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LEADING

LEADING LIFE OF PROSTITUTION
AND LEWDNESS

Resorting to a hotel for the commission of acts of lewdness during one night, constituting parts of a continuous transaction, does not amount to "leading the life of lewdness" within Code, § 4943. State v. McDavitt, 118 N. W. 370, 140 Iowa, 342, 132 Am. St. Rep. 275.

"Leading questions" are defined to be those which ordinarily suggest to the witness the answer desired, or which, embodying a material fact, admit of a direct answer by a simple "yes" or "no," or which instruct a witness how to answer on material points. Rosenkovitz v. United Railways & Electric Co., 70 Atl. 108, 110, 108 Md. 306.

A question is not necessarily "leading" because it admits of a direct negative or affirmative answer, but to make it objectionable when only a single fact is sought to be elicited it should suggest the answer. The use of the words "whether or not" in propounding a question to a witness does not in all cases relieve the question from the objection of being leading. Bryan Press Co. v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. (Tex.) 110 S. W. 99, 100, 101.

A woman who inhabits a house of ill fame or other place as a shelter or resort in which to engage in unlawful sexual commerce is “leading a life of prostitution and lewdness," within the meaning of Code, § 4943, which provides that if any person for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness resorts to, uses, occupies, or inhabits any house of ill fame or place kept for such purpose, or if any person be found leading a life of pros-er titution, such person shall be imprisoned, etc. The law means during every instant of her residence there, and not merely while in the flagrant act. True, as counsel say, "she must be found while in the act prohibited by the statute"; but the acts here prohibited is not the act of sexual intercourse, but the living of a life of prostitution and lewdness in the house or other resort in which she is found. State v. Shaw, 101 N. W. 109, 125 Iowa, 422.

LEADING QUESTION

A "question is leading" when it suggests the desired answer to the witness. El Paso & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Welter (Tex.) 125 S. W. 45, 49.

"Leading questions" are such as suggest answers favorable to the interests of the party asking them. Parsons v. Bridgham, 34 Me. 240, 242 (citing 1 Starkie, Ev. [7th Ed.] 169).

A question, containing the words "whethor not," so as in most instances to prevent the use of the words "yes" or "no" in answer, is said to be ordinarily not leading; whether it is or not depends on the nature of the question, the subject-matter, and the particular manner in which the other parts of it are framed. State v. Taylor, 50 S. E. 247, 254, 57 W. Va. 228.

A question is "leading" when it indicates the real or supposed fact which the examiner desires to have confirmed by the answer and the use of the words "whether or not" does not necessarily prevent a question from being leading if it still suggests the answer desired. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 88 N. E. 166, 168, 239 Ill. 370.

A question propounded plaintiff, as to whether two items in an account previously rendered defendant, and offered in evidence by him, represented or was intended to represent the notes sued on, was rightfully rejected as being "leading." Sayre v. Woodyard,

A "leading question" is a question "em-66 S. E. 320, 322, 66 W. Va. 288. bodying a material fact and admitting of an answer by a simple negative or affirmative." Walker v. Baldwin & Frick, 68 Atl. 25, 30, 106 Md. 619 (quoting and adopting definition in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 434; Lee v. Tinges, 7 Md. 234).

A "leading question" is one which suggests the desired answer; and a question | susceptible to either an affirmative or negative answer, which does not suggest the desired answer, is not objectionable as leading. Williams v. Smith, 72 Atl. 1093, 1099, 29 R. I. 562.

The question, "Did you make any demand upon the defendant for the value of said damaged goods?" addressed to a witness, was not "leading." International & G. N. R. Co. v. H. P. Drought & Co. (Tex.) 100 S. W. 1011, 1012.

A witness was asked by the state in a burglary case, in order to identify a suit case as one which accused and another had in their possession: "Do you think that you would know that grip if you was to see it? A. I do not know; I think I would. Q. How does that compare with it? A. That kinder "Any question by which the fact is made looks like the color of the grip they had. Q. known to the witness, which the interrogator Do you know whether it is or not? A. No, wishes to find asserted in and by his answer, sir; I do not know exactly whether it is or is a leading question.' It is none the less not." Held, that the questions were not obleading because the alternative form of ex-jectionable as leading; a "leading question" pression is used, as 'Did you, or did you being one framed so as to indicate the annot?" Parsons v. Huff, 38 Me. 137, 141 (cit-swer desired. Majors v. State, 140 S. W. ing People v. Mather [N. Y.] 4 Wend. 247, 21 1095, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 488. Am. Dec. 122; Hopper v. Commonwealth, 6 Grat. [47 Va.] 681).

The question asked by the defense, if it was possible, during the time the fight was

in progress, for any man to leave the crowd | LEARNED
and go 40 feet and return with a bat without
witness seeing him, which question was ad- LEARNED IN THE LAW
dressed to the evidence of the state that de-
fendant had done just this thing, is not a
"leading question"; a question not being
leading because it can be answered "Yes" or
"No," but being leading where it suggests the
answer desired. People v. Jones, 117 Pac.
176, 180, 160 Cal. 358.

In an action by a mine employé for injuries resulting from the fall of rock or slate from the roof, a question on the direct examination of a witness called on behalf of plaintiff "whether in that mine that roof will sound all right in response to tapping and drumming with a pick and in a minute or two fall," is objectionable as leading. Harper v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 142 Ill. App.

594, 597.

A "leading question" is one that may be answered "yes" or "no," and suggests the answer desired. Indeed, by a "leading" question is meant one which suggests to the witness the desired answer. Merely because it may be answered by "yes" or "no" does not render the question leading. Where a witness was asked by his counsel (1) "if his wife ** had ever had any cough or lung trouble" prior to a certain exposure; (2) "whether or not his wife had ever had any female trouble" prior to such exposure; (3) "if his wife ever suffered with rheumatism, lumbago, or anything of that kind" before such exposure-it was held not leading, though answerable "yes" or "no." St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Lowe (Tex.) 97 S. W. 1087, 1088 (citing Able v. Sparks, 6 Tex. 350; Mathis v. Buford, 17 Tex. 155; Trammel v. McDade, 29 Tex. 361; Lott v. King, 15 S. W. 231, 79 Tex. 292; Birgen v. Producers' Yard, 11 S. W. 1027, 72 Tex. 55; Cleveland v. Duggan, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 84).

LEAF TOBACCO

Filler tobacco as leaf tobacco, see Filler
Tobacco.

"Congress is, of course, presumed to be familiar with the fact that 'leaf tobacco' is divided into classes, or is subjected, before being placed in bales, to some kind of an assortment." Erhardt v. Schroeder, 15 Sup. Ct. 45, 48, 155 U. S. 124, 39 L. Ed. 94.

LEAGUE

See Major League; Square League. "League" and "legion" are of entirely different meanings; "league" being defined as an "alliance of persons," and "legion" as a "military body or organization." People ex rel. Felter v. Rose, 80 N. E. 293, 295, 225 IIL 496.

Where an attorney has been disbarred for violation of legal ethics, which is one of the branches required by Pol. Code, § 686, to be considered in passing upon the qualifications of one seeking admission to the bar, he is not "learned in the law" within the constitutional provision requiring that a state's Danattorney shall be learned in the law. forth v. Egan, 119 N. W. 1021, 1025, 23 S. D. 43, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418.

LEARNED PROFESSION

Aliens imported under contract as expert accountants were not members of a recognized "learned profession," within Act Cong. March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213,

relating to the departure of aliens, and declaring in section 4 that the inhibition against the importation of aliens to perform labor or services of any kind, skilled or unskilled, shall not apply to persons belonging to any recognized learned profession. The definition of the word "profession" given in the Century Dictonary and approved in United States v. Laws, 16 Sup. Ct. 998, 163 U. S. 259, 41 L. Ed. 151, is a broad one, and it

seems not unreasonable to assume that Con

gress qualified it with the adjective “learned" for the express purpose of restricting the scope of the exception. In re Ellis, 124 Fed. 637, 643.

Physicians, teachers, and lawyers belong to the "learned professions." Flanders v. Daley, 48 S. E. 327, 120 Ga. 885.

LEARNING

See Institution of Learning.

LEASE

See Entire Lease; Further Lease; Granted and Leased; Lessee; Mining Lease; Oral Lease; Sublease.

Expiration of lease, see Expire-Expiration.

See, also, Let.

"The right 'to lease' by the ordinarily accepted meaning of the terms is unto the lessee. The owner, or first party, grants the lease, lets or demises the leased premises, and it is the second party who leases." Hence where plaintiff's predecessor in title as "party of the first part" executed a lease of certain premises to defendant "as party of the second part" for a term of two years, which contained a clause that at the expiration of the lease the party of the "first part" should have the privilege of leasing the premises for a further term of one year, etc., the words "party of the first part" used in such renewal clause were so plainly a clerical error, used in the place of party of the "second part" intended, as to put a purchaser of the property on inquiry as to the ten

ant's right to renew. Gray v. Maier & Zobelein Brewery, 84 Pac. 280, 281, 2 Cal. App. 653.

A "lease" is a commutative contract. Werlein v. Janssen, 36 South. 216, 218, 112 La. 31.

"A 'lease' is nothing but a contract, and is governed by the same rules that other contracts are." Feaster v. Fagan, 113 N. W. 478, 479, 135 Iowa, 633.

The contract employed in the creation of the relation of landlord and tenant is called a "lease," and with reference to this the parties are designated as "lessor" and "lessee." Foss v. Stanton, 57 Atl. 942, 76 Vt. 365.

The indenture or writing is the evidence of the lease, though the term "lease" is sometimes used to designate the writing or instrument. Mattlage v. McGuire, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1083, 1085, 59 Misc. Rep. 28.

The word "lease" has a settled technical import. It imports a contract by which one person, either natural or artificial, devests

himself, or itself of, and another person takes possession of, lands or chattels for a term. Moorshead v. United States Rys. Co., 96 S. W. 261, 272, 203 Mo. 121.

A "lease" in writing constitutes a written contract, and the lessee cannot surrender it or be released from its terms without the consent of the lessor, and it is absolutely essential to the termination of the term that both the lessor and lessee agree to the surrender, and, when this is shown, the tenant is no longer liable. To constitute the surrender there must be a mutual agreement be tween the lessor and lessee. Higgins v. Street, 92 Pac. 153, 154, 19 Okl. 45, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, 14 Ann. Cas. 1086.

A "lease" is a contract for the possession and profits of land and tenements on the one side and the recompense of rent or property on the other. Ward v. American Health Food Co., 96 N. W. 388, 391, 119 Wis. 12.

A paper cannot be considered as a "lease," where it is not signed by the lessee, does not identify the premises, or state when the term is to begin or upon what dates the rent is payable. Kuntz v. Mahrenholz, 88 N. Y. Supp. 1002, 1003.

An agreement to give a lease is not a "lease," unless followed up by occupation, which is evidence of lessee's agreement to hire. Goldberg v. Wood, 90 N. Y. Supp. 427, 428, 45 Misc. Rep. 327.

No particular form of expression is necsary to constitute a lease, and whatever expressions explain the intentions of the parties to be that one shall divest himself of the possession of his property and that the other shall take it for a certain period of time are sufficient, and will amount to a "lease" for the specified time as effectually as if the most proper form of words had been used for that purpose. Board of Sup'rs of Hancock County v. Imperial Naval Stores Co., 47 South. 177, 179, 93 Miss. 822, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693.

The word "lease," as used in Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1901, § 5524, providing that any telephone company authorized under the act shall have power to lease or attach to other telephone lines or exchanges by lease or purchase, does not include the power to sell all the property and franchises of a telephone company to another corporation, nor can the power to sell be necessarily implied from the grant of the expressed powers. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Evansville, 127 Fed. 187, 193.

A "lease" is "a species of contract for the possession and profits of lands and tene- The word "lease," as used in a lease for ments, either for life, or for a certain term a term of one year with the privilege of four of years, or during the pleasure of the par- years' additional "lease," was equivalent to ties." A writing by which defendants gave "term." Quinn v. Valiquette, 68 Atl. 515, 519, plaintiff the right to enter on and take pos- 80 Vt. 434, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 962 (citing session of a strip of their land, and construct Harding v. Seeley, 33 Atl. 1118, 148 Pa. 20. thereon a tramway, and occupy it for a stated A direction by one who had been occupytime, in consideration of a certain amounting an apartment to the janitress, who was per year, is a lease. Asher v. Johnson, 82 without authority to lease the same, not to let any one have the apartment during his absence, and a statement by him that when he came back he would sign the lease with the agent and that he wanted it for a year, did not constitute an "oral lease," and was no more than an agreement for a lease. Columbia Bank v. Clarke, 108 N. Y. Supp. 587. 588.

S. W. 300, 301, 118 Ky. 702 (quoting Bouvier). An instrument reciting that it is agreed that a lease will be given on certain terms, and which was preceded by a letter in which different terms were proposed, and the parties subsequently agreed on still other terms, did not constitute a "lease," though it was accompanied by a payment of rent and the lessee took possession. Ver Steeg v. BeckerMoore Paint Co., 80 S. W. 346, 351, 106 Mo. App. 257.

To constitute a "lease" the essentials of a contract must be present, and there must be an offer and an acceptance of the terms of the offer. Israelson v. Wollenberg, 116 N. Y. Supp. 626, 627, 63 Misc. Rep. 293.

An instrument reciting receipt from defendants of $10 for deposit on rent of two specified lofts, "rent to be $65 per month and to fun for two years," did not constitute a "lease" of the lofts for two years; it having been delivered to defendants by an agent of the owners not authorized to make leases, and it also being contemplated that a "lease"

should be subsequently executed by the owners. Finkelstein v. Fabyik, 107 N. Y. Supp. 67, 69.

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An instrument described as a "lease," which fixed no length of time for it to run nor expressed any consideration therefor, and which recited that it was for months," and provided that "on leaving the order for said goods dollars on the delivery of the same, dollars, and

every week thereafter the sum of dollars," and which purported to be for the rent of household goods and jewelry, which were nowhere set forth or included in the covenants or agreements contained in the instrument, was not a "lease." State v. Cordray, 98 S. W. 1, 2, 200 Mo. 29, 9 Ann. Cas. 1110.

Since Rev. St. 1899, § 1187, expressly authorizes a street railway company to lease its property, and since section 4160, provides that when technical words having a peculiar meaning are used in a statute they shall be understood according to their technical import, a street railroad company leasing its property and franchises to another street railroad company is not liable for an injury to a passenger resulting from the negligence of the employés of the latter company; the word "lease" importing a contract by which one person devests himself and another person takes possession of property for a term. Moorshead v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 100 S. W. 611, 613, 203 Mo. 121.

Where the owner of a sewing machine places it in possession of a prospective purchaser with an option to purchase at a fixed valuation, and with no agreement to rent, such transaction is not a lease within Comp. St. 1907, c. 32, § 26, providing that an agreement for lease must be in writing, and a copy filed with the county clerk. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Omaha Umbrella Mfg. Co., 119 N. W. 958, 959, 83 Neb. 619.

The word "lease," as used in Rev. St. 1899, § 1060, authorizing railroad leases, contemplates such an instrument as divests the lessor of possession and control and places the same in the lessee to the exclusion of the lessor, possessing all the qualities and incidents of a lease at common law between landlord and tenant. The rule that a landlord, in the absence of a covenant to do so, is under no obligation to make repairs, is applicable to leases of railroads; so that the lessor, in the absence of a covenant to repair, is not liable for injuries sustained by employés of the lessee company by the latter's negligence in failing to keep the track in proper repair. Hahs v. Cape Girardeau & C. R. Co., 126 S. W. 524, 528, 147 Mo. App. 262. Where an instrument granted to defendants the use of and the right to occupy certain lands described as a game preserve, and provided that it was understood that any failure on defendants' part to perform any of the agreements expressed should work "a for

feiture of this lease," and plaintiff in its complaint alleged that it "entered into a certain indenture of lease," and that "at the time of the commission of said acts last aforesaid such defendants were tenants of said plaintiff under and by virtue of said lease, and for the purposes therein mentioned," the instrument would be regarded as a "lease,” creating the relation of landlord and tenant. Shafter Estate Co. v. Alvord, 84 Pac. 279, 2 Cal. App. 602.

In other

A "lease" is defined by Bouvier to be: "A species of contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements either for life or for a term of years or during the pleasure of the parties. A conveyance by way of demise always for a less term than the party conveying has in the premises. Duration for a shorter period than the duration of the interests of the lessor in the land is one of its essential features, for if the lessor disposes of his entire interest it becomes an assignment, and is not a lease. words, the granting of a lease always supposes that the grantor reserves in himself a reversion." In 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 597, a lease is defined as: "A contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements on the one side and the recompense or rents on the other, or in other words, a conveyance to a person for life, years or at will, in consideration of a rent, or other recompense." Within these definitions a sealed writing, witnessing that "the lessors do demise, let and lease for coal mining and coke manufacturing purposes for a period of thirty years" a tract of land, and which expressly agrees that "if at the expiration of the said period of thirty years, all the available merchantable coal which can be profitably mined has not been mined and removed, the lessees shall have the privilege of an extension of this lease on the same

terms and conditions as those herein before set forth, for a reasonable additional time until the whole of said coal can be so mined and removed," and which provides for a rent or royalty to the lessors of a certain amount per ton, created a "lease." Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 53 S. E. 928, 930, 59 W. Va. 605, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 628.

Where a statute provides for the payment of a franchise tax by railroads, express companies, chair and dining car companies, etc., to the state, and also a local tax to the county, city, or taxing district, and another statute provides for the ascertainment of the franchise tax according to that proportion of the capital stock which the length of lines operated, owned, or leased in the state bears to the total mileage operated, owned, or leased, and the proportion of the tax to be paid in any locality is to be computed in the same way, a traffic arrangement by which one railroad obtains the right to use the tracks of another for a certain period of time at a certain rental, in order to

obtain ingress to a terminal city, is a "lease," the lessee an option to purchase the said within the meaning of the statute and for "leased premises” at a certain price. Held, the mileage operated under which the rail- that the saving clause was not a reservation road is liable to pay a franchise tax. Jeffer- of an easement merely, but reserved from son County v. Board of Valuation & Assess- the operation of the lease the fee of the porment of Kentucky, 78 S. W. 443, 445, 117 Ky. tion reserved, and, such reservation having 531. been omitted from a deed executed on the exercise of the option, the grantor was entitled to have the mistake corrected. Angeles & R. R. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co., 87 Pac. 1029, 1030, 150 Cal. 21.

Where a will devised a farm to a son of testatrix, and provided that if the farm should be leased for the purpose of mining the proceeds of the lease should be divided among the children of testatrix, the word "lease" was not used in a technical sense, but indicated a method of converting the minerals into proceeds. Hyde v. Rainey, 82 Atl. 781, 784, 233 Pa. 540, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 726.

Under a covenant in an oil and gas lease that the lessor would, in and by any deed thereunder executed by him, prohibit any drilling for oil or gas on any land so conveyed, the word "deed" does not include a "lease," so as to prohibit the lessor from leasing the land for the purpose of drilling oil and gas wells thereon. Test Oil Co. v. La Tourette, 91 Pac. 1025, 1029, 19 Okl. 214. The use in a writing of such words as "lease" and "rent," the fact that it is for a definite period and a recited consideration, that it provides for an abatement of rent in case of the obstruction of the wall by other buildings, also for necessary access through and upon the premises, and that the lessor warrants the title to said leasehold for the time herein mentioned, demonstrates that the writing was intended as a "lease." Levy v. Louisville Gunning System, 89 S. W. 528, 530, 121 Ky. 510, 1 L. R..A. (N. S.) 359.

The words "reserves" and "leases," in the title and body of chapter 244, p. 456, Laws 1897, providing for the assessment and taxing of mineral reserves, or leases, or separately owned mineral, or mineral rights, to the owner thereof, separately from the land, and providing penalties for its violation, mean at one time reserved or leased mineral, and at another written instruments evidencing mineral rights. Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Neosho County, 89 Pac. 750, 751, 75 Kan. 335.

Naphtha lamps and fire alarm lanterns owned and used by a lighting company in performance of its contract to light and maintain all naphtha lamps used by the city for lighting are not within Rev. Laws, c. 12, § 23, cl. 2, making personal property "leased" for profit liable to taxation where located, since the lamps are not held by the city as a "lessee." Rising Sun St. Lighting Co. v. City of Boston, 63 N. E. 408, 181 Mass. 211.

Los

A jury's negative answer to the special interrogatory, "Did you find that" the landlord's agent "had authority to waive the lease" of the landlord on any part of the crop covered by his lien, is not inconsistent with the verdict for the defendant, as authority to "waive the lease" is something different from authority to waive the lien. Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 92 N. W. 58, 60, 118 Iowa, 337. As conveyance

of

Conveyance as including, see Conveyance. A "lease" is defined to be "a conveyance lands or tenements to a person for life, for a term of years, or at will, in consideration of a return of rent or some other recompense." Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 57 S. E. 1087, 1089, 1 Ga. App. 25 (quoting and adopting definition in Black, Law Dict.).

A "lease" is a conveyance of an estate or interest in real property for life, for years, at will, or for a term less than the grantor had in the real property. The term is not satisfied by a contract by which a landowner gives to another a right to convey water from a spring. Clark v. Strong, 93 N. Y. Supp. 514, 516, 105 App. Div. 179.

"A lease' may be in a sense a conveyance, but such is not the commonly accepted nor the accurate meaning of the term. When we say premises are 'leased,' we generally mean that the use of them is transferred." Duff v. Keaton, 124 Pac. 291, 294, 33 Okl. 92, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472 (quoting definition in Perkins v. Morse, 2 Atl. 130, 78 Me. 17, 57 Am. Rep. 780).

A "lease" is a conveyance by the owner of an estate to another of a portion of his interest therein for a term less than his own, and it passes a present interest in the land for the period specified. Chandler v. Hart, 119 Pac. 516, 519, 161 Cal. 405, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1094.

To "lease" is to transfer, for a term specified therein, from the lessor to the lessee, the property therein demised. Moorshead v. United Rys. Co., 96 S. W. 261, 277, 203 Mo. 121.

The word "lease" is sometimes used to signify the interest and estate which is conveyed, but may properly apply to the instrument or means of conveyance. Weander v. Claussen Brewing Ass'n, 84 Pac. 735, 736, 42 Wash. 226, 114 Am. St. Rep. 110, 7 Ann.

A "lease" granted premises, described on a blueprint attached, reserving from the said "leased premises" that portion lying between the tracks of the L. Railroad, as shown on such blueprint, and also reserving a strip of land 10 feet on either side of said railroad tracks. Another clause granted Cas. 536.

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