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82 Neb. 140.

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branch ditch, drain or water course neces- such dependent relation is not established by sary to secure the object of the improvement, the fact that it seeks the connection at one whether the same is mentioned therein or of its terminals. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. R. not," the word "lateral" does not qualify the v. United States, 195 Fed. 962, 965. words "branch ditch, drain or water course," An interurban electric railway for pasand therefore, under a petition to improve a ditch extending in a southerly direction, it is sengers and some freight, running under proper to order the construction of a branch state charter between points in the state ditch commencing half a mile northeast of through the middle of a diamond-shaped the starting point of the main ditch and in-area inclosed by two steam railways, and in tersecting the main ditch about a hundred its general course parallel to and more or less feet from its starting point. Omaha & N. P. competing with the steam roads, and workR. Co. v. Sarpy County, 117 N. W. 116, 117, ing on a different plan, is not a "lateral branch line of railroad," within the meaning of the act to regulate commerce of February 4, 1887, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, requiring carriers subject to the act to establish switch connections with such lines on certain conditions, and permitting owners of such lines as well as shippers to make complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission in case of the carrier's failure upon written application, and authorizing such commission to hear, investigate, and determine whether such conditions exist, and to make an order directing the carrier to comply with the act. United States v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 33 Sup. Ct. 5, 6, 226 U. S. 14, 57 L. Ed. 104.

Sess. Laws 1905, c. 140, p. 254, § 1, requiring a "lateral passageway of at least 900 feet" between all fish traps, means that every trap must be so located that there shall be no other trap within a distance of 900 feet laterally therefrom; and a trap was not properly located where a parallelogram, formed by lines 900 feet long, projected at right angles to the ends of the trap and lines connecting the same drawn parallel to the course of the trap 900 feet on either side thereof, intersected traps previously located, though the trap in question did not intersect similar parallelograms of the prior traps. Johansen v. Mulligan, 83 Pac. 417, 418, 41 Wash. 379.

LATERAL RAILROAD

“A ‘lateral road' is one proceeding from some point on the main trunk between its termini." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Waters. 66 Atl. 685, 688, 105 Md. 396, 12 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 326 (quoting and adopting definition in Newhall v. Galena & C. U. R. Co., 14 Ill. 273).

Laws 1869, p. 2399, c. 917, §§ 3, 4, under which plaintiff railroad company was organized by the consolidation of the N. and H. Railroad Companies, provide that the consolidation shall not release the new corporation from any of the restrictions of duties of the several corporations. Laws 1846, p. 272, c. 216, creating the H. Company, authorized it to construct a single, double, or treble track road between New York and Albany, and section 1 further authorized it to conWithin the meaning of section 1 of the struct the branches for depot and station Interstate Commerce Act (Act Feb. 4, 1887. accommodations needed for its business. c. 104, 24 Stat. 379), as amended by Act June Plaintiff seeks to condemn land for 35 miles 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, which pro- of track from its general depot in New York vides that "any common carrier subject to City for an "additional main track," and to the provisions of this act upon application afford a more expeditious means of handling of any lateral branch line of railroad traffic. Held, that the charter contemplated * * shall construct, maintain and op- such tracks as would accommodate the depot erate upon reasonable terms, a switch con- conditions for a treble-track railroad, and nection with any such lateral branch line of the purposes of the desired track in question railroad," etc., and further providing (as came within the spirit of the additional charamended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7. ter power to construct branches for station 36 Stat. 545) that, if it fails to make such accommodation needed for railroad business, connection on application, the Interstate though it already had treble tracks over the Commerce Commission may, on complaint same distance. So it is true that a "lateral and after a hearing, order it done, whether or branch railroad" usually contemplates one a road is or is not a “lateral branch line of running from some point on the main line, railroad," and entitled to invoke the powers intended as a connecting line or feeder, to of the commission, depends on the relation which it bears to the line with which switch quote the American & English Encyclopedia connection is asked, and not upon its relation of Law (volume 18, p. 561); but in the presto the shippers or territory. It is such a later-ent case the statute itself defines the branch al branch when it is tributary to and depend- or branches to be constructed, and these are ent on the other line for an outlet, or in other words is essentially a feeder, but not when it is in effect an independent and competing line, although it does not compete as to a portion of the territory involved, and

"for depot and station accommodations, as may be required for the business of said railroad." New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Untermyer, 117 N. Y. Supp. 443, 446, 133 App. Div. 146.

A "lateral railroad" built under the lateral railroad law (Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §§ 5398-5404) is governed by the general railroad laws so far as applicable, and is subject to governmental regulation. A railroad, to be built by a stone company, is not deprived of its character as a lateral railroad within the lateral railroad law (Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §§ 5398-5404), because it is to connect with a lateral road already existing, where the two roads together do not exceed the length fixed by the statutes and will be used as one road. Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 94 N. E. 406, 409, 175 Ind. 319, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646.

The right given to a railroad company chartered to construct a railroad from the city of Baltimore to the Ohio river, to construct "lateral railroads," in any direction whatever, in connection with such railroad, is not, in the absence of anything in the charter to that effect, limited to construction of branches which will be feeders for the port of Baltimore, but authorizes the construction of a branch from the main line to connect with another branch, so as to take around the city of Baltimore freight going in either direction, and not intended for that city. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Waters, 66 Atl. 685, 688, 105 Md. 396, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326.

LATERAL SUPPORT

The right of "lateral support" extends no further than to avoid negligence as to land incumbered with buildings. Sharpless v. Boldt, 67 Atl. 652, 653, 218 Pa. 372.

LAUNCH

Learned in the Law; Liability Creat-
ed by Law; Limited by Law; Local
Law; Matter of Law; Mistake of
Law; Municipal Law; Operation of
Law; Ordinary Course of Law; Or
ganic Law; Penal Laws; Practice
(In Law); Practice of Law; Prescrib-
ed by Law or Ordinance; Presump-
tion of Law; Previously Ascertained
by Law; Provided by Law; Provisions
of Law; Remedial Law; Retrospective
Law; Returnable According to Law;
Revenue Law; Seisin in Law; Session
Laws; Special Law; Specially Prescrib-
ed by Law; Statute; Stock Law; Sub-
stantive Law; Surrender by Operation
of Law; Trial at Law; Under the
Laws; Uniform Operation of Laws.
As regulation, see Regulation.

Ex post facto law, see Ex Post Facto.
Law of necessity, see Police Power.
Otherwise provided by law, see Other-
wise.

Prohibited by law, or otherwise, see Oth-
erwise.

Remedy at law, see Remedy.
Similar law, see Similar.

See, also, Act (In Legislation).

"Law," according to an ancient maxim, "is good sense, and what is contrary to good sense is not good law." Burke v. State, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1099, 64 Misc. Rep. 558.

"Law" is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power, says Blackstone. It can never properly be a law, unless notified to those who are to obey it. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 98 S. W. 178, 185, 117 Tenn. 263, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 282, 119 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 10 Ann. Cas. 829 (citing Green

As rigging and apparel, see Ships' Rig- Bag, Oct. 1906). ging and Apparel.

LAUNDRY

See Occupied as a Steam Laundry.

LAUREL

See Japanese Laurel,

LAW

"Law" might be defined as the aggregate of those rules and principles of conduct promulgated by legislative authority or established by local custom, and our laws are the resultant derived from a combination of the divine or moral laws, the laws of nature and human experience, as such resultant has been evolved by human intellect influenced by the virtues of the ages. State v. Central Lumber Co., 123 N. W. 504, 508, 24 S. D. 136, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804.

"Law" is defined to be a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Common

See At Law and in Equity; Attorney at Law; Authorized by Law; Business Required by Law; By-Law; Color of Law;

Law;

The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by legislative authority long-established local Henry

Commercial Law; Conclusion of Law; Conflict with General Law; Contrary to Law; Court of Law; Criminal Law; Custody of the Law; Decision Against customs having the force of law. Law; Due Course of Law; Due Prov. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 105, 30 R. I.

or

cess of Law; Election Law; English 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. Law; Equal Protection of Law; Er- 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006. ror of Law; Existing Law; General "Legislative power," within Const. art. Law; Ignorance of Law; Insurance 4, § 1 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 175), providing that Law; Intestate Laws; Issue at Law; the legislative power shall be vested in the Issue of Law; Knowledge of the Law; General Assembly, is the power to make laws; 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-3

616.

right, for in such case the mistake is really one of fact. Marshall v. Lane, 27 App. D. C. 276, 280.

a "law" is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state; a "rule" is distinguished from whim, caprice, compact, agreement, or discretion, and "prescribed" To have the force of "law," a rule must means that the rule shall be manifested and possess the quality of uniformity and unipublished, so as to be known as a rule of civ-versality and must operate upon all improveil conduct. Merchants' Exchange of St. ments of the entire political community afLouis v. Knott, 111 S. W. 565, 571, 212 Mo. fected by it alike. "Laws" are not like garments which citizen and judge may put on and off at will. A law for a section of the state is not a law of the land, and modification of the common law to meet the conditions and wants of individuals in localities would not constitute modifications to meet the conditions and wants of the people. Nothing less than the welfare of the whole people can be considered, and the sovereignty of society at large must be behind the adoption and enforcement of any rule or it is not law. Clark v. Allaman, 80 Pac. 571, 580, 71 Kan. 206, 70 L. R. A. 971 (citing 1 Black. Com. 45).

"Law" is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power. In the language of Mr. Webster in his famous definition: "It is the general law, the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry to render judgment after trial so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." It is not every act of legislation in form that is law. Jamison v. Wimbish, 130 Fed. 351, 358 (quoting Hurtado v. People of California, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 110 U. S. 535, 28 L. Ed. 232).

The phrase, “which may by law be

brought before him," used in a statute defining the offense of bribery, and making it a material element thereof that the offered bribe shall be on a question which may by law be brought before the person sought to be bribed in his official capacity, means a law in force at the time of the offered bribe.

of Agriculture for the inspection, disposition, etc., of cattle, sheep, etc., and the carcasses and meat food products of cattle sheep, etc., not inconsistent with Act Cong. June 30, 1906, c. 3913, 34 Stat. 674, authorizing such

Regulations prescribed by the Secretary

regulations, had the force of "law." State v. Peet, 68 Atl. 661, 663, 80 Vt. 449, 14 L. R.

State v. Butler, 77 S. W. 560, 572, 178 Mo. A. (N. S.) 677, 130 Am. St. Rep. 998.

272.

It is not every act, legislative in form, that is "law." "Law" is something more than mere will asserted as an act of power. It must be not a special rule for a particular person or a particular case, but, in the language of Mr. Webster, "the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society," and thus excluding, as not due process of law, acts of attainder, bills of pains, and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial, and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation. Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude. In re McNaught, 99 Pac. 241, 247, 1 Okl. Cr. 528 (quoting with approval from Hurtado v. California, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. Ed. 232).

"Law' is a statement of the circumstances, in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts. But the word commonly is confined to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within the power of the courts. A threat that depends upon the choice of the party affected to bring himself within that power would be called law in the ordinary sense. We do not speak of blockade running by neutrals as unlawful. And the usages of speech correspond to the limit of the attempts of the lawmaker, except in extraordinary cases. It is true that domestic corporations remain always within the power of the domestic law." Acts done by domestic corporation outside of the United States, which largely depend for their efficacy upon the co-operation, in a conspiracy to drive a rival out of business, of soldiers and officials in Costa Rica, acting under governmental sanction, in territory over which that state exercises a de facto sovereignty, cannot be made the basis of the action to recover threefold damages authorized by the Sherman AntiTrust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209, 210, c. 647) § 7, on behalf of those injured in their business by reason of violations of that statute. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. Co., 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 512, 213 U. S. 347, 356,

The rule that equity will not reform a deed on the ground of mistake where the mistake is one of law applies only where the Under Const. art. 6, § 23, making the word "law" is used in the sense of general county court a tribunal of limited jurisdiclaw, or law of the country, and does not ap- tion, and after designating certain matters ply where it is used in the sense of a private' of which it shall have cognizance adds and

such court and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred by "law," and section 28 of the same article, requiring that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all the courts of the same class or grade so far as regulated by "law" shall be uniform. The word "law," as that word is used in section 23, obviously means law which is enacted by the legislative department of the state government which the Constitution has created, and "law" found in section 28 is of the same character. Const.

art. 20, provides for the organization of the city and county of Denver. By section 4 of the article the people of the new organization are vested with the exclusive power to make their own municipal charter, and under this constitutional authority a charter was adopt

ed.

Section 182 of the charter provides that all cases of contested elections shall be tried by the county court, with certain exceptions. Const. art. 6, § 23, makes of the county court a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, not including matters of election contests. Section 28 provides that all laws relating to courts shall be of uniform operation throughout the state. Const. art. 7, § 11, provides that the General Assembly shall pass laws to secure the purity of the elections. Section 12 that the General Assembly shall by general law designate the courts by whom the election contests not therein provided for shall be tried. Held, that legislation relating to the jurisdiction and procedure of the state courts is exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly, and that section 182 of the charter is void. Hence the county courts did not have jurisdiction of a proceeding to contest an election on the proposition of granting certain franchises in the city streets. Williams v. People, 88 Pac. 463, 465, 38 Colo. 497.

Const. 1901, § 45, providing that no "law" shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be enacted and published at length, reaches only those cases where the act is strictly amendatory or revisory in its char

festly for the purpose of allowing the Legislature to pass a different act for cities, towns, and villages, and another act for counties and political subdivisions of counties. If the plural had not been used, and the Legislature had been simply authorized to pass a general law, then it would have been compelled to pass one general law, applying alike to cities and counties. Blakey v. City Council of Montgomery, 39 South. 745, 746, 144 Ala. 481.

As domestic laws

The statutes of a state have no extrater

ritorial force, and are not "law" in another state, in the ordinary sense of the term. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Prewitt, 105 S. W. 463, 465, 127 Ky. 399.

By-laws of corporation

That a day fixed by the by-laws of a corporation for the regular monthly meeting of the directors fell on a holiday did not warrant a meeting the next day, where the bylaws made no such provision; Civ. Code, § 11, permitting an act appointed by "law or contract" to be performed on a particular day, which falls on a holiday, to be performed on the next business day, being inapplicable. Cheney v. Canfield, 111 Pac. 92, 93, 158 Cal. 342, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 16.

Constitutions and amendments

The word "law," in Const. 1867, art. 2, § 17, declaring that a bill shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor, etc., does not include a proposed constitutional amendment authorized by article 14, empowering the General Assembly to propose constitutional amendments, and a proposed constitutional amendment adopted by the General Assembly need not be submitted to the Governor for his approval. Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 Atl. 538, 540, 101 Md. 78, 4 Ann. Cas. 692.

The term "law," as used in Const. art. 5, § 31, providing that no law shall extend the term of any public officer after his election, does not refer to the Constitution and the will of the people expressed at the polls in the matter of proposed amendments to that instrument, but relates to statutes enact

v. Board of Com'rs of Silver Bow County, 87 Pac. 450, 451, 34 Mont. 426.

acter; and if a law is in itself complete, in-ed by the Legislature. State ex rel. Teague telligible, and original in form, it does not fall within the meaning of the Constitution. Miller v. Griffith, 54 South. 650, 651, 171 Ala. 337.

The state and federal Constitutions are "laws," within How. Ann. St. c. 164, § 4, giving mutual benefit associations power to make regulations for their own government not contrary to the laws of the United States or this state. Kern v. Arbeiter Unterstuetzungs Verein, 102 N. W. 746, 750, 139 Mich. 233.

"There is no merit in the contention that section 222 of the Constitution prohibits the passage of a single law covering the issuance of bonds, and that it requires that more than one law should be passed to authorize a city or town to issue the bonds. The authority to the Legislature, given by this section, is to pass general laws authorizing counties, cities, Where a statute or decisions of the courts towns, villages, districts, or other political authorizes a revisal on the ground that the subdivisions of counties, to issue bonds; and verdict is contrary to the "law," the "law" the plural word 'laws' was employed mani-referred to means the "law" of that case as

Decisions

given by the court, whether right or wrong. | person who commences or carries on any
Lynch v. Snead Architectural Iron Works, business, etc., for the transaction or carrying
116 S. W. 693, 695, 696, 132 Ky. 241, 21 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 852.

A judicial decision is not a "law." It is merely evidence of what the law is, and a change of decision is not the promulgation of a new law. Hence the constitutional provision as to laws impairing the obligations of contracts does not apply to judicial decisions. Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 106 N. W. 9, 13, 131 Iowa, 540, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, 9 Ann. Cas. 1117.

Municipal ordinance

Ordinance distinguished, see Ordinance. "Ordinances" are mere rules or by-laws of a municipal corporation. The word "law" does not ordinarily include a municipal ordinance. Wright v. City of Macon, 64 S. E. 807, 813, 5 Ga. App. 750.

A city ordinance may be considered a law of the state, within the constitutional provision prohibiting the state from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Memphis, 198 Fed. 955, 956.

Though an ordinance of a county requiring one engaged in the business of raising cattle to pay a license fee does not denounce failure to obtain the license as a crime, one so failing is subject to prosecution by virtue of Pen. Code, § 435, declaring guilty of a misdemeanor every person who commences or carries on any business without procuring a license required by "any law of this state" for the carrying on of the same; an ordinance being a law within such code provision. Ex parte Miller, 110 Pac. 139, 13 Cal. App. 564.

on of which a license is required, by “any
law of this state," without taking out a li-
cense prescribed by such law, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, includes a "county ordinance."
Plumas County v. Wheeler, 87 Pac. 909, 913,
149 Cal. 758 (citing In re Lawrence, 11 Pac.
217, 69 Cal. 608).

A complaint by a city filed in the record-
er's court of the city which alleges that ac-
cused committed the prohibited act within
the police jurisdiction, contrary to law and
in violation of an ordinance of the city, charg-
es a violation of the ordinance, for the word
"law" may include an ordinance, and accused
must know that he is prosecuted for a viola-
tion of an ordinance of the city. Dowling v.
City of Troy, 56 South. 116, 117, 1 Ala. App.
508.

A complaint by a city by its attorney which alleges that accused did the prohibited act "contrary to law" fails to charge a violation of a municipal ordinance; the phrase "contrary to law" having been appropriated by Code 1907, § 7353, to the definition in indictments of violations of statutes, and the word "law," unless otherwise qualified in a penal proceeding, presumptively referring to the common law, in the absence of a statute giving it another meaning. Rosenberg v. City of Selma, 52 South. 742, 743, 168 Ala.

195.

Order of court

The term "by law," as used in Ky. St.
1903, § 4129, providing that the sheriff shall
be collector of all taxes unless the payment
thereof is "by law" directed to be made to

some officer, means a statute and does not
include an order of the fiscal court. Com-
monwealth v. Wade's Adm'r, 104 S. W. 965,

Special laws

In Ky. St. § 3096, as amended and reenacted by Acts 1910, c. 107, providing that | 966, 126 Ky. 791. when, in any city of the second class having a street railway, the railway company is required by law or its franchise, or by any contract with the city, to pave any part of a street or alley, the cost shall be assessed against the company, the term "required by law" applies where the general council passes an ordinance making the requirement and such a requirement by ordinance is authorized by the act. City of Newport v. Silva, 137 S. W. 546, 549, 144 Ky. 450.

A municipal ordinance providing what officer of a municipality shall sign the certificate of legality to be indorsed on municipal bonds issued under authority of Rev. St. 1899, 88 1719 1724, is a provision of "law," within the constitutional requirement that such certificate shall be indorsed on the bond of any county, etc., to be signed by the county auditor or other officer "authorized by law." Diefenderfer v. State, 83 Pac. 591, 593, 14 Wyo. 302.

The clause "law of this state," as used in Pen. Code, § 435, providing that every

The word "laws," in a constitutional provision that all laws not repugnant to the Constitution shall be continued in force until they expire by limitation, etc., applies to all special as well as general laws. Butler v. City of Lewiston, 83 Pac. 234, 236, 11 Idaho, 393.

Statutes and common law

The expressions "required by law," "allowed by law." and "limited by law," and the like, employed in a statute, refer to statutory law. People v. Knapp, 132 N. Y. Supp. 747, 750, 147 App. Div. 436.

A plea averring that arbitrators were sworn according to the law is not subject to the objection that it omits to aver that the arbitrators were sworn in accordance with Civ. Code 1896, § 515, since the term "law," if unqualified, except in cases involving penal matters, embraces legislative enactments, as well as the common law. Tennessee Coal,

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