tion and obtaining a monopoly of trade in their products, either complete or partial, is in violation of the federal Anti-Trust Law (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647), which makes unlawful every "combination in restraint of interstate or foreign trade and commerce," and also of Pub. Acts Mich. 1899, p. 409, No. 255, as supplemented by Pub. Acts Mich. 1905, p. 507, No. 329, prohibiting all combinations entered into for the purpose and with the intent of establishing and maintaining a "monopoly"; nor is such transaction relieved from its invalidity under the latter statute by Pub. Acts Mich. 1905, pp. 153, 154, No. 105, which authorizes mining corporations of the state to purchase and own stock in other similar corporations. Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 Fed. 869, 874.

there must be an intent by unlawful means to | purpose and intention of eliminating competiexclude others from the same traffic or business, or from acquiring by the same means property and material things. One of the purposes of Anti-Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, in making illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, is to maintain interstate commerce on the basis of free competition, and any contract, combination, or conspiracy, the purpose or direct effect of which is to restrict such free competition by way of transportation or otherwise, is in restraint of interstate commerce and unlawful. The fact that the several acts by which the purpose of a combination in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states is effected are, taken in isolation, lawful or intrastate in character, and not within the purview of Anti-Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, does not relieve the combination from illegality; but such acts must be viewed as elements of a whole and in the light of their purpose and effect in combination. United States v. Reading Co., 183 Fed. 427, 456.

A secret arrangement between two corporations, which together produced about 85 per cent. of all the licorice paste consumed in the United States and sold to consumers throughout the country, by which they ceased competition, fixed from time to time the prices at which each should sell, and apportioned the customers between them, and also by concerted action secured contracts with their chief, if not only competitors, which enabled them to control either the output of such competitors or the prices at which and the persons to whom they should sell, constitutes a virtual "monopoly" in the interstate distribution of the substance manufactured. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823, 834.

The combination of the stocks of the various corporations trading in petroleum and its products in the hands of a holding com

The generic character of the prohibitions of Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, against combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign trade or commerce, and monopolization or attempts to monopolize any part thereof, covers every conceivable act which can possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the condemnation of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts are clothed. The words "restraint of trade" in Anti-Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, condemning combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign trade or commerce, or the monopolization or attempts to monopolize any part thereof, should be given a meaning which will not destroy the in-pany, with the intent to exclude others from dividual right to contract, and render difficult, if not impossible, any movement of trade in the channels of commerce, the free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to protect. The standard of reason which had theretofore been applied at the common law and in the United States in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the prohibitions of Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, against combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign trade or commerce, or monopolization or attempts to monopolize any part thereof, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 31 Sup. Ct. 632, 648, 221 U. S. 106, 179-184, 55 L. Ed. 663.

The control by one mining corporation organized under the laws of Michigan of another similar corporation engaged in a competing business in interstate and foreign commerce by acquiring a majority of its stock, or in part by soliciting and obtaining proxies from other stockholders with the

the trade, and thus centralize in the combination the perpetual control of the movement of these commodities in the channels of interstate and foreign commerce, constitutes a violation of the prohibitions of Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, against combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce, or the monopolization or attempt to monopolize any part of such trade or commerce. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 516, 221 U. S. 1, 61, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734.

An indictment against operators of a cotton corner for alleged violation of the Sherman anti-trust law charged that defendants had conspired to monopolize a part of the trade and commerce among the several states by becoming members of and engaging in an unlawful combination in the form of an agreement by which they were severally to purchase cotton to such an extent that, together, they would have enough to enable them to control the price of such cotton, and severally to demand arbitrary, excessive, and monopolistic prices for the same on the sale

thereof by them respectively to spinners and manufacturers other than such conspirators. Held that, since no monopoly exists when individuals, each acting for himself, own large quantities of a commodity, the indictment was fatally defective as alleging only a scheme to demand monopolistic prices as the result of individual as distinguished from collective power. United States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664, 672.

A business device by which a considerable number of competing corporations are welded into a single corporate entity controlling from 90 to 95 per cent. of the commerce of the country in a particular branch required for the economical production of a necessity of mankind, as shoe machinery, is a monopoly, within the federal anti-trust act. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. La Chapelle, 99 N. E. 289, 290, 212 Mass. 467, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 715.

The term "months," when used in a statute, means calendar months, not lunar months, unless there is something in the statute which indicates that a contrary meaning was intended. Simmons v. Hanne, 39 South. 77, 79, 50 Fla. 267, 7 Ann. Cas. 322 (citing Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Buddington, 9 South. 246, 27 Fla. 215, 12 L. R. A. 770; Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 46); Bertwell v. Haines, 63 Pac. 702, 10 Okl. 469.

The word "month," whenever it occurs in the statute of this state, means a "calendar month," unless the contrary be particularly expressed. Kimball v. Lamson, 2 Vt. 138, 141.

Under Rev. St. 1878, § 2183, providing that a tenancy by sufferance may be terminated by the landlord giving "one month's notice" in writing to the tenant, requiring him to remove from the demised premises, a notice is sufficient where giving the proper number of days before the action is brought as contained in the calendar month in which it is given. Minard v. Burtis, 53 N. W. 509, 511, 83 Wis. 267.

An undue and unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce, forbidden by the act of July 2, 1890, results from the concerted scheme of railway carriers possessing a substantial monopoly of the transportation facilThe term "month" in a policy of life inities between the anthracite deposits in Penn-surance construed to mean a calendar month. sylvania and tide-water distributing points, Bohles v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, and also controlling, with the aid of their 83 Atl. 904, 905, 83 N. J. Law, 246. subsidiary coal-mining and selling companies, nearly three-fourths of the annual supply of anthracite, whereby a large number of the independent coal operators were induced to enter singly into uniform perpetual agree

ments for the sale to some one of such carriers, or its subsidiary coal company, of the entire output of their several mines and any

others they might thereafter acquire, at a fixed percentage of the general average price prevailing at tide-water points at or near New York, which would net the operator slightly more than if he shipped and sold on his own account, the necessary result being to secure to the carriers the control at tide-water markets of the sale of a large part of the independent output. United States v. Reading Co., 33 Sup. Ct. 90, 94, 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. Ed. 243.

MONTE

As banking game see Banking Game. "Monte" is a game kept by a dealer; that is, the dealer against all the bettors. Chancellor v. State, 107 S. W. 823, 824, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 464.

MONTH

See Calendar Month; Tenant from
Month to Month.

A month is a definite period of time, commencing on the 1st day thereof, and ending on the 28th, 29th, 30th, or 31st day. Derby v. Dancey, 36 South. 795, 796, 112 La. 891.

The word "month" in a contract to sell 4,000 tons of asphalt to be delivered on orders not exceeding 400 tons "in any one of each month for asphalt delivered during month" payments to be made on the 10th the preceding month meant calendar month. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. Southern Re

fining Co., 110 Pac. 951, 953, 158 Cal. 264.

When an act is required by statute to be performed within a certain number of months after a certain date, the word "months" will be construed to mean calendar months, whether of 28, 29, 30, or 31 days, and proceedings in error commenced on the corresponding day of the fourth month after the rendition of the judgment comply with the statute in this regard. Oehler v. Walsh, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 446, 447.

The term "months," in a constitutional provision providing that a vacancy in an office of any judge holding office by election shall be filled by appointment, the appointee to hold his office until the next general election for any state officer, held at least six months after the vacancy occurs, means calendar months. Foster v. State ex rel. Stanford, 43 South. 179, 180, 149 Ala. 632.

Under Laws 1892, p. 1490, c. 677, § 26, relating to the computation of "months," and negativing any right to include in such computation a day beyond the day in the last month so counted, having the same numerical order in the days of the month as the day from which the computation is made, and section 27 providing that a Sunday or public holiday must be excluded from

the reckoning if it is the last day of any such period, when a life insurance policy provides that no action can be maintained thereon after six months from the death of the insured, and such period expires on Sunday, an action commenced on the following Monday is barred by the express terms of the policy. Ryer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 77 N. E. 727, 185 N. Y. 6.

MONTHLY PAYMENTS

See In Monthly Payments as Due. MONTHLY SETTLEMENT

By a contract for services of plaintiff for five years in selling defendant's beer to certain customers, defendant agreed, on condition that such sales should not be less

than 30,000 barrels per annum, to pay plaintiff 12 cents per barrel so sold yearly during the term of the agreement, monthly settlements to be made. Held, that the words "monthly settlements" could not be construed to mean "monthly payments," thereby qualifying the provisions by which the promise to pay was conditioned on sales of a specified amount per annum, and payments were to be made yearly, and that nothing would become due until the expiration of a year, or at least until 30,000 barrels should have been sold. Gminder v. Zeltner Brewing Co., 111 N. Y. Supp. 215, 217, 126 App. Div. 776.

MONUMENT

See Suitable Monument.

counties having a population of over 500,000 and less than 1,000,000 to erect a building in memory of the soldiers and sailors in the War of the Rebellion from such counties; a memorial hall being in the nature of a "monument." Yoho v. Allegheny County, 67 Atl. 648, 649, 218 Pa. 401.

MONUMENTS (In Boundaries)

See Natural Monument; Permanent
Monument.

"Monuments" are permanent landmarks established for the purpose of indicating boundaries. Thompson v. Hill, 73 S. E. 640, 643, 137 Ga. 308.

Permanent objects, such as streams, or rivers, and the shore of a lake, or highways, or other lands, or buildings, or stakes, when

referred to in the description of property conveyed, are known as "monuments." Temple v. Benson, 100 N. E. 63, 213 Mass. 128.

A deed describing land as running along an unnavigable stream, or referring to it as it a "monument." the boundary, makes Drake v. Russian River Land Co., 103 Pac. 167, 170, 10 Cal. App. 654.

In the description in a deed of land, commencing 26 feet west of the southeast corner of a certain lot, "being the southwest corner of the portion of said lot, formerly owned by B., where she now resides," and running thence north 26 feet, thence west 26 feet, or to and intersecting "the northeast corner of a lot formerly owned by M.," and running thence south to Seventh street, and

Dutiable as dressed granite, see Dressed thence to place of beginning, said southwest Granite.

corner of land owned by B., and said northA testator, who sets apart a specified real "monuments," which are fixed and viseast corner of land owned by M., are not sum from his estate for funeral expenses and ible objects, within the rule that real monuproper interment of his remains and a suit-ments called for in the description of a deed able monument to his memory, and requests are ordinarily given precedence over disthat his remains be buried on a designated tances called for; it not appearing that such the disputed lines of description in the deed. corners are any more established than are Koch v. Gordon, 133 S. W. 609, 610, 231 Mo.

ranch, does not authorize the executors to

645.

The engineer making an original survey of a tract into lots, blocks, and streets set

use a part of the fund for the erection of a free library as a memorial; the word "monument" being used in its natural sense as meaning a shaft or any structure placed over a tomb or at a grave, and not in its applied sense as meaning a reminder taking stakes on the ground to indicate boundaries any form. In its applied sense, a monument, of lots. He made a resurvey from his origbeing a reminder, may take any form. Na-inal notes, and discovered a discrepancy be poleon's battles are monuments to his memory. Horace by his poetry "built himself a monument more enduring than brass"; and Sir Christopher Wren in his oft-quoted epitaph, "Si Monumentum Requiris Circumspice," declares St. Paul's cathedral his monument. Fancher v. Fancher, 103 Pac. 206, 207, 156 Cal. 13, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 944, 19

Ann. Cas. 1157.

Act April 3, 1903 (P. L. 136), amending Act May 22, 1895, authorizing the erection of soldiers' monuments, and reciting the title of such amended act in its own title, is a sufficient notice of a provision in the amended act allowing county commissioners in

tween the stakes and the field notes. In placing the stakes originally, he intended to place them in accordance with the notes and plat. One of the earliest purchasers found the stakes, and relied thereon. Oth ers accepted the stakes as marking the boundaries. An abutting street was improved with paving, gutters, curb, and parking in

accordance with the boundaries of the lots established by the stakes. Held, that the stakes constituted monuments on the ground controlling the field notes, and established the boundaries between property owners and were controlling on the city. Tomlinson v. Golden (Iowa) 138 N. W. 448, 450.

MOOR

MOORAGE

Wharfage synonymous, see Wharfage. MOOT CASE

A "moot case" is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy. Ex parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 702.

The fact that a suit may be a friendly one would not of necessity render it a "moot case," which is defined as one which seeks to determine an abstract question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights. State

v. First Catholic Church of Lincoln, 128 N. W. 657, 658, 88 Neb. 2.

"Moral certainty" is a probability sufficiently certain to justify action upon it. "Reasonable and moral certainty" may be said to be that degree of probability which exists with such strength as to justify human action upon it. Austin v. State, 64 S. E. 670, 6 Ga. App. 211.

Where a fact established by evidence is the only one that can reasonably exist under the circumstances, the truth is established to a "moral certainty," which is the highest degree of certainty obtainable in human affairs. Evidenciary circumstances relied on and essential to establish any necessary element in a criminal prosecution must, in order to be efficient, be shown to exist to the satisfaction of the jury with the same degree of certainty as the ultimate object of inquiry is required to be to warrant a finding in the affirmative. Schwantes v. State, 106 N. W.

237, 244, 127 Wis. 160.

A "mathematical demonstration" is whol

different from a "moral certainty." Evidence of demonstration relates to necessary

"A 'moot case' is one which seeks to de-ly termine an abstract question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights." "It is universally understood by the bench and bar

* that a moot case is one which seeks

truths, truths as to which the supposition of and cannot be true, but what is also absurd, the contrary involves, not merely what is not whereas moral evidence is the basis of conconvictions which these distinct and dissimtingent truth. It follows obviously that the ilar classes of evidence are capable of producing are necessarily of very different natures. In the one absolute certitude is the

to get a judgment on a pretended controversy when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy." Where a request is made of a public officer to perform an act under a statute, and he, although believing that the law requires its performance, refuses because of a doubt on the subject and because he wishes the question to be quickly and finally settled by the decision of a court, a proceeding brought by the state to compel such action on his part is not fictitious. State v. is of a nature of which the other does not Dolley, 108 Pac. 846, 847, 82 Kan. 533 (quot-admit. Bowman v. Little, 61 Atl. 1084, 1086, ing Adams v. Union Railroad Co., 42 Atl. 517, 21 R. I. 140, 44 L. R. A. 273; Ex parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 701).

MORAL

See Contrary to Good Morals. MORAL CERTAINTY

See To a Moral Certainty.

"Moral certainty" is that degree of proof which the law requires of moral evidence. Moral certainty is described as a state of impression produced by facts in which a reasonable mind feels a sort of coercion or necessity to act in accordance with it. It is also declared to be a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. People v. Lew Fook, 75 Pac. 188, 141 Cal. 548.

result, to which moral certainty, the highest
degree of assurance of which truths of the
latter class admit, is necessarily inferior.
Wills, Cir. Ev. 5.
full and complete assurance which admits of
Moral certainty is that
without doubt upon the conclusions to which
no degrees, and induces a sound mind to act
it naturally and reasonably leads. 2 Stew-
art's Elements, c. 2, § 4. It is apparent, then,
that the precision attainable in the one case

101 Md. 273.

The term "moral certainty," as applied to the evidence in a criminal case, has the same meaning as "reasonable doubt." State v. Martin, 74 Pac. 725, 728, 29 Mont. 273; State v. Wappenstein, 121 Pac. 989, 998, 67 Wash. 502; Stewart v. State, 115 S. W. 374, 375, 88 Ark. 602 (citing Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Jones v. State, 14 South. 772, 100 Ala. 88; Woodruff v. State, 12 South. 653, 31 Fla. 320; Carlton v. People, 37 N. E. 244, 150 Ill. 181, 41 Am. St. Rep. 346); Norman v. State, 74 S. E. 428, 10 Ga. App. 802. See, also, People v. Buettner, 84 N. E. 218, 220, 233 III. 272, 13 Ann. Cas. 235.

"Reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" may be used interchangeably. The writers of legal dictionaries define "moral certainty" to mean that degree of certainty which will justify a jury in grounding upon

it their verdict. Bouvier defines the term to St. Rep. 329 (quoting and adopting definition mean: "Certainty that convinces and directs in Adams, Eq. [8th Ed.] 98). the understanding, and satisfies the reason MORAL HAZARD and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as follows: "In the law of criminal evidence that degree of assurance which induces a man of sound mind to act without doubt upon the conclusion to which it leads. Hendrix v. United States, 101 Pac. 125, 129, 2 Okl. Cr. 240.