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Mine Growing crops of grain are fructus in- The word “lands," as used in a statute dustriales, and Civ. Code, 88 186-188, defin- governing descent and distribution, which ing "land" as the solid material of the earth, provides that a surviving spouse shall be enwhether soil, rock, or other substance, ex- titled to an estate for life in the lands of an clude growing grain, and only include such intestate leaving issue, remainder to such isgrowing things as are annexed to the earth sue, includes a mine open at the time of the by roots, such as are deemed fructus natu- vesting of the life estate, and such mine is, rales. Bjornson v. Rostad (S. D.) 137 N. W. under the statute, inherited as lands by the 567, 570.
life tenant. Lone Acre Oil Co. v. Swayne
(Tex.) 78 S. W. 380, 383. Highway, street, or right of way
The term "land,” as used in statutory Rem. & Bal. Code, & 8739, authorizes any enactments, means and includes mines and railroad corporation to enter upon any of the mining claims. Bradford v. Morrison, 29 state school lands to locate its road. Section Sup. Ct. 349, 351, 212 U. S. 389, 53 L. Ed. 8740 authorizes every railroad corporation to 564 (quoting and adopting definitions in Rev. "appropriate” by condemnation any land or St. Ariz. pars. 2708, 2948). interest therein, and any rights of way for Minerals tunnels beneath the surface, including state
“Land" includes coal and minerals in school lands, tide lands, etc., necessary for the line of the road, provided that, if the bed of place. Huss v. Jacobs, 59 Atl. 991, 994, 210
Pa. 145. such railway is upon a state or county road, the corporation shall be responsible for the
Under Code, c. 2, § 5, subsec. 10, providcost of relocating the road appropriated. Sec-ing that "land" includes lands, tenements, tion 8738 permits any corporation to change and hereditaments and all rights thereto and the grade or location of its “road or canal” in interest therein other than a chattel interorder to avoid dangerous or deficient curves, est therein, where on a bill filed by a vendor etc. Section 5717, provides that “when it for a specific performance, it was decreed shall be necessary in the location of any road that the land be sold, and the entire acreage herein mentioned to appropriate any part of was sold and conveyed without restriction or any public road, street or alley," etc., the reservation, the conveyance carried title to county court may, except within the limits of the coal and minerals beneath the surface of a municipal corporation, agree with the cor- the land. Steinman v. Vicars, 39 S. E. 227, poration upon the conditions upon which it 229, 99 Va. 595. may be appropriated, and, if the parties can- A bill may be maintained to quiet the tinot agree, the corporation may appropriate tle to coal and other minerals under and on so much thereof as may be necessary in the a tract of land; the minerals being "land" location of the road. Section 5718 provides within Code 1896, $ 809, providing that when that whenever a private corporation is au- any person is in peaceable possession of lands, thorized to appropriate any lic highway, whether actual or constructive, claiming to etc., as mentioned in the last section, if it be own the same, and his title thereto or to any within any town, incorporated or not, the part thereof is denied or disputed, he may corporation shall locate its road upon the maintain a suit in equity to settle the title particular street, etc., designated by the local and to clear up all doubts and disputes conauthorities; but if they refuse to make such cerning it. Gulf Coal & Coke Co. v. Alabama designation the corporation may make such Coal & Coke Co., 40 South. 397, 398, 145 Ala. appropriation without reference thereto. Sec-228. tion 5719 provides that when a public high
Petroleum, oil, and natural gas are inway, etc., is taken by agreement, the corpora- cluded in the comprehensive idea which the tion may place tollgates thereon with the law attaches to the word "land" and are a part consent of the local authorities, but shall not of the soil in which they are found. A lease when the highway is appropriated without of land for the purpose of mining coal or exagreement. Section 8737 authorizes every tracting oil or natural gas from the soil or railroad corporation to construct its railway rock is in effect a grant of the corpus of the across, along, or upon any stream, plank land. Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S. E. 533, 536, road, turnpike, etc., paying any damages caus- 53 W. Va. 206. ed thereby. Held, that a railway company “ 'Oil,' before its extraction, is a mineral, could not acquire by eminent domain as and is a part of the 'land.'” Swayne v. Lone against the public the exclusive right to use | Acre Oil Co., 86 S. W. 740, 742, 98 Tex. 597, one-half of a street for a double-track rail- 69 L. R. A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117; Isom v. way; the term "land," as used in sections Rex Crude Oil Co., 82 Pac. 317, 318, 147 Cal. 8739 and 8740, not including land already de- | 659. voted to a public use, such as a street. State Pontoon ex rel. B. Schade Brewing Co. v. Superior A pontoon floating upon the water of a Court of Spokane County, 113 Pac. 576, 578, navigable stream, between high and low wa62 Wash. 96.
ter mark, though fastened to the shore by a use such water supply on the same terms as
cable, is not "land," and an action for an in- "Land" covered by water within the pubjury to a person thereon by a moving vessel lic domain of the United States is as much is within the admiralty jurisdiction. The a part thereof as the dry land. Kean v. CalMackinaw, 165 Fed. 351, 352.
umet Canal & Improvement Co., 23 Sup. Ct. Premises synonymous
651, 659, 190 U. S. 452, 47 L. Ed. 1134. Premises as including land, see Premises. The owner of the bank of a navigable
The Liquor Tax Law (Laws 1897, p. 225, stream owns to the center of the stream, unc. 312, & 24, subd. 1), prior to the amendment less the ownership of the bank and the bed made by Laws 1905, p. 145, c. 104, made it of the stream has been separated, subject unlawful to traffic in liquor within one-half only to governmental and public rights; and mile of the building and “premises,” of any the bed of a navigable stream is "land.” state hospital, and the amendment added the Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Teluwords "orlands” after the word "prem-lah Paper Co., 122 N. W. 1062, 1065, 140 Wis. ises." On a petition for the cancellation of
417. a liquor tax certificate, it was stipulated that Timber defendant, prior to the amendment, had been
The word "lands," in Const. 1890, $ 211, legally selling liquor at the place in question. prohibiting the sale of school nds, includes Held, that "lands” was synonymous with the soil only, and not timber growing there“premises," and in view of the stipulation on; and hence Code 1906, $ 4702, is not unthere could be no cancellation of the certifi- constitutional because it authorizes a sale of cate, whether defendant was carrying on his such timber. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. business within one-half mile of lands owned State, 53 South. 1, 2, 97 Miss. 355. and used by a state hospital and contiguous to it, or within one-half mile of the buildings,
Town lots or blocks or not. The terms "premises" and "lands” Where a party contracts for the purare synonymous, and, if there is any distinc-chase of a threshing outfit, unless he shall go tion between the words, it is that the word to Oklahoma and buy land, the word "land" “premises" is more inclusive. According to is broad enough to include a piece of real Bouv, Law Dict. and Worcest. Dict. the word property described as a block in a town site. "premises" is defined as "lands and tene- J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Mickley, 83 ments." According to Cent. Dict., it is de Pac. 970, 72 Kan. 372. tined as "lands and houses or tenements."
Trees According to Stand. Dict., it is defined as "land or lands; land with its appurtenances.”
At common law, "land" embraces, not In re Cullinan, 99 N. Y. Supp. 374, 375, 113 only the soil, but its natural products, such App. Div. 485.
as trees, growing upon and affixed to it. L.
N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 53 South. As property
1, 2, 97 Miss. 355. See Private Property; Property.
Trees standing on land are a part of the Proceeds of sale
"land," the title to which can be passed by Act of Separation from Massachusetts a statutory deed. Morgan v. Pott, 101 S. W. (Rev. St. 1883, p. 1005) § 1, par. 7, exempt-1717, 719, 124 Mo. App. 371. ing from taxation "lands” theretofore granted to any religious society, etc., while the
Water and water power same continue to be owned by such society,
“Land” includes the water upon it, and, does not exempt a fund created from the pro when the fee to land is acquired by condemceeds of a sale of such lands. Inhabitants of nation, everything which is comprehended in Gorham v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund in the term “land," including water, vests in the First Parish in Gorham in Cumberland Coun- expropriator. Philadelphia Trust, Safe De ty, 82 Atl. 290, 292, 109 Me. 22.
posit & Ins. Co. v. Borough of MerchantReal estate and real property synony
ville, 69 Atl. 729, 730, 74 N. J. Eq. 330.
Under Gen. St. 1902, § 2321, which proThe word "land," as used in Code 1904, vides for the taxation of land owned or tak$ 1105 (3-6), authorizing the condemnation of en by a municipal corporation for the crealands or any in trust or estate therein, is tion or furnishing of a supply of water, if synonymous with “real estate” and “real the inhabitants of the town in which it is property.” Swan v. Washington Southern R. situated do not have the use and do actually Co., 61 S. E. 750, 751, 108 Va. 282.
the inhabitants of the municipal corporaAs security
tion, in which case the property shall be exSee Security.
empt, a dam located on such land is not an Submerged land
item subject to taxation separate from the The word "lands" includes the beds of land, and should have been included in an nonnavigable lakes and streams, and lands item of the assessment denominated "land are none the less land for being covered with used in connection with reservoir." City of water. State v. Jones, 122 N. W. 241, 243, Norwalk v. Town of New Canaan, 81 Atl. 143 Iowa, 398.
1027, 1029, 85 Conn. 119,
The Flowage Act (Laws 1868, c. 20, $ 1; LAND FOR HOLDING WATER Pub. St. 1901, c. 142, 8 12) provides that any The words "land for holding such wacorporation authorized by charter may erectter," in St. 1883, p. 469, c. 177, creating a and maintain on its land a water mill or dam water company to supply the inhabitants of to back the flowage of water for the develop a town with water, and authorizing the comment of power and section 13 provides that if pany to take and hold water of designated land is overflowed or otherwise injured by streams and all lands “necessary for holdthe use of such dam, and such injury is not ing and preserving such water,” mean land within 30 days after due notice satisfactorily for a reservoir. Dorr v. Inhabitants of Sharadjusted, petition may be brought to the su- on, 84 N. E. 446, 449, 198 Mass. 240. perior court to have the damage assessed. Held, upon petition to assess damages for LAND JOBBER the flowing out or taking of the head or falls A man who occasionally buys and sells of a stream located upon petitioner's land, land cannot be said to be a land jobber or which had been neither utilized nor developed, a dealer in lands; but, if a man makes a that the term "land" in the act was not used particular business of buying and selling in a narrow or restricted sense to apply only land to obtain profit, he is properly designatto land as distinguished from water, but to ed as a “land jobber” or dealer in land. land with all the incidents of full ownership; Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 94 S. W. 90, that the damage or "injury" intended by the 92, 116 Tenn. 259. act was such as resulted from depriving the landowner of the ability to use his land to LAND SUITABLE FOR CULTIVATION the best advantage in view of its location See Suitable for Cultivation. and natural adaptability; and that a limi
LAND, TIMBER, AND tation of the use of undeveloped water pow
RIGHTS er was an injury to land, for which compensation must be made. Swain v. Pemigewas
The term "land, timber and timber set Power Co., 85 Atl. 288, 289, 76 N. 4. 498. rights," as used in a lease of a railroad, etc.,
specifying that plaintiff demised, let, etc., to LAND ACTUALLY USED
defendant for 91 years, all land, timber, and See Actually Used.
timber rights, etc., included all the standing
timber. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & LAND CERTIFICATE
N. C. R. Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C.
368, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, 125 Am. St. Rep. As chattel, see Chattel. As personal property, see Personal Prop- 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363. erty.
LAND TITLED A "land certificate" is, the obligation of Const. art. 14, § 2, provides that all genthe government entitling the owner to secure eral land certificates shall be located, surthe designated quantity of land by following veyed, or patented only on vacant and unthe requirements of the law. Waterman v. appropriated public domain, and not on any Charlton, 120 S. W. 171, 172, 102 Tex. 510. "land titled” or equitably owned under color
of title from the sovereignty of the state, LAND DAMAGES
evidence of the appropriation of which is on Compensation for land taken under the the county record or in the general land power of eminent domain, and for the build- office, or when the appropriation is evidenced ings on it, is technically "land damages." by the occupation of the owner or of some The building is technically not only a part of person holding for him. Held, that where it the land, but is technically land; and an ac- was not claimed that certificates by which tion for compensation for land taken under land was surveyed under a railroad grant the power of eminent domain, and buildings were improperly issued, and the descriptions which are upon that land, is as matter of in the patents in express terms covered the technical law and ordinary parlance, spoken land described in a subsequent patent to K., of as an action for "land damages.” In an it being necessary to resort to evidence aliaward of special commissioners to assess unde to show that the railroad patents did damages for land taken to widen a street not convey the state's title to the land in under a railroad's track directing that the controversy, it was "land titled,” within such town should pay the entire expense of land constitutional provision. McLennan v. Fishdamage occasioned by the taking of land ander (Tex.) 130 S. W. 598, 599. property, the term "land damages” was not limited to the value of the land taken apart LAND TO LAND from the erection thereon, and hence, where Fishing for menhaden with purse or the land taken supported one of the abut- drag seines, in a bay on our coast not ing ments of the railroad bridge, the railroad was an entrance over three nautical miles in entitled to damages for the taking of the width between headlands on the main, or abutment as well as the land. New York, between the mainland and an island, or beN, H. & H. R. Co. v. Blackstone, 69 N. E. tween islands, is prohibited by chapter 261, 315, 316, 184 Mass. 491.
Pub. Laws 1885, defining the width of such entrance, or any part thereof, to such pro- The term "landed property” is defined hibited waters, measured from "land to by Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, as "real estate, land.” McClain v. Tillson, 19 Atl. 457, 458, whether in fee simple or leasehold, and 82 Me. 281.
whether improved or unimproved." Joesting
v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 55 Atl. 456, 457, LAND VALUABLE FOR MINERALS
97 Md. 589. “Lands valuable for minerals" in the law means all lands chiefly valuable for any
Annexation Act, 8 19 (Acts 1888, p. 127, of the mineral deposits treated in the legis. c. 98), declared that until 1900 the rate of lation relating to mining claims, rather than taxation on all "landed property” in certain lands chiefly valuable for agricultural pur- territory annexed to Baltimore should not poses. Webb v. American Asphaltum Min. exceed the rate for Baltimore county, and Co., 157 Fed. 203, 205, 84 C. C. A. 651.
that after 1900 the county rate should not be
increased for city purposes on "landed propUnder Rev. St. U. S. 88 2318, 2319, re-erty within the territory until avenues, serving from sale lands valuable for miner-streets, or alleys shall have been opened or als, and opening for exploration and pur-constructed through the same, nor until there chase all valuable mineral deposits in the shall be on every block of ground so to be lands of the United States, to render lands formed six dwellings or storehouses ready raluable for minerals there must be miner- for occupation. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, $ als in such quantities as to justify effort to 4a, defined “landed property” to mean real extract them; but it is not necessary that estate, whether improved or unimproved minerals of sufficient amount to allow im- and until avenues, streets, or alleys shall mediate profitable working be shown to ex- have been opened, constructed, and improved, ist, but it is enough if the vein or deposit has shall be construed to mean until avenues, a present or prospective commercial value. streets, or alleys shall have been opened, Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 99 Pac. 176, 178, graded, curbed, and otherwise improved to 154 Cal. 768.
full width by some substantial material. LANDED
Held, that property within the territory an
nexed to the city by the act of 1888 situated Plaintiff, cotton company, delivered cot- in a block bounded by improved streets, ton to a compress company and subsequently though not containing six dwellings or storedelivered the warehouse receipts of that com- houses, was not “landed property” within pany to a railway company and received in such act. Hiss v. City of Baltimore, 64 Atl. exchange bills of lading. The cotton com- 52, 103 Md. 620. pany shipped the cotton over the railway line to a purchaser under a contract requiring Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, relating to that the cotton should be delivered in good the annexation of a certain tract to Balticondition to the purchaser's mills "landed," more, provided that until 1900 the tax rate and drafts for the purchase price with bills upon all “landed property" and taxable perof lading attached were drawn by the cotton sonal property in the tract should not exceed company on the purchaser and honored be the rate of Baltimore county for 1887, and fore the cotton was delivered at its destina- that after 1900 the rate should be the same as tion. Held, that "landed” meant that the for the rest of the city of Baltimore, provided cotton company was responsible for the en- that the increased rate should not take effect tire shipment of cotton and for damages to until avenues, streets, or alleys should be it until delivered at the point of destination, opened through the property, and at least six and therefore the right of recovery for dam. dwellings or storehouses be ready for occupaages to the cotton resulting from exposure tion upon each block of ground so to be to the weather while in the possession of the formed. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, provided compress company was in the cotton company, that the term "landed property" in the act although it had not been called on to repay of 1888 should mean real estate whether in any of the purchase price. Southern Ry. Co. fee simple or leasehold; that the provision v. Jones Cotton Co., 52 South. 899, 900, 167 as to the opening of avenues, etc., should Ala. 575.
mean avenues, etc., opened, graded, curbed,
and otherwise improved from curb to curb LANDED PROPERTY
by pavement or other substantial material, In an act annexing certain territory to and that the term “block of ground" should a city, providing that the rates of taxation mean an area not exceeding 200,000 superfion all “landed property" so annexed shall cial square feet bounded on all sides by innot exceed a certain rate, the phrase "landed tersecting avenues, streets, or alleys, graded, property," as used in the act, meant rural, curbed and otherwise improved from curb to unimproved land, as distinguished from real curb, by pavement or other substantial maestate compactly built on, as in a city. terial. A triangular block, being part of the Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v. Rosen- tract annexed by the act of 1888, contained thal, 62 Atl. 579, 581, 102 Md. 298 (citing 1,000,000 superficial square feet, bounded on Sindall v. City of Baltimore, 49 Atl. 647, 93 one side by 3034 feet of a road, part of which Md. 533).
was curbed and macadamized, the rest cov
ered with an inch of stone, but uncurbed., United States to a detention shed maintaine On another side. was a common road not by the owners of the vessel on their dock, graded, curbed, or paved, and on the third where he was detained under guard pending side was a private toll road, curbed and determination of his right to enter the Unitpaved in the middle. There were about 47 ed States, did not constitute a “landing" of dwellings and storehouses on the block. such person within Act Cong. May 6, 1882, Held, that a leasehold interest in the block c. 126, § 2, 22 Stat. 59, as amended by Act was taxable under the county, and not the July 5, 1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 115, prohibiting city, tax rate. City of Baltimore v. Schafer, the master of any vessel from knowingly 68 Atl. 138, 140, 107 Md. 38.
landing or permitting to be landed any ChiActs 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, provides nese laborer, etc. United States v. Seabury, after the year 1900 the Baltimore county rate 133 Fed. 983, 985. of taxation at the time of the passage of the Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. act shall not be increased for city purposes 1217, declares that it shall be the duty of the on any landed property within the annex owners, officers, and agents of any vessel until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have bringing an alien to the United States to been opened or constructed through the same, adopt due precautions to prevent the “landnor until there shall be on every block of ing” of any such alien "from such vessel" at ground so to be formed at least six dwellings any time or place other than that designated or warehouses ready for occupation. Acts by the immigration officers, and any such 1902, p. 199, c. 120, defines "landed property owner, etc., who shall land or permit to land to mean real estate, whether in fee simple or any alien at any other place shall be guilty leasehold, and whether improved or unim- of a misdemeanor. Held, that the words proved. Held, that a wholly unimproved lot "landing from vessel" as so used mean "to bound by a street or alley on two of its four go ashore," the landing being complete the sides and contiguous to a 28-acre tract of moment the vessel is left and the shore is land with no visible boundary separating it reached. Niven v. United States, 169 Fed. from such tract was “landed property” with 782, 785, 95 C. C. A. 248. in the meaning of the acts, and hence not subject to the Baltimore city rate of taxation 1908, c. 93, § 28, par. "b,” providing that
The word “landing” in Hurd's Rev. St. until it had reached the standard of devel- there must be maintained at the “landing” opment required by the act to make it urban at which miners take or leave the cage sufliproperty. City of Baltimore v. Gail, 68 ati. I cient light to show the “landing” and sur282, 285, 106 Md. 684.
rounding objects, when considered in conLANDHOLDER
nection with section 16, par. "e," requiring Acts 1903, p. 255, c. 145, relating to im. the mine superintendent to see that sufficient provement of gravel and macadamized roads, lights are maintained at the top and bottom contemplates as resident “landholders” of landings when the men are hoisted and lowthe county, whose lands abut upon the pro- ered, and section 2, par. “b,” providing that posed improvements, who are entitled to sign at the bottom of every shaft and at every a petition for the improvements, only the caging place therein a sufficient passageway holders of a title in fee, and not mere life must be cut around the landing place, is tenants. Kemp v. Goodnight, 80 N. E. 160, broad enough to cover the place at the bot162, 168 Ind. 174.
tom or at the top of the shaft where miners
enter or leave the cage and the mine operator LANDING
must keep each of those places lighted. RobSee Public Landing.
ertson v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 87
N. E. 373, 374, 238 Ill. 344. According to the accepted meaning, the act of "landing” is setting on shore, or com
As wharf or place for loading and uning on shore. Taylor v. United States, 152
loading Fed. 1, 10, 81 C. C. A. 197 (dissenting opinion). "A ‘landing' is a space adjacent to a "Landing from such vessel" takes place
navigable water where vessels may approach and is complete the moment the vessel is left and land to unload and receive passengers and the shore reached within Immigration
and freight, and where articles of freight Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. 1213, may be left for loading on the vessel, or 1217, making it the duty of any officer in after they have been unloaded until they can charge of any vessel bringing an alien to the be taken away.” Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. United States to adopt precautions to prevent v. People ex rel. Dailey, 78 N. E. 790, 793, the landing from such vessel of such alien 222 Ill. 427 (quoting and adopting definition at any time or place other than that desig- in Farnham, Water & Water Rights, $ 145a). nated by the immigration officers. Taylor v. LANDING PLACE United States, 28 Sup. Ct. 53, 54, 207 U. S.
Land abutting upon water, from which 120, 52 L. Ed. 130.
water shipments can be made, and leased for The transfer of a Chinese person from that purpose, with privileges of piling lumthe vessel in which he was brought to the ber, is a landing place, within Rev. St. c. 9,