vancements were made thereafter, the words | Misc. Rep. 402 (citing Pelletier v. Saunders, quoted referred to advancements already 67 N. C. 261; In re Thornton's Estate, 5 Ohio made. In re Bresler's Estate, 119 N. W. 1104, Dec. 151). 1107, 155 Mich. 567. "May be revived," in equity rule 56, prescribing the procedure to revive a suit on the death of a party, the expression "may be revived" should be read "must be" or "shall be," and one entitled to revive a suit in equity, which has abated by the death of a party, is not authorized to proceed therefor by motion, but must follow the procedure prescribed by rule 56 by filing a bill of revivor, or a bill in the nature of a bill of revivor. Dillard's Adm'r v. Central Virginia Iron Co., 125 Fed. 157, 159. MAY BECOME "The phrase 'may become' prima facie refers to the future." Haspel v. O'Brien, 67 Atl. 123, 218 Pa. 146, 11 Ann. Cas. 470. MAY COME Code, § 841, describing embezzlement by a receiver as the fraudulent conversion to his own use of property which "may come" into his possession by virtue of his employment, comprehends property in the hands of the receiver before the passage of the act, but embezzled thereafter. Fields V. United States, 27 App. D. C. 433, 439. MAY CONTINUE IN SESSION The expression "may continue in session," etc., in Baltimore City Charter (Laws 1898, p. 359, c. 123) § 216, declaring that the city council shall meet on the Thursday next after the third Monday in May, 1899, and upon the same day in each year thereafter, and may continue in session for 120 days, and no longer, in each year, provided that they may so arrange their sittings that the same may be held continuously or otherwise, does not mean that at the end of the 120 days, or at the end of the year during which the council meet that number of days, all unfinished business must come to an end, and be again gone over from the beginning to give it effect. Bond v. City of Baltimore, 74 Atl. 14, 16, 111 Md. 364. MAY DEDUCT Though the words "may deduct," as used in Code Civ. Proc. § 1903, as amended by Laws 1904, p. 1285, c. 515, providing that, in an action for wrongful death, plaintiff "may deduct” from the amount recovered the expenses of the action, the reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent, and his commissions upon the residue, confer a mere power, the power is given without limitation as to the persons in whose favor it may be exercised, and the observance of the statute is therefore not merely discretionary but is rendered necessary by the scope of the statute and its clear intent and purpose. In re McDermott's Estate, 99 N. Y. Supp. 829, 49 MAY FRAME CHARTER that cities of a specified class "may frame The provision in the state Constitution a charter for its own government" means that a city of such class may frame a charter for the government of itself as a city, which includes all that is necessary or incident to the government of the municipality, but not all the power that the state has for the protection of the rights and regulation of the duties of the inhabitants in the city, as be tween themselves. Nor does the Constitution confer unlimited power on the city to regulate, by its charter, all matters that are strictly local, for there are many matters that are local to a city, requiring govern mental protection which are foreign to the scope of municipal government. State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & K. Telephone Co., 88 S. W. 41, 43, 189 Mo. 83. MAY HAVE Where a witness replied to a question concerning his former testimony, "I don't know; I may have," the words "may have” were not necessary or even probably intended as a statement that his best recollection was that he had so testified, but rather that he had no recollection whatever about it. The answer seems to be a statement that he did not know and had no recollection. Higgins v. Shepard, 70 N. E. 1014, 1015, 186 Mass. 57. Plaintiff gave defendant railroad company a receipt reciting that it was in full satisfaction of all claims and demands whatsoever which plaintiff "has or may have" against defendant by reason of damages to plaintiff's land from the overflow of water, etc., for all expenses caused by the overflow, for the conveyance of a parcel of land over which the overflow was, and for a general release, and providing that a deed and release should be executed. Held, that the receipt only provided for the release of the existing claim for damages caused by the overflow, and not for future claims for such damages. McCabe v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 124 N. Y. Supp. 652, 654, 139 App. Div. 698. "May have suffered' is a form of the verb 'to suffer,' descriptive of completed action, and, so far as tense is concerned, is the equivalent of the past tense, indicative mood, has suffered.' This latter form of the verb may be substituted for that used without change of meaning." An instruction authorizing the jury to allow damages for any permanent injuries plaintiff "may have suffered' by reason of the injury in question, if any," was not objectionable as permitting the allowance of such damages based on mere probability or conjecture. Ballard v. Kansas City, 86 S. W. 479, 480, 110 Mo. App. 391. MAY HOLD COURT The words "may hold court," as used in Const. art. 7, § 11, empowering the Legislature to authorize judges of circuit courts to hold court for each other, do not limit the power of circuit judges to the exchange only to hold a regular term of the circuit court, but permit the Legislature to authorize a judge of one circuit to make orders at chambers in another circuit, and conduct generally the business in such circuit which a judge is authorized by law to transact. Southern Wisconsin Power Co., 122 N. W. 801, 808, 140 Wis. 245. MAY LIMIT In re coal of a stated kind the second party "may use" in the operation of a mine and reduction works during a limited time is valid, and binds the purchaser to take from the seller all the coal that may be needed or re quired in the conduct of such business during the time specified. Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson Coal Mining Co., 188 Fed. 179, 183, 112 C. C. A. 95. MAY WISH See As She May Wish. MAY 1ST, 2 PER CENT., OR JULY by losing the discount he has additional time within which to pay, and that the bill is not due except at option of purchaser until July 1st. Howes & Howes v. Union Mfg. Co. (Ky.) 113 S. W. 512, 513. MAYHEM The words "may limit," as used in the Terms of sale, "May 1st, 2 per cent., or New York Motor Vehicle Law, which prohib-July net," mean that the purchaser may pay its the operation of motor vehicles in closely on or before the earlier date and save the built up districts at a greater speed than discount, that if he does not care to do so, a mile in six minutes, and provides that the municipal authorities may limit, by ordinance, the speed of motor vehicles on public highways, are equivalent to the words "may still further restrict." A city or village is thus authorized to enact an ordinance prescribing a lower rate of speed within its territorial jurisdiction than that permitted by the general law itself, and the driver of a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the lower rate, but not in excess of a mile in six minutes, is subject to prosecution, for violation of the ordinance only; but a person operating an automobile at a greater speed than a mile in six minutes, though within the limits of the municipality, is still liable to punishment under the general law. People ex rel. Hainer v. Keeper of Prison of Seventh District Magistrates' Court of City of New York, 83 N. E. 44, 46, 190 N. Y. 315. MAY NEED See As She May Need. MAY PERMIT The term "may permit," in equity rule 67, as it stood prior to the amendment of May 15, 1893, as given in 149 U. S. 793, 13 Sup. Ct. III, cannot properly be held to mean "may require" or "may compel," and the rule, as amended, providing that on due notice given, as prescribed by previous order, the court may, in its discretion, permit the whole or any part of the evidence to be adduced orally in open court on final hearing, does not require the court to require an unwilling party to so adduce evidence and forego his right to use the methods prescribed by the rule prior to the amendment. Hyams v. Federal Coal & Coke Co., 152 Fed. 970, 973, 82 C. C. A. 324. MAY THEN BE See As It May Then Be. MAY USE An agreement by one party to furnish and by the other party to purchase all the See. also, Maim. Under Code 1896, § 5095, providing that one who "unlawfully, maliciously and intenanother person is guilty of "mayhem," the tionally cuts, bites or strikes off an ear" of injury to the ear must be such as disfigures to ordinary observation, as distinguished from Green v. State, 44 South. 194, 151 Ala. 14, a wounding which simply mars the member. 125 Am. St. Rep. 17, 15 Ann. Cas. 81. MAYOR As judicial officer, see Judicial Officer. "The word 'mayor' first occurs in English history in 1189, when Richard I substituted Romans styled such officer 'prefectus urbi,' a mayor for the two bailiffs of London. The and originally the English title for such officer was either 'bailiff' or 'portreeve,' just as the sheriff was 'shire reeve'; i. e., sheriff." "It is said that the word 'mayor' comes from the old English word 'maier,' which means power,' 'authority,' and not from the Latin power and authority of the town, and the 'major,' meaning greater. He represents the duty of presiding at meetings of the town commissioners is only one of the duties he exercises. While the power and duties of of the town or the laws of the state, it is 'mayor' may vary according to the charter probably without any exception his duty to execute the laws and local regulations of his city and to supervise the discharge of their duties by the subordinate officers of the city government." State v. Thomas, 53 S. E. 522, 523, 141 N. C. 791 (quoting 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4450). In the manufacture of corn meal for culinary purposes, the corn is first kiln-dried, then cracked or ground between rollers, and afterwards bolted. A product made by the same rollers but set farther apart so as not to crush the grain so finely, and with the corn not kiln-dried, and the product not bolted, but merely passed between the rollers and then loaded in the cars, and variously known as "cracked corn," "chop," "coarse meal," was not in the ordinary acceptation of the term "meal," and was properly distinguished from meal in apportioning cars among shippers. State ex rel. Crandall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 101 N. W. 23, 24, 72 Neb. 542. The general municipal act of March 13, (of a liquor tax certificate, may sell liquor 1883 (St. 1883, p. 93, c. 49), divides cities into on Sunday to his guests with their meals. six classes, provides for a mayor in the first In re Cullinan, 87 N. Y. Supp. 660, 662, 93 four, makes him in the fourth class a member App. Div. 427. of the council, with the right to vote only in case of a tie, and in the last two classes requires the council to elect one of its members president, imposing on him the duty of signing all ordinances preliminary to publication, but giving him no veto power, and not requiring him to perform the duties of a mayor. Act March 27, 1897 (St. 1897, p. 190, c. 129), entitled, "An act to require ordinance and resolution passed by the city council or other legislative body of any municipality to be presented to the mayor, or other chief executive officer of such municipality, for his approval," provides (section 1) that every ordinance imposing a penalty passed by the council shall before it takes effect be presented to the mayor for his approval, and that, if it fails to receive his approval, it shall be lost, unless on its return it receives the votes of three-fourths of all the members, "provided that * this section shall not apply to cities in which the mayor is a member of the city council, or other governing body," and provides (section 4, p. 191) that in municipalities in which there is no mayor the duties imposed on said officer by the provisions of the act shall be performed by the president of the board of trustees, or other chief executive officer of the municipality. Held, that to prevent injustice and absurdity, the proviso in section 1 should be made to read "mayor or other chief executive," or the word "mayor" should be held to include all executive officers similarly situated, and thus prevent a construction giving the veto power to the president of the board of trustees of cities of the fifth and sixth classes, when it is denied to the mayor of cities of the fourth class. City of San Buenaventura v. McGuire, 97 Pac. 526, 527, 8 Cal. App. 497. MAYORDOMO MEAN TIME "Mean solar time" is arrived at by the motion of a fictitious sun called the "mean sun," which is imagined to move with perfect uniformity, being sometimes behind the true sun and sometimes in advance of it. This time changes with the longtitude, and, in a country of the magnitude of the United States, the difference of time between places caused much difficulty in the regulation of the movements of railway trains. About the year 1883 the principal railroads of the United States adopted an arbitrary standard for the purpose of securing uniformity in the operation and connection of their trains. Under this system the country was divided into four sections, eastern, central, mountain, and Pacific, approximately 15 degrees in width from east to west, and the time of the central meridian of each section was adopted as the uniform railroad time for the entire section. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. David Moffat Co., 154 Fed. 13, 20, 83 C. C. A. 91. A "mayordomo" is an officer in charge of an irrigation water system under the laws MEANDER of New Mexico. Candelaria v. Vallejos, 81 Pac. 589, 595, 13 N. M. 146. MEADOW MEANDER CORNERS "Meander corners" hold, as declared by the rules of the United States Land Office, the peculiar position of denoting a point on The term "meadow" included salt marsh- line between landowners without usually bees and beaches. Sandiford v. Town of Hamp-ing the legal terminus or corner of the land stead, 90 N. Y. Supp. 76, 82, 83, 97 App. Div. owned. Where meander corners of a govern163. MEAL See Coarse Meal. ment survey are lost or obliterated, they must be restored in accordance with the circulars of the United States Land Office. Kleven v. Gunderson, 104 N. W. 4, 6, 95 Minn. 246. MEANDER LINE If a single sandwich satisfies the desires of a person, it constitutes a "meal," and the keeper of a hotel has the right to serve liquors to him with such meal, under Laws 1897, p. 234, c. 312, § 31, cl. "k," providing that the keeper of a hotel, being the holder 77 Ark. 338. Generally "meander lines" are lines which course the banks of navigable streams or other navigable waters. Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Bigelow, 92 S. W. 534, 537, The point to which the water of a navi- | line, and the surveyed tracts actually abut gable stream usually rises, in an ordinary on a body of water proper to be meandered season of high water, is the "meander line" | under the rules governing public survey, and which forms the boundary of the title of the in such case the title of the abutting owner government. State v. Portland General Elec- extends to the actual water line, at least as tric Co., 98 Pac. 160. 162, 52 Or. 502. it existed at the time the survey was made. Owners of land bounded on a nonnavigable lake or on a body of water, the banks of which were meandered in the original government survey, have no title to the submerged bed Wright v. of such lake or body of water. City of Council Bluffs, 104 N. W. 492, 493, 130 Iowa, 274, 114 Am. St. Rep. 412. "A 'meander line' is not a line of boundary, but one designed to point out the sinuosity of the bank or shore and a means of ascertaining the quantity of land in the fraction which is to be paid for by the purchaser." Sherwin v. Bitzer, 106 N. W. 1046, 1047, 97 Minn. 252 (quoting and adopting definition in Whitaker v. McBride, 25 Sup. Ct. 531, 197 U. S. 510, 49 L. Ed. 857). The court judicially knows that "meander lines" are unsatisfactory as the basis for The "meandetermination of boundaries. A "meander line" is not a boundary line, but is designed to point out the sinuosities der lines" running along or near the margin of the bank or shore of a river to ascertain of waters are run for the purpose of ascerthe quantity of land in a fractional subdivi- taining the quantity of the upland to be chargsion, except where such line is run and mon-ed for and not for the purpose of limiting uments erected, so that in the absence of such monuments the fact that a stream has been meandered does not limit the title of a grantee of the riparian land to the meandered line instead of to the thread of the stream. People v. Economy Light & Power Co., 89 N. E. 760, 767, 241 Ill. 290. "Meander lines" are run in surveying fractional portions of the public lands bordering upon navigable rivers, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of defining the sinuosities of the banks of the stream. Seabrook v. Coos Bay Ice Co., 89 Pac. 417, 418, 49 Or. 237. "The 'meander lines' run along or near the margin of waters are run by the government surveyors for the purpose of ascertaining the exact quantity of the upland to be charged for, and not for the purpose of limiting the title of the grantee to such meander lines." McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 33 South. 628, 630, 109 La. 625 (quoting, and adopting definition in Hardin v. Jordan, 11 Sup. Ct. 811, 838, 140 U. S. 380, 35 L. Ed. 428). A "meander line" is not established as a boundary, but is a line drawn along the shore of water disregarding its minor sinuosities, and is not used to mark the limits of land, but to determine the number of acres for the title of the grantee to such meander lines. Kleven v. Gunderson, 104 N. W. 4, 6, 95 Minn. 246 (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. Ed. 428; St. Paul & P. Ry. Co. v. Schurmeier, 7 Wall. [74 U. S.] 272, 19 L. Ed. 74; 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4452). A government survey or plat of a township selected by the state under the swamp lands act (Act Cong. Sept. 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519) showed that a certain part of the survey was not laid out into sections and subdivisions, and that the surveyed part was separated from the unsurveyed part by a meandered line, the unsurveyed part being veyor's field notes described as low, wet designated as "sunk lands" and in the sur lands. state according to the official plats of the The township was patented to the survey. Held, that a "meandered line," being an ordinary line bounding a body of land, lands was a body of water, though temporarithere was nothing to show that the sunk the entire township passed to the state as ly covered with water, and under the patent swamp lands. Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co. v. Board of Directors, St. Francis Levee Dist., 139 S. W. 625, 628, 100 Ark. 94. which the government will demand payment; MEANING and, when payment for such acreage is made, the purchaser's title exists to the water's edge, though there be small unmeasured tracts lying outside the meander line. Barringer v. Davis, 120 N. W. 65, 68, 141 Iowa, 419. "A meander line,' in an official survey, is not a line of boundary, but, as said in Horne v. Smith, 15 Sup. Ct. 988, 159 U. S. 40, 40 L. Ed. 68, is used as a means of ascertaining the quantity of land in the fraction which is to be paid for by the purchaser.'" Tolleston Club of Chicago v. Lindgren, 77 N. E. 818, 820, 39 Ind. App. 448. A "meander line" is not a boundary line, where it substantially represents a water See Plain Meaning. MEANS See External, Violent and Accidental Means; Mechanical Means; Reasonable Means; Safe Means. Any means, see Any. Any other means, see Any Other. In an interference involving the invention of a machine for mechanically transferring a cigar "bunch" from the mould to a wrapping mechanism by which the wrapper is applied to the cigar "bunch," and in which the machines of the parties showed different species of transferring device, the term "means," in the issues calling for the combination with the wrapping mechanism of "means for transferring the bunches from the mould to the wrapping mechanism," was a generic term, and applicable alike to the transferring device of each party. Lecroix v. Tyberg, 33 App. D. C. 586, 591. within the meaning of the statute, as if he had departed from a duty regularly laid on him. United States v. Rosenthal 126 Fed. 766, 774. The expression "means at his command," used in a charge in a prosecution for murder asserting the proposition that, in order to justify a killing under a claim of self-de"Means" signifies a plan or method of fense, the slayer must have resorted to all procedure. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Beezley, reasonable "means at his command," con101 S. W. 1051, 1052, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 108. sistent with his own safety, to avoid the In a patentee's claim reading, "In a sew-necessity of taking human life, is equivalent ing machine a back guide, around which the to the expression "means in his power." goods are adapted to be held, a needle co- King v. State, 44 South. 941, 942, 54 Fla. 47. operating with said back guide, means for A system of perforated pipes in a buildreciprocating said needle longitudinally and ing, connected with valves outside the buildmeans for causing said needle to recede lat-ing for the use of firemen, constitute a "means erally from said back guide after its point has of preventing and extinguishing fires," withentered the material," the word "means," in the provisions of Greater New York Chardescribing the word needle as an element of ter, Laws 1897, p. 263, c. 378, § 762, providing the combination, refers to some mechanism that the owners of manufactories, office buildother than the needle, the latter being sep-ings, etc., shall provide such fire hose, fire exarately specified as one element, so that the tinguishers, and other means of preventing claim is not infringed by a machine em- and extinguishing fires as the fire commisbodying all the elements of the combination, sioners may direct. Lantry v. Hoffman, 105 but in which defendant's needle is slightly in- N. Y. Supp. 353, 354, 55 Misc. Rep. 261. clined, and the path in which its point recipMEANS OF KNOWLEDGE rocates passing the back guide is nearer thereto than is the like path of its shaft, and the reciprocation of which is longitudinal. Lewis Blind Stitch Mach. Co. v. Premium Mfg. Co., 163 Fed. 950, 955, 90 C. C. A. 310. The word "means," as used in Rev. Codes 1899, § 8042, providing that, when an offense may be committed by the use of different "means," the "means may be alleged in the alternative in the same count," is to be defined as synonymous with the word "agency" or "instrumentality." The fraudulent appropriation of property or the secreting of it with a fraudulent intent to appropriate it as described in Rev. Codes 1899, § 7462, defining "embezzlement," are different acts or facts that may constitute the crime of "embezzlement," and are not the "means" of committing the offense. State v. Lonne, 107 N. W. 524, 525, 15 N. D. 275. A wall in course of construction is not "works," "ways," nor "means," within the New York Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1902, p. 1748, c. 600), making an employer liable for injuries caused by defective works, ways, or means. Ripp v. Fuchs, 113 N. Y. Supp. 361, 364, 129 App. Div. 321. See Equal Means of Knowledge. "Means of knowledge' plainly within reach of stockholders by the exercise of the slightest diligence is in legal effect equivalent to knowledge." Cole v. Birmingham Union Ry. Co., 39 South. 403, 405, 143 Ala. 427 (quoting and adopting definition in Jesup v. Illinois C. R. Co., 43 Fed. 483). The existence of public records of deeds, access to which is easy, and which would disclose that a trustee's representation that he had sold trust property worth $2,200, so as to net less than $600, was fraudulent, since the "means of knowledge" are equivalent to knowledge. A clue to the fact, which, if followed up diligently, would lead to a discovery, is, in law, equivalent to discovery, equivalent to knowledge. Irwin v. Holbrook, 73 Pac. 360, 363, 32 Wash. 349. MEASURE See Board Measure. Under a statute giving mayors of certain cities power to veto any measure passed by the board of aldermen, a mayor has no power to veto the election of a police justice by the board of aldermen, since such an election is not a measure. Rich v. McLaurin, 35 South. 337, 83 Miss. 95. In Rev. St. § 5444, providing that every officer of the revenue, who, by any means whatever, knowingly admits or aids in admitting any goods on payment of less than The word "measure," in Const. art. 4, the amount of duty legally due thereon, shall § 1, providing that an initiative petition shall be punished, if the "means” adopted by him "include the full text of the 'measure,'” and was to accept a duty that did not belong to as it is used in Laws 1907, p. 400, § 2, prohim, and to take advantage of his knowl-viding that the initiative petition "shall edge that his performance of that duty be attached to a full and correct copy of the would be recognized by his superior officer, title and text of the 'measure,'" etc., means that would be quite as much of a "means," an act as it comes from the hands of the Leg3 WDS. & P.2D SER.-23 |