MUNICIPAL FUNCTION Code Civ. Proc. § 264, provides that no [provided by the Constitution, even if elections award shall be made on any claim against relating to common public schools must be the state, except upon such legal evidence held viva voce. Frost v. Central City, 120 as would establish liability against an in- S. W. 367, 368, 134 Ky. 434. dividual or corporation. Canal Law, § 47, provides that no judgment shall be awarded by the Court of Claims for damages from neglect or conduct of any state officer having charge of canals, or from any accident connected with the canals, unless the facts make out a case which would create a legal liability against the state, were they established in court against an individual or corporation. Held, that the phrase "individual or corporation" includes a town; Town Law, 8 2, defining a "town" as a "municipal corporation" comprising the inhabitants within its boundaries. O'Bryan v. State, 125 N. Y. Supp. 490, 491, 68 Misc. Rep. 618. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MUNICIPAL COURTS As state court, see State Court. There is no substantial or material difference between the terms "city court" and "municipal court." Miller v. People, 82 N. E. 521, 523, 230 Ill. 65. MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT Const. art. 11, § 13, providing that the Legislature shall not delegate to any association or individual power to perform any "municipal function," has no application to St. 1899, p. 358, c. 247, permitting territory to be annexed to towns at the discretion of the inhabitants, nor does it effect the validity thereof, for "the fixing of the boundaries of the territory to be annexed is in no sense of the words a 'municipal function.'" There is no constitutional provision that intimates that this power can be conferred only on some legislative body, and not upon the electors of the locality to be affected, and, in the absence of such a provision, the question as to whether it shall be given to the one or the other is purely one of policy, upon which the determination of the Legislature is conclusive. People v. Town of Ontario, 84 Pac. 205-208, 148 Cal. 625. Laws 1905, p. 275, c. 163, creating a board, to be known as the state capitol commission, for the purpose of procuring the erection of a capitol building, and authorizing the commission to procure the erection of a building, adopt plans and specifications, etc., is not in conflict with Const. art. A covenant in a lease that the tenant shall comply with the orders of "municipal departments" of the city of New York in-3, § 26, declaring that the Legislature shall cluded the tenement house department of such city, although its existence began at a date subsequent to the execution of the lease. Palmieri V. Antinozzi, 95 N. Y. Supp. 865, 866, 47 Misc. Rep. 237. MUNICIPAL ELECTION See Next General Election. Included in any election, see Any. Under Rev. Laws 1905, § 336, municipal elections, as well as state and county collections, may be contested, and a village election is a "municipal election." State ex rel. Village of Excelsior v. District Court of Hennepin County, 120 N. W. 894, 895, 107 Minn. 437. An election authorized by the general council of a city of the fourth class to submit the question of whether the city should issue bonds to raise money for the erection | of common school buildings was not held under any statutes relating to common schools, but was a "municipal election" held under Ky. St. § 3490, subsec. 34, authorizing cities of the fourth class to issue municipal bonds for municipal purposes, and providing that the city council, if they deem it necessary to incur a debt, shall give notice of an election to determine whether the debt shall be incurred, and, if two-thirds of the qualified electors vote therefor, shall provide by ordinance for creating the debt, so that the election was properly held by secret ballot, as not delegate to any special commission power to perform any "municipal function"; the erection of a capitol building not being a "municipal function," which in such case is restricted to the affairs of cities and towns. Davenport v. Elrod, 107 N. W. 833, 834, 20 S. D. 567. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 'Municipal governments' are entities distinct from the state government, incurring liabilities of their own, in no way binding upon the state, and acquiring rights and property in which the state has no property interest. Except where the law makes the municipal government an agent for the state in collecting the state's taxes, or in discharging some other state function, there is no relation between the one and the other of principal and agent, as that relation is usually understood in the law. The state may, through its legislative branch, confer upon, and withdraw from, the counties and cities power of taxation. But, when the power thus conferred is for the benefit of the local community in which it is to be exercised, its exercise is not by agent for a principal. It is by a quasi independent government for the benefit of the people within its limits." Bank of Kentucky v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 94 S. W. 620, 621 (quoting and adopting definition in Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. 413). MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS An indebtedness created by bonds for a street improvement as authorized by statute, allowing a city to order the original construction of a city improvement at the cost of abutting owners, and to issue 10year bonds against the property not paying in cash, is not a "municipal indebtedness" within the Constitution, limiting municipal indebtedness. Guilfoyle's Ex'r v. City of Maysville, 112 S. W. 666, 667, 129 Ky. 532. MUNICIPAL LAW "Municipal law" is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state. That definition is a part of Sir William Blackstone's, which adds, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 111 S. W. 565, 571, 212 Mo. 616 (citing 1 Kent, Comm. 447). MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION The only acts of a city council subject to the referendum by Const. art. 4, § 1a, reserving the referendum as to "municipal legislation," are such as come within the term "municipal legislation"; and such legislation must be considered in the sense of laws of general application, and does not include transient orders to a particular person, and the latter may be adopted without reference to the referendum. Long v. City of Portland, 98 Pac. 1111, 1112, 53 Or. 92. To understand the signification of the words "municipal legislation," as used in Const. art. 11, § 2, prohibiting the Legislature from amending the charters of cities and towns, the right of which is reserved to the voters thereof, and article 4 providing that the referendum may be demanded by the people, which power is reserved to the legal voters of every municipality and district, as to all local, special, and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and districts, requires an interpretation of the term "local and special legislation," the right to formulate rules in relation to which is impliedly denied to cities and towns, on the principle that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The qualifying words "local" and "special" are synonymous, and, in the sense in which they are used, mean any enactment that is plainly intended to affect a particular person or thing or to be in effect in some specified locality only. The words "municipality" and "district" are evidently expressions of equivalent import, for a district legally created from a designated part of the state and organized to promote the convenience of the public at large is a "municipal corporation." The authority of such a corporation has been heretofore derived from an act of the legislative assembly creating it, and, as such statute is applicable to and enforceable in a part of the state only, it is a local or special law. The change in the organic law deprives the legislative assembly of all authority to enact, amend, or repeal any charter of a town, the legal voters of which reserve to themselves the exercise of all such power, except the right of repeal, and it was evidently the intention of the framers of such constitutional provision, and also the people who ratified it, to vest an incorporated city or town with authority to provide the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers as to amendments of a charter, which change is reasonably within the term of "municipal legislation." Acme Dairy Co. v. City of Astoria, 90 Pac. 153, 154, 49 Or. 520. MUNICIPAL OFFENSE As crime, see Crime. MUNICIPAL OFFICE A "village," as defined in the statute on elections (Rev. Laws 1905, § 154), is a municipality, and an office therein is a "municipal office," within section 336. State ex rel. Village of Excelsior v. District Court of Hennepin County, 120 N. W. 894, 895, 107 Minn. 437. MUNICIPAL OFFICER See, also, City Officer. In the broad sense "municipal officers" include all local elective or appointive officers. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of New York, 134 N. Y. Supp. 50, 52, 149 App. Div. 491. The mayor and aldermen constitute the "municipal officers of a city," under Rev. St. 1903, c. 1, § 6, par. 25. Huntington v. City of Calais, 73 Atl. 829, 830, 105 Me. 144. Const. art. 16, § 6, limiting the terms of ofThe term "municipal officer," as used in fice to two years, means "city officers." State ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 99 Pac. 940, 946, 38 Mont. 250 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4618). Sergeant at arms of council "The distinction is plainly taken between a person acting as a 'servant' or 'employé,' who does not discharge independent duties but acts by the direction of others, and an 'officer' empowered to act in the discharge of a duty or legal authority in official life." Where a fireman, wrongfully discharged from the fire department of the city of New York, pending reinstatement, accepted a position as sergeant at arms to the council of the municipal assembly, he was a mere "employé" of the city, and not an "officer," within New York City Charter (Laws 1897, p. 543, c. 378, § 1549), prohibiting “municipal officers" from holding two offices. Padden v. City of New York, 92 N. Y. Supp. 926, 928, 45 Misc. Rep. 517 (quoting and adopting definition in Olmstead v. City of New York, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 481, and citing People v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535). Judge Judges of city courts, organized by Rev. St. 1899, c. 37, § 240, are municipal officers, within Const. art. 9, § 11, providing that the fees, salary, or compensation of no municipal officer elected or appointed for a definite term shall be increased or diminished during the term. Wolf v. Hope, 70 N. E. 1082, 1087, 210 Ill. 50. Policeman since the river constitutes the south and east boundary of the city, as declared in its amended charter, the construction of a bridge across the river was a "municipal purpose," and hence the authority for the bond issue was valid and within the title to the act. City of Columbia v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 200 Fed. 569, 571, 119 C. C. A. 49. Under a charter authorizing a city to incur indebtedness for "municipal purposes," for use in public buildings, etc., is a muthe furnishing of water for street sprinkling, nicipal purpose. City of Winchester v. WinWaterworks Co., 148 S. W. 1, 6, 149 A policeman is not strictly a state officer, nor is he a "municipal officer" or servant of a city in which his duties are to be perform-chester ed, and is therefore not within Const. art. 16, § 6, limiting the terms of office of municipal officers to two years. State ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 99 Pac. 940, 946, 38 Mont. 250. A private policeman or watchman em ployed by a private corporation, who is paid Ky. 177. The acquisition of parks is, without any express words of authorization, included whenever a grant of power is conferred to acquire property for "municipal purposes." City of Oakland v. Thompson, 91 Pac. 387, 388, 151 Cal. 572. An ordinance of a town out of debt, by the corporation and who may be discharged by it, is not a municipal officer, so as to make his wages exempt from garnish-levying a property tax for "municipal purment, notwithstanding the fact that he was empowered to make arrests and subject to the supervision and control of the city police department. Tabb v. Mallette, 47 S. E. 587, 588, 120 Ga. 97, 102 Am. St. Rep. 78. State officer distinguished poses" and a poll tax "for said purposes," sufficiently specifies the purposes for which the taxes are levied, within Const. § 180, requiring an ordinance imposing a tax to specify distinctly the purpose for which the same is levied. The expression "for municipal purposes," in the ordinance, is the same in meaning as if it had read "for ordinary municipal purposes" or "for carrying on the town government in the ordinary routine." Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Eversole (Ky.) 96 S. 478, 479. The distinction between "state officers" and "municipal officers" is that the duties of the former concern the state at large and the general public, although exercised within definite territorial limits, while the func-W. tions of the latter relate to a particular community. Ex parte Corliss, 114 N. W. 962, 988, 16 N. D. 470. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE See Ordinance. As statute, see Statute. Laws 1905, p. 2096, c. 737, § 11, providing that no municipality shall build and operate for other than "municipal purposes" any systems for furnishing gas or electricity for lighting purposes, without a certificate of authority granted by the state gas commis Violation of ordinance as crime, see sion, enacted when Laws 1897, p. 438, c. 414, Crime. MUNICIPAL PROPERTY authorizing a village to maintain a lighting system for lighting its streets and the private buildings of its inhabitants, was in As private property, see Private Prop- force, prohibits a village from erecting a erty. A tax legally imposed by a municipality is "municipal property" of which the municipality cannot be deprived without due process of law. Harris v. Stearns, 97 N. W. 361, 363, 17 S. D. 439. MUNICIPAL PURPOSES See Corporation for Municipal Purposes. The erection of a school building was a "municipal purpose" for which the city was authorized to issue bonds. Frost v. Central City, 120 S. W. 367, 368, 134 Ky. 434. lighting system for lighting the private buildings of its inhabitants unless authority therefor is granted by the commission. Potsdam Electric Light & Power Co. v. Village of Potsdam, 97 N. Y. Supp. 190, 192, 49 Misc. Rep. 18. Const. art. 8, § 8, gives the Legislature power to establish and abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter the same. Article 9, § 5, provides that the Legislature shall authorize counties or incorporated cities and towns to impose taxes for county and municipal purposes, and for no Acts Ala. 1894-95, p. 593, entitled "An other. Article 12, § 1, provides that the Legact to amend an act entitled an act to incor- islature shall institute a uniform system of porate the city of Columbia," etc., provides public free schools and provide for the liber(section 29) for the construction of a bridge al maintenance thereof. Section 10 requires across the Chattahoochie river, and author- the Legislature to provide for the division of izes the issue of bonds therefor. Held that, the counties into convenient school districts, 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-31 and for the levying and collecting of a dis ment, essentially a revocable agency, subject to legislative control "which may destroy its very existence with the mere breath of arbitrary decision." In re City of Pittsburg, 66 Atl. 348, 352, 217 Pa. 227 (quoting and adopting the definition in City of Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169). A "municipality" is merely an agency intrict school tax for the exclusive use of pubstituted by the sovereign for the purpose of lic free schools within the district. Section carrying out in detail the objects of govern11 provides that any incorporated town or city may constitute a school district, and the fund raised by section 10 may be extended in the district where levied for building or repairing schoolhouses, purchase of school libraries and text-books, etc., so that the distribution among all the schools of the district be equitable. Held, that the power giv. en the Legislature to prescribe the "powers" of municipalities and to authorize cities and towns to assess and impose taxes for "municipal purposes" does not authorize the giving to municipalities, as such, authority to issue bonds and levy a municipal tax to pay them, when the proceeds are to be used to erect schoolhouses and maintain a system of pub- A "municipality" is an arm of the state, lic education in the municipality, as provided an effluence from its sovereignty, and is an by Laws 1899, c. 4869, § 37, as amended instrumentality by which the state seeks to by Laws 1907, c. 5817, § 3. Brown v. City of Lakeland, 54 South. 716, 717, 61 Fla. 508. division of the state." "It is a public corpo"A municipality' is a mere political subration having for its object the administration of a portion of the powers of the government delegated to it for that purpose." Penick v. Foster, 58 S. E. 773, 775, 129 Ga. 217, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346. give its citizens the best government possible; hence a municipal waterworks system is of a governmental and public nature, and is exempt from taxation. Commonwealth V. MUNICIPAL TREASURY Expenses of municipal treasury, see Ex- City of Covington, 107 S. W. 231, 232, 128 Ky. penses. 36, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1214. MUNICIPAL YEAR The word "municipality," as used before the independence of Texas, comprehended not The "municipal year" has usually been taken to be the political year, or year inter-only the town but certain adjacent country, vening between the taking of office by the respective city officers elected in each year. So where the time of elections was fixed as the first Tuesday of April in each year, and as this day may fall on the first or any day up to and including the 7th day of the month, the municipal year may vary several days in length. It is not a fixed number of days or weeks or months. The term "municipal year," as used in Comp. St. 1903, c. 50, § 25, providing that a liquor license shall expire on the last Monday of the "municipal year," means the political year. Reusch v. City of Lincoln, 112 N. W. 377, 378, 78 Neb. 828. MUNICIPALITY See Freeholder of the Municipality. Improvement of municipality, see Im- and the square set apart for municipal buildings was granted for the use of the people cinct, and was not granted to the central or of the whole district, municipality, or precapitol town alone. City of Victoria v. Victoria County (Tex.) 94 S. W. 368, 371. The term "municipality" has sometimes been limited by definition to include municipal corporation in the proper and strict sense. But the term is also used by good authority in a broader sense to include public and political corporations which are not strictly municipal. Hanson v. City of Cresco, 109 N. W. 1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 533 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4630). As used in Const. art. 4, providing that the referendum may be demanded by the people, which power is reserved to the legal voters of every "municipality" and district, as to all local, special, and municipal legisPrivate powers of municipality, see Pri- lation of every character in and for their vate Powers. Other municipalities, see Other. "Municipalities" are statutory creatures. Burke v. State, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1099, 64 Misc. Rep. 558. “Municipalities” are but mere departments or agencies of the state, charged with the performance of duties for and on its behalf, and subject always to its control. Straw v. Harris, 103 Pac. 777, 782, 54 Or. 424. "'Municipalities' are agencies of the commonwealth created by the sovereignty of the people." Adams v. Oklahoma City, 95 Pac. 975, 979, 20 Okl. 519. respective municipalities and districts, the words "municipality" and "district" are evidently expressions of equivalent import, for a district legally created from a designated part of the state and organized to promote the convenience of the public at large is a municipal corporation. The authority of such a corporation has been heretofore derived from an act of the legislative assembly creating it, and, as such statute is applicable to and enforceable in a part of the state only, it is a local or special law. Acme Dairy Co. v. City of Astoria, 90 Pac. 153, 154, 49 Or. 520. County A county is within Const. art. 4, § 1a, reserving the initiative and referendum powers to the voters of every municipality and district, and the people of the several counties are authorized, by article 9, § 1a, to regulate taxation and exemptions within their several counties, as provided by article 4, § 1a, in a manner subservient to any general law which may be enacted, though the word "district," as used in article 4, § 1a, has a broader signification than "county," and may designate a territory comprising more than a county, or containing less area. Schubel v. Olcott, 120 Pac. 375, 379, 60 Or. 503. The original meaning of a "municipality" was a "free town under the Roman Empire, with powers of local self-government." Its precise use now would confine it to subordinate subdivisions of the state having powers of local self-government. Dillon, however, points out in the same section, after stating the proper signification of the word: "But sometimes it is used in a broader sense that includes also public or quasi corporations, the principal purpose of whose creation is as an instrumentality of the state, and not for the regulation of the local and special affairs of a compact community." Act March 30, 1892 (P. L. p. 369; Gen. St. p. 2078), providing for liens for persons doing labor or furnishing materials under any contract for a public improvement made with any city, town, township, or other municipality authorized by law to make contracts for public improvements, applies to contracts with counties for public improvements. Union Stone Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, 65 Atl. 466, 469, 71 N. J. Eq. 657 (citing 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. [4th Ed.] p. 39, § 20). Act March 30, 1892 (P. L. p. 369; 2 Gen. St. p. 2078), provides that any person who, pursuant to the terms of a contract for any public improvement in any city, town, township, or other "municipality," within the state, authorized by law to contract for such improvement, shall perform labor or furnish materials for the completion of such contract, shall have a lien on the moneys due under the contract. Held that, where a county let a contract for the construction of a county courthouse, the county was a "municipality," within such act. Herman & Grace v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 64 Atl. 742, 71 N. J. Eq. 541. School district municipal corporations, while school districts and counties, properly speaking, are not. A municipality is a corporation having the right to administer local government as a city or incorporated town. A school district is merely an agency of state with limited corporate powers belonging to a class of corporate bodies known as quasi corporations. Schmutz v. Special School Dist. of City of Little Rock, 95 S. W. 438, 439, 78 Ark. 118 (citing Memphis Trust Co. v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist., 62 S. W. 902, 69 Ark. 284; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 22). Township Code Supp. 1902, § 2575, provides that when a controversy arises between municipalities or boards of health thereof respecting the location of pesthouses, reference shall be made to the president of the state board of health, who shall appoint a committee whose order in the premises shall be final. Code, § 394, declares each county to be a body corporate for civil and political purposes, and gives it power to sue and be sued and other corporate powers. A township is not expressly declared to be a body corporate, and has no right to sue or to be sued and none of the characteristics of a corporation. Held, that, in view of the evident legislative intention, a township is a "municipality" within the statute. Hanson v. City of Cresco, 109 N. W. 1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 533. Village elections (Rev. Laws 1905, § 154), is a "municipality." State ex rel. Village of Excelsior v. District Court of Hennepin County, 120 N. W. 894, 895, 107 Minn. 437. A village, as defined in the statute on MURDER See Assault with Intent to Commit Mur- The word "murder" defines the crime itself, and is not a constituent element thereof. Hocker v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 111 S. W. 676, 679. "Murder" is an unlawful killing with malice. Cole v. State, 59 S. E. 24, 26, 2 Ga. App. 734. "Murder" is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. State v. Tinkler, 83 Pac. 830, 831, 72 Kan. 262; State v. Ireland, 83 Pac. 1036, 1038, 72 Kan. 265; State v. Wetter, 83 Pac. 341, 346, 11 Idaho, 433; State v. Abbott, 62 S. E. 693, 64 W. Va. 411; State v. Johnson (Del.) 78 Atl. 605, 2 Boyce, 49; State v. Brown, 60 S. E. 945, 946, 79 S. C. 390; State v. Moore (Del.) 74 Atl. 1112, 1114, 1 Boyce, 142. A special school district is not within the constitutional provision declaring that no county, city, town, or "municipality" shall issue any interest bearing evidence of indebtedness. All corporations intended as agencies in the administration of civil government are public, as distinguished from private, corporations. Cities and school dis- Murder is the unlawful killing of a hutricts are public corporations. Cities are man creature in being with malice afore |