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“Leading questions" are defined to be
those which ordinarily suggest to the witness LEADING LIFE OF PROSTITUTION the answer desired, or which, embodying a AND LEWDNESS
material fact, admit of a direct answer by a Resorting to a hotel for the commission simple “yes” or “no," or which instruct a of acts of lewdness during one night, consti- witness how to answer on material points. tuting parts of a continuous transaction, does Rosenkovitz v. United Railways & Electric not amount to "leading the life of lewdness” Co., 70 Atl. 108, 110, 108 Md. 306. within Code, $ 4943. State v. McDavitt, 118
A question is not necessarily “leading" N. W. 370, 140 Iowa, 312, 132 Am. St. Rep. because it admits of a direct negative or af275.
firmative answer, but to make it objectionA woman who inhabits a house of ill able when only a single fact is sought to be fame or other place as a shelter or resort elicited it should suggest the answer. The in which to engage in unlawful sexual com- use of the words "whether or not" in promerce is "leading a life of prostitution and pounding a question to a witness does not in lewdness," within the meaning of Code, $| all cases relieve the question from the objec4943, which provides that if any person fortion of being leading. Bryan Press Co. y. the purpose of prostitution or lewdness re- Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. (Tex.) 110 S. W. 99, sorts to, uses, occupies, or inhabits any house 100, 101. of ill fame or place kept for such purpose, or
A question, containing the words "whethif any person be found leading a life of prostitution, such person shall be imprisoned, vent the use of the words "yes" or "no" in
er or not," so as in most instances to preetc. The law means during every instant of her residence there, and not merely while in whether it is or not depends on the nature of
answer, is said to be ordinarily not leading ; the flagrant act. True, as counsel say, “she the question, the subject matter, and the parmust be found while in the act prohibited by ticular manner in which the other parts of it the statute"; but the acts here prohibited are framed. State v. Taylor, 50 S. E. 247, is not the act of sexual intercourse, but the
254, 57 W. Va. 228. living of a life of prostitution and lewdness in the house or other resort in which she is
A question is "leading" when it indicates found. State v. Shaw, 101 N. W. 109, 125 the real or supposed fact which the examiner Iowa, 422.
desires to have confirmed by the answer and
the use of the words "whether or not" does LEADING QUESTION
not necessarily prevent a question from being A "question is leading" when it suggests leading if it still suggests the answer desired. the desired answer to the witness. El Paso Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 88 N. E. 166, 168, & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Welter (Tex.) 125 S. W. 239 Ill. 370. 45, 49.
A question propounded plaintiff, as to “Leading questions” are such as suggest whether two items in an account previously answers favorable to the interests of the rendered defendant, and offered in evidence party asking them. Parsons v. Bridgham, 34 | by him, represented or was intended to repreMe. 240, 242 (citing 1 Starkie, Ev. [7th Ed.] sent the notes sued on, was rightfully reject169).
ed as being "leading.” Sayre v. Woodyard, A “leading question” is a question "em- 66 S. E. 320, 322, 66 W. Va. 288. bodying a material fact and admitting of an The question, "Did you make any deanswer by a simple negative or affirmative." | mand upon the defendant for the value of Walker V. Baldwin & Frick, 68 Atl. 25, 30, said damaged goods?" addressed to a wit106 Md. 619 (quoting and adopting definition ness, was not "leading." International & G. in 1 Greenl. Ev. 8 434; Lee v. Tinges, 7 Md. N. R. Co. v. H. P. Drought & Co. (Tex.) 100 234).
S. W. 1011, 1012. A "leading question” is one which sug. A witness was asked by the state in a gests the desired answer; and a question burglary case, in order to identify a suit susceptible to either an affirmative or nega- case as one which accused and another had tive answer, which does not suggest the de- in their possession: “Do you think that you sired answer, is not objectionable as leading. would know that grip if you was to see it? Williams v. Smith, 72 Atl. 1093, 1099, 29 R. A. I do not know; I think I would. Q. How I, 562.
does that compare with it? A. That kinder “Any question by which the fact is made looks like the color of the grip they had. Q. known to the witness, which the interrogator Do you know whether it is or not? A. No, wishes to find asserted in and by his answer, sir; I do not know exactly whether it is or is a leading question. It is none the less not." Held, that the questions were not obleading because the alternative form of ex-jectionable as leading; a "leading question" pression is used, as 'Did you, or did you being one framed so as to indicate the annot?' Parsons v. Huff, 38 Me. 137, 141 (cit- swer desired. Majors v. State, 140 S. W. ing People v. Mather [N. Y.) 4 Wend. 247, 21 1095, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 488. Am. Dec. 122; Hopper v. Commonwealth, 6 The question asked by the defense, if it Grat. [47 Va.] 081).
was possible, during the time the fight was
in progress, for any man to leave the crowd | LEARNED and go 40 feet and return with a bat without witness seeing him, which question was ad- LEARNED IN THE LAW dressed to the evidence of the state that de- Where an attorney has been disbarred fendant had done just this thing, is not a for violation of legal ethics, which is one of "leading question”; a question not being the branches required by Pol. Code, 8 686, to leading because it can be answered "Yes" or be considered in passing upon the qualifica"No," but being leading where it suggests the tions of one seeking admission to the bar, he answer desired. People v. Jones, 117 Pac. is not "learned in the law" within the con176, 180, 160 Cal. 358.
stitutional provision requiring that a state's In an action by a mine employé for in- attorney shall be learned in the law. Danjuries resulting from the fall of rock or slate forth v. Egan, 119 N. W. 1021, 1025, 23 S. D. from the roof, a question on the direct ex- 43, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418. amination of a witness called on behalf of
LEARNED PROFESSION plaintiff "whether in that mine that roof will sound all right in response to tapping and
Aliens imported under contract as exdrumming with a pick and in a minute or pert accountants were not members of a two fall,” is objectionable as leading. Har- recognized “learned profession,” within Act per v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 142 11. App. Cong. March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 594, 597.
relating to the departure of aliens, and de
claring in section 4 that the inhibition against A "leading question” is one that may be the importation of aliens to perform labor or answered "yes" or "no," and suggests the an- services of any kind, skilled or unskilled, swer desired. Indeed, by a "leading" ques- shall not apply to persons belonging to any tion is meant one which suggests to the wit- recognized learned profession. The defininess the desired answer. Merely because it tion of the word "profession” given in the may be answered by “yes” or “no” does not Century Dictonary and approved in United render the question leading. Where a wit- States v. Laws, 16 Sup. Ct. 998, 163 U. S. ness was asked by his counsel (1) “If his 259, 41 L. Ed. 151, is a broad one, and it wife
had ever had any cough or seems not unreasonable to assume that Conlung trouble” prior to a certain exposure; (2) gress qualified it with the adjective “learn“whether or not his wife had ever had any ed" for the express purpose of restricting female trouble” prior to such exposure; (3) the scope of the exception. In re Ellis, 124 “if his wife
ever suffered with Fed. 637, 643. rheumatism, lumbago, or anything of that kind" before such exposure-it was held not
Physicians, teachers, and lawyers beleading, though answerable “yes” or “no." long to the “learned professions." Flanders St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. V. Lowe (Tex.) v. Daley, 48 S. E. 327, 120 Ga. 885. 97 S. W. 1087, 1088 (citing Able v. Sparks, 6
See Institution of Learning.
See Entire Lease; Further Lease; Grant
ed and Leased ; Lessee; Mining Lease;
Oral Lease; Sublease. LEAF TOBACCO
Expiration of lease, see Expire-Expira
See, also, Let.
"The right 'to lease' by the ordinarily “Congress is, of course, presumed to be accepted meaning of the terms is unto the familiar with the fact that 'leaf tobacco' is lessee. The owner, or first party, grants the divided into classes, or is subjected, before lease, lets or demises the leased premises, being placed in bales, to some kind of an and it is the second party who leases." assortment.” Erhardt v. Schroeder, 15 Sup. Hence where plaintiff's predecessor in title Ct. 45, 48, 155 U. S. 124, 39 L. Ed. 94. as “party of the first part" executed a lease
of certain premises to defendant “as party LEAGUE
of the second part" for a term of two years,
which contained a clause that at the expiraSee Major League; Square League.
tion of the lease the party of the "first part"
should have the privilege of leasing the “League" and "legion" are of entirely premises for a further term of one year, etc., different meanings; "league" being defined the words “party of the first part" used in as an “alliance of persons," and “legion” as such renewal clause were so plainly a clera "military body or organization." People ical error, used in the place of party of the ex rel. Felter y. Rose, 80 N. E, 293, 293, 225 “second part" intended, as to put a purchasIll. 496.
er of the property on inquiry as to the ten
ant's right to renew. Gray v. Maier & Zobe- A "lease" is a contract for the possession lein Brewery, 84 Pac. 280, 281, 2 Cal. App. and profits of land and tenements on the 653.
one side and the recompense of rent or propA "lease" is a commutative contract. erty on the other. Ward v. American Health Werlein v. Janssen, 36 South. 216, 218, 112 Food Co., 96 N. W. 388, 391, 119 Wis. 12. La. 31.
A paper cannot be considered as "A ‘lease' is nothing but a contract, and "lease," where it is not signed by the lessee, is governed by the same rules that other con- does not identify the premises, or state when tracts are.” Feaster v. Fagan, 113 N. W. the term is to begin or upon what dates the 478, 479, 135 Iowa, 633.
rent is payable. Kuntz v. Mahrenholz, 88 N. The contract employed in the creation of
Y. Supp. 1002, 1003. the relation of landlord and tenant is called An agreement to give a lease is not a a "lease,” and with reference to this the par- "lease," unless followed up by occupation, ties are designated as “lessor" and "lessee.” which is evidence of lessee's agreement to Foss v. Stanton, 57 Atl. 942, 76 Vt. 365. hire. Goldberg v. Wood, 90 N. Y. Supp. 427,
428, 45 Misc. Rep. 327. The indenture or writing is the evidence of the lease, though the term "lease" is some- No particular form of expression is nectimes used to designate the writing or instru- sary to constitute a lease, and whatever exment. Mattlage v. McGuire, 111 N. Y. Supp. pressions ex ain the intentions of the parties 1083, 1085, 59 Misc. Rep. 28.
to be that one shall divest himself of the posThe word "lease" has a settled technical session of his property and that the other import. It imports a contract by which one
shall take it for a certain period of time are person, either natural or artificial, devests sufficient, and will amount to a "lease" for himself, or itself of, and another person
the specified time as effectually as if the most takes possession of, lands or chattels for a proper form of words had been used for that term. Moorshead v. United States Rys. Co., purpose. Board of Sup’rs of Hancock County 96 S. W. 261, 272, 203 Mo. 121.
v. Imperial Naval Stores Co., 47 South. 177,
179, 93 Miss. 822, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693. A "lease" in writing constitutes a written contract, and the lessee cannot surren
The word "lease," as used in Burns' Ann. der it or be released from its terms without St. Ind. 1901, $ 5524, providing that any telethe consent of the lessor, and it is absolutely phone company authorized under the act essential to the termination of the term that shall have power to lease or attach to other both the lessor and lessee agree to the sur-telephone lines or exchanges by lease or purrender, and, when this is shown, the tenant chase, does not include the power to sell all is no longer liable. To constitute the surren- the property and franchises of a telephone der there must be a mutual agreement be company to another corporation, nor can the tween the lessor and lessee. Higgins v. power to sell be necessarily implied from the Street, 92 Pac. 153, 154, 19 Okl. 45, 13 L. R. grant of the expressed powers. Cumberland A. (N. S.) 398, 14 Ann. Cas. 1086.
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Evans
ville, 127 Fed. 187, 193. A "lease" is "a species of contract for the possession and profits of lands and tene- The word "lease,” as used in a lease for ments, either for life, or for a certain term a term of one year with the privilege of four of years, or during the pleasure of the par- years' additional “lease," was equivalent to ties.” A writing by which defendants gave "term.” Quinn v. Valiquette, 68 Atl. 515, 519, plaintiff the right to enter on and take pos- 80 Vt. 434, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 962 (citing session of a strip of their land, and construct Harding v. Seeley, 33 Atl. 1118, 148 Pa. 20. thereon a tramway, and occupy it for a stated
A direction by one who had been occupytime, in consideration of a certain amount ing an apartment to the janitress, who was per year, is a lease. Asher V. Johnson, 82 S. W. 300, 301, 118 Ky. 702 (quoting Bouvier). let any one have the apartment during his
without authority to lease the same, not to An instrument reciting that it is agreed absence, and a statement by him that when that a lease will be given on certain terms, he came back he would sign the lease with and which was preceded by a letter in which the agent and that he wanted it for a year, different terms were proposed, and the par- did not constitute an "oral lease," and was ties subsequently agreed on still other terins, no more than an agreement for a lease. Codid not constitute a "lease,” though it was lumbia Bank v. Clarke, 108 N. Y. Supp. 587. accompanied by a payment of rent and the 588. lessee took possession. Ver Steeg v. Becker- An instrument reciting receipt from deMoore Paint Co., 80 S. W. 346, 351, 106 Mo. fendants of $10 for deposit on rent of two App. 257.
specified lofts, "rent to be $65 per month and To constitute a "lease" the essentials of to run for two years," did not constitute a a contract must be present, and there must be "lease" of the lofts for two years; it having an offer and an acceptance of the terms of been delivered to defendants by an agent of the offer. Israelson v. Wollenberg, 116 N. Y. the owners not authorized to make leases, Supp. 626, 627, 63 Misc. Rep. 293.
and it also being contemplated that a "lease" should be subsequently executed by the own-, feiture of this lease," and plaintiff in its comers. Finkelstein v. Fabyik, 107 N. Y. Supp. plaint alleged that it "entered into a certain 67, 69.
indenture of lease," and that "at the time of An instrument described as a "lease," the commission of said acts last aforesaid which fixed no length of time for it to run such defendants were tenants of said plainnor expressed any consideration therefor, and tiff under and by virtue of said lease, and for which recited that it was for
the purposes therein mentioned,” the instrumonths,” and provided that “on leaving the ment would be regarded as a "lease,” creatorder for said goods dollars on the ing the relation of landlord and tenant. delivery of the same,
Shafter Estate Co. v. Alvord, 84 Pac. 279, 2 every week thereafter the sum of
Cal. App. 602. lars," and which purported to be for the rent A "lease” is defined by Bouvier to be: of household goods and jewelry, which were “A species of contract for the possession and nowhere set forth or included in the cove- profits of lands and tenements either for life nants or agreements contained in the instru- or for a term of years or during the pleasure ment, was not a “lease.” State v. Cordray, 98 of the parties. A conveyance by way of deS. W. 1, 2, 200 Mo. 29, 9 Ann. Cas. 1110. mise always for a less term than the party
Since Rev. St. 1899, § 1187, expressly au- conveying has in the premises. Duration for thorizes a street railway company to lease a shorter period than the duration of the its property, and since section 4160, provides interests of the lessor in the land is one of that when technical words having a peculiar its essential features, for if the lessor dismeaning are used in a statute they shall be poses of his entire interest it becomes an understood according to their technical im- assignment, and is not a lease. In other port, a street railroad company leasing its words, the granting of a lease always supproperty and franchises to another street poses that the grantor reserves in himself railroad company is not liable for an injury a reversion." In 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law to a passenger resulting from the negligence (2d Ed.) 597, a lease is defined as: “A conof the employés of the latter company; the tract for the possession and profits of lands word "lease” importing a contract by which and tenements on the one side and the recone person devests himself and an er per ompense or rents on the other, or in other son takes possession of property for a term. words, a conveyance to a person for life, Moorshead v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, years or at will, in consideration of a rent, 100 S. W. 611, 613, 203 Mo. 121.
or other recompense.” Within these definiWhere the owner of a sewing machine lessors do demise, let and lease for coal
tions a sealed writing, witnessing that "the places it in possession of a prospective pur- mining and coke manufacturing purposes for chaser with an option to purchase at a fixed a period of thirty years” a tract of land, and valuation, and with no agreement to rent, which expressly agrees that “if at the expirasuch transaction is not a lease within Comp. tion of the said period of thirty years, all the St. 1907, c. 32, § 26, providing that an agree available merchantable coal which can be ment for lease must be in writing, and a profitably mined has not been mined and copy filed with the county clerk. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Omaha Umbrella Mfg. of an extension of this lease on the same
removed, the lessees shall have the privilege Co., 119 N. W. 958, 959, 83 Neb. 619.
terms and conditions as those hereinbefore The word "lease," as used in Rev. St. set forth, for a reasonable additional time 1899, § 1060, authorizing railroad leases, con- until the whole of said coal can be so mined templates such an instrument as divests the and removed," and which provides for a rent - lessor of possession and control and places or royalty to the lessors of a certain amount the same in the lessee to the exclusion of per ton, created a "lease.” Harvey Coal & the lessor, possessing all the qualities and Coke Co. v. Dillon, 53 S. E. 928, 930, 59 W. incidents of a lease at common law between Va. 605, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 628. landlord and tenant. The rule that a land
Where a statute provides for the paylord, in the absence of a covenant to do so, ment of a franchise tax by railroads, express is under no obligation to make repairs, is ap- companies, chair and dining car companies, plicable to leases of railroads; so that the etc., to the state, and also a local tax to lessor, in the absence of a covenant to repair, the county, city, or taxing district, and anis not liable for injuries sustained by em- other statute provides for the ascertainment ployés of the lessee company by the latter's of the franchise tax according to that pronegligence in failing to keep the track in portion of the capital stock which the length proper repair. Hahs v. Cape Girardeau & C. of lines operated, owned, or leased in the R. Co., 126 S. W. 524, 528, 147 Mo. App. 262. state bears to the total mileage operated,
Where an instrument granted to defend-owned, or leased, and the proportion of the ants the use of and the right to occupy cer- tax to be paid in any locality is to be comtain lands described as a game preserve, and puted in the same way, a traffic arrangement provided that it was understood that any fail- by which one railroad obtains the right to ure on defendants' part to perform any of use the tracks of another for a certain pethe agreements expressed should work “a for-Triod of time at a certain rental, in order to obtain ingress to a terminal city, is a "lease,” , the lessee an option to purchase the said within the meaning of the statute and for “leased premises” at a certain price. Held, the mileage operated under which the rail that the saving clause was not a reservation road is liable to pay a franchise tax. Jeffer- of an easement merely, but reserved from son County v. Board of Valuation & Assess- the operation of the lease the fee of the porment of Kentucky, 78 S. W. 443, 445, 117 Ky. tion reserved, and, such reservation having 531.
been omitted from a deed executed on the Where a will devised a farm to a son exercise of the option, the grantor was enof testatrix, and provided that if the farm titled to have the mistake corrected.
Los should be leased for the purpose of mining Angeles & R. R. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt the proceeds of the lease should be divided Co., 87 Pac. 1029, 1030, 150 Cal. 21. among the children of testatrix, the word
A jury's negative answer to the special "lease" was not used in a technical sense, interrogatory, "Did you find that” the landbut indicated a method of converting the min- lord's agent "had authority to waive the erals into proceeds. Hyde v. Rainey, 82 Atl. lease” of the landlord on any part of the 781, 784, 233 Pa. 540, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 726. crop covered by his lien, is not inconsistent
Under a covenant in an oil and gas lease with the verdict for the defendant, as authorthat the lessor would, in and by any deed ity to "waive the lease" is something different thereunder executed by him, prohibit any from authority to waive the lien. Fishbaugh
illing for oil or gas on any land so con- v. Spunaugle, 92 N. W. 58, 60, 118 Iowa, 337. veyed, the word “deed" does not include a
As conveyance "lease," so as to prohibit the lessor from leasing the land for the purpose of drilling
Conveyance as including, see Conveyance. oil and gas wells thereon. Test Oil Co. v. A "lease" is defined to be “a conveyance La Tourette, 91 Pac. 1025, 1029, 19 Okl. 214. of lands or tenements to a person for life, The use in a writing of such words as
for a term of years, or at will, in considera
tion of a return of rent or some other rec"lease" and "rent,” the fact that it is for a
ompense." definite period and a recited consideration,
Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 57 that it provides for an abatement of rent in S. E. 1087, 1089, 1 Ga. App. 25 (quoting and case of the obstruction of the wall by other adopting definition in Black, Law Dict.). buildings, also for necessary access through A "lease" is a conveyance of an estate and upon the premises, and that the lessor or interest in real property for life, for years, warrants the title to said leasehold for the at will, or for a term less than the grantor time herein mentioned, demonstrates that the had in the real property. The term is not writing was intended as a "lease.” Levy satisfied by a contract by which a landowner v. Louisville Gunning System, 89 S. W. 528, gives to another a right to convey water 530, 121 Ky. 510, 1 L R..A. (N. S.) 359. from a spring. Clark v. Strong, 93 N. Y.
The words “reserves” and “leases,” in Supp. 514, 516, 105 App. Div. 179. the title and body of chapter 244, p. 456,
"A 'lease' may be in a sense a conveyLaws 1897, providing for the assessment and ance, but such is not the commonly accepted taxing of mineral reserves, or leases, or sep- nor the accurate meaning of the term. When arately owned mineral, or mineral rights, we say premises are ‘leased,' we generally to the owner thereof, separately from the mean that the use of them is transferred." land, and providing penalties for its viola Duff v. Keaton, 124 Pac. 291, 294, 33 Okl. 92, tion, mean at one time reserved or leased 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472 (quoting definition in mineral, and at another written instruments Perkins v. Morse, 2 Atl. 130, 78 Me. 17, 57 evidencing mineral rights. Kansas Natural Am. Rep. 780). Gas Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Neosho Coun
A "lease" is a conveyance by the owner ty, 89 Pac. 750, 751, 75 Kan. 335.
of an estate to another of a portion of his Naphtha lamps and fire alarm lanterns interest therein for a term less than his own, owned and used by a lighting company in and it passes a present interest in the land performance of its contract to light and for the period specified, Chandler v. Hart, maintain all naphtha lamps used by the city 119 Pac. 516, 519, 161 Cal. 405, Ann. Cas. for lighting are not within Rev. Laws, c. 12, 1913B, 1094. 8 23, cl. 2, making personal property “leased"
To "lease" is to transfer, for a term for profit liable to taxation where located, specified therein, from the lessor to the lessee, since the lamps are not held by the city as the property therein demised. Moorshead v. a "lessee.” Rising Sun St. Lighting Co. v. United Rys. Co., 96 S. W. 261, 277, 203 Mo. City of Boston, 63 N. E. 408, 181 Mass. 211. 121.
A "lease" granted premises, described The word "lease" is sometimes used to on a blueprint attached, reserving from the signify the interest and estate which is said "leased premises" that portion lying conveyed, but may properly apply to the inbetween the tracks of the L. Railroad, as strument or means of conveyance. Weander shown on such blueprint, and also reserving v. Claussen Brewing Ass'n, 84 Pac. 735, 736, a strip of land 10 feet on either side of 42 Wash. 226, 114 Am. St. Rep. 110, 7 Ann. said railroad tracks. Another clause granted | Cas. 536.