v. Tefft-Weller Co., 128 Fed. 381, 385, 63 C. C. A. 123, 65 L. R. A. 106. Carrying a concealed weapon is not an offense involving "moral turpitude," and the offender's conviction is not ground for his deportation. Ex parte Saraceno, 182 Fed. 955, 957. A "moral obligation" on the part of the state must have something more substantial than legislation obnoxious to the fundamental law to rest upon; something more for a foun- The keeper of a disorderly house within dation or starting point than a statute which Pen. Code 1911, art. 496, defining a disorderly is itself immoral. A moral obligation can nev-house as any assignation house, or theater or er be deemed to rest upon the people of the state to discharge a contract made by the Legislature in direct violation of the Constitution. Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454, 457 (citing Adsit v. Osmun, 48 N. W. 31, 84 Mich. 420, 11 L. R. A. 534). Political obligations distinguished "Moral obligations' are universal and immutable, but 'political obligations' must frequently vary according to political circumstances." Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 263, 7 L. Ed. 666 (Johnson, J., dissenting). MORAL TURPITUDE "Everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals is said to be done with 'turpitude."" Thus where an attorney, acting as a notary public, falsely certified, to affidavits to be used in the prosecution of pension claims, that the affiants personally appeared before him and were sworn and acknowledged the execution thereof, and he was convicted in a federal court, under Rev. St. U. S. § 4746, imposing a fine for such an offense not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, he was convicted of an offense involving "moral turpitude," justifying his disbarment, under Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4775. In re Hopkins, 103 Pac. 805, 806, 54 Wash. 569 (quoting and adopting definition in Bouv. Law Dict.). "Turpitude," in its ordinary sense involves the idea of inherent baseness or vileness, shameful wickedness; depravity. In its legal sense, it includes everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The word "moral," which so often precedes the word "turpitude," does not seem to add anything to the meaning of the term, other than that emphasis which often results from tautological expression, within the divorce statute. Holloway v. Holloway, 55 S. E. 191, 126 Ga. 459, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, 115 Am. St. Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas. 1164 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4580; Webst. Dict.; Black, Law Dict.; Bouv. Law Dict.). Proof of a prior conviction of assault and battery was inadmissible to affect a witness' credibility, under the rule permitting evidence of prior convictions of offenses involving "moral turpitude," as such term signities an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, and depravity not inherent in assault and battery. Gillman v. State, 51 South. 722, 723, 165 Ala. 135. house where liquors are kept for sale and women of bad reputation are permitted, is guilty of an offense involving "moral turpitude," and a witness for accused is properly cross-examined as to whether he is under an indictment for keeping a disorderly house. Bird v. State (Tex.) 148 S. W. 738, 739 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4580). The illegal sale of intoxicating liquors is not a crime involving moral turpitude within Kirby's Dig. § 5247, authorizing the revocation of a physician's license on his conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, the words "moral turpitude" implying something immoral, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law, and offenses against the liquor laws, such as illegal sales of liquor, are statutory crimes, and merely mala prohibita. Fort v. City of Brinkley, 112 S. W. 1084, 1085, 87 Ark. 400. Proof of a conviction of an illegal sale of intoxicating liquors is not admissible to impeach a witness' credibility; the crime not showing "moral turpitude," which signifies an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, or depravity. Swope v. State, 58 South. 809, 811, 4 Ala. App. 83. vileness, or depravity in the private and social "Moral turpitude" is an act of baseness, duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the acbetween man and man. Though the point at cepted and customary rule of right and duty which an act begins to take on the color of turpitude is not very definitely marked, yet the commission of the crime of larceny, whether grand or petit, undoubtedly involves "moral turpitude," as that term is commonly used. In re Henry, 99 Pac. 1054, 1055, 15 Idaho, 755, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 207. Fighting not being an offense involving "moral turpitude," the state may not, on cross-examination of defendant, show that he had paid several fines for fighting before the charge of assault for which he was being tried. Pollok v. State (Tex.) 101 S. W. 231, 232. MORE More necessary public use Under a Code provision allowing property already taken for public use to be taken for a "more necessary public use" than that to which it has been already appropriated, the land of a private person, subject to an easement for a public highway, may be taken by a water company for a dam and reservoir. Marin County Water Co. v. Marin County, 79 | MORE OR LESS (Personalty) More than ten years Where defendant pleaded that he had been in peaceable possession of all the property described in plaintiff's petition, using and exercising ownership over same for "more than ten years next preceding the filing of said suit," the phrase quoted indicates that It was not the intention of the pleader to limit the time of possession to the ten years immediately preceding the filing of the suit. Campbell Real Estate Co. v. Wiley (Tex.) 83 S. W. 251, 252 (citing Hennessy v. Savings & Loan Co., 55 S. W. 124, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 591). In a contract for sale of goods, the qualifying words "more or less" merely provide against slight and accidental variations in mund Peycke Co., 110 Pac. 1088, 1089, 14 Cal. App. 32. number, measure or weight. Hills v. Ed The phrase "more or less," as used in a contract for the manufacture and sale of glass, where the quantity is stated at 200,000 square feet "more or less," means only such immaterial variations in quantity as would occur naturally in connection with such a contract. Hadley-Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. 242, 243, 74 C. C. A. 462. The words "more or less," in a contract for the sale of a designated number of staves "more or less," all being branded, etc., are merely precautionary so as to cover slight and unimportant inaccuracies and do not enlarge the descriptive words or quantity. Little Rock Cooperage Co. v. Gunnels, 101 S. W. 729, 730, 82 Ark. 286, 12 Ann. Cas. 293. The terms "about" and "more or less," as used in a contract of sale of "about" 250 tons of grapes "more or less," do not create such an ambiguity in the contract as to let in extrinsic evidence of previous or contemporaneous conversations to show intent. terson v. Chaix, 90 Pac. 948, 951, 5 Cal. App. 525. Pe Quantity identified by independent circumstances, or determined by option of buyer Where a contract is made to sell or fur independent circumstances, such as an entire nish certain goods identified by reference to lot deposited in a certain warehouse, or all that may be manufactured by the vendor in a certain establishment, or that may be shipped by his agent or correspondent in certain vessels, and the quantity is named with the qualification of "about," or "more or less," or words of like import, the contract applied to the specific lot; and the naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty, but only as an estimate of the probable amount, in reference to which good faith is all that is required of the party making it. In such cases the governing rule is somewhat analogous to that which is apThe phrase "more or less" following a plied in the description of land, where natunumeral conveys the meaning of an estimate ral boundaries and monuments control coursof probable distance or amount. The idea es and distances and estimates of quantity. of nearness is suggested but that of fixedness A contract for the sale of cotton linters stipis excluded, and, where the question at isulated that the seller confirmed the sale to sue in the controversy is one of distance, it the buyer of the "season's output of linis a question of fact for the jury to determine ters * * * estimated at 200 to 250" bales. as to what is a reasonable limit in connection with the subject-matter and surrounding facts and circumstances of the particular case. Geiger v. Kaestner, 148 Ill. App. 529, 532; Santa Paula Commercial Co. v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Co., 120 Pac. 347, 348, 86 Kan. 328. MORE OR LESS Held, that the contract was for the sale of the output, regardless of the number of bales, especially in view of the evidence that the buyer was buying linters generally, and wanted all he could get, and the buyer was required to take the output consisting of 66 bales in excess of the maximum estimate. Loeb v. Winnsboro Cotton Oil Co. (Tex.) 93 MORE OR LESS (Realty) The words "more or less" ordinarily mean "about," when used in a deed. Carling v. Wilson (Ala.) 58 South. 417, 418. Where land sold was described by metes and bounds, the words "containing by estimate" a certain number of acres were equivalent to the words "more or less." Mayer & Schmidt v. Wooten, 102 S. W. 423, 427, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 327. "In common-law conveyances the words 'more or less,' while sometimes having practically no effect, are frequently added to prevent the precise quantity named from being conclusive on the parties, and may operate to make a sale of land one in gross instead of by the acre." Ainsa v. United States, 161 U. S. 208, 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 544, 40 L. Ed. 673. When the description of the quantity of land conveyed by the deed concludes with the words "more or less," the purchaser is not entitled to any reduction on account of a deficiency unless it is very gross. Keenan v. Bird, 14 N. Y. Supp. 457, 60 Hun, 175, 177; Cunningham v. Millner, 82 Va. 526, 527. Where an agreement for the conveyance of land describes it as 32 acres more or less, and which does not describe the land by metes and bounds, or by any fixed ascertainable monuments, the words "more or less" do not weaken or destroy the statement of the quantity. Brooks v. Halane, 116 Ill. App. 383, 388. The qualification "more or less," specified in a conveyance of land, will cover any deficiency not so gross as to justify a suspicion of willful deception or mistake amounting to fraud. In the latter event the purchaser may apportionment of the price according to the have either a rescission of the sale or an Ga. 531 [4]; Smith v. Dudley, 69 Ga. 768 [3]; 2 Warv. Vendors, § 832; Finney v. Morris, 42 S. E. 1020, 116 Ga. 758; Wylly v. Gazan, 69 Ga. 506, 516; Walton v. Ramsey, 50 Ga. 618; Adams, Eq. [8th Ed.] 177, 178; Spence v. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; Leyden v. Hickman, 75 Ga. 684; Seymore v. Rice, 21 S. E. 293, 94 Ga. 183; Yost v. Mallicote's Adm'r, 77 Va. 610). The words "more or less," as used in a deed stating that the land conveyed contained a specified number of acres more or less, are not construed to mean "as estimated," "as supposed," but are construed to mean about the specified number of acres, and are designed to cover only such small errors of surveying as usually occur in surveys. Winton v. McGraw, 54 S. E. 506, 508, 60 W. Va. 98. The term "more or less," when appended to the expressed area of land stated in a deed, constitutes a recognition of the fact that measurements of land are apt to differ, and that men of intelligence and experience, who are familiar with the premises, may not agree in their estimates; and one who purchases land in bulk or as containing an estimated number of acres can ordinarily obtain no relief on account of any shortage which subsequent accurate measurement may disclose, but the introduction of the words "more or less" does not afford a shield against liability for false representations, and the mere fact that the deficiency is very large in proportion to the supposed quantity is often treated as in itself evidence of fraud or of mutual mistake, and in such case the purchaser is entitled to relief by rescission, or by an abatement of the price, or, where he has paid the price, an action at law for damages. Boddy v. Henry, 101 N. W. 447, N. Y. 327, 41 Am. Rep. 371; Lewis v. Hoeld452, 126 Iowa, 31 (citing Paine v. Upton, 87 the [Tex.] 76 S. W. 309; Couse v. Boyles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212, 38 Am. Dec. 514; Harrell v. Hill, 19 Ark. 102, 68 Am. Dec. 202; Triplett v. Alden, 26 Grat. [67 Va.] 721, 21 Am. Rep. 320; Hoback v. Kilgores, 26 Grat. [67 Va.] 442, 21 Am. Rep. 317; Camp v. Norfleet's Adm'x, 5 S. E. 374, 83 Va. 380; Fiske v. Fleming's Syndic, 15 La. 202; Estes v. Odom, 18 S. E. 355, 91 Ga. 600; Anthony v. Oldacre, 34 Call [8 Va.] 489; Cravens v. Kiser, 4 Ind. 512; Blessing's Adm'rs v. Beatty, 1 Rob. [40 relative value. The use of the words con fers no additional right upon the seller. Kendall v. Wells, 55 S. E. 41, 42, 126 Ga. 343 (quoting and adopting definition in Civ. Code 1895, § 3542, and citing 4 Kent, Comm. [14th Ed.] 467; 1 Jones, Real Prop. §§ 398, 399, 400; Rawle, Cov. [5th Ed.] § 297; Washb. Real Prop. [6th Ed.] § 2322; 1 Warv. Vendors, § 381; Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 51 S. E. 666, 123 Ga. 842; Jack son ex dem. Suffern v. McConnell [N. Y.] 19 Wend. 175, 32 Am. Dec. 439; Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 355, 4 Am. Dec. 67; Wright v. Wright, 34 Ala. 194; Seegar v. Smith, 3 S. E. 613, 614, 78 Ga. 616, 618; Beall v. Berkhalter, 26 Ga. 567; Estes v. Odom, 18 S. E. 355, 91 Ga. 600; Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 25 S. E. 556, 98 Ga. 388; Seymore v. Rice, 21 S. E. 293, 94 Ga. 184; Harrison v. Talbot, 2 Dana [32 Ky.] 258; Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231; Gauldin v. Shehee, 20 Va.] 287; Crislip v. Cain, 19 W. Va. 438; Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338; McCandless Building & Land Soc. v. Smith, 54 Md. 187, v. Young, 96 Pa. 289; Baltimore Permanent 39 Am. Rep. 374; Hosleton v. Dickinson, 1 N. W. 550, 51 Iowa, 244). The language "more or less," used in contracts for the sale of land, must be understood to apply only to small excesses or deficiencies attributable to variance of instruments of surveyors, etc., and these terms are used to rather replace the idea of a contract of hazard, and implies that there is no con siderable difference in the quantity. Berry's Ex'x v. Fishburne, 51 S. E. 827, 104 Va. 459. Reasonable excess or deficiency covered The words "more or less" in a deed relieve only from the necessity for exactness, and not from gross deficiency. Boggs v. Bush, 122 S. W. 220, 222, 137 Ky. 95. The return of appraisers setting aside a year's support to a widow described the property set aside as "450 acres of land, more or less, including homestead." Held, that the The words "more or less" in a conveywords "more or less" indicate that no pre-ance ordinarily mean that the grantor does cise number of acres was intended, but that the statement of the quantity was given as descriptive of the land assigned. Hancock v. King, 66 S. E. 949, 950, 133 Ga. 734. The words "more or less," used in describing land, are ordinarily intended and understood not to admit of infinite variation, but to restrain the representation to a reasonable or usual allowance for small errors in surveys; and a description of land, in a bill to quiet title thereto, as beginning at a point on the south line of S. avenue, 60 feet, more or less, eastwardly from the southeast corner of S. avenue and B. avenue, said point being at the intersection of said south line of S. avenue, and the north and south fence separating the lot described from the lot at the southeast corner of said two avenues supposed to belong to B., 60 feet more or less, to the southeast corner of said B. lot, thence northwardly along the fence separating the lot described from the B. lot and parallel, or nearly so, with B. avenue, 202 feet, more or less, to the place of beginning, being sufficiently definite that, if the action had been ejectment, a surveyor would have been able, in case of recovery, to locate the exact limits, and the sheriff to execute a writ of possession, was sufficient. Touart v. Jett Bros. Contracting Co., 53 South. 751, 753, 169 Ala. 638. * A grantor, whose land was bounded on the east by lands of S., conveyed a part to C., and then conveyed land lying between that conveyed to C. and that owned by S., describing it as "beginning at a point * adjoining the land of C., thence running easterly 58 feet to the land of S., * all distances above mentioned to be more or less." Held, that the conveyance covered all of the land owned by the grantor lying between the lands of S. and C., whether "more or less" than 58 feet wide. Holden v. Crolly, 138 N. Y. Supp. 23, 25, 153 App. Div. 254. Mistake or fraud Where through innocent mistake a grantor represented that a tract, described by metes and bounds, containing but 69.71 acres contained 82 acres more or less, the grantee, purchasing by the acre and paying the price in ignorance of the deficiency, could sue in equity for the deficiency in the acreage; the words "more or less" not including a considerable variance, and the mistake being sufficient to induce the court to believe that if the truth had been known the purchase would not have been made. Straus v. Norris, 79 Atl. 611, 612, 78 N. J. Eq. 488. not warrant the precise quantity of land named therein, but import that the actual quantity is a near approximate to that mentioned, so that, if there is no more than a reasonable deficit in the quantity, such as a shortage arising from a part thereof taken for street, there is no breach of the covenant in the conveyance. Kitzman v. Carl, 110 N. W. 587, 133 Iowa, 340, 12 Ann. Cas. 296. Risk as to quantity indicated The general rule is that, where it appears in a deed conveying land by the qualifying words "more or less" that the statement of the number of acres in the deed is a mere matter of description and not of the essence of the contract, the purchaser, in the absence of fraud, takes the risk as to the quantity of acres conveyed to him. Adams v. Betz, 78 N. E. 649, 651, 167 Ind. 161; Newman v. Kay, 49 S. E. 926, 932, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L. R. A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39 (citing 4 Kent, Comm. 467; Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231; Flagg v. Mason, 6 N. E. 702, 141 Mass. 64; Libby v. Dickey, 27 Atl. 253, 85 Me. 362; Frenche v. Chancellor of State of New Jersey, 27 Atl. 140, 51 N. J. Eq. 624, 40 Am. St. Rep. 548; Borkenhagen v. Vianden, 52 N. W. 260, 82 Wis. 206; Estes v. Odom, 18 S. E. 355, 91 Ga. 600); Kendall v. Wells, 55 S. E. 41, 44, 126 Ga. 343 (citing Jones, Real Prop. §§ 398, 399, 400; Rawle, Cov. [5th Ed.] § 297; 3 Washb. Real Prop. [6th Ed.] § 2322; Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 51 S. E. 666, 123 Ga. 842; Jackson v. McConnell [N. Y.] 19 Wend. 175, 32 Am. Dec. 439; Powell v. Clarke, 5 Mass. 355, 4 Am. Dec. 67; Wright v. Wright, 34 Ala. 194); Cohen v. Numsen, 65 Atl. 432, 433, 104 Md. 676; Yates v. Buttrell (Tex.) 132 S. W. 831, 832. Sale in gross or by acre indicated The description of land conveyed as containing so many acres, "more or less," constitutes a sale by the acre, unless it plainly appears from the whole deed that a sale in gross was intended. Pack v. Whitaker, 65 S. E. 496, 498, 110 Va. 122. A description in a deed of land as 15 acres, "more or less," off the southwest corner of a quarter section, signified a sale in gross of 15 acres, and was not uncertain Because of the words quoted. W. C. Early & Co. v. Long, 42 South. 348, 89 Miss. 285. Where defendant rented a tract of land of plaintiff, and executed a rent note, promising to pay plaintiff $160 for rent of 40 acres of land at $4 per acre, more or less, etc., it was held that the words "more or less" referred to the quantity of land, and that the instrument should be construed to evidence a contract for renting by the acre, and not for a gross sum for the entire tract. Ayers v. Heustess, 127 S. W. 957, 94 Ark. 493. Immaterial deviation-2 in 200 acres On an exchange of land, a deficiency of about two acres in a farm of "200 acres, more or less," is insufficient to raise a presumption that it would have prevented the exchange, if known. Webber v. Harter, 134 N. W. 947, 950, 154 Iowa, 317. Material deviation-8 in 200 acres Where a contract for the exchange of a stock of goods for a farm described it as containing 200 acres "more or less according to the government survey," such quoted words contemplated only such differences as were due to errors incident to measurements by different surveyors and the variance in the instruments used, and did not cover a discrepancy of 8.58; such discrepancy being sufficient to justify an allowance of damages. Fisher v. Trumbauer & Smith (Iowa) 138 N. W. 528, 530. Same-30 in 80 acres The term "more or less," in a deed describing the land as 80 acres more or less, does not cover a shortage of 30 acres, and the grantee going into possession and improving the land before discovering the fraud of the grantor, who knew that the land described was 50 acres, may elect to retain the land the grantor conveyed and demand an abatement of the price for so much as the quantity falls short of the amount represented. McGhee v. Bell, 70 S. W. 493, 496, 170 Mo. 121, 59 L. R. A. 761. MORGUE As used in Rev. St. 1906, § 3586a, making it unlawful to establish a morgue on any street on which there are dwelling houses, unless the owners or occupants of such dwelling houses within 200 yards thereof give their written consent, the word "morgue" must be given its usual meaning, which is a place or deadhouse where the bodies of persons found dead are exposed for identification, or that they may be claimed by their friends. Koebler v. Pennewell, 79 N. E. 471, 473, 75 Ohio St. 278 (citing Black, Law Dict.; Rap. & L. Law Dict.; Cent. Dict.; Stand. Dict.; Webst. Dict.; Thesaurus, Dict.; Enc. Dict.). MORTAL INJURY The words "mortal injuries," as used in an indictment for murder alleging that defendant inflicted certain mortal injuries, must be taken as the equivalent of "serious bodily injuries," as used in Cr. Code, § 215, providing that an aggravated assault is committed when a serious bodily injury is in flicted upon the person assaulted, and such indictment justifies a conviction for an ag gravated assault. Mapula v. Territory, 80 Pac. 389, 391, 9 Ariz. 199. MORTAR "Mortar" is a mixture of lime in paste with sand. It may be divided into two principal classes: Hydraulic mortar, which is made of hydraulic lime, and common mortar, made of common lime. Donaldson v. Roksament Stone Co., 170 Fed. 192, 193. MORTGAGE See Chattel Mortgage; Constructive Mortgage; Dry Mortgage; Equitable Mortgage; Indicia of a Mortgage; Kansas Cut-Throat Mortgage; Personal Mortgage; Purchase-Money Mortgage; Railroad Mortgage; Tight Mortgage. Deed, mortgage, or otherwise, see Otherwise. Party to mortgage, see Party. Subject to mortgage, see Subject to. "A 'mortgage' is literally a dead pledge." Stumpe v. Kopp, 99 S. W. 1073, 1076, 201 Mo. 412. At common law a mortgage was a conditional conveyance to secure the payment of money or the performance of some act, to be void upon such payment or performance. By more modern law and under the statutes of many states a mortgage is a mere lien upon land. Its dominant attribute is security, but nevertheless it must be regarded as "both a lien in equity and a conveyance at law." United States v. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co., 24 Sup. Ct. 546, 547, 193 U. S. 651, 48 L. Ed. 830 (citing Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1191). A mortgage is a conveyance of an estate or property by way of pledge for the security of a debt, to become void on payment thereof, and is not a mere lien. Poarch v. Duncan, 91 S. W. 1110, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 275. A "mortgage" is a pledge of land described in the agreement by a grantor to the grantee and to revert to the grantor on the discharge of the obligation for the performance of which it is pledged. Safe Deposit Title Guaranty Co. v. Linton, 62 Atl. 566, 213 Pa. 105 (citing Lance's Appeal, 4 Atl. 375, 112 Pa. 456; Moran v. Munhall, 53 Atl. 1094, 204 Pa. 242). A "mortgage" is a conveyance or transfer of property, either real or personal, as security to pay a debt or in discharge of some other obligation. Williams v. Davis, 45 South. 908, 909, 154 Ala. 422. An instrument will be deemed a mortgage, whatever its form, if, taken alone or in connection with the surrounding circumstances, it appears to have been given to se |