LAWFUL CHASTISEMENT being sufficiently broad to include gold and silver, as well as paper money. Brittain v. State, 105 S. W. 817, 819, 820, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 169. Under a statute providing that in an indictment for the larceny of money it is sufficient to allege the larceny of the same, with Where the punishment inflicted by a parent on a child is so excessive and cruel as to show that the parent was not acting in good faith for the benefit of the child, the parent is guilty of an unlawful assault, and cannot justify his act by claiming that the punishment inflicted was a “lawful chastise-out specifying the denomination or kind therement"; but so long as a parent acts in good faith, honestly thinking that what he does is for the benefit of the child, he is within his prerogative, and the law will not interfere. State v. Koonse, 101 S. W. 139, 141, 123 Mo. App. 655. LAWFUL CHILD Where a will provided that the property given to one of the devisees should, if he died without lawful children, go to the heirs of another devisee, an adopted child of the devisee first mentioned was not a "lawful child," within the meaning of the will. Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S. W. 731, 732, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259. LAWFUL CLAIM A good faith claim, appearing to be formidable and founded on grounds having the appearance, though false, of a paramount title, is not covered by a warranty against lawful claims, but such a warranty is intended to cover real claims and not claims only appearing real. An outstanding legal title is within a covenant of warranty against “lawful claims," and if asserted, is a “lawful claim," though an eviction may be avoided by showing a superior equity. Mackenzie v. Clement, 129 S. W. 730, 731, 144 Mo. App. 114. LAWFUL COURSE of, an indictment, charging accused with stealing money "lawful currency of the realm" (i. e., of the United States), to the amount and value of $20 or more, sufficiently describes the money, to constitute larceny, within Ky. St. 1903, § 1194, punishing larceny of money of the value of $20 or more. Todd v. Com. (Ky.) 93 S. W. 631, 632 (citing Commonwealth v. Mann [Ky.] 14 S. W. 685; Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush [76 Ky.] 356; Travis v. Commonwealth, 27 S. W. 863, 96 Ky. 77). Where a theft is charged, and the allegation is general that the money taken was lawful current money of the United States, the evidence must show that it was legal tender coin or legal tender currency of the United States, and the nickel is legal tender under the provisions of U. S. Comp. St. 1901, P. 2349. Black v. State, 79 S. W. 311, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 107. LAWFUL DEBT "A 'debt' is defined as 'that which is due from one person to another, whether money, goods, or services; that which one person is bound to pay to or to perform for another, that which one is obliged to do, or suffer.'" Plaintiff's husband gave his bond for the payment of money, secured by a mortgage on his farm, in which plaintiff joined. The husband died, devising the farm to plaintiff, who deeded it to her son, who assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage, but failed to do so. On the death of the son, without issue, his widow, having a dower in trust in the farm, executed a quitclaim deed of it to plaintiff and the other heirs, subject to decedent's "lawful debts," which plaintiff as A bond recited that plaintiff lumber and oil company had a claim on certain timber in litigation which had been attached in a certain suit against the S. Lumber Company, and provided that in consideration of the release of the attachments, and that plaintiff would not litigate its rights in such suit, the obligors bound themselves to pay any inter-sumed and agreed to pay. Held that, since est which plaintiff might have in the timber to be determined by any lawful course. Held, that a lawful course for determining plaintiff's interest was by suit on the bond; plaintiff not being required to establish first its interest in the timber by suit against the S. Lumber Company. Camp v. Capital Mining, Lumber & Oil Co. (Ky.) 128 S. W. 323, 324. LAWFUL CURRENCY See Lawful Money. plaintiff did not sign the bond and was not personally liable for the mortgage debt, the covenant of her son to pay it was not enforceable against him, and hence the covenant in the deed from his widow to plaintiff did not obligate plaintiff to pay the debt; a claim not enforceable at law not being a "lawful debt." Bonhoff v. Wiehorst, 108 N. Y. Supp. 437, 441, 57 Misc. Rep. 456 (quoting and adopting definition in Imp. Dict.; citing Latimer v. Veader, 46 N. Y. Supp. 823, 20 App. Div. 426). LAWFUL DEFENSE An indictment charging theft from the person of "two dollars in money, lawful currency of the United States of America and of the value of two dollars," was sustained by proof of the theft of two dollars in silver; the term "currency," or "lawful currency,"451, 455, 16 Okl. 241. By the words "lawful defense of the person" is meant what is sometimes termed self-defense. Robinson v. Territory, 85 Pac. LAWFUL DUTY In Rev. St. § 5451, which makes it a criminal offense to give or offer bribes, etc., to induce any officer of, or person acting for or on behalf of, the United States in any official function to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, the phrase "lawful duty" is not restricted to a duty imposed by statute, but is broad enough to cover a duty imposed by a lawful superior; and an indictment charging a conspiracy to induce an assistant statistician in the Department of Agriculture to furnish to the accused advance news of crop conditions, and to cause to be published false reports as to such conditions in violation of the rules of the department, to aid defendants in market speculations, by promising such employé a percentage of the profits of such speculations, charges a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States under Rev. St. § 5440. United States v. Haas, 163 Fed. 908, 910. Regulations of the Agricultural Department having forbidden the giving out of any statement relating to the business of the department without the approval of the chief of the bureau, and secrecy having been imposed on all employés by the established usage and practice, indictments charging bribery of an associate statistician of the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Agriculture to divulge the contents of the current cotton crop report in advance of its official publication stated an offense under Rev. St. § 5451, making it a crime to bribe any person acting for the United States in any official function to do or commit any act in violation of his lawful duty. Haas v. Henkel, 166 Fed. 621, 627. LAWFUL ENTRY LAWFUL FENCE See, also, Legal and Sufficient Fence. A fence, posts of which are rotted off, is not a lawful fence within Rev. St. 1899, § 3295, providing that in a county where swine are restrained from running at large a fence composed of three barbed wires, stretched on posts, firmly set in the ground, not more than 16 feet apart, shall be a lawful fence. Smith v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 105 S. W. 10, 12, 127 Mo. App. 160. Under Rev. St. 1899, § 1105, requiring a railroad company to construct and maintain fences sufficient to prevent stock getting on the track, an instruction, in an action under such section for injuries to stock, which defined a lawful fence as one sufficient "to resist horses, cattle, swine, and like stock," was not erroneous for using the phrase "to resist"; such phrase not being as strong as the phrase "to prevent" in the statute. Hax v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co., 100 S. W. 693, 695, 123 Mo. App. 172. Rev. St. 1899, § 3295, providing for the construction of fences sufficient to prevent swine from running at large, composed of wire 4 feet high and posts 16 feet apart, referred to outside fences other than those required of railroads, so that a fence conforming to such specifications, constructed by an adjoining landowner along a railroad right of way, did not constitute a "lawful fence," for the building of which the landowner could recover from the railroad under Rev. St. 1899, § 1105 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 945). Sharp v. Quincy, O. & K. C. Ry. Co., 123 S. W. 507, 508, 139 Mo. App. 525. The petition in an action for damages to growing crops from trespassing stock alleged that the premises were situated in a subdivision where hogs, etc., were prohibited from The expression that the "entry must be running at large, and were inclosed by a lawlawful" means, not that it must have been ful fence under the statute when the treseffected under a formal right capable of en-passes occurred, and described the stock law forcement by legal proceedings, but that it district by metes and bounds, and further almust not be through any unlawful or wrong-leged that, in the event that plaintiff's fence ful act, upon which the mortgagee would be estopped to found a right. Stouffer v. Harlan, 74 Pac. 610, 613, 68 Kan. 135, 64 L. R. A. 320, 104 Am. St. Rep. 396. LAWFUL EXCUSE That provision for alimony made by a Nevada court is not enforceable against the husband, a resident of California, because no jurisdiction of his person was acquired, does not constitute a lawful excuse within Pen. Code, § 270, which makes it an offense for a parent to willfully omit without lawful excuse to furnish necessary food, etc., for his child. Ex parte McMullin, 126 Pac. 368, 370, 19 Cal. App. 481. LAW EXPENSES Other lawful expenses, see Other. was not in strict compliance with the statute, nevertheless it was sufficient to keep out all stock sought to be excluded of an ordinary disposition, and not of a fence-breaking nature. Held, that the petition alleged a common-law liability based on the stock owner's negligence in knowingly permitting vicious animals to run at large, as well as the statutory liability based upon plaintiff's maintenance of a "lawful fence," within the stat ute. Posey v. Coleman (Tex.) 133 S. W. 937, 939. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 2496, refence at least five feet high, which shall be quires every farmer, etc., to make a sufficient hog-tight, around his cleared land. Article 2497 permits one injured by the trespass of cattle or other stock to complain to a justice of the peace, who shall appoint two freeholders to ascertain the sufficiency of the The word "lawful," qualifying the word "heirs," is not sufficient per se to show an intention not to use the word "heirs" in its ordinary legal sense as a word of inheritance fence and the damages, and, if it appears that, descriptive of the whole line of lawful heirs. the fence was sufficient, the owner of the Reilly v. Bristow, 66 Atl. 262, 264, 105 Md. stock shall be liable for the damages. Article 2498 authorizes the impounding of trespass- ing stock for a second offense when the owner protection.. Article 2499 exempts the stock owner from liability if the fence be insuf- ficient. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4998, as amended by Acts 1901, c. 123, provides The words "lawful heirs," as used in a in order to determine who were the legal heirs of the testator. Mooney v. Purpus, 70 N. E. 894, 895, 70 Ohio St. 57. In construing a will using the words Under Code Civ. Proc. c. 44, providing that a corral fence exclusively for the pur- pose of inclosing stacks, if outside of any lawful inclosure, shall be sufficient and law- Rev. St. 1899, § 1973, defining a lawful fence, and providing that unless the fence comes up to the requirements any person may have a right of action for damages re- sulting from injuries to his live stock from such illegal fence, refers to what is termed a "lawful inclosure," and does not create a liability on the railroad company for the kill- ing of live stock in collision with a train, where such stock strayed onto the right of way because of a defect in the railroad's right of way fence. Martin v. Chicago, B. In common parlance, the terms "heirs at within the ordinary and usual meaning of the not to be held ex vi termini to include an adopted heir. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S. W. 585, 589, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775 (citing Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S. W. 288, 94 Mo. A devise to the testator's "lawful heirs" should be construed as referring to those who see Class. The word "lawful" before the word "Children" are embraced within the term any child dying without issue of his body shall descend to the survivors of the chil- who take and hold as purchasers directly constituted heirs. Held, that the term "lawfrom testator. Smith v. Ellington-Guy Tim- | fully constituted heirs" was merely a tautober Co., 71 S. E. 445, 446, 155 N. C. 389. logical way of referring to his lawful heirs at his death; and that the grantee took a life estate, with remainder to those who should comprise the class known as the grantee's heirs at his death. Bradley v. Goff, 147 S. W. 1012, 1014, 243 Mo. 95. Under a will giving all the testator's land to his son for life with remainder to his "lawful heirs born of his wife," the son did not take a fee under the rule in Shelley's Case so as to give his widow a dower therein. The words "born of his wife," qualifying and explaining his "lawful heirs," confining the remainder to the children of his wife, and preventing the operation of the rule. The superadded words show that the devisor intended to make the words "lawful heirs" designatio personarum; that is, they show an intention on his part to limit the remainder over to a particular class of heirs. Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514. A testator gave his wife, for life, all of his estate, and provided that after her death it should go to his eldest daughter for life. He then declared that after the daughter's death such portion of his estate as might remain should be equally divided between his lawful heirs. Held, that the testator meant by the term "lawful heirs" those persons who at his death were entitled to inherit his intestate real estate. In re Cowley's Will, 97 N. W. 930, 931, 120 Wis. 263. LAWFUL ISSUE Testatrix adopted defendant in 1890, but, aside from recording of the deed, no public recognition of the relationship appears, testatrix having assumed no authority over defendant who continued to reside with her natural parents and other relatives until her marriage. In 1905 testatrix made a will giving defendant, who was designated "my young friend," $100. After various other dispositions, the will provided that the residue of the estate should go to testatrix's "lawful heirs," excepting specified nephews. 676. Held, that defendant is not entitled to share under the residuary clause. Warden V. Overman, 135 N. W. 649, 652, 155 Iowa, 1. Where a testator devises a parcel of real estate to his son for life with remainder to his lawful heirs, and the son marries after the death of the testator, held, that upon the death of the son, the wife takes as heir, where there is nothing in the will tending to show that the testator used the words "law ful heirs" in a different sense from their strict technical import. Miller v. Miller, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 451, 454. In a devise to the testator's grandson of a tract of land, and if he should die without "lawful heirs of his body" then to the testator's granddaughter, does not limit the estate of the grandson to a life estate where he had heirs of his body, but merely creates a conditional estate in the granddaughter by way of executory devise or shifting use. Sessoms v. Sessoms, 56 S. E. 687, 688, 144 N. C. 121 (citing Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284; Morrisett v. Stevens, 48 S. E. 661, 136 N. C. 160; Jones v. Ragsdale, 53 S. E. 842, 141 N. C. 200; Whitfield v. Garris, 42 S. E. 568, 131 N. C. 148, reaffirmed in 45 S. E. 904, 134 N. C. 24; criticising Bird v. Gilliam, 28 S. E. 489, 121 N. C. 328; Dawson v. Quinnerly, 24 S. E. 483, 118 N. C. 188; Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514). A grantor executed a deed to his son, granting the property to him during his natural life, and at his death, then to his lawfully See Die Without Lawful Issue Surviving. The term "lawful issue" is not a technical term, and when used in a deed does not necessarily bring the deed under the rule in Shelley's Case, like the word "heirs," which is always a technical word, necessarily bringing the deed under the rule regardless of intention. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 114 S. W. 673, As children born in wedlock After death of testator and probate of life, and on his death to his "lawful issue," his will, devising land in New York to B. for Acts Mich. 1881, p. 48, No. 55, and Laws N. Y. 1895, p. 313, c. 531, declaring that the subsequent marriage of the parents shall legitimatize their children previously born, B. had a lawful wife, M., by whom he had were passed. Prior to either act, and while children, he had children by another woman, S., and, after enactment of the Michigan act, he, in an action in that state in which jurisdiction was not acquired of M., a resident of New York, and on grounds not recognized by the laws of New York for divorce, obtained a decree of divorce; and thereafter in Michigan there was a marriage ceremony between him and S. Subsequently, in an action in New York by M. against B. for separation, there was a decree establishing the fact that M. was still the wife of B., notwithstanding the Michigan decree. Held, that B.'s children by S. were not entitled to take under the will. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 83 N. E. 569, 190 N. Y. 458, 128 Am. St. Rep. 585. Under the rule that, where statutes can Civ. reasonably be construed to avoid conflict, at law, and section 1387, providing that every illegitimate child is an heir to the person who, in writing signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his mother, and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock, will be held not to be in conflict in the case, where both the mother and child are illegitimate, on the ground that section 1387 makes the child the heir of his mother, while section 1388, taken alone, excludes him, but section 1387, which has to do solely with the right of illegitimates to inherit, will be construed as applicable only to inheritance by an illegitimate from a parent who is legitimate, or, for purposes of inheritance, the illegitimate child by reason of section 1387 is to be held to be within the terms "lawful issue," as that term is used in section 1388. In re De Cigaran's Estate, 89 Pac. 833, 835, 150 Cal. 682. Where the father of defendants at the time of their birth was the lawful husband of another woman than their mother, but thereafter, in Michigan, obtained a divorce legal in that state, though not in the state of New York, and married their mother thereby establishing their legitimacy in that state, under Act Mich. March 28, 1881 (Pub. Acts 1881, p. 48, No. 55), they are entitled in New York to take under a devise to "the lawful issue" of their father. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1019, 1020, 118 App. Div. 69. A will, dated and which took effect in 1872, gave property in trust for the testator's son, with remainder to his "lawful issue." The son was then married and had children. After the death of his then wife, he married the mother of certain illegitimate children. Laws 1895, c. 531, providing that illegitimate children whose parents had theretofore intermarried or should thereafter intermarry should thereby become legitimatized. Held, that the illegitimate children were not entitled to share in the remainder, since, while all children, whether legitimate or not, are the "issue" of their parents, that word, when qualified by the adjective "lawful," which is the antithesis of unlawful or illegitimate, is ordinarily understood to mean those only begotten and born in lawful wedlock, and it cannot be assumed that the testator considered the contingencies of the birth of illegitimate children, the enactment of a statute by which they might be legitimatized, and the marriage of their parents. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Skillin, 138 N. Y. Supp. 884, 886, 154 App. Div. 227. As descendants The words "lawful issue, if any, of the body," mean lineal descendants, taking by right of representation per stirpes. Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 72 Atl. 166, 169, 104 Me. 297. The primary meaning of "lawful issue” is descendants, and, in the absence of the use of the words in a will in another sense, it will be so construed. Under a residuary bequest to testator's stepmother and half-sister, in equal portions, and, in the event of either dying without issue, the share of the one so dying to the survivor, the stepmother dying before testator, he does not die intestate as to the share given, but there is an implied bequest of it to her issue. In re Disney's Will, 103 N. Y. Supp. 391, 392, 118 App. Div. 378 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238; Chwatal v. Schreiner, 43 N. E. 166, 148 N. Y. 683). Under a will, establishing a trust fund for the benefit of a daughter of the testatrix during her life, and directing that on her death the principal be paid to her then "lawful living issue," the term "lawful living issue" does not include an adopted daughter. In re Hopkins, 89 N. Y. Supp. 467, 468, 43 Misc. Rep. 464 (citing New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Where testator by will devised his property in trust for his wife, on her death to be divided among his lawful issue, and gave the same to the persons entitled to the other half of his residuary estate, and by a clause disposing of such half testator provided that it should go to the lawful issue of his children or to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita, it was the intent of the testator to limit the phrase "lawful issue" in the first clause to the lawful issue of his children, or Atl. 630, 633, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. Inglis v. McCook, 59 to his lawful issue. * * # "The words 'lawful issue,' when used in a domestic will, primarily and generally mean descendants. Where there is nothing to the contrary to be found in the context of the instrument, or in extraneous facts proper to be considered, that is the sense in which they are presumed to be used. The real question is whether the testatrix used them in that sense or in some other sense. In giving construction to the words used by the testatrix in a domestic will, we cannot assume, without the clearest evidence, that she used the words 'lawful issue' in the sense they might possibly bear under the laws of a foreign country in which she died." In re Tenney, 93 N. Y. Supp. 811, 818, 104 App. Div. 290 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 19, 20, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Testator's will directed that his estate be divided into as many parts as he had children, the income of each part to go to a child for life, and upon the child's death the part to be divided among the "lawful issue" |