limitations. Inglin v. Hoppin, 105 Pac. 582, 583, 156 Cal. 483.

Judicial act distinguished

An act is a "judicial" one where it undertakes to determine a question of right or obligation or of property as the foundation on which it proceeds. A "judicial act" determines what the law is and what the rights of parties are in reference to transactions already had; a "legislative act" determines what the law shall be in future cases. Newell v. Franklin, 74 Atl. 1009, 1011, 30 R. 1. 258; In re County Commissioners of Counties Comprising Seventh Judicial Dist., 98 Pac. 557, 560, 22 Okl. 435 (quoting and adopting definition in Sinking Fund Cases).

Const. art. 14, declares that the General Assembly may propose constitutional amendments, each amendment being embraced in a separate bill, by three-fifths of all members elected to each of the two houses, which bill shall be published by order of the Governor for a specified time before the election at which the amendment shall be submitted to the voters in a form to be prescribed by the General Assembly. Many provisions of the Constitution refer to the "General Assembly" in a manner indicating that the Governor is not included within the term. By the Constitutions of 1776, 1851, and 1864 the Governor was given no authority to veto a proposed constitutional amendment. Const. 1867, art. 2, § 17, declares that, to guard "A legislative act' is one which preagainst hasty and partial legislation, every "bill” which shall have passed the House of scribes a general rule of conduct." A municDelegates and the Senate shall be presented ipal ordinance providing for the paving of a to the Governor before it becomes a "law." street at the cost of the property benefited Only a majority of both houses is required to thereby to the extent of the benfit, being a adopt legislative measures. Held, that a pro-judicial and not a legislative act, is invalid

because passed without notice to the prop- [Atlantic Coast Line Co., 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 69, erty owners affected thereby. Sears v. At- 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150. lantic City, 64 Atl. 1062, 1063, 73 N. J. Law, 710, 118 Am. St. Rep. 724.

The official action of a legal body which is the result of judgment and discretion is a "judicial act" rather than a "legislative act," and so too an act which determines the rights and duties of parties under existing law, with relations to existing facts, is said to be judicial rather than legislative. Gulnac v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 64 Atl. 998, 1000, 74 N. J. Law, 548, 122 Am. St. Rep. 405.

State courts, in reviewing orders of the public service commission, act judicially and not "legislatively." Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Stevens, 172 Fed. 595, 600.

When the public service commission, on complaint after hearing and the taking of evidence, entered an order requiring that complainants stop its interstate trains at a station, the commission's act was "legislative" and not judicial. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Stevens, 172 Fed. 595, 606.

The passage of a city ordinance granting a franchise to a public service corporation involves "legislative action" only, and such action cannot be reviewed by a writ of certiorari. Tenny v. City of Columbia, 92 Pac. 895, 896, 48 Wash. 150.

That which distinguishes a "judicial" from a "legislative" act is that the one is a determination of what the law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of future cases falling under its provisions. Tyson v. Washington County, 110 N. W. 634, 636, 78 Neb. 211, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350 (citing and adopting definition in Cooley. Const. Lim.).

Injunctive relief against railway passenger rates as fixed by the Virginia State Corporation Commission may be. granted by a federal court if such rates are confiscatory, although, for some purposes, the commission is a court, since proceedings to establish rates are legislative, and therefore are not comprehended by the provision of Rev. St. § 720, forbidding federal courts from enjoining proceedings in state courts, which provision looks to the character of the proceedings, not the character of the body. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 69, 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

as

The words "legislative authority," used in Const. art. 11, § 8, have no greater significance than such words as "common council or other legislative body" would have had. They were simply intended to designate the particular body, which it was recognized would exist under some name or other in every municipality, as the proper official agency to submit propositions for amendments to charters, and were not intended to define the powers of that body or place it in a position where it would be beyond restrictions by the organic act of the city. Hence the "initiative" provision of the charter of Los Angeles, giving power to the electors to adopt ordinances, is not shown to be unconstitutional because of the words "legislative authority" being used by the Constitution to designate the ordinary legislative body of a city, in providing for submission by legislative authority of the city of a proposed charter amendment to the voters of the city. In re Pfahler, 88 Pac. 270, 278, 150 Cal. 71, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, 11 Ann. Cas. 911.

The term "legislative authority of a Establishment of rates as legislative city," as used in Laws 1903, p. 364, c. 175, as

or judicial act

The fixing of water rates by a city, when not a matter of contract, is a "legislative function" rather than a judicial function. City of Pocatello v. Murray, 173 Fed. 382, 385 (citing Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 154 U. S. 397, 38 L. Ed. 1014; Southern Pac. Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 101 Fed. 779, 42 C. C. A. 12).

The function of fixing railroad rates is a "legislative function." Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 973, 974.

The establishment of railway passenger rates by the Virginia Corporation Commission is not res judicata in a suit which seeks injunctive relief on the ground that the rates are confiscatory, although such commission for some purposes is a court, and acted only after hearing and investigation, since proceedings to establish rates are legislative, and not judicial, in their nature. Prentis v.

amended by Laws 1907, p. 192, c. 99, providing that the legislative authority of a city having control of any public street shall have power to grant authority for the construction of street railways thereon of which the motive power is other than steam, and to prescribe the terms and conditions, and in Const. art. 11, § 10, providing that city charters may be amended by proposals therefor, submitted by legislative authority of the city to the electors thereof, etc., and in numerous statutes, means the mayor and council, and hence the mayor and council had the sole power to prescribe the terms on granting a street railway franchise; and an ordinance passed by the city council, and approved by the mayor, granting such a franchise is valid, notwithstanding an amendment to the city charter requiring the council to submit street railway franchises to the voters for their approval. Benton v. Seattle Electric Co., 96 Pac. 1033, 1035, 50 Wash. 156.

Acts 1906, pt. 1, c. 1, empowering cities The "legislative department" within of the first class to construct a system sewer- Const. art. 3, dividing the powers of governage, authorizing the mayor to appoint a com- ment into the legislative, executive, and judimission who may appoint an engineer, secre- cial departments, is composed of the body tary, and treasurer, and determine what sys-enacting laws for the state or, by delegation, tem of sewerage is most expedient, and re- for minor subdivisions and municipalities. port the same to the council, etc., is not in Witter v. Cook County Com'rs, 100 N. E. 148, conflict with Const. § 160, providing that the 149, 256 Ill. 616. mayor, police judges, members of legislative boards, etc., shall be elected by qualified voters; the commission not being a "legislative board." Miller v. City of Louisville (Ky.) 99 S. W. 284, 285.

Under N. Y. Const. art. 3, § 26, providing that the powers and duties of a board of supervisors may be devolved upon the mu"Legislative officers" are those whose dunicipal assembly, etc., or other "legislative ties relate mainly to the enactment of laws. body," the words "or other legislative body" State v. Kelly, 77 S. W. 996, 997, 103 Mo. mean the legislative body of the city by App. 711 (quoting Bouv. Law Dict.); O'Grady whatever name it may be designated. Wil-v. Polk, 116 N. Y. Supp. 290, 291, 132 App. cox v. McClennan, 95 N. Y. Supp. 941, 942, 47 Div. 47 (quoting Bouv. Law Dict.). Misc. Rep. 465. LEGISLATIVE POWER

change of St. Louis v. Knott, 111 S. W. 565, Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 88 S. W. 571, 212 Mo. 616. 648, 650, 189 Mo. 107, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186.

The power to carry into effect Const. U. S. art. 4, § 4, providing that the United States shall guarantee to very state in the Union a republican form of government, is a "legislative power" and resides in Con-ernor shall appoint an additional judge "for gress; and Congress may delegate to the President the power to determine whether the Constitution of a new state is republican in form. Frantz v. Autry, 91 Pac. 193, 214,

Whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form within the meaning of the guaranty in Const. art. 4, § 4, because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum, is not a judicial question, but a political one, which is solely for Congress to determine. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State of Oregon, 32 Sup. Ct. 224, 228, 223 U.ly belonging to either of the others. In re S. 118, 56 L. Ed. 377.

The words "legislative power," as used in Const. art. 4, § 1, conferring legislative power on the General Assembly, mean the power or authority, under the Constitution or form of government, to make, alter, and repeal laws and to pass any law within the ordinary functions of legislation not delegated to the federal government or prohibited by the state Constitution, not transferring, how-not ever, from the people fundamental legislative power. Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N. E. 1, 4,