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United States is entitled to priority, insolCode Civ. Proc. $ 390, provides that, vency laws are “laws of tbe states," although where a cause of action not involving real their operation is suspended by the bankestate within the state accrues against a non- ruptcy act. In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673, 687, resident, an action cannot be brought there- 82 C. C. A, 531 (citing In re Wright, 95 Fed. on in the state after the expiration of the 807). time limited by the “law of his residence"

The phrase "laws of the states," as used for bringing a like action. Held, that the in Bankr. Act July 1898, providing for the phrase "law of his residence” means the law payment of debts owing to any person who, of the debtor's residence at the time the by the “laws of the states," or the United cause of action accrued, and not the time States, is entitled to priority, means that when the action was commenced. Utah Nat. the priorities must be determined by the laws Bank v. Jones, 96 N. Y. Supp. 338, 339, 109 of the particular state where the proceeding App. Div. 526.

is pending, and not by the laws of all the

states together. In re P. J. Potter's Sons, LAW OF THE LAND

143 Fed. 407, 411. See Due Process of Law.

A county ordinance regulating sheep LAW OF NECESSITY

grazing, and imposing a license tax thereon The “law of necessity," as applied to the “is a law of this state” within Pen. Code, s power to punish for contempt, is the law of 435, providing that every person commencing self-defense. People ex rel. Attorney Gen- or carrying on any business for which a lieral v. News-Times Pub. Co., 84 Pac. 912, cense is required by any “law of this state,” 967, 35 Colo. 253 (adopting definition in without taking out or procuring the license Thomas, Constructive Contempt).

prescribed, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Plu

mas County v. Wheeler, 87 Pac. 909, 913, 149 LAW OF THE ROAD

Cal. 758; Sierra County v. Flanigan, 87 Pac. The custom of the road, and the law 913, 149 Cal. 769 (citing In re Lawrence, 11 founded on it, to go to the right of the cen- Pac. 217, 69 Cal. 608). ter of the road in order to safely pass Municipal ordinances are "laws of the governs the case of vehicles passing on the state," within the provisions of Pen. Code, same side of the roads and streets so wide § 435, making it a misdemeanor for a perthat there is no necessity for them to turn son to carry on any calling for the transacto the right of the center line in order to tion of which a license is required by any pass safely. Wright v. Fleischman, 85 N. law of the state, without taking out or proY. Supp. 62, 41 Misc. Rep. 533.

curing the prescribed license. Ex parte

Sweetman, 90 Pac. 1069, 1070, 5 Cal. App. LAW OF THE STATE

577; Ex parte Bagshaw, 93 Pac. 864, 865, 152 The "laws of a state" are such enact- Cal. 701. ments as its Legislature promulgates, and as expounded by its courts, and a state stat- LAW STUDENT ute has such meaning as the judicial depart

See Student. ment of the state construes it to have, though without such judicial construction the fed- LAW OF THE UNITED STATES eral courts might from its language construe

Congressional enactments having generit differently. Commonwealth v. Interna

al application throughout the United States, tional Harvester Co. of America, 115 S. W. and not the purely local laws of the District 703, 706, 131 Ky. 551, 133 Am. St. Rep. 256; of Columbia, are what are meant by the American Tobacco Co. V. Commonwealth

provision of the Federal Judicial Code, & (Ky.) 115 S. W. 755, 756.

250, for the appellate review in the Federal A provision in a note that the same shall Supreme Court of judgments and decrees of be construed by the “laws of the state" of the court of appeals of the District in cases Kansas means the statute of the state with in which the construction of many law of reference to negotiable instrument and the the United States" is drawn in question by rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, the defendant. American Security & Trust and does not comprehend the decisions of Co. v. Commissioners of District of Colum. local courts construing like contracts that bia, 32 Sup. Ct. 553, 554, 224 U. S. 491, 56 had been or might thereafter be announced, L. Ed. 856. nor can it be expended so as to make the de

The phrase, “laws of the United States," cisions of the local courts the governing law as used in the removal acts, authorizing rewith respect to the construction of the pro-moval of a cause arising under the laws of visions of the mortgage given to secure such the United States, means acts of Congress, note. Keene Five Cent Sav. Bank v. Reid, and does not include executive rules and reg123 Fed. 221, 227, 59 C. C. A. 225.

ulations, unless a recovery of damages is Within the provision of Bankr. Act, ß expressly authorized by statute for a disre 64b(5), giving priority to debts owing to any gard of such regulations. Beck v. Johnson, person who by the laws of the state or the 169 Fed. 154, 162.

The laws enacted by a territorial Legis- (1015, 1019, 177 Mo. 699 (quoting with aplature, subject to disapproval by Congress, proval from State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 367, are not "laws of the United States," and a 16 S. W. 830, 105 Mo. 204). suit arising under them, as where a corporation organized under them is a party to the LAWFUL ACT suit, does not arise under the laws of the

The words "lawful act," as used in Pen. United States, and a federal court has no Code 1895, 8 684, providing that if any perjurisdiction on that ground. Maxwell v.

son in the performance of a lawful act shall Federal Gold & Copper Co., 155 Fed. 110, 112, by negligence and carelessness cause the 83 C. C. A. 570.

death of another he is guilty of negligent

homicide of the first degree, is defined by LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

article 685 as an act not forbidden by the GOVERNING THE SOCIETY

penal law, and which would give no just A certificate in a mutual benefit associa-occasion for a civil action. Gorden v. State tion, requiring that members should comply (Tex.) 90 S. W. 636, 637. with all “laws, rules, and regulations governing the society," or that might be thereafter LAWFUL AUTHORITY enacted for its government, related to bylaws enacted to control the internal manage

See Proper and Lawful Authority. ment of the association, and did not include Plaintiff's superintendent visited the a by-law by which the society attempted to land on which defendants were claimed to limit its liability on all outstanding certif- have committed a trespass in cutting timber, icates to an amount not exceeding one-half of and on each of the visits stopped at defendthe amount the association had contracted ants' camp. On his first visit the superinto pay on the death of members in good tendent pointed out the section or lot lines standing. Bornstein v. District Grand Lodge to the foreman of defendant company and No. 4 Independent Order B'nai B'rith, 84 requested him to keep an accurate account Pac. 271-275, 2 Cal. App. 624.

of all timber he might cut. A like request

was made of defendant S., who was presiLAWFUL

dent and general manager of defendant comSee Shall be Lawful.

pany. Held, sufficient to show that plaintiff See, also, Legal.

acquiesced in the cutting and removing of the Where plaintiffs alleged that, being the timber, subject to defendants' accounting for owners of certain capital stock in defendant its actual value, and that it was not cut company, they deposited it with the com- without "lawful authority," within Rem. & pany, to be sold by defendant and the pro- Bal. Code, $ 939, authorizing a recovery of ceeds used in paying its debts, in considera- treble damages for the cutting of timber tion of an agreement that plaintiff's should without lawful authority, etc. Lytle Loghold certain offices of defendant until its ging & Mercantile Co. v. Humptulips Driving business should be in successful operation, Co., 111 Pac. 774, 775, 60 Wash. 559. that defendant violated its agreement and ejected plaintiffs from the offices, and had

LAWFUL BENEFICIARY sold and issued the stock to others, and The word “lawful," as used in a benefit refused and failed to deliver it to plaintiffs, certificate, providing that the beneficial asor to pay plaintiffs the value thereof, though sociation would pay to the beneficiary a cerrequested to do so, there could be no recor- tain sum of money, provided he was the ery as on a contract, as the alleged contract “lawful” beneficiary of the member at the was illegal under Civ. Code, $ 431, requiring time of his death, means, according to the directors of a corporation to be elected an- laws of the beneficial association, that plainnually by the stockholders or members, and tiff should be at the time of the member's section 2240, declaring that which is con- death within the order of family relationtrary to an express provision of the law ship to the beneficiary mentioned in the charnot "lawful.” Glass v. Basin & Bay State ter. Davin v. Davin, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1012, Min. Co., 77 Pac. 302, 304, 31 Mont. 21.

1014, 114 App. Div. 396. Legal, adequate, and reasonable syn

LAWFUL BUSINESS onymous In speaking of the provocation neces

In Business Corporations Law, $ 2, ausary to arouse the heat of passion, which thorizing the formation of stock corporations would result in reducing the crime to man- for any lawful business, “lawful business" slaughter, “this court has held that “lawful,' means one lawful to all who engage in it and ‘legal,' 'adequate,' and 'reasonable,' when does not include the business of practicing used as adjectives qualifying 'provocation,' law; the right to practice law being in the are synonyms; and, as a general rule, with nature of a franchise from the state confervery few exceptions, it takes an assault or red only for merit. In re Co-operative Law personal violence to constitute this provoca- Co., 92 N. E. 15, 16, 198 N. Y. 479, 32 L. R. A. tion." State v. Heath, 121 S. W. 149, 154, (N. S.) 55, 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 19 Ann. Cas. 221 Mo. 565; State v. McKenzie, 76 S. W.879.


being sufficiently broad to include gold and Where the punishment inflicted by a par- silver, as well as paper money. Brittain v. ent on a child is so excessive and cruel as State, 105 S. W. 817, 819, 820, 52 Tex. Cr. R. to show that the parent was not acting in 169. good faith for the benefit of the child, the Under a statute providing that in an inparent is guilty of an unlawful assault, and dictment for the larceny of money it is sufcannot justify his act by claiming that the ticient to allege the larceny of the same, withpunishment inflicted was a "lawful chastise-out specifying the denomination or kind therement"; but so long as a parent acts in good of, an indictment, charging accused with stealfaith, honestly thinking that what he does is ing money “lawful currency of the realm" for the benefit of the child, he is within his (i. e., of the United States), to the amount prerogative, and the law will not interfere. and value of $20 or more, sufficiently deState v. Koonse, 101 S. W. 139, 141, 123 Mo. scribes the money, to constitute larceny, App. 655.

within Ky. St. 1903, § 1194, punishing lar

ceny of money of the value of $20 or more. LAWFUL CHILD

Todd v. Com. (Ky.) 93 S. W. 631, 632 (citing Where a will provided that the property Commonwealth v. Mann (Ky.) 14 S. W. 685 ; given to one of the devisees should, if he Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush [76 Ky.] died without lawful children, go to the heirs 356; Travis v. Commonwealth, 27 S. W. 863, of another devisee, an adopted child of the 96 Ky. 77). devisee first mentioned was not a "lawful child," within the meaning of the will. Coch- Where a theft is charged, and the alleran v. Cochran, 95 S. W. 731, 732, 43 Tex. gation is general that the money taken was Civ. App. 259.

lawful current money of the United States,

the evidence must show that it was legal LAWFUL CLAIM

tender coin or legal tender currency of the A good faith claim, appearing to be for- United States, and the nickel is legal tender midable and founded on grounds having the under the provisions of U. S. Comp. St. 1901, appearance, though false, of a paramount p. 2349. Black v. State, 79 S. W. 311, 46 title, is not covered by a warranty against Tex. Cr. R. 107. lawful claims, but such a warranty is intended to cover real claims and not claims LAWFUL DEBT only appearing real. An outstanding legal A 'debt' is defined as 'that which is due title is within a covenant of warranty against from one person to another, whether money, “lawful claims,” and if asserted, is a “law- goods, or services; that which one person ful claim," though an eviction may be avoid is bound to pay to or to perform for another, ed by showing a superior equity. Mackenzie that which one is obliged to do, or suffer.' v. Clement, 129 S. W. 730, 731, 144 Mo. App. Plaintiff's husband gave his bond for the pay114.

ment of money, secured by a mortgage on

his farm, in which plaintiff joined. The LAWFUL COURSE

husband died, devising the farm to plaintiff, A bond recited that plaintiff lumber and who deeded it to her son, who assumed and oil company had a claim on certain timber agreed to pay the mortgage, but failed to in litigation which had been attached in a do so.' On the death of the son, without iscertain suit against the S. Lumber Company, sue, his widow, having a dower in trust in and provided that in consideration of the re- the farm, executed a quitclaim deed of it to lease of the attachments, and that plaintiff plaintiff and the other heirs, subject to dewould not litigate its rights in such suit, the cedent's "lawful debts," which plaintiff asobligors bound themselves to pay any inter- sumed and agreed to pay. Held that, since est which plaintiff might have in the timber plaintiff did not sign the bond and was not to be determined by any lawful course. personally liable for the mortgage debt, the Held that a lawful course for determining covenant of her son to pay it was not enplaintiff's interest was by suit on the bond; forceable against him, and hence the coveplaintiff not being required to establish first nant in the deed from his widow to plaintiff its interest in the timber by suit against the did not obligate plaintiff to pay the debt; a S. Lumber Company. Camp v. Capital Min. claim not enforceable at law not being a ing, Lumber & Oil Co. (Ky.) 128 S. W. 323, "lawful debt.” Bonhoff v. Wiehorst, 108 N. 324.

Y. Supp. 437, 441, 57 Misc. Rep. 456 (quoting

and adopting definition in Imp. Dict.; citing LAWFUL CURRENCY

Latimer v. Veader, 46 N. Y. Supp. 823, 20 See Lawful Money.

App. Div. 426). An indictment charging theft from the person of “two dollars in money, lawful cur

LAWFUL DEFENSE rency of the United States of America and By the words "lawful defense of the perof the value of two dollars,” was sustained son” is meant what is sometimes termed by proof of the theft of two dollars in silver; self-defense. Robinson v. Territory, 85 Pac. the term "currency," or "lawful currency," 451, 455, 16 Okl. 241.


LAWFUL FENCE In Rev. St. § 5451, which makes it a See, also, Legal and Sufficient Fence. criminal offense to give or offer bribes, etc., A fence, posts of which are rotted off, is to induce any officer of, or person acting for not a lawful fence within Rev. St. 1899, 8 or on behalf of, the United States in any offi- 3295, providing that in a county where swine cial function to do or omit to do any act in are restrained from running at large a fence violation of his lawful duty, the phrase "law- composed of three barbed wires, stretched ful duty" is not restricted to a duty imposed on posts, firmly set in the ground, not more by statute, but is broad enough to cover a than 16 feet apart, shall be a lawful fence. duty imposed by a lawful superior; and an Smith v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 105 S. W. 10, indictment charging a conspiracy to induce 12, 127 Mo. App. 160. an assistant statistician in the Department

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 1105, requiring of Agriculture to furnish to the accused ad

a railroad company to construct and main. vance news of crop conditions, and to cause tain fences sufficient to prevent stock getting to be published false reports as to such con

on the track, an instruction, in an action ditions in violation of the rules of the depart under such section for injuries to stock, ment, to aid defendants in market specula- which defined a lawful fence as one sufficient tions, by promising such employé a percent. "to resist horses, cattle, swine, and like age of the profits of such speculations, charg. stock,” was not erroneous for using the es a conspiracy to commit an offense against phrase "to resist”; such phrase not being as the United States under Rev. St. $ 5440. strong as the phrase "to prevent” in the United States v. Haas, 163 Fed. 908, 910.

statute. Hax v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co., Regulations of the Agricultural Depart- 100 S. W. 693, 695, 123 Mo. App. 172. ment having forbidden the giving out of any

Rev. St. 1899, § 3295, providing for the statement relating to the business of the de construction of fences sufficient to prevent partment without the approval of the chief swine from running at large, composed of of the bureau, and secrecy having been im- wire 4 feet high and posts 16 feet apart, reposed on all employés by the established us- ferred to outside fences other than those reage and practice, indictments charging bri- quired of railroads, so that a fence conformbery of an associate statistician of the Bureau ing to such specifications, constructed by an of Statistics of the Department of Agricul- adjoining landowner along a railroad right ture to divulge the contents of the current of way, did not constitute a "lawful fence," cotton crop report in advance of its official for the building of which the landowner publication stated an offense under Rev. St. could recover from the railroad under Rev. $ 5451, making it a crime to bribe any per- St. 1899, § 1105 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 945). Sharp son acting for the United States in any offi- v. Quincy, o. & K. C. Ry. Co., 123 8. W. cial function to do or commit any act in vio- 507, 508, 139 Mo. App. 525. lation of his lawful duty. Haas v. Henkel,

The petition in an action for damages to 166 Fed. 621, 627.

growing crops from trespassing stock alleged

that the premises were situated in a subdiviLAWFUL ENTRY

sion where hogs, etc., were prohibited from The expression that the "entry must be running at large, and were inclosed by a law. lawful" means, not that it must have been ful fence under the statute when the treseffected under a formal right capable of en- passes occurred, and described the stock law forcement by legal proceedings, but that it district by metes and bounds, and further almust not be through any unlawful or wrong-leged that, in the event that plaintiff's fence ful act, upon which the mortgagee would be was not in strict compliance with the statute, estopped to found a right. Stouffer v. Har- nevertheless it was sufficient to keep out all lan, 74 Pac. 610, 613, 68 Kan. 135, 64 L. R. stock sought to be excluded of an ordinary A. 320, 104 Am. St. Rep. 396.

disposition, and not of a fence-breaking na

ture. Held, that the petition alleged a comLAWFUL EXCUSE

mon-law liability based on the stock owner's That provision for alimony made by a negligence in knowingly permitting vicious Nevada court is not enforceable against the animals to run at large, as well as the statuhusband, a resident of California, because no tory liability based upon plaintiff's mainjurisdiction of his person was acquired, does tenance of a “lawful fence,” within the stat

ute. Posey v. Coleman (Tex.) 133 S. W. 937, not constitute a lawful excuse within Pen.

939. Code, g 270, which makes it an offense for a parent to willfully omit without lawful ex- quires every farmer, etc., to make a sufficient

Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 2496, recuse to furnish necessary food, etc., for his fence at least five feet high, which shall be child. Ex parte McMullin, 126 Pac. 368, 370, hog-tight, around his cleared land. Article 19 Cal. App. 481.

2497 permits one injured by the trespass of fence and the damages, and, if it appears that descriptive of the whole line of lawful heirs.
the fence was sufficient, the owner of the Reilly v. Bristow, 66 Atl. 262, 264, 105 Md.
stock shall be liable for the damages. Article 326.
2498 authorizes the impounding of trespass-

cattle or other stock to complain to a justice LAW EXPENSES

of the peace, who shall appoint two freeOther lawful expenses, see Other. holders to ascertain the sufficiency of the

The word “lawful,” qualifying the word

ing stock for a second offense when the owner "heirs," is not sufficient per se to show an

of the premises deems it necessary for his intention not to use the word "heirs" in its

protection. . Article 2499 exempts the stock ordinary legal sense as a word of inheritance

owner from liability if the fence be insuf- or of limitation. Wool v. Fleetwood, 48

ficient. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4998, s. E. 785, 789, 136 N. C. 460, 67 L. R. A. 444.
as amended by Acts 1901, c. 123, provides
that any fence in a locality which has stat-

The words "lawful heirs," as used in a

utory restrictions upon the running at large will whereby the testator bequeathed his

of stock which is sufficient to keep out or residuary estate to his lawful heirs, without

dinary stock permitted to run at large under other or further designation as to who are in-

the chapter shall be deemed a lawful fence, tended as his beneficiaries, and directed that

and requires all such fences to be four feet the same should be equally divided among

high. Held, that the statutes were enacted to his lawful heirs, share and share alike, de-

give lanaowners complying with their re- scribed all the persons who, at the time of

quirements as to fences a special remedy for the death of the testator, answered the de-

damages by trespassing stock, irrespective scription of lawful heirs and were entitled

of negligence. Posey v. Coleman (Tex.) 133 to share in the residuary estate, regardless

S. W. 937, 939.

of the degree of their relationship to the tes-

Under Code Civ. Proc. c. 44, providing in order to determine who were the legal

tator, and resort must be had to the statute

that a corral fence exclusively for the pur- heirs of the testator. Mooney v. Purpus, 70

pose of inclosing stacks, if outside of any N. E. 894, 895, 70 Ohio St. 57.

lawful inclosure, shall be sufficient and law-

ful if it is not less than 15 feet distant from In construing a will using the words

the stacks, is substantially built with posts "legal heirs” and “lawful heirs," the words

not more than 8 feet distant from each other "legal” and “lawful” do not modify or change

and with not less than 5 strands of barbed the legal effect of the word "heirs." Stisser

fence wire and not less than 5 feet high, and v. Stisser, 85 N. E. 240, 242, 235 III. 207.

that any other kind of fence which is as

In common parlance, the terms "heirs at

effective for the purpose of a fence as that law” and “lawful heirs" are used indiscrim-

above prescribed is lawful and sufficient, a inately as synonymous and convertible terms,

fence the posts of which were 17 or 18 feet and, whenever either is used, they invariably

apart, which approached the stacks in places refer to the heirs on whom descent is cast by

within 6 feet, consisted of but 4 strands of law, and not to an heir by adoption. The

barbed wire, and was only 46 inches high, relation of an heir by adoption is an excep-

was not a "lawful fence.” Johnson v. Rick- tional and unusual one, and does not come

ford, 122 N. W. 386, 389, 18 N. D. 268.

within the ordinary and usual meaning of the

Rev. St. 1899, § 1973, defining a lawful words "lawful heirs,'' and those words ought

fence, and providing that unless the fence not to be held ex vi termini to include an

comes up to the requirements any person adopted heir. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S. W.

may have a right of action for damages re- 585, 589, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117,

sulting from injuries to his live stock from 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775 (citing

such illegal fence, refers to what is termed a Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S. W. 288, 94 Mo.

“lawful inclosure," and does not create a 338).

liability on the railroad company for the kill-
ing of live stock in collision with a train,

A devise to the testator's "lawful heirs"

where such stock strayed onto the right of should be construed as referring to those who

way because of a defect in the railroad's are such at the testator's death, unless a dif-

right of way fence. Martin v. Chicago, B. ferent intent is plainly manifested by the

& Q. Ry. Co., 89 Pac. 1025, 15 Wyo. 493.

will. Hill v. Hill, 132 N. W. 738, 739, 90

Neb. 43, 38 L. R. A. (N. S., 198.


A devise of land to testator's children,

See Personal and Lawful Heir.

Devise to lawful heirs as devise to class, subject to the provision that the share of

any child dying without issue of his body

see Class.

shall descend to the survivors of the chil.
The word “lawful" before the word dren, or the lawful heirs surviving any of
"heir" in a devise does not, in the absence of the children, gives to the children an estate
a contrary intent clearly indicated in the in fee, defeasible as to each on his dying
will, mean “legitimate," but means simply without leaving lawful issue, and on the
the person designated by law to take by de death of a child, without issue surviving, his
scent. Harrell v. Hagan, 60 S. E. 909–911, interest passes to the surviving children or
147 N. C. 111, 125 Am. St. Rep. 539.

grandchildren surviving any of the children;
"Children" are embraced within the term the words “lawful heirs” meaning surviving
"lawful heirs,” but the word is not per se children and grandchildren of the devisees,

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