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of the child. At the time the will was exe- | carrying "lawful merchandise." Dene Shipcuted several of the testator's children were ping Co. v. Tweedie Trading Co., 143 Fed. married and had children. Held, that the 854, 855, 74 C. C. A. 606. daughters of a deceased daughter and a grandchild of such daughter took equally under the clause "lawful issue"; that phrase being equivalent to "descendants." Phelps v. Cameron, 96 N. Y. Supp. 1014, 1016, 109 App.

Div. 798.

Testator gave one half of his residuary estate to trustees for the use of his wife for life, and on her death to divide the same among his lawful issue, or to trustees for their use as his wife should direct by will. In default of such will, he gave the same to persons then entitled to the other half of his residuary estate, to be distributed and held on the same trusts and in the same proportions as were mentioned in another clause of his will. Held, that the term "lawful issue" includes not only children but descendants. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27.

Where the phrase "lawful issue" is used in a will, if it clearly appears that it was used in a particular meaning, the phrase may be restricted to children then living, or to children then living and to the representatives of any deceased child. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27.

Testator gave property to trustees in trust, with directions to pay the net income to his three children for life; the trust to continue as long as any of the children lived. He provided that, if any of his children should die without lawful issue, the surviving children should have his share, and if any of the children should die, leaving lawful issue, the child so surviving should take the share of the income which the deceased parent would have taken, had he survived, and on the termination of the trust the property should vest in the surviving lawful issue of testator's children. Held, that words "lawful issue" meant children, and included only the lawful children of testator's children in being at the time of their death. Brisbin v. Huntington, 103 N. W. 144, 147, 128 Iowa, 166, 5 Ann. Cas. 931.

As words of purchase

LAWFUL MONEY

See Lawful Currency.

ment charging "larceny" of certain money The term "lawful money," in an indictbeing "lawful money" of the United States, means money as commonly understood and includes bank notes. State v. Finnegean, 103 N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286, 4 Ann. Cas. 628.

"Lawful money" means money which passes from hand to hand and from person to person and circulates through the commoney." Lawful money is that which is usumunity, and is synonymous with "current ally used as a medium of exchange. State v. Quackenbush, 108 N. W. 953, 955, 98 Minn.

515.

LAWFUL OBSTRUCTIONS

Although the grass plats and shade trees along the sidewalk may be "obstructions," yet when ample width is left to answer the demands of travel they are obstructions that serve a useful purpose and are not inconsistent with the object for which streets are made and maintained. Like a fence, a hydrant, a hitching post, telephone or telegraph poles, they are "lawful obstructions," and a wire stretched around a grass and tree plat in a street for the protection of the plat is not such an obstruction as to render the city liable for injuries received by one who tripped and fell over such wire; the wire being in plain sight of pedestrians passing along the street. Teague v. City of Bloomington, 81 N. E. 103, 104, 40 Ind. App. 68 (citing Lostutter v. City of Aurora, 26 N. E. 184, 126 Ind. 436, 12 L. R. A. 259; City of Vincennes v. Spees, 74 N. E. 277, 35 Ind. App. 389; Weinstein v. City of Terre Haute, 46 N. E. 1004, 147 Ind. 556).

LAWFUL ORDER

Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, relating to the authority of a commerce commission, provides with respect to proceedings at law in a Circuit Court of the United States in case of the disregard of a "lawful order" of The words "lawful issue" in a deed are the commission, the finding of facts of the words of purchase and not of limitation. La- commission shall be prima facie evidence of cey v. Floyd, 87 S. W. 665, 667, 99 Tex. 112. the matters therein stated. The court says Where a deed conveyed land to the gran- that the phrase "lawful order" implies more tee and his wife and to the legitimate heirs than the exercise of mere jurisdictional powof the grantee, and in case of no "lawful er or authority. "The words 'lawful order' issue" then over, the words “lawful issue" | mean an order the commission has jurisdicmean legitimate heirs and are words of purchase. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. E. 1012, 1013, 35 Ind. App. 662.

LAWFUL MERCHANDISE

Asphalt is "lawful merchandise" in a charter for West Indian trade, which provides that the vessel shall be employed in

tion to make. An order may be lawful and at the same time erroneous, so that if the commission made an order in a matter over which they had judisdiction, which was merely an error of judgment as to precisely the degree of reparation, for instance, the carrier ought to make, the order would still be lawful." Western New York & P. R. Co.

V. Penn Refining Co., Limited, of Oil City,
Pa., 137 Fed. 343, 352, 70 C. C. A. 23.

LAWFUL POSSESSION

In St. 1907, p. 999, c. 538, § 2, providing that the owner or other person in the lawful possession of land may recover damages by trespassing animals from the owner or person chargeable with the care of such animals, the words "lawful possession" mean only peaceable or quiet possession, contradistinguished from possession which is not merely constructively tortious, but actually So. Fisch v. Nice, 106 Pac. 598, 599, 12 Cal. App. 60.

LAWFUL PURPOSE

Under County Government Act Cal. 1897 (St. 1897, p. 458) § 25, subd. 35, authorizing a board of supervisors to grant franchises along and over the public roads and highways for all "lawful purposes," upon such terms and conditions as in their judgment may be necessary and proper, the authority of the board has relation to the purposes for which a highway is dedicated, and is limited by the uses, primary and incidental, to which under the law a highway is devoted; the "lawful purpose" must be consistent with the character and in furtherance of the design of the easement which the public has in and to the highways. The only right which the public has in and to the highways is to use it for the purpose of traveling over it without obstruction or interference; and the control which the board of supervisors can lawfully exercise must have in view the promotion of that use, and cannot extend be

travel. A grant by a county board of supervisors of a franchise to erect poles and string electric wires thereon, along and over the public highway of a county for the purpose of lighting the highway, is an incident to the contemplated use of such highway, and is for a "lawful purpose," and it is immaterial that the lighting was in part used for private purposes. Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 94 Pac. 858, 860, 7 Cal App. 534.

County Government Act 1897 (St. 1897, p. 466) § 25, subd. 35, authorizes county supervisors to grant franchises over the public roads and highways for all "lawful pur-yond whatever is necessary to facilitate poses" on such terms and conditions as, in their judgment, may be necessary and proper, and in such manner as to present the least possible obstruction and inconvenience to the traveling public. Held, that the words "lawful purposes," as so used, should be construed as limited to purposes in aid of the public's easement of travel, something which would promote the public comfort and convenience in the use of the highway; and hence such act did not authorize a county board of supervisors to grant a franchise to an electric power company to erect its power line along a highway, the title to the soil of which is not in the abutting property owners, for the primary purpose of furnishing light and power to private individuals, without rendering compensation to such abutting owners. Gurnsey V. Northern California Power Co., 117 Pac. 906, 909, 160 Cal. 699, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185.

The payment of a debt by a county which the Legislature has authorized is a "lawful purpose," for the issuing of bonds as authorized by County Law, § 12 (Laws 1892, p. 1746, c. 686), giving to boards of supervisors the power to borrow money on the credit of the county. County of Ontario v. Shepard, 91 N. Y. Supp. 611, 614, 100 App. Div. 200.

A "lawful purpose" which will excuse one for carrying a concealed weapon is "a lawful purpose that was specific, and, in a sense, temporary. For example, if a person should buy a deadly weapon at a store, and put it in his pocket for the purpose of taking it home; or if a person should find a deadly weapon, and place it in his pocket for the purpose of keeping it only till he could restore it to the owner, or make some other disposition of it—such person would not be carrying a deadly weapon concealed within the meaning of said act." State v. Iannucci (Del.) 55 Atl. 336, 337, 4 Pennewill, 193.

The words "lawful purposes," in the New York statute providing that no corporation shall issue either stock or bonds except for money, labor, or property actually received for the use and lawful purposes of such corporation, are general in character, but would seem to mean such property as Would be germane to, or connected with, the business purposes of the corporation, as defined in its charter or articles of incorporation. Corporate bonds cannot be issued for the consideration of a note which is never collected. In re Waterloo Organ Co., 134 Fed. 341, 343, 67 C. C. A. 255.

LAWFUL REASONS

See Good and Lawful Reasons.
LAWFUL RESTRAINT

Where a bank which paid money into the state treasury as taxes, supposing that it had the right to do so, in lieu of county and city taxes, delayed for more than two years to make application to the auditor to issue his warrant for the repayment of the money, relying upon a decision of the Court of Appeals to the effect that such payments by

other banks similarly situated were proper, it lost the right to demand such a warrant, though that decision was overruled after the lapse of the two years, as the decision was not a "lawful restraint," within Ky. St. § 2544, providing that, in all cases where the doing of an act necessary to save any right

or benefit is restrained or superseded by in-forceable as a contract to lease; the words junction or other "lawful restraint," the "lawfully authorized" in paragraph 2696 not time covered by the injunction or restraint meaning an authorization in writing. Murshall not be estimated in the application of phey v. Brown, 100 Pac. 801, 804, 12 Ariz, any statute of limitations. Bank of Com- 268. merce of Louisville v. Stone, 56 S. W. 683, 684, 108 Ky. 427.

LAWFUL RESTRICTIONS

The "lawful restrictions" authorized by P. L. 1893, p. 302 (Gen. St. p. 3235), providing for the granting of a location for street railway tracks subject to restrictions, refer to restrictions that are to be made in the interest of the public and indicate a legislative act in granting a location. An ordinance granting a location may contain restrictions in the form of covenants requiring the street railway company to pave the streets in which the tracks are laid, and such restrictions are obligatory on any subsequent purchaser of the street railway tracks and franchises, even without an express assumption. Borough of Rutherford v. Hudson River Traction Co., 63 Atl. 84, 88, 73 N. J. Law, 227.

LAWFUL USE

An instruction, in an action for the death of an automobilist struck by a car, that the street railway company must use reasonable care to operate its cars on public streets with regard to "the lawful and customary use" of the streets by others, and that if, at the time decedent was killed, the company was not operating the car with regard to "the lawful and customary use" of the streets, but negligently operated the car, it was liable, is not erroneous as referring to the extent of travel, of which there was no evidence, but refers to the use of the street by the public; the word "lawful" meaning according to law as distinguished from an unlawful use and the word "customary" meaning according to usage and referring to the mode of using the streets. Smiley v. East St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 100 N. E. 157, 158, 256 Ill. 482.

LAWFUL WEDLOCK

See Same as Lawful Wedlock.

LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED

Under Civ. Code 1901, pars. 721, 725, 732, 2696, providing that no estate in land for a term of more than one year shall be conveyed, except by an instrument in writing subscribed by the party, "or by his agent thereunto authorized in writing," prohibiting actions on any lease for more than one year, unless in writing and signed by the party to be charged, "or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized," a lease for more than a year, signed by one of the parties and by a person verbally authorized by the other party, but not acknowledged by either, is not a valid lease, but is not within the prohibition in paragraph 2696, and is en3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-4

LAWFULLY BEGOTTEN

See Heirs Lawfully Begotten. LAWFULLY CLAIMING POSSESSION Civ. Code, § 1927, provides that agreements of letting upon hire bind the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring against all persons lawfully claiming the same. Defendant on August 29, 1906, leased to plaintiff for 22 months, to commence January 21, 1907, certain land. P. A. was in possession of the land under lawful lease from the owners, and it was determined in litigation to oust him that he was entitled to possession until March 6, 1907. Plaintiff had been a tenant of P. A. but his lease expired in November, 1906, but he was permitted by P. A. to occupy a house but instructed by P. A. not to farm the land. He did farm the land and gave defendant his share of the crops as rental under the lease commencing January 1, 1907. During January and February, 1907, P. A.'s cattle got upon the land and did damage to the plaintiff's crop. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to damages from defendant as for breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, as P. A.'s act was the act of one lawfully claiming possession. Agoure v. Lewis, 113 Pac. 882, 884, 15 Cal. App. 71.

LAWFULLY NATURALIZED

In Rev. St. § 1994, providing that any woman married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen, the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" limits the section to a woman lawfully within the country, her own capacity independent of her marital status, being essential to citizenship; so that where an alien married woman was not entitled to enter the country under the immigration regulations, because of a contagious disease, the naturalization of her husband would not

make her a citizen entitled to enter, under the statute. In re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980,

982.

LAWYER

As laborer, see Laborer.

As learned in the law, see Learned in
the Law.

As member of learned profession, see
Learned Profession.

A "lawyer" is one skilled in the law, while an "attorney" is an officer in a court of justice who is employed by a party in a cause to manage it for him. A law student fresh from his school and not a licensed of

ficer of the court may well be termed a lawyer, but not an attorney. Danforth v. Egan, 119 N. W. 1021, 1024, 23 S. D. 43, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418.

LAY-LAID

As construct

Where the city of Camden laid new pipes in place of old ones, which had been laid by a water company, the city's predecessor, such

laying is within the meaning of Act March 9,

1871 (P. L. p. 415), authorizing the city to

charge 75 cents per foot of frontage on land bordering on streets through which water pipes are laid. Doughten v. City of Camden,

59 Atl. 16, 17, 71 N. J. Law, 126.

LAID DOWN

The word "laid down," in a contract of sale which requires the buyer to pay a specified price f. o. b. cars at his place of business in this country, or "laid down" at his place of business, or free at his place of business, duty unpaid, must be construed according to the universal understanding of merchants and importers throughout the United States and the foreign country, and the universal understanding is that the buyers should pay import duties; and the buyer must pay such duties without deduction from or credit on the price. Steidtmann v. Joseph Lay Co., 84 N. E. 640, 642, 234 Ill. 84.

LAID UP

Ship

A yacht is "laid up for repairs," within a provision of the charter party, in such case allowing a rebate from the charter money, where it is at rest, having some damage made good, that in a material degree impairs its ability to pursue the voyage as a yacht, though the charterer may continue to eat and sleep and entertain friends on board. Dahlgren v. Whitaker, 124 Fed. 695, 696.

LAY OFF-LAID OFF

The words "laid off," in Pierce's Code 1905, § 3560, providing that all streets, lanes, and alleys "laid off" and recorded in accordance with the statute shall be considered highways, must be given their usual and ordinary meaning, and a town site or addition is "laid off" when it is surveyed or measured and marked on the ground. Meachem v. Seattle, 88 Pac. 628, 630, 45 Wash. 380.

Though the words "lay off" were used in a

notice terminating the service of an employé, it was a sufficient indication of action under Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 636, c. 466) § 1543, authorizing his suspension without pay for a year. Shane v. City of New York, 120 N. Y. Supp. 428, 430, 135 App. Div. 218.

LAY OUT-LAID OUT

The words "lay out," in the will of Benjamin Franklin, creating a trust fund for the

town of Boston, do not mean merely the adoption of a plan for the use of the money in accordance with the will, but include the actual expenditure of it by the board of managers named in the will in the establishment of public works of the kind described. City of Boston v. Doyle, 68 N. E. 851, 854, 184 Mass. 373.

east half of a block, of the southern half of Under the deed of U., the owner of the land conveyed being described as binding on his land, the northern boundary line of the a 10-foot alley "here laid out," and the grant

including the use of this alley in common,

wide to be laid out by U., extending norther"together with the use of any alley 10 feet ly parallel to P. street from the northwest corner of" the land conveyed "to H. street," while the words "laid out," in reference to the latter alley, are used in the sense of constructed or improved, and not in their ordinary meaning of the adoption of outlines or location, the alley being laid out in such sense by the deed, which clearly defines its location, the grantee's easement in the alley is not dependent on the grantor improving it, and is not lost by nonperformance Oberheim of his personal covenant to do so. v. Reeside, 81 Atl. 590, 592, 116 Md. 265 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4037).

The delineation of a street on a map made pursuant to Act March 21, 1871 (P. L. p. 638) § 23, in amendment of the charter of the village of Passaic, does not suffice to make an actual street within section 57 of the charter (Act April 2, 1873 [P. L. p. 507]), empowering the counsel to alter any street already or thereafter to be laid out. Erie R. Co. v. City of Passaic, 74 Atl. 338, 339, 79 N. J. Law, 19.

Laws N. H. 1903, p. 257, c. 255, § 3, relative to establishment of waterworks, provides that, "in case the town shall not be able to agree with the owner of any property or right taken for the purposes of this act, either party may apply to the superior court to have the same laid out' and damages determined." The court says the words "laid out" are undoubtedly derived from the procedure followed in laying out highways, "and the term itself and the direct reference indicate that the method of the divestiture of private title in road-laying proceedings was within legislative contemplation in this class of legislation. The decision of the selectmen laying a highway is a judgment, and includes both a finding upon the question of public good and a location upon the ground of the new way. The term 'laid out' is of familiar use in the taking of land for railroads. In such cases the corporation is authorized to locate its road, subject to petition by any landowner for a change of location, and to obtain title by deed to any lands which it deems necessary for the road. Pub. St. 1901, c. 158, § 8. If such deeds cannot

be obtained, application may be made for an assessment of damages. Id. § 9. The damages must be paid, or tendered, or deposited for the landowner, before entry is made upon the land to construct the road, except by the owner's consent. Id. §§ 18, 19. From all the evidence it is clear that by the permission given in certain cases to apply to have the desired right 'laid out' was meant an application to have the desired right, in the language before quoted (Laws 1901, p. 806, c. 290, § 2), 'taken, appropriated, and condemned.' The words 'laying out' and 'taking,' in a statute relating to eminent domain, were held to have the same meaning in Charlestown Branch R. v. County Com'rs of Middlesex, 7 Metc. [48 Mass.] 78, 84. The legislative intention seems clear, therefore, to authorize the plaintiffs to secure the necessary rights by purchase if they could; if not, by condemnation." Town of Littleton v. Berlin Mills Co., 58 Atl. 877, 880, 73 N. H.

11.

As surveyed or platted

A town site or addition is "laid out" when it is surveyed or measured and marked upon the ground. Meachem v. City of Seattle, 88 Pac. 628, 630, 45 Wash. 380.

All necessary steps included

The city of Boston took part of lands for a short parkway, to be controlled by the park commissioners, and made a settlement with the owner, by which the city agreed to construct a roadway and walk, to which he should have perpetual access, and to assume any assessment for betterments for the construction of the park on the land not taken. Subsequently the city street commissioners laid out a street several miles long, which, where the owner's land lay, was superimposed on the parkway, and no physical change was made therein. Held not to preclude assessment for betterments on the owner's lands for the new street, which was a wholly new layout by the commissioners; to "lay out" meaning, in this connection, to fix the termini and prescribe the boundaries of a highway, and establish it as a public easement of travel, by official act of the proper authorities. Leahy v. Charles, 95 N. E. 834, 835, 209 Mass. 316.

The word "established," in Pol. Code, § 671, providing that, if a private way is "established" over the wild lands of a person who has no notice of the proceeding, he may within six months after receiving such notice, and not thereafter, proceed to have his damages assessed, has the same meaning as the words "laid out" in section 672; that is, the laying out of a way under the order of the ordinary. Watkins v. Country Club, 47 S. E. 538, 539, 120 Ga. 45.

Under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 6759, declaring that every public highway "laid out," or which may hereafter be "laid out," and which shall not be opened or used within six

years from the time of its being laid out, shall cease to be a highway for any purpose whatever, the words "laid out" doubtless mean established, surveyed, declared a road; a highway has been laid out-that is to say, it has been established and declared to be a highway by the judgment of the court. Where a highway was established by the judgment of the county commissioners, and within six years thereafter it was included within the corporate limits of a town, it did not become extinct, under such statute, though not opened or used as a highway. Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Town of Whiting, 65 N. E. 759, 761, 30 Ind. App. 182 (quoting and adopting definitions in Decker v. Washburn, 35 N. E. 1111, 8 Ind. App. 673). As locate

A petition for a highway was not oblocate and establish" a road, instead of askjectionable, because it prayed that the court ing to have the road "laid out"; the term "laid out" being colloquial, meaning "to plan in detail," while "to locate" is to define the limits, to establish in a particular place, and, in a road proceeding, is as comprehensive as "lay out"-the term "lay out" expressing the work to be done by the viewers in establishing on the ground the lines and angles of the road. Feagins v. Wallowa County, 123 Pac. 902, 62 Or. 186.

LAYING OR RELAYING

Buffalo City Charter, § 288 (Laws 1891, p. 200, c. 105, as amended by Laws 1901, p. 661, c. 228, § 8), provides for the laying and relaying of sidewalks at the expense of abutting owners. Laws 1891, p. 221, c. 105, § 393, divides streets into carriage ways and sidewalks, and Buffalo City Ordinance, c. 4, pars. 8, 9, declares that the owner or occupant may be required to grade and level the sidewalk in front of his premises between the street and curbs, and, on his failure to grade and level the sidewalk for ten days after notice, the same may be done at his expense. Held, that the words "laying or relaying" of a sidewalk, within section 288, have the same meaning as "grading or regrading" in section 8, in each case referring to original work on the sidewalk or street, and not to repair after the sidewalk is once laid or relaid. Konowalski v. City of Buffalo, 115 N. Y. Supp. 467, 470, 131 App. Div. 465.

LEAD

The zinc ores known as carbonate, silicate and sulphide of zinc are free of duty, the carbonate and silicate as "calamine,” and the sulphide as "minerals, crude," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 2, Free List pars. 514, 614, 30 Stat. 196, 199, except that when they contain lead they are subject to the duty provided on "lead-bearing ore of all kinds,” in section 1, Schedule C, par. 181, 30Stat. 166. United States v. Brewster, 167 Fed. 122, 123, 92 C. C. A. 574.

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