"A 'lease' is a contract for the possession of profits of land and tenements on the one side and the recompense or rents on the other, or, in other words, a conveyance to a person for life, years, or at will in consideration of a rent or other recompense." Headley v. Hoopengarner, 55 S. E. 744, 748, 60 W. Va. 626. Grant of easement stead of a mere contract for their use as licensee under the owner. Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 73 N. E. 523, 524, 187 Mass. 402. A contract, whereby it was agreed that plaintiff should have the exclusive privilege of the public stenographer's office in a certain hotel, plaintiff agreeing to pay the rent promptly each month in advance for the exclusive privilege of the public stenogra for the hotel management, and to furnish competent stenographers for this service, was not a "lease," but a mere agreement to allow plaintiff to carry on business in the hotel. Hess v. Roberts, 108 N. Y. Supp. 894, 895, 124 App. Div. 328. Ky. St. 1903, § 2031, authorizes a guard-pher's office, and to do private correspondence ian to lease any real estate of his ward until the latter shall arrive at full age provided no such lease is made for a longer term than seven years. Held that, where a guardian granted an easement for the laying of pipe line over his ward's land, a conveyance would be construed as a valid lease of the property for the purpose intended during the minority of the ward but not for a longer term than seven years. Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Howard (Ky.) 100 S. W. 270. As deed See Deed. As grant See Grant. As incumbrance See Incumbrance. License distinguished The difference between a license and a lease is that a lease gives to the tenant the right of possession against the world, while a license creates no interest in the land, but is simply the authority or power to use it in some specific way. Joplin Supply Co. v. West, 130 S. W. 156, 161, 149 Mo. App. 78. A license in respect to real estate is an authority to do a particular act or series of acts on the land of another without possessing an estate therein. The test to determine whether an agreement for the use of real estate is a license or a lease is whether the contract gives exclusive use of the premises against all the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, in which case it is a license, the question to be determined by a construction of the instrument. Shaw v. Caldwell, 115 Pac. 941, 943, 16 Cal. App. 1. An agreement whereby tenants of a store building, leased for a plumbing business, allowed a third person to occupy part of it in conducting an electrical supply business, was a "lease," though called a "license" by them. Denecke v. Henry F. Miller & Son, 119 N. W. 380, 384, 142 Iowa, 486, 19 Ann. Cas. 949. An instrument by which defendant contracted to "let," and plaintiff to "take," the right to maintain, at a race park, three stands for sale of candies, said right being exclusive for said business within said park, also the storeroom under the tracks, and one of said stands, not to exceed a certain size, the period of "letting," and the amount and to be in the main pavillion, and providing times of payment of the "rent," instead of being a "license," is a "lease," affecting defendant in the exclusive use of the land, so that plaintiff, having paid the rent, can recover no part of it, though the park is destroyed by fire before the end of the period of letting. Mehlman v. Atlantic Amusement Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 222, 223, 65 Misc. Rep. 25. A contract to let to plaintiffs the exclusive news, confectionery, view, and checking privileges on defendant's steamers for certain specified seasons, though denominated a "lease," was not a "lease," but a "license." Nash v. Thousand Islands Steamboat Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 336, 342, 123 App. Div. 148. An instrument granting, demising, and leasing certain land for the purpose solely of minerals, laying pipe lines, building tanks, mining and operating for oil, gas, and other and structures to take care of the products and not merely a license to enter and operate is a lease conveying an interest in the land, for oil or gas. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 Atl. 207, 225 Pa. 338. The test to determine whether an agreement for the use of real estate is a "lease" or a license is whether the contract gives exclusive possession of the premises against the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a license to occupy under the owner. An instrument by which the owner of premises let An instrument by which the owner of to defendant "his ice business and privileges land therein described grants to another all with the use and benefit of his the gas and oil under it, with the exclusive icehouses," for a term ending on a certain right to enter thereon at all times to drill date, gave defendant the exclusive posses and operate for oil or gas, etc., and provides sion of, and the entire beneficial interest in, for the time within which the various wells the icehouses and the land under them, so shall be completed, with a stipulated monthas to constitute a lease of the premises, in-ly rental for each well not finished on time, in * Mining license A contract simply giving a right to take ore from a mine, no estate being granted, confers a mere "license," and licensee acquires no right to the ore until separated from the freehold; but an instrument devising lands for mining purposes, for a designated term of years, at a fixed rent, and giv. ing the right to erect all necessary buildings, is a "lease," not merely a mining license. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 Atl. 207, 208, 225 Pa. 338, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 614. Implied covenant for quiet enjoyment The words "grant," "demise," or "lease," in a lease for years, creates a covenant in law for good title and quiet enjoyment of the lands demised during the term. Headley v. Hoopengarner, 55 S. E. 744, 747, 60 W. Va. 626. As perpetuity See Perpetuity. As property See Personal Property; Property. As privilege See Privilege. Sale and contract of sale distinguished A conveyance of standing timber for sawmill purposes is a sale of land and not a "lease" within Civ. Code 1895, § 3613, declaring that on a sale of land there is no implied warranty of title, and hence a vendee of standing timber cannot defend against a suit on purchase-money notes in any plea predicated on the breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. McLendon Bros. Finch, 58 S. E. 690, 692, 2 Ga. App. 421. V. A contract binding the party of the first part to rent certain land to the party of the second part, providing for the payment of three installments of rent, and agreeing that if these are paid the party of the first part will convey the land to the party of the second part, was a "lease" and not a contract of sale. Thomas v. Johnson, 95 S. W. 468, 469, 78 Ark. 574 (citing Quertermous v. Hatfield, 14 S. W. 1096, 54 Ark. 16; Ish v. Morgan, 3 S. W. 440, 48 Ark. 413; Watson v. Pugh, 10 S. W. 493, 51 Ark. 218; Cheney v. Libby, 10 Sup. Ct. 498, 134 U. S. 68, 33 L. Ed. 818; Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 467; Houston v. Smythe, 5 South. 520, 66 Miss. 118). A written instrument denominated a "lease," acknowledging the receipt of $50, and providing for further payments of $10 per month, with interest, until a certain sum was paid, after which the leased personalty was to become the property of the lessee, was a conditional sale. Pringle v. Canfield, 104 N. W. 223, 19 S. D. 506. A contract provided that plaintiff leased from the owner of certain land a tract containing 250 acres and agreed to pay $205 for the year 1905, with the privilege of rerenting the property on the same terms for seven successive years, and that in case of such renewals, on full payment of the rent, the owner on completion of the period would convey the property to plaintiff in consideration of $1, and the amount, with legal interest, of taxes paid pending the contract. Held, that such contract operated as a "lease," and the annual payments as rent, so long as it was executory, and on completion of the payments it became a sale, at plaintiff's option, on his paying $1, taxes, and interest pending the contract. Heard v. Heard & Lee, 41 South. 827, 828, 148 Ala. 673 (citing Davis v. Robert, 8 South. 114, 89 Ala. 404, 18 Am. St. Rep. 126; Wilkinson v. Roper, 74 Ala. 140). The owner of land on which there were dumps of slag and smelter products entered into a contract denominated a "lease," by which he purported to lease the land for a stated term, with the right to remove the dumps on payment of a series of notes maturing at intervals through a portion of the term. The contract provided, in effect, that removal of the dumps should proceed only in proportion as payments were made, that when all the dumps were removed the lease should terminate, and that on payment of all the notes on or before maturity the lessee * should be entitled to a bill of sale of the dumps, with the right to remove the same within a specified term. It further provided that: "It is mutually agreed that all work on the said above-described slag, slag dumps and materials and smelter products shall be performed in a thoroughly workmanlike manner, and that any failure of the said party of the first part to do or keep any of the agreements herein, or any failure to pay immediately when due any one or more of said 100 promissory notes, shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the said party of the first part under this agreement, and the said party of the second part shall have the right * * * to declare each and every one and all of the said 100 promissory notes, or whatever number of the said notes may remain unpaid, mediately due and payable, and to collect the same, * * * * * im 串 and in case of but a conditional sale of the material in the dumps, which gave the owner alternative remedies for breach of the contract, and that, where he declared a forfeiture and took possession because of default in payment of notes, he could not also collect the notes maturing thereafter. Manson v. Dayton, 153 Fed. 258, 259, 265, 82 C. C. A. 588. An agreement to sell a machine for a certain price, installments to be paid on acceptance of the proposition and shipment of the machine, with an option of returning it within a certain time in lieu of the last payment, and giving no claim on the part paid, is a "lease" for experimental purposes with the privilege of completing the purchase, and not a sale within Civ. Code, § 1770, providing that one who manufactures an article under an order for a particular purpose warrants it reasonably fit therefor. Kullman, Salz & Co. v. Sugar Apparatus Mfg. Co., 96 rac. 369, 372, 153 Cal. 725. A contract recited that S. desired to have the "use" of plaintiff's building and saloon fixtures, to become "the owner of said fixtures when fully paid for," and provided that S. could use the premises for a specified term; that he should make specified monthly payments to plaintiff, until the total pay. ments, after deducting monthly ground rent, should equal the cost of the building, fixtures, etc., and 8 per cent. per annum interest thereon, when S. should be deemed the owner of the fixtures, thereafter paying plaintiff $55 per month until the expiration of his ground lease, and that S.'s failure to make the monthly payments should evidence a relinquishment of his rights under the contract. Held, that the contract evidenced a conditional sale of the fixtures, etc., and not a "lease" thereof; S. becoming the owner thereof on reimbursing plaintiff his original investment, with interest, etc. Coors v. Reagan, 96 Pac. 966, 967, 44 Colo. 126. A contract, after reciting that the vendors had "rented" certain furniture, provided that the title should remain in the vendors until the purchase money was paid in specified installments, and on default in any payment the vendors reserved the right to take possession without legal process. There was further provision that all payments should be placed to the credit of the vendee as payments on the "lease," or any other goods for which he might owe the vendors on open account on any other "lease," and that the vendee was to have no title to the "lease" until his account should be settled in full. Held, that the contract was one of conditional sale, entitling the vendors to the protection afforded by Code 1907, § 7342, making it a crime to remove or sell personal property to hinder or defraud any person who has a valid claim thereto, with knowledge of the existence of such claim. Steele v. State, 48 South. 673, 674, 159 Ala. 9. A contract, though in the form of a lease and called a "lease," by which the vendor reserves title until final payment should be made, and the right of rescission in case the purchaser should fail to pay any installments of the so-called rent, is a conditional sale. Unitype Co. v. Long, 143 Fed. 315, 317, 74 C. C. A. 453. A "lease" of property under an agreement that, on payment of a specified sum in installments, title shall pass to the lessee, amounts to a conditional sale, valid as to third parties as well as the parties to the transaction. Kidder v. Wittler-Corbin Machinery Co., 80 Pac. 301, 302, 38 Wash. 179. Sharing contract An owner of a farm and milk route let it to one on condition that he furnish horses, etc., and divide the proceeds as follows: ly. Held, that the contract did not create Eggs, daily; crops, when sold; milk, month the relation of landlord and tenant and is not a "lease," and hence did not create the relation necessary to allow the application of the law relating to the right of distress for rent. Olden v. Mather, 67 Atl. 435, 73 N. J. Eq. 217 (citing Gray v. Reynolds, 50 Atl. 670, 67 N. J. Law, 169). LEASE AT WILL A lease of real property for more than three years, signed by an agent whose authority is not in writing, has against the principal no other force or effect, either in law or in equity, than a "lease at will," because of the first section of the statute of frauds. Clement v. Young-McShea Amusement Co., 67 Atl. 82, 84, 70 N. J. Eq. 677, 118 Am. St. Rep. 747 (citing Gen. St. p. 1602). LEASE FOR YEARS A lease for any definite period is a "lease for years," and a lease for one year and a lease for 99 years create an estate of equal dignity. Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Harrison County, 42 South. 290, 298, 89 Miss. 448. "A lease for years' is a contract between lessor and lessee for the possession and profits of lands and tenements on the one hand and a recompense by rent or other consideration on the other." City of New York v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 104 N. Y. Supp. 157, 160, 53 Misc. Rep. 126 (quoting and adopting definition in McAdam, Landl. & T. 127). LEASE FROM YEAR TO YEAR A lease for one year to continue thereafter from year to year so long as mutually agreeable to the parties is a "lease from year to year" after the first year, and entitles the tenant to possession for at least two years and to sixty days' notice before the end of a year to terminate the lease. McQuinn v. Logue, 128 S. W. 516, 517, 143 Mo. App. 232. LEASE OF CONVICTS "The attempt is made to construe the expression 'leasing or hiring of convicts,' as used in the Constitution, as being synonymous with 'leasing of farms to be worked by the convicts.' How futile such an effort is will be apparent when we recall that at the adoption of the Constitution there was no system of leasing farms, and hence it was impossible that the constitutional convention could have dealt with a situation which had never arisen." Henry v. State, 39 South, 856, 876, 87 Miss. 1. LEASEHOLD A "leasehold" is defined to be "an estate in realty held under a lease." Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 57 S. E. 1087, 1089, 1 Ga. App. 25 (quoting and adopting definition in Black, Law Dict.). "A 'leasehold interest' is not real estate, but merely a chattel real, which is personal property." Townsend v. Boyd, 66 Atl. 1099, 1101, 217 Pa. 386, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1148. A "leasehold" is an intangible chattel real; it is an entity per se, distinguished from the fee ownership out of which it issues. "Whether the distinction seems refined or not, it is real in legal thought, for a leasehold is not the wheat or corn produced under the right conferred by the lease. The lease is a thing apart from the commodities produced under the right conferred by it." A sealed writing demising and leasing for coal mining and coke manufacturing purposes for thirty years a tract of land, and granting unto the lessee the sole right of mining, shipping, and selling coal from the leased premises, with an extension to remove coal which can be profitably mined, providing for a rent or royalty to the lessor of ten cents a ton for all coal mined, containing a forfeiture clause for breach of covenant, created a leasehold or chattel real, taxable to the les whether they belong to the landowner or the lessee, to be taxed under the designation of "leasehold." If they belong to the owner of the land, they are charged to him, either as land or as personal property. Their value is not to be included in, or taken to make up, the value of the intangible thing, the leasehold. State v. Bare, 56 S. E. 390, 393, 60 W. Va. 483. Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §§ 8395, 8396, giving a mechanic's lien on buildings and land to the extent of the title of the owner for whose immediate benefit the labor was done, or materials furnished, and where the owner has only a leasehold, the lien is not impaired by a forfeiture of the lease for rent, one furnishing materials under a contract with a purchaser in possession does not obtain a lien on the building as against the vendor after a surrender of the possesterm "leasehold" not including such purchassion and rights of the purchaser; the er. Toner v. Whybrew, 98 N. E. 450, 453, 50 Ind. App. 387. As chattel real See Chattel Real. As freehold See Freehold. As goods and chattels As homestead See Homestead. As interest in land See Interest (In Property). As property See Personal Property; Property; Real Property. LEAST See At Least. see under Acts 1905, p. 285, c. 35. Harvey LEAVE-LEAVING Coal, etc., Co. v. Dillon, 53 S. E. 928, 936, 59 W. Va. 605. In A "leasehold" is the right to use property upon which a lease is held for the purpos es of the lease. It is intangible property, which the law recognizes as having value, but which is incorporeal in its nature. It is not the property upon which the lease is held nor the property used in its exercise. determining the taxable value of the leasehold, the pecuniary value of the property used in connection therewith or the use of which constitutes the leasehold estate may not be taken into consideration. The land which constitutes the subject of the leasehold is taxed, not as a leasehold, nor in the name of the lessee, but as land, in the name of the owner, and is not to be taxed over again in the name of the lessee, on the theory that it constitutes part of the lease hold. Nor are the improvements on the land, See Die Leaving Children; Die Leaving Going away from a horse, beyond sight, hearing, and reasonably immediate reach, is "leaving" it, within a city ordinance declaring leaving any horse unhitched within a street a nuisance. Monroe v. Hartford St. Ry. Co., 56 Atl. 498, 500, 76 Conn. 201. The word "leaving," as used in an ordinance forbidding the leaving of a horse, etc., unattended in the street, means to desert, to abandon, to forsake; hence to give up, to relinquish. Southern Hardware & Supply Co. v. Standard Equipment Co., 48 South. 357, 358, 158 Ala. 596. The word "leave," in a letter written by testator to plaintiff, reciting "Delos, if there is not any change in my family, I shall leave one-half of what I have for you, but have | do not produce fermentation. F. H. Leggett willed you $1,000-now I want to say to you & Co. v. United States, 131 Fed. 817, 818. -you get me up a cane that will be good enough for you when I get through with, LEAVES and I will 'leave' the cane and $1,000 with it when I get through," means prima facie will. The testator accepted the cane furnished by plaintiff, and used it for many years, but did not leave $1,000 to plaintiff, but substantially all of his property to an adopted daughter, who was amply provided for without the $1,000. Plaintiff was entitled to specific performace of the contract created by the letter. Bush v. Whitaker, 91 N. Y. Supp. 616, 618, 45 Misc. Rep. 74. See Ornamental Leaves. Artificial leaves, see Artificial Flowers. As to palm leaves which have been subjected to processes that restore their natural appearance and prevent decay, and some of which have been arranged in wreaths on wire frames, held that, as there had been no advance in manufacture that destroyed the original articles or made them useful for other purposes, or altered their trade designation, they still remained dutiable as "leaves," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule N, par. 425, 30 Stat. 191, rather than as "manufactures" of palm leaf, provided for in paragraph 450, 30 Stat. 193. Kreshower v. United States, 152 Fed. 485, 486. LEDGER See Stock Ledger. As book of original entries, see Book of A ledger is a book of accounts in which are collected and arranged, each under its appropriate head, the various transactions scattered throughout the journal or daybook. First Nat. Bldg. Co. v. Vandenberg, 119 Pac. 224, 227, 29 Okl. 583. Defendant's dray driver finished loading his dray from a car, drove away from the car from four to six feet and stopped the team, and was tying the load on the dray without having hold of the lines, when another team frightened his horses and they backed against the car, crushing plaintiff. Held, that the driver was not negligent as having left his team, within an ordinance making it unlawful to leave an animal attached to a dray upon a public street without locking the wheels of the vehicle; to "leave," within the ordinance, meaning to depart or abandon for the time, to go away from the immediate charge and supervision of the animals. While the driver of M.'s team had gotten down to fasten his load, B.'s team was negligently driven so as to frighten M.'s team, which backed up and crushed plaintiff's intestate. Held, that the fact that the accident would not have happened if the wheels of M.'s dray had been locked was no excuse for the negligent driving of B.'s team, where the act of M.'s driv"Left," in a devise of all the testatrix's er in getting down did not amount to a leav-estate to two grandchildren equally to be ing of his team within an ordinance requiring wheels to be locked in such cases, the condition and equipment of M.'s dray being immaterial on the question of B.'s liability, unless M.'s driver violated the ordinance and by the fact of so doing was negligent. Sullivan v. Morton Draying & Warehouse Co., 108 Pac. 895, 896, 13 Cal. App. 35. Laws N. C. 1899, p. 175, c. 54, § 62, authorizes service on certain insurance companies by "leaving" the summons in the office of the commissioner of insurance. Held that, where a return recited that service was made by reading the summons to the commissioner of insurance and "delivering" a copy thereof to him, it would be presumed that a copy of the summons was left with the commissioner; the court in which the action was brought being one of general jurisdiction. Johnston v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. Supp. 1052, 1059, 104 App. Div. 550. LEAVENED Edible wafers, raised in the making by the use of baking powder or bicarbonate of soda, are "leavened," although such agents LEFT See Whatsoever is Left. their estate, not subject to the debts or control of their husbands, and providing that on the death of either of them without descendants the survivor should have the share of the one so dying, and on the death of the survivor without descendants what was left should go to the others, shows that testatrix did not intend to devise to others the entire In a will giving testator's wife, the interest on a sum of money so long as she lives and remains unmarried, to be "left secured on my real estate," the phrase quoted did not require the legacy to the wife to be secured by a mortgage on testator's real estate, but created a charge on such real estate without the aid of a mortgage. Plum v. Smith, 62 Atl. 763, 764, 70 N. J. Eq. 602. LEFT WITH A person being in charge of an office must be understood to have been in charge of the whole of it, and a paper placed before |