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LEG

See Breaking of a Leg.

his eyes in a conspicuous place on the office | for its distribution, is not a "legacy" or desk therein is, in contemplation of Code Civ. "distributive share," within the meaning of Proc. 1011, "left with a person having such terms as used in War Revenue Act charge" of the office. People v. Perris Irr. June 13, 1898, c. 448, § 29, 30 Stat. 464; Dist., 76 Pac. 381, 142 Cal. 601. and, under Act June 27, 1902, c. 1160, § 3, 32 Stat. 406, which provides that no tax shall be assessed under said section 29 in respect of any contingent beneficial interest which shall not become absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment prior to July 1, 1902, the only interest of the legatee in such income which was subject to taxation was the amount thereof actually received by him prior to said July 1, 1902, provided such amount was $10,000 or more. Lynch V. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 164 Fed. 161, 163, 90 C. C. A. 147.

A policy insuring against an accidental breaking of a "leg or arm" covers fractures of bones of the limbs whether in the hands or feet or in the upper or central divisions of the limbs, including a fracture of the heel bone (os calcis). Rogers v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 111 S. W. 518, 131 Mo. App. 353.

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Testamentary trustees are entitled to pay the income from trust funds to the guardian of an infant beneficiary pending proceedings for settlement of their accounts without requiring a bond; such income being neither a "legacy" nor "distributive share," within Code Civ. Proc. § 2746. In re Williams, 123 N. Y. Supp. 383, 384, 66 Misc. Rep. 417.

Testator gave his sister a specified amount and also one-half of his residuary estate. By a codicil he gave to two nieces and a nephew "the legacy which I have left to my sister," share and share alike. Held, that the word "legacy" will be construed to include, not only the money legacy in the will, but the gift of half of the residuary estate. In re Norris' Estate, 66 Atl. 1000, 1001, 217 Pa. 560.

"No particular words are essential to create a legacy' or devise; the essential thing is that the intention of the testator to thereby make the gift from property of the estate is shown." A clause of a will providing that "the residue of my real estate, after my son H. has been paid what he has paid for me at various times, I will and bequeath," etc., creates a "legacy" to H. of the amounts paid by him for the testator. In re Barclay's Estate, 93 Pac. 1012, 1014, 152 Cal. 753.

The right given to a beneficiary by a will to receive a stated share of the net income from the entire residuary estate of *he testator, left in trust until the time fixed

Shares of stock in a New Jersey corporation belonging to a testatrix, resident of Rhode Island, and passing under a bequest in her will, are subject to the inheritance tax imposed by P. L. 1906, p. 432, c. 228, entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to tax intestates' estates, legacies,' etc., which by section 1, subd. 2, imposes a tax when the transfer is by will of property within the state, and decedent was a nonresident of the state at death; the stock being embraced by the term "legacies" as used in the title. Dixon v. Russell, 73 Atl. 51, 52, 78 N. J. Law, 296.

Gift causa mortis distinguished
See Gift Causa Mortis.
Payment of debt

A legacy implies a bounty, and not a payment. In re Dailey's Estate, 89 N. Y. Supp. 538, 542, 43 Misc. Rep. 552.

The word "legacy," as used in the War Revenue Act June 13, 1898, imposing a tax on "legacies" in the hands of administrators, executors, or trustees, is a definite gift by will of personal property either general and pecuniary, or specific. It is of specific article of personal property or of ascertained and definite pecuniary amount which may be readily valued by the executor or trustee having it in charge. Disston v. McClain, 147 Fed. 114, 117, 77 C. C. A. 340.

Personalty or realty

A "legacy" is a gift by will of personal property. Harding's Adm'r v. Harding, 116 S. W. 305, 307, 132 Ky. 133.

A "legacy" is defined as "a bequest or gift of personal property by last will and testament." Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W. 283, 286, 196 Mo. 587 (quoting Black, Law Dict.).

The terms "legacy" and "legatee" have different meanings in the French Code and Civil Law, from what they usually have under the English system; but even in the United States they may be used to refer to a devise of real property. Lindsay v. Wil

son, 63 Atl. 566, 570, 103 Md. 252, 2 L. R. | Campbell's Estate, 75 Pac. 851, 853, 27 A. (N. S.) 408. Utah, 361 (citing Page, Wills, § 2).

A "legacy" is a disposition of personal property by will. Under a will creating a trust, the beneficiary was empowered to dispose of the property by will and give the same to various charitable institutions and directed her executors after the payment of numerous bequests, to pay out of the residue any inheritance taxes due on any of the legacies whether to the state or federal authorities. Held, that the various dispositions of the trust estate constituted "legacies" and are entitled to have the transfer taxes paid out of the residuary estate. ham v. New York Ass'n for Improving the Condition of the Poor, 69 N. E. 367, 369, 177 N. Y. 218.

"Legacy and devise" and "legatee and devisee" are often used as interchangeable phrases in wills and everyday conversation, and therefore courts would not feel fettered to any nice construction where the subjectmatter or context shows the words were used interchangeably and as of the same import. But such popular and loose construction is hardly permissible in view of the statutory rule of hermeneutics. Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W. 283, 286, 196 Mo. 587.

While the word "devise" is the approIs-priate term to pass title to real estate, and "bequeath" the term applicable to gifts of personal property, a strict adherence to technical words is not necessary to give effect to a testator's intent, and the fact that the word "devise" is not used does not prevent the title to real estate passing by the use of the word "bequeath." Mills v. Tompkins, 97 N. Y. Supp. 9, 10, 110 App.

Strictly speaking, the term "legacies" refers to personal property, but it may be, and often is, used in a more extended sense by persons unacquainted with the precise meaning of legal terms, and, when so used, may embrace real estate. Russell v. Elden, 15 Me. 193, 196.

Div. 212.

LEGACY TAX

See Inheritance Tax.

A tax on an interest in personal proppassing by will is a "legacy tax." In re Macky's Estate, 102 Pac. 1075, 1078, 46 Colo. 79, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1207.

Although the words "devise" and "devisee" properly and technically apply only to real estate, and the words "legacy," "leg-erty atee," "bequest," and "bequeath" only to personal property, they have been made interchangeable by Ky. St. 1903, § 467, which provides that "the words 'legatee' and 'devisee' shall each be held to convey the same idea; and the words 'bequeath' and 'devise' to mean the same thing; and the words 'bequest' and 'legacy' shall each be held to mean the same thing and to embrace and include either real or personal property or both." Roberts v. Chenoweth, 112 S. W. 625, 627.

In common acceptation, "bequest" and "legacy" are synonymous terms, but "bequeath" is the term generally by which a gift of personalty is made in a will, and a legacy is the money or personal property bequeathed. The words "devise," "bequest," and "legacy" are not infrequently used in wills in a sense different from their strict legal meaning. It is stated, in a recent work on wills, that: "Of the verbs used to denote the act of making a will, 'devise' is properly used of realty, and 'bequeath' of personalty. Of the nouns used to name the various forms of gift, 'devise' is used of a gift of realty. 'Legacy' is used of a gift of personalty in general. None of these words have so fixed a legal meaning, however, that a gift will fail because testator does not use the words descriptive of the gift or the act of giving with technical accuracy. A devise is often miscalled a 'bequest,' or 'bequest' is often used to include both realty and personalty, or is used of a gift of money alone. So the verb 'devise' is often used to refer to personalty alone." In re

The inheritance tax is variously termed "succession tax," "legacy tax," and "probate duties"; but, whatever it may be termed, it is not a tax upon property, but upon the right of succession thereto. State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, 106 N. W. 93, 96, 97 Minn. 11, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056.

A tax may be laid upon property immediately after it has devolved upon any person by will or inheritance so as to be not easily distinguishable from a form of taxation sometimes called "legacy tax." Appeal of Hopkins, 60 Atl. 657, 659, 77 Conn. 644.

The tax variously called an "inheritance tax," a "legacy tax," a "transfer tax," and a "succession tax," is a "burden imposed by government on all gifts, legacies, and successions, whether of real or personal property or both, or any interest therein, passing to certain persons (other than those specially excepted), by will, by intestate law, or by deed or assignment made inter vivos, intended to take effect at or after the death of the grantor." In re Morris' Estate, 50 S. E. 682, 138 N. C. 259 (quoting and adopting definition in Dos Passos [2d Ed.] § 2).

The words "an act to tax

lega

cies," in the title of Act May 15, 1906 (P. L. p. 432) do not express that the object of the act, so far as it relates to legacies, is the imposition of a tax upon the transfer of property which is the subject of a bequest, and as Const. art. 4, § 7, par. 4, requires that the object of every law shall be expressed in the

See, also, Legal Disability.

title thereof, the statute is unconstitutional | LEGAL CAPACITY
so far as it seeks to tax the transfer of prop-
erty which is the subject of a bequest. Dix-
on v. Russell, 76 Atl. 982, 983, 79 N. J. Law,
490.

LEGAL

See, also, Lawful.

The term "legal" means that which is according to law. Vaughn v. National Council, Junior Order United American Mechanics, 117 S. W. 115, 116, 136 Mo. App. 362.

"Legal" is defined as according to the principle of law; according to the method required by statute; by means of judicial proceedings. In re Folwell's Estate, 62 Atl. 414, 415, 68 N. J. Eq. 728, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)

1193.

The "capacity to sue" is the right to come into court, and differs from a "cause of action," which is the right to relief in court. Howell v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 121 Pac. 346, 347, 86 Kan. 450.

"Incapacity to sue exists where there is some legal disability, such as infancy, or lunacy, or a want of title in the plaintiff to the character in which he sues." That plaintiff was appointed administrator as alleged, accepted the office, and qualified therefor, and letters of administration de bonis non are issued to him, and the validity of his appointment was not questioned, gives him "capacity to sue," though he may not be the real party in interest, and though the admitted facts may not authorize a recovery by

Lawful, adequate, and reasonable, syn- him. Homans v. New York Life Ins. Co., 106

onymous

"Legal,' 'lawful,' 'adequate,' and 'reasonable,' when used as adjectives qualifying 'provocation,' are synonymous, and, as a general rule, with few exceptions, it takes an assault or personal violence to constitute this provocation." State v. McKenzie, 76 S. W. 1015, 1019, 177 Mo. 699 (quoting with approval from State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830, 105 Mo. 204); State v. Heath, 121 S. W. 149, 154, 221 Mo. 565 (quoting and adopting definition in State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830, 105 Mo. 204). LEGAL ADVICE AND SERVICES

The services of an attorney for an administratrix, consisting of giving her advice, drawing leases and other legal instruments, ejecting nonpaying tenants, collecting doubtful demands due the estate, discovering assets, and in investigating and adjusting disputed claims, are such as the estate is liable for, under Rev. St. 1899, § 223, providing for allowances for "legal advice and services." Hill v. Evans, 91 S. W. 1022, 1024, 114 Mo. App. 715.

LEGAL AND SUFFICIENT FENCE

The phrase "legal and sufficient fence," as used in Rev. St. 1883, c. 51, §§ 36, 37, requiring a railroad company to erect and maintain along the line of its road a legal and sufficient fence, means a fence sufficient to restrain and exclude any of the ordinary domestic animals from straying on that part of its track which passes through and is contiguous to the inclosure where such animals are pastured or kept; and a fence abutting a railroad, four feet in height and otherwise complying with the statute, and that will restrain horses, cows, and oxen, but will not restrain sheep, is not a legal and sufficient fence. Cotton v. Wiscasset, W. & F. R. Co., 57 Atl. 785, 786, 98 Me. 511.

LEGAL AVOIDANCE

See Matter of Legal Avoidance.

N. Y. Supp. 929, 930, 55 Misc. Rep. 574 (quoting and adopting Ward v. Petrie, 51 N. E. 1002, 157 N. Y. 301, 68 Am. St. Rep. 790).

"Want of legal capacity," within the meaning of Rev. St. 1898, § 2649, specifying the grounds for demurrer to a complaint, refers to personal disability, such as infancy, idiocy, coverture, and the like, or to want of title to the character in which the plaintiff sues; a defect going to the cause of action itself as regards the plaintiff. One showing that in no event, under no circumstances, and in no capacity does plaintiff own or represent the cause of action sought to be enforced, does not fall within the statute. McKenney v. Minahan, 97 N. W. 489, 491, 119 Wis. 651.

Under the express provisions of Rev. St. 1899, § 3535, it is only when the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue that a demurrer will lie on the ground that he has no capacity to sue; the words "legal capacity to sue" referring to infancy, want of authority, or any personal disability to maintain the action. Littleton v. Burgess, 91 Pac. 832, 836, 16 Wyo. 58, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.

A demurrer on the ground of want of "legal capacity to sue" must relate to some legal disability on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute and maintain his action. This disability must be "such as infancy, coverture, idiocy, and the like, and not the absence of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." Pratt v. Northern Pac. Exp. Co., 90 Pac. 341, 342, 13 Idaho, 373, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 499, 121 Am. St. Rep. 268 (quoting and adopting definition in Pomeroy Code Remedies [4th Ed.] p. 180). LEGAL CAUSE

"Legal cause" is necessarily the deduction from some act, event, or circumstance. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. McCarthy, 90 Pac. 203, 206, 5 Cal. App. 301 (citing Marsh v. Superior Court, 26 Pac. 962, 88 Cal. 596).

"Legal cause," as used in an instruction in an action for abuse of process author.

izing recovery if defendant issued an attach- | LEGAL DISABILITY
ment against plaintiffs without legal cause,
was not synonymous with "probable cause."
Sehon, Blake & Stevenson v. White (Ky.) 92
S. W. 280, 281.

An entry, under statutes authorizing an entry on land under the directions of a railroad company solely for the purpose of making a preliminary survey of a proposed railway line subject to liability for all damages done to the land, constitutes a "legal cause and good excuse" within the statute providing that any person who without legal cause and good excuse enters the premises of another after warning shall be punished. State v. Simons, 40 South. 662, 145 Ala. 95.

LEGAL CHARGE OF CRIME

A "legal charge of crime," as contemplated by extradition statutes, means one made in that state having jurisdiction to try the offense, and from which the fugitive fled. The word "charged," in 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 7017, declaring that, when any person shall be found within the state charged with an offense committed in another state, the court or magistrate may on complaint issue a warrant for his arrest, contemplates that the person arrested and delivered up committed the offense in another state and is in such state legally charged with crime. State ex rel. Grass v. White, 82 Pac. 907, 908, 909, 40 Wash. 560, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563.

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A member of a fraternal insurance order, who dies leaving only brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews not living with him, dies without "legal dependents," within the certificate of membership, providing for payment to legal dependents, and his administrator is entitled to the fund for the payment of debts

of administrad distribution in due course

the words "legal dependents" meaning those relying on the member for support. Little v. Colwell, 74 S. E. 10, 158 N. C. 351, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 450 (citing 2 Words and Phrases, pp. 1991, 1992).

There being no legal duty imposed by law on insured to support his mother, as is the case with his wife and minor children, she is not a "legal dependent" within the meaning of a policy payable to his "legal dependent." Vaughn v. National Council, Junior Order United American Mechanics, 117 S. W. 115, 116, 136 Mo. App. 362.

3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-5

A petition by adult heirs and on behalf of minor heirs to open a decree of the county court approving the final report of the executor and distributing the estate, to correct an error resulting from an erroneous allowance to the executor and his attorney, which purports to be a petition of persons interested in the estate, and which sets forth facts' showing that the allowance is erroneous as a matter of law, and which avers the fact of the minority of heirs and presentation of the petition on their behalf, is, as to such heirs, a sufficient petition within Prob. Code, § 287, authorizing persons laboring under any legal disability, to move to reopen the account of executor before final distribution; the term "legal disability" including minority, though the minors have a guardian. In re Nelson's Estate, 129 N. W. 113, 116. 26 S. D. 615.

Rev. St. 1898, § 3968, provides that no action can be maintained against the sureties on any bond given by a guardian unless it be commenced within four years from the time when the guardian shall have been discharged, excepting that if, at the time of such discharge, the person entitled to bring the action shall be under any "legal disability to sue," the action may be commenced at any time. Held, that the words "legal disability to sue," as used therein, referred to some characteristic of the person disqualifying him from acting freely for the protection of his rights, and not to an impediment to the suability of the particular cause of action, and so inability of the plaintiff to sue during the period of accounting and until the settlement of the guardian's account was not within the exception of persons "under [any] legal disability to sue." Wescott v. Upham, 107 N. W. 2, 3, 127 Wis. 590 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4060).

LEGAL DUTY

See Lawful Duty.
LEGAL ENTITY

See Entity.

LEGAL ESTATE

Seised importing, see Seised.
Seisin importing, see Seisin.

LEGAL ESTOPPEL

Equitable estoppel distinguished, see Estoppel in Pais.

Estoppel by deed, see Estoppel.

LEGAL EVIDENCE

It was unnecessary to advise the jury of the meaning of "legal evidence" in an instruction that the law demanded conviction where there was sufficient legal evidence to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as any man competent to serve as a juror would understand that it meant any evidence the jury

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A bill of sale intended as an absolute transfer of title, but made with a secret agreement that the grantee, after selling enough goods to pay the grantor's indebtedness to him, should turn back to the grantor the remainder, or their proceeds, presents a case of "constructive fraud," sometimes called "legal fraud." Walklin v. Horswill, 123 N. W. 668, 672, 24 S. D. 191.

Misrepresentations of a material fact, made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, or if made by mistake and innocently, and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal "fraud," under Code 1907, § 4298, authorizing the rescission of a contract of sale of stock of a corporation. Southern States Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Wilmer Store Co. (Ala.) 60 South. 98, 99.

"Misrepresentation of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted upon by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently and acted upon by the opposite party, constitutes 'legal fraud.'" Camp V. Carithers, 65 S. E. 583, 585, 6 Ga. App. 608 (quoting definition in Civ. Code, § 4026). LEGAL GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL AS

MATTER OF LAW

The words "legal ground for granting a new trial as matter of law," in a request for a ruling that if plaintiff after testifying was arrested in court during the trial of the case, and the jury noticed some of the acts connected with her arrest, and were thereby made suspicious that plaintiff was arrested for perjury, there was a "legal ground for granting a new trial as a matter of law," mean that the conditions referred to called for a new trial as a matter of law, and as so construed the request is erroneous. Kelley v. City of Boston, 87 N. E. 493, 494, 201 Mass. 86.

LEGAL HEIRS

See Lawful Heirs.

My legal heirs, see My.

The term "legal heirs," in its technical sense, as used in the common law, includes all persons born in lawful matrimony who succeed to the estate in real property of an ancestor. Thomas v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 105 N. W. 922, 923, 126 Wis. 593, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 904, 5 Ann. Cas. 456.

The term "legal heirs," in legal strictness signifies those entitled to inherit real estate; it is also used to indicate those who would take under the statute of distribution. Dickerman v. Alling, 76 Atl. 362, 363, 83 Conn. 342 (citing Ruggles v. Randall, 38 Atl. 885, 70 Conn. 44; Tingier v. Chamberlin, 42 Atl. 718, 71 Conn. 469).

In construing a will using the words "legal heirs" and "lawful heirs," the words "legal" and "lawful" do not modify or change the legal effect of the word "heirs." Stisser v. Stisser, 85 N. E. 240, 242, 235 Ill. 207.

As used in a will making a bequest to testator's wife and the legal heirs of his son, and, in case his son should die without wife or heirs, then to the heirs of another, the words "heirs" and "legal heirs" meant "children." Knowles v. Knowles, 65 S. E. 128, 130, 132 Ga. 806.

Where testator, by a codicil to his will, provided that the income derived from certain property should go to "my legal heirs," the term "legal heirs" means next of kin and legal heirs of testator, and does not include next of kin or legal heirs of his wife. v. Metcalf, 58 Atl. 743, 744, 77 Conn. 176.

Miller

Under a limitation in a will to the "legal heirs" of a person, they were to be determined as of the date of his decease, and are the persons who under the laws then in force would have been entitled to inherit his real estate if he had died intestate. Holmes v. Holmes, 80 N. E. 614, 617, 194 Mass. 552.

The words "legal heirs," in a will which bequeathed a feather bed to testator's son and devised to his "wife and legal heirs of J. my youngest son" all the household furni 65 S. E. 128, 130, 132 Ga. 806. ture, meant "children." Knowles v. Knowles,

Testator bequeathed certain personalty to "the legal heirs" of his housekeeper.

In re

Schnitzler, 114 N. Y. Supp. 934, 935, 61 Misc.
Held, that her husband was excluded.
Rep. 218.

Where a testator left to trustees an estate for his grandchild, the trust to continue three years during which the trustees were to possess and manage the property and its income and provide for and pay over to the grandchild at their discretion, and at the end of the three years the estate to pass to the possession of the grandchild, if then alive, and "if the grandchild die before the trust ceases her legal heirs to be substituted in place of deceased in every respect," the granddaughter's husband is not one of her "legal heirs" in the sense of the devise over

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