The Flowage Act (Laws 1868, c. 20, § 1; | LAND FOR HOLDING WATER Pub. St. 1901, c. 142, § 12) provides that any corporation authorized by charter may erect and maintain on its land a water mill or dam to back the flowage of water for the development of power and section 13 provides that if land is overflowed or otherwise injured by the use of such dam, and such injury is not within 30 days after due notice satisfactorily adjusted, petition may be brought to the superior court to have the damage assessed. Held, upon petition to assess damages for the flowing out or taking of the head or falls of a stream located upon petitioner's land, which had been neither utilized nor developed, that the term "land" in the act was not used in a narrow or restricted sense to apply only to land as distinguished from water, but to land with all the incidents of full ownership; that the damage or "injury" intended by the act was such as resulted from depriving the landowner of the ability to use his land to the best advantage in view of its location and natural adaptability; and that a limitation of the use of undeveloped water power was an injury to land, for which compensation must be made. Swain v. Pemigewasset Power Co., 85 Atl. 288, 289, 76 N. H. 498. The words "land for holding such water," in St. 1883, p. 469, c. 177, creating a water company to supply the inhabitants of a town with water, and authorizing the company to take and hold water of designated streams and all lands "necessary for holding and preserving such water," mean land for a reservoir. Dorr v. Inhabitants of Sharon, 84 N. E. 446, 449, 198 Mass. 240. LAND JOBBER LAND ACTUALLY USED See Actually Used. LAND CERTIFICATE As chattel, see Chattel. A man who occasionally buys and sells land cannot be said to be a land jobber or a dealer in lands; but, if a man makes a particular business of buying and selling land to obtain profit, he is properly designated as a "land jobber" or dealer in land. Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 94 S. W. 90, 92, 116 Tenn. 259. LAND SUITABLE FOR CULTIVATION RIGHTS TIMBER timber The term "land, timber and rights," as used in a lease of a railroad, etc., specifying that plaintiff demised, let, etc., to defendant for 91 years, all land, timber, and timber rights, etc., included all the standing timber. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C. 368, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, 125 Am. St. Rep. As personal property, see Personal Prop- 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363. erty. A "land certificate" is the obligation of the government entitling the owner to secure the designated quantity of land by following the requirements of the law. Waterman v. Charlton, 120 S. W. 171, 172, 102 Tex. 510. LAND DAMAGES Compensation for land taken under the power of eminent domain, and for the buildings on it, is technically "land damages." The building is technically not only a part of the land, but is technically land; and an action for compensation for land taken under the power of eminent domain, and buildings which are upon that land, is as matter of technical law and ordinary parlance, spoken of as an action for "land damages." In an award of special commissioners to assess damages for land taken to widen a street under a railroad's track directing that the town should pay the entire expense of land damage occasioned by the taking of land and property, the term "land damages" was not limited to the value of the land taken apart from the erection thereon, and hence, where the land taken supported one of the abutments of the railroad bridge, the railroad was entitled to damages for the taking of the abutment as well as the land. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Blackstone, 69 N. E. 315, 316, 184 Mass. 491. LAND TITLED Const. art. 14, § 2, provides that all general land certificates shall be located, surveyed, or patented only on vacant and unappropriated public domain, and not on any "land titled" or equitably owned under color of title from the sovereignty of the state, evidence of the appropriation of which is on the county record or in the general land office, or when the appropriation is evidenced by the occupation of the owner or of some person holding for him. Held, that where it was not claimed that certificates by which land was surveyed under a railroad grant were improperly issued, and the descriptions in the patents in express terms covered the land described in a subsequent patent to K., it being necessary to resort to evidence aliunde to show that the railroad patents did not convey the state's title to the land in controversy, it was "land titled," within such constitutional provision. McLennan v. Fisher (Tex.) 130 S. W. 598, 599. entrance, or any part thereof, to such prohibited waters, measured from "land to land." McClain v. Tillson, 19 Atl. 457, 458, 82 Me. 281. LAND VALUABLE FOR MINERALS The term "landed property" is defined by Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, as "real estate, whether in fee simple or leasehold, and whether improved or unimproved." Joesting v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 55 Atl. 456, 457, 97 Md. 589. Annexation Act, § 19 (Acts 1888, p. 127, "Lands valuable for minerals" in the law means all lands chiefly valuable for any of the mineral deposits treated in the legis-C. 98), declared that until 1900 the rate of lation relating to mining claims, rather than lands chiefly valuable for agricultural purposes. Webb v. American Asphaltum Min. Co., 157 Fed. 203, 205, 84 C. C. A. 651. Under Rev. St. U. S. §§ 2318, 2319, reserving from sale lands valuable for minerals, and opening for exploration and purchase all valuable mineral deposits in the lands of the United States, to render lands valuable for minerals there must be minerals in such quantities as to justify effort to extract them; but it is not necessary that minerals of sufficient amount to allow immediate profitable working be shown to exist, but it is enough if the vein or deposit has a present or prospective commercial value. Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 99 Pac. 176, 178, 154 Cal. 768. LANDED Plaintiff, cotton company, delivered cotton to a compress company and subsequently delivered the warehouse receipts of that company to a railway company and received in exchange bills of lading. The cotton company shipped the cotton over the railway line to a purchaser under a contract requiring that the cotton should be delivered in good condition to the purchaser's mills "landed," and drafts for the purchase price with bills of lading attached were drawn by the cotton company on the purchaser and honored before the cotton was delivered at its destination. Held, that "landed" meant that the cotton company was responsible for the entire shipment of cotton and for damages to it until delivered at the point of destination, and therefore the right of recovery for damages to the cotton resulting from exposure to the weather while in the possession of the compress company was in the cotton company, although it had not been called on to repay any of the purchase price. Southern Ry. Co. v. Jones Cotton Co., 52 South. 899, 900, 167 Ala. 575. LANDED PROPERTY In an act annexing certain territory to a city, providing that the rates of taxation on all "landed property" so annexed shall not exceed a certain rate, the phrase "landed property," as used in the act, meant rural, unimproved land, as distinguished from real estate compactly built on, as in a city. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v. Rosenthal, 62 Atl. 579, 581, 102 Md. 298 (citing Sindall v. City of Baltimore, 49 Atl. 647, 93 Md. 533). taxation on all "landed property" in certain territory annexed to Baltimore should not exceed the rate for Baltimore county, and that after 1900 the county rate should not be increased for city purposes on "landed property" within the territory until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened or constructed through the same, nor until there shall be on every block of ground so to be formed six dwellings or storehouses ready for occupation. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, § 4a, defined "landed property" to mean real estate, whether improved or unimproved and until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened, constructed, and improved, shall be construed to mean until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened, graded, curbed, and otherwise improved to full width by some substantial material. Held, that property within the territory annexed to the city by the act of 1888 situated in a block bounded by improved streets, though not containing six dwellings or storehouses, was not "landed property" within such act. Hiss v. City of Baltimore, 64 Atl. 52, 103 Md. 620. Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, relating to the annexation of a certain tract to Baltimore, provided that until 1900 the tax rate upon all "landed property" and taxable personal property in the tract should not exceed the rate of Baltimore county for 1887, and that after 1900 the rate should be the same as for the rest of the city of Baltimore, provided that the increased rate should not take effect until avenues, streets, or alleys should be opened through the property, and at least six dwellings or storehouses be ready for occupation upon each block of ground so to be formed. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, provided that the term "landed property" in the act of 1888 should mean real estate whether in fee simple or leasehold; that the provision as to the opening of avenues, etc., should mean avenues, etc., opened, graded, curbed, and otherwise improved from curb to curb by pavement or other substantial material, and that the term "block of ground" should mean an area not exceeding 200,000 superficial square feet bounded on all sides by intersecting avenues, streets, or alleys, graded, curbed and otherwise improved from curb to curb, by pavement or other substantial material. A triangular block, being part of the tract annexed by the act of 1888, contained 1,000,000 superficial square feet, bounded on one side by 3034 feet of a road, part of which was curbed and macadamized, the rest cov ered with an inch of stone, but uncurbed. [ United States to a detention shed maintaine On another side was a common road not by the owners of the vessel on their dock, graded, curbed, or paved, and on the third where he was detained under guard pending side was a private toll road, curbed and determination of his right to enter the Unitpaved in the middle. There were about 47 ed States, did not constitute a "landing" of dwellings and storehouses on the block. such person within Act Cong. May 6, 1882, Held, that a leasehold interest in the block c. 126, § 2, 22 Stat. 59, as amended by Act was taxable under the county, and not the July 5, 1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 115, prohibiting city, tax rate. City of Baltimore v. Schafer, the master of any vessel from knowingly 68 Atl. 138, 140, 107 Md. 38. landing or permitting to be landed any ChiUnited States v. Seabury, nese laborer, etc. 133 Fed. 983, 985. Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, provides after the year 1900 the Baltimore county rate of taxation at the time of the passage of the act shall not be increased for city purposes on any landed property within the annex until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have been opened or constructed through the same, nor until there shall be on every block of ground so to be formed at least six dwellings or warehouses ready for occupation. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 120, defines "landed property" to mean real estate, whether in fee simple or leasehold, and whether improved or unimproved. Held, that a wholly unimproved lot bound by a street or alley on two of its four sides and contiguous to a 28-acre tract of land with no visible boundary separating it from such tract was "landed property" within the meaning of the acts, and hence not subject to the Baltimore city rate of taxation until it had reached the standard of development required by the act to make it urban property. City of Baltimore v. Gail, 68 282, 285, 106 Md. 684. LANDHOLDER Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. 1217, declares that it shall be the duty of the owners, officers, and agents of any vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt due precautions to prevent the “landing" of any such alien "from such vessel" at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers, and any such owner, etc., who shall land or permit to land any alien at any other place shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that the words landing from vessel" as so used mean "to go ashore," the landing being complete the moment the vessel is left and the shore is reached. Niven v. United States, 169 Fed. 782, 785, 95 C. C. A. 248. The word "landing" in Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 93, § 28, par. "b," providing that there must be maintained at the "landing" at which miners take or leave the cage suffiAtl.cient light to show the "landing" and sur Acts 1903, p. 255, c. 145, relating to improvement of gravel and macadamized roads, contemplates as resident "landholders" of the county, whose lands abut upon the proposed improvements, who are entitled to sign a petition for the improvements, only the holders of a title in fee, and not mere life tenants. Kemp v. Goodnight, 80 N. E. 160, 162, 168 Ind. 174. LANDING See Public Landing. According to the accepted meaning, the act of "landing" is setting on shore, or coming on shore. Taylor v. United States, 152 Fed. 1, 10, 81 C. C. A. 197 (dissenting opinion). "Landing from such vessel" takes place and is complete the moment the vessel is left and the shore reached within Immigration Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. 1213, 1217, making it the duty of any officer in charge of any vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt precautions to prevent the landing from such vessel of such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers. Taylor v. United States, 28 Sup. Ct. 53, 54, 207 U. S. 120, 52 L. Ed. 130. The transfer of a Chinese person from the vessel in which he was brought to the rounding objects, when considered in con- Rob As wharf or place for loading and unloading "A landing' is a space adjacent to a navigable water where vessels may approach and land to unload and receive passengers and freight, and where articles of freight may be left for loading on the vessel, or after they have been unloaded until they can be taken away." Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Dailey, 78 N. E. 790, 793, 222 Ill. 427 (quoting and adopting definition in Farnham, Water & Water Rights, § 145a). LANDING PLACE Land abutting upon water, from which water shipments can be made, and leased for that purpose, with privileges of piling lumber, is a landing place, within Rev. St. c. 9, § 13, subsec. 1, authorizing taxation of personalty employed in trade where the owner occupies a landing place. Inhabitants of Georgetown v. William E. Hanscome & Co., 79 Atl. 379, 380, 108 Me. 131. Rev. St. c. 9, § 12, provides that all per sonal property within or without the state shall be assessed to the owner in the town where he is an inhabitant on the 1st day of each April. Section 22 provides that partners in business whether residing in the same or different towns, may be jointly taxed under their partnership name in the town where their business is carried on for all personal property enumerated in section 13, par. 1, employed in such business, except that, if any portion of such property is placed or situated in a town other than where their place of business is under specified circumstances, they shall be taxed therefor in such other town. Section 13, par. 1, provides that all personal property employed in trade shall be taxed in the town where so employed on the 1st day of each April, provided that the owner, his servant, subcontractor, or agent so employing it occupies any "landing place," etc., therein for the purpose of such employment. Held that, to sus tain an assessment of taxes on lumber be longing to a firm in a certain town, it must ap pear that the firm were at the time of the assessment carrying on business in the town, and that the property assessed was employed in that business, or if their place of business was in another town that the property so employed was placed or situated in the town where sought to be assessed and the property must be employed in trade, etc.; and, if their place of business is in another town than that in which the property is deposited, it must appear that the firm or their servants or agents so employing the property occupied for purposes of the employment a "landing place," etc., in the town where the assessment is sought to be made, and where members of a firm resided in other towns and cut logs in other towns, which were hauled to a town where they were sought to be assessed for taxation, there sawed by a portable sawmill, and "stuck up" to season in a field within the town with the intent to leave it there until sold, when it was to be hauled to a railroad siding, half a mile distant also in the town, for shipment, and all the work done on the lot was done under contract of another person, the firm, however, supervising the work so far as to determine the size and shape of the manufactured product, the firm having no office anywhere, their books being kept in another town at a dwelling house from where the Correspondence of the firm was carried on and prospective purchasers taken by the firm to the sticking grounds to examine the lumher, the business of the firm was being carried on in another town, and the lumber was not subject to taxation in the town where deposited, since the field where the lumber was "stuck up" was not a "landing place" within the statute, the term "landing" first incorporated into the statute in Laws 1869, c. navigable water for landing and unlanding 53, then meaning a place on a river or other goods, or for taking on or letting off passengers or a place where any kind of craft Cann v. Inhabitants of Town of Minot, 78 lands or for storing logs for winter. Atl. 465, 467, 107 Me. 393. LANDLORD Mc A man to be a "landlord" must sustain some relation to the land, such as owner, or quasi owner, and, while a landlord may assign the rent, the assignee is not a "landlord" within the meaning of the statute giving a landlord's lien. State v. Elmore, 46 S. E. 939, 941, 68 S. C. 140. "A landlord' is a person whose lands are occupied." Hence, when a petitioner said he was a landlord, he, in effect, said he was the person whose lands were occupied. Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228, 230. Under General Milwaukee Ordinance, c. 20, § 36, inhibiting all persons from leasing or letting either as landlord or agent, any room, house, or other premises to be used for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, the term "landlord" is not restricted in its meaning to the owner of an estate in lands, but refers to lessees who let particular rooms. City of Milwaukee v. Beatty, 135 N. W. 873, 874, 149 Wis. 349. Under a statute enacted in the reign of George II, a landlord was permitted to appear and defend in ejectment, and the word "landlord" was interpreted to include all persons claiming title consistent with the persons sued as tenants in possession. Bower v. Cohen, 54 S. E. 918, 919, 126 Ga. 35. Premises were leased for one year, and before the expiration of that term the landlord leased to another the premises for a term to begin at the expiration of the first term. The first tenant held over, and the Landlord brought summary proceedings to dispossess him. Section 2231, Code Civ. Proc. provides that a tenant holding over at the expiration of his lease may be removed and section 2235 provides that the application may be made by the "landlord or lessor." Held that the lessor of both tenants was the "landlord or lessor" within the statute, and could maintain an action to dispossess the first tenant, if there had been no election by the landlord to continue the lease. Eells v. Morse, 127 N. Y. Supp. 438, 440, 142 App. Div. 592. A petition in summary proceedings for the possession of land, alleging that the petitioner is the lessee and "landlord" thereof, is not a sufficient compliance with Code Civ. Proc. 2235, requiring the petition to state the interest of the petitioner in the premises. The statement that the petitioner was the "lessee" and "landlord" is the assertion mere ly of an interest and not a description of such interest. Ferber v. Apfel, 99 N. Y. Supp. 215, 216, 113 App. Div. 720 (citing Kazis v. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App. Div. 636; Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228; Engel-Heller Co. v. Henry Elias Brewing Co., 75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Potter v. New York Baptist Mission Soc., 52 N. Y. Supp. 294, 23 Misc. Rep. 671; Ross v. Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683; Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38 Misc. Rep. 790. Owner not equivalent A description of the petitioner as the "landlord of the premises hereinafter described" is insufficient to confer jurisdiction of summary proceedings, for that does not state that he is the owner, but merely alleges the relation of the parties without stating petitioner's interest in the premises. Underhill v. Cohen, 114 N. Y. Supp. 115, 117, 61 Misc. Rep. 627. LANDLORD AND CROPPER possession being an essential eleme Whiteside v. Oasis Club, 142 S. W. 752, 75, 162 Mo. App. 502. The words "landlord and tenant" signify not only the immediate parties to a lease, but also their respective successors in interest. Where a landlord assigns his lease with his right to the control, occupancy, and possession of the premises for more than four years beyond the expiration of the term, and the tenant holds over, the assignee may elect to treat the holding over as a tenancy for another year. United Merchants' Realty & Improvement Co. v. Roth, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1112, 1113, 53 Misc. Rep. 92. Under the direct provisions of Code 1896, § 2711, where one party furnishes land for raising a crop and another furnishes the labor and the team to cultivate it, with a stipulation for a division of the crop between them, the relation of landlord and tenant exists between them; the status, fixed by the statute, being contractual. Kennedy v. McDiarmid, 47 South. 792, 793, 157 Ala. 496. The reservation of rent in some form and allegiance to the title are distinguishing characteristics of a contract by which the Anrelation of landlord and tenant exists. drews v. Erwin (Ky.) 78 S. W. 902, 903. Where one enters into possession of land under a deed claiming it in good faith as owner, and does not recognize any interest in the grantor, the relation of "landlord and tenA verbal contract between a cropper, who ant" does not exist, and he cannot be sumowed a large supply account for which his marily dispossessed as a tenant at sufferlandlord was security and also owed his ance. Sharpe v. Mathews, 51 S. E. 706, 707, landlord for supplies, and his landlord, † 123 Ga. 794 (citing Watson v. Toliver, 29 S. whereby it was agreed that, if the cropper E. 614, 103 Ga. 123). should desire to work elsewhere the following year, he should settle up his supply account and notify the landlord before a time fixed, so that he might have time to get some one else, and that, if the cropper did not settle up and notify the landlord before the time fixed, then he was to be a cropper for the landlord for the following year, does not create the relation of landlord and cropper within Act Dec. 17, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 63), as amended by Act Aug. 7, 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 91), providing that, where the relation of landlord and cropper has been created, it shall be unlawful for any person during the contract to employ the cropper or to disturb in any way such relation; that act contemplating a complete contract and not a contract whereby the relation will be created in the future on the happening or nonhappening of a given contingency, dependent on the will of one of the parties. Polk v. Thomason, 61 S. E. 123, 124, 130 Ga. 542.. LANDLORD AND TENANT The relation of "landlord and tenant" is that which subsists by virtue of a contract for the possession of lands at will, for a definite period, or for life. Foss v. Stanton, 57 Atl. 942, 76 Vt. 365. The relation of landlord and tenant arises under contract, express or implied, for possession of lands or tenements in consideration of certain rent to be paid therefor; Reservation of rent is not essential to the creation of the relation of "landlord and tenant." Plaintiffs conveyed to defendant by deed all the timber and trees on the tract of land described; the deed providing that the grantee should have all the rights of way and privileges over and upon the land usually extended to lumbermen, provided that the timber should be removed within three years, and that all refuse, timber, barns, houses, cabins, sheds, etc., remaining on the premises at that time should revert to and become the property of plaintiffs. Held, that such deed was not a mere license, but was sufficient to create the relation of "landlord and tenant." Alexander v. Gardner, 96 S. W. 818, 819, 123 Ky. 552, 124 Am. St. Rep. 378. Plaintiff, who resided on a farm, contracted to allow defendant to occupy free of rent one of the houses on the farm and carry on the same for a term of years. Each party was to furnish certain things for the farm, and the crops were to be sold and proceeds divided. Held, that the relation of "landlord and tenant" did not exist between the parties as to the house, but that defendant's |