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with, and not a sale of his leasehold interest. scribed—was intended, not the last day of the Leist v. Dierssen, 88 Pac. 812, 814, 4 Cal. period for which'the publication was directApp. 634.
ed. Harrison v. Wallis, 90 N. Y. Supp. 44, The rule that the expression, "the real 49, 44 Misc. Rep. 492. property last hereinbefore described,” used LAST SESSION in the granting part of a tax deed, includes
In a statute providing that supervisors only one tract of several described in the might, at their last session before regular deed, applies only where the last description election, etc., “last session" means the last is of a single tract which is segregated from regular session appointed by law. It has no the others and described wholly apart from reference to special sessions called for some them for some independent purpose, and specific purpose. The "session" includes the where no language intervenes between such entire sittings of the board, from the meeting description and the operative words of the on the first day till the final adjournment. grant which will extend the application of Tuohy v. Chase, 30 Cal. 524, 527. the word beyond that tract. King v. Gibson, 113 Pac. 429, 430, 84 Kan. 29.
See During Last Sickness. LAST GENERAL ELECTION
The term “last sickness," as used in stat"See General Election.
utes of wills, means where the testator is in LAST KNOWN ADDRESS
extremis, or overtaken by a sudden and vioUnder Pol. Code, $ 3650, which requires
lent sickness, and has not time nor opportunian assessor to state in the assessment of ty to make a written will. A nuncupative property the name and post office address, it will is made “at the time of the last sickknown, of the person to whom the property ness," as required by Ballinger's Ann. Codes is assessed, the address shown on the last & St. $ 4605, though not made when testator assessment constitutes the last known post violent sickness, and has not time or oppor
is in extremis, or overtaken by sudden and office address so far as the tax records are concerned, and, in the absence of other in- tunity to make a written will, where made formation, the tax collector must take notice when the last sickness has so progressed that of the address so shown and mail the notice testator expects death, and is liable to die of resale to such address. Campbell v. Mor- at any time, and in view of, and as preparaan, 119 Pac. 89, 90, 161 Cal. 325.
tory to, such result, which followed, he made
the verbal will, and this without regard to LAST PLACE OF ABODE
his opportunity then or afterwards to make A service of a writ of scire facias, in a
a written will. In re Miller's Estate, 91 suit commenced in Massachusetts, by the of-Pac. 967, 47 Wash. 253, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) ficer's leaving a copy therefor at the “last 1092, 125 Am. St. Rep. 904, 14 Ann. Cas. 1163 and usual place of abode" of a trustee in (quoting and adopting the definition in Prince that state, according to the laws of the state, v. Hazelton [N. Y.) 20 Johns. 502, 11 Am. was sufficient, though prior to such service Dec. 307). he had removed to a neighboring state. Where a verbal will is made in the last Adams v. Rowe, 11 Me. 89, 90, 25 Am. Dec. sickness, of which the testator dies, when 266.
such sickness has progressed to such a point
that he expects death at any time, and reaLAST PORT OF DISCHARGE
lizes that he is liable to die therefrom at any See Final Port of Discharge.
time, and in view of such expected death, LAST PRECEDING
and as preparatory thereto, makes a will
near to the time of his death, such will is The term “last preceding,” in a statute made in the “last sickness” of the testator, providing that when the common council in although a sufficient time may have interany city, having at the “last preceding” state vened between the making of the oral will census more than 50,000 inhabitants, shall and the death of the testator to have perconsider it necessary to procure grounds for mitted the making of a written will. Goda public market, such council shall appoint a frey v. Smith, 103 N. W. 450, 455, 73 Neb. committee, refers to the statė census which 756, 10 Ann. Cas. 1128. may immediately precede in point of time the action of the council, and the law is general.
"Last sickness," as the term is used in State es rel. Board of Education of City of statutes allowing a verbal will to be made in Minneapolis v. Brown, 106 N. W. 477, 480, 97 the “last sickness" of the testator, does not Minn. 402, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327.
mean that he must be in extremis or articulo
mortis, nor is it necessary that he be preLAST PUBLICATION
vented from making a written will by surIn Comp. Laws N. M. 1897, 88 2956, 2967, prise of sudden death. The requirement is relating to a publication of a notice, and re- satisfied if the disease of which the testator quiring the last publication at least two dies has progressed to such a point that he weeks before the return day, by "last publi- expects death at any time and is liable to cation" the last act of making the notice pub- die therefrom at any time, and in view of lic-the last insertion in a newspaper pre such expected death and as preparatory
thereto such will is made, and that there Notes] top p. 743; Walker v. Wells, 25 Ga. after death from such sickness does occur. 141, 71 Am. Dec. 164). Baird v. Baird, 79 Pac. 163, 165, 70 Kan.
“Latent ambiguity” arises from some 561, 68 L. R. A. 627, 3 Ann. Cas. 312.
collateral circumstance or extrinsic matter
in a case where the language of the instruLATE
ment is intelligible. Barrett v. Kansas &
Texas Coal Co., 79 Pac. 150, 151, 70 Kan. 649. The word "late," as used in an officer's return of service of the summons by leaving
A "latent ambiguity" exists when, there at defendant's "late place of residence being no defect in the description on the means formerly, recently, existing not long face of the instrument, it becomes necessary ago. "Late" is defined as "existing not long to fit the description to the thing-in other ago; not long ago but not now." The term words, to identify it by parol evidence; and "late place of residence” evidently meant the evidence of surrounding circumstances and place where the defendant had recently re- inferences from such circumstances are adsided but did not then reside, and hence the missible to show to which thing the ambigureturn did not show compliance with the ous description applies. Sherrod v. Battle, statute requiring service by leaving at de 70 S. E. 834, 838, 154 N. C. 345. fendant's usual place of residence. Minneso. “A 'latent ambiguity' in a will, which may ta Thresher Mfg. Co. v. L'Heureux, 118 N. W. be removed by extrinsic evidence, may arise 565, 566, 82 Neb. 692 (quoting and adopting (1) either when it names a person as the obdefinitions in 25 Cyc. p. 161; Webst. Dict.). ject of a gift, or a thing as subject to it,
and there are two persons or things that LATELY PENDING
answer such name or description; or (2) Where an exhibit in the record recited when the will contains a misdescription of that certain chancery causes were “lately the object or subject, as where there is no pending" in a certain circuit court, such re- person or thing in existence, or, if in existcital did not show that such causes were still ence, the person is not the one intended, or on docket. Scott v. Thomas, 51 S. E. 829, the thing does not belong to the testator." 831, 104 Va. 330.
Wheaton v. Pope, 97 N. W. 1046, 1048, 91 An order-book entry of final judgment is Minn. 299 (quoting Patch v. White, 6 Sup. essential to show in the record on appeal ren- Ct. 617, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed. 860). dition thereof. Reference to the cause, in A “latent ambiguity” is one where the the clerk's certificate, as one “lately pending” equivocality of expression or obscurity of inin the court below, is not enough. Chicago tention does not arise from the words themHorseshoe Co. of Indiana v. Gostlin, 66 N. E. selves, but from the ambiguous state of ex514, 515, 30 Ind. App. 504.
trinsic circumstances to which the words of
the instrument refer, and which is susceptiLATENT
ble of explanation by the mere development
of extraneous facts without altering or add“Latent" means not discernible by exam-ing to the written language or requiring ination. Anderson v. Van Riper, 128 N. Y. more to be understood thereby than will fairSupp. 66, 67.
ly comport with the ordinary or legal sense
of the words and phrases used. Teague v. LATENT AMBIGUITY
Sowder, 114 S. W. 484, 488, 121 Tenn. 132. A “latent ambiguity” is one developed
Where there is no defect on the face of by extrinsic evidence, where the particular a will, but there is an uncertainty in atwords, in themselves clear, apply equally tempting to put it into effect, the ambiguity well to two different meanings. Wolff Truck is "latent.” Jennings v. Telbert, 58 S. E. Frame Co. v. American Steel Foundries, 195 420-421, 77 S. C. 454. Fed. 940, 944, 115 C. C. A. 628 (citing definition in Petrie v. Trustees of Hamilton Col- LATENT DEFECT lege, 53 N. E. 216, 158 N. Y. 458).
A "latent defect" is one which could A “latent ambiguity," as defined by Lord not have been discovered by inspection. L. Bacon, is "that which seems certain and McManus Co. v. Drexel Furniture Co., 68 S. without ambiguity for anything that appear- E. 859, 860, 8 Ga. App. 158. eth upon the deed or instrument, but there A defect in a roll of cloth sold, which is some collateral matter, outside of the consists of holes in the cloth, is not a latent deed, that breedeth the ambiguity.” If this defect, since it is easily discoverable. Strauss double meaning is apparent on the face of v. Salzer, 109 N. Y. Supp. 734, 735, 58 Misc. the instrument, then the ambiguity is a pat. Rep. 573. ent one. If the language is apparently not of double meaning, but is shown to be so LATERAL only by the aid of collateral or extrinsic facts, the ambiguity is "latent." Oliver v. In a statute providing that a petition to Henderson, 49 S. E. 743, 121 Ga. 836, 104 widen, deepen, and alter a ditch "shall be Am. St. Rep. 185 (citing 1 Jarm. Wills [Am.'held to include any side 'lateral spur or branch ditch, drain or water course neces- , such dependent relation is not established by sary to secure the object of the improvement, the fact that it seeks the connection at one whether the same is mentioned therein or of its terminals. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. R. not," the word “lateral" does not qualify the v. United States, 195 Fed. 962, 965. words “branch ditch, drain or water course,”
An interurban electric railway for pasand therefore, under a petition to improve ditch extending in a southerly direction, it is sengers and some freight, running under a proper to order the construction of a branch state charter between points in the state ditch commencing half a mile northeast of through the middle of a diamond-shaped the starting point of the main ditch and in- area inclosed by two steam railways, and in tersecting the main ditch about a hundred its general course parallel to and more or less feet from its starting point. Omaha & N. P. competing with the steam roads, and workR. Co. v. Sarpy County, 117 N. W. 116, 117, branch line of railroad,” within the meaning
ing on a different plan, is not a "lateral 82 Neb. 140.
of the act to regulate commerce of February Sess. Laws 1905, c. 140, p. 254, § 1, re- 4, 1887, as amended by the act of June 18, quiring a "lateral passageway of at least 900 1910, requiring carriers subject to the act to feet" between all fish traps, means that every establish switch connections with such lines trap must be so located that there shall be on certain conditions, and permitting owners no other trap within a distance of 900 feet of such lines as well as shippers to make laterally therefrom; and a trap was not complaint to the Interstate Commerce Comproperly located where a parallelogram, mission in case of the carrier's failure upon formed by lines 900 feet long, projected at written application, and authorizing such right angles to the ends of the trap and lines commission to hear, investigate, and deterconnecting the same drawn parallel to the mine whether such conditions exist, and to course of the trap 900 feet on either side make an order directing the carrier to comthereof, intersected traps previously located, ply with the act. United States v. Baltithough the trap in question did not inter- more & 0. S. W. R. Co., 33 Sup. Ct. 5, 6, sect similar parallelograms of the prior 226 U. S. 14, 57 L. Ed. 104. traps. Johansen v. Mulligan, 83 Pac. 417, 418, 41 Wash. 379.
Laws 1869, p. 2399, c. 917, 88 3, 4, under
which plaintiff railroad company was organLATERAL RAILROAD
ized by the consolidation of the N. and H. “A ‘lateral road' is one proceeding from Railroad Companies, provide that the consome point on the main trunk between its solidation shall not release the new corporatermini.” Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Waters. tion from any of the restrictions of duties 66 Atl. 685, 688, 105 Md. 396, 12 L. R. A. of the several corporations. Laws 1846, p. (N. S.) 326 (quoting and adopting definition 272, c. 216, creating the H. Company, author. in Newhall v. Galena & C. U. R. Co., 14 in. ized it to construct a single, double, or treble
track road between New York and Albany, 273).
and section 1 further authorized it to conWithin the meaning of section 1 of the struct the branches for depot and station Interstate Commerce Act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, accommodations needed for its business. C. 104, 24 Stat. 379), as amended by Act June plaintiff seeks to condemn land for 35 miles 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, which pro- of track from its general depot in New York vides that "any common carrier subject to city for an “additional main track,” and to the provisions of this act upon application afford a more expeditious means of handling of any lateral branch line of railroad traffic. Held, that the charter contemplated
shall construct, maintain and op- such tracks as would accommodate the depot erate upon reasonable terms, a switch con conditions for a treble-track railroad, and nection with any such lateral branch line of the purposes of the desired track in question railroad,” etc., and further providing (as came within the spirit of the additional charamended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7, ter power to construct branches for station 36 Ştat. 545) that, if it fails to make such accommodation needed for railroad business, connection on application, the Interstate though it already had treble tracks over the Commerce Commission may, on complaint same distance. So it is true that a "lateral and after a hearing, order it done, whether
or branch railroad" usually contemplates one a road is or is not a "lateral branch line of running from some point on the main line, railroad,” and entitled to invoke the powers intended as a connecting line or feeder, to of the commission, depends on the relation which it bears to the line with which switch quote the American & English Encyclopedia connection is asked, and not upon its relation of Law (volume 18, p. 561); but in the presto the shippers or territory. It is such a later-ent case the statute itself defines the branch al branch when it is tributary to and depend or branches to be constructed, and these are ent on the other line for an outlet, or in oth-“for depot and station accommodations, as er words is essentially a feeder, but not may be required for the business of said when it is in effect an independent and com- railroad." New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. peting line, although it does not compete as Untermyer, 117 N. Y. Supp. 443, 446, 133 to a portion of the territory involved, and App. Div. 146.
A "lateral railroad" built under the lat- Learned in the Law; Liability Createral railroad law (Burns' Ann. St. 1908, 88 ed by Law; Limited by Law; Local 3398-5404) is governed by the general rail- Law; Matter of Law; Mistake of road laws so far as applicable, and is sub- Law; Municipal Law; Operation of ject to governmental regulation. A railroad, Law; Ordinary Course of Law; Or: to be built by a stone company, is not de- ganic Law; Penal Laws; Practice prived of its character as a lateral railroad (In Law); Practice of Law; Prescribwithin the lateral railroad law (Burns' Ann. ed by Law or Ordinance; PresumpSt. 1908, $S 5398-5401), because it is to con- tion of Law; Previously Ascertained nect with a lateral road already existing, by Law; Provided by Law; Provisions where the two roads together do not exceed of Law; Remedial Law; Retrospective the length fixed by the statutes and will be Law; Returnable According to Law; used as
one road. Westport Stone Co. V. Revenue Law; Seisin in Law; Session Thomas, 94 N. E. 406, 409, 175 Ind. 319, 35 Laws; Special Law; Specially PrescribL. R. A. (N. S.) 646.
ed by Law; Statute; Stock Law; SubThe right given to a railroad company
stantive Law; Surrender by Operation chartered to construct a railroad from the
of Law; Trial at Law; Under the city of Baltimore to the Ohio river, to con
Laws; Uniform Operation of Laws. struct "lateral railroads,” in any direction
As regulation, see Regulation. whatever, in connection with such railroad,
Ex post facto law, see Ex Post Facto. is not, in the absence of anything in the
Law of necessity, see Police Power. charter to that effect, limited to construction
Otherwise provided by law, see Otherof branches which will be feeders for the
wise. port of Baltimore, but authorizes the con
Prohibited by law, or otherwise, see Othstruction of a branch from the main line to
erwise. connect with another branch, so as to take
Remedy at law, see Remedy. around the city of Baltimore freight going in
Similar law, see Similar. either direction, and not intended for that
See, also, Act (In Legislation). city. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Waters, 66 "Law,” according to an ancient maxim, Atl. 685, 688, 105 Md. 396, 12 L. R. A. (N. "is good sense, and what is contrary to good S.) 326.
sense is not good law.” Burke v. State, 119
N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1099, 64 Misc. Rep. 558. LATERAL SUPPORT
"Law" is a rule of civil conduct prescribThe right of "lateral support" extends no further than to avoid negligence as to ed by the supreme power, says Blackstone. land incumbered with buildings. Sharpless
It can never properly be a law, unless noti7. Boldt, 67 Atl. 652, 653, 218 Pa. 372.
fied to those who are to obey it. Ingersoll v.
Coal Creek Coal Co., 98 S. W. 178, 185, 117 LAUNCH
Tenn. 263, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 282, 119 Am.
St. Rep. 1003, 10 Ann. Cas. 829 (citing Green As rigging and apparel, see Ships' Rig. Bag, Oct. 1906). ging and Apparel.
“Law" might be defined as the aggregate
of those rules and principles of conduct proLAUNDRY
mulgated by legislative authority or estab
lished by local custom, and our laws are the See Occupied as a Steam Laundry.
resultant derived from a combination of the
divine or moral laws, the laws of nature LAUREL
and human experience, as such resultant has
been evolved by human intellect influenced See Japanese Laurel.
by the virtues of the ages. State v. Central
Lumber Co., 123 N. W. 504, 508, 24 S. D. LAW
136, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804. See At Law and in Equity; Attorney at
"Law” is defined to be a rule of civil conLaw; Authorized by Law; Business duct prescribed by the supreme power in a Required by Law; By-Law; Color of state, commanding what is right and prohibLaw; Commercial Law; Common
iting what is wrong. The laws of a state Law; Conclusion of Law; Conflict are more usually understood to mean the with General Law; Contrary to Law; rules and enactments promulgated by legisCourt of Law; Criminal Law; Cuslative authority or long-established local
Henry tody of the Law; Decision Against customs having the force of law. Law; Due Course of Law; Due Pro
v. Cherry & Webb, 73 Atl. 97, 105, 30 R. I. cess of Law; Election Law; English 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. Law; Equal Protection of Law; Er- 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006. ror of Law; Existing Law; General "Legislative power," within Const. art. Law; Ignorance of Law; Insurance 4, § 1 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 175), providing that Law; Intestate Laws; Issue at Law; the legislative power shall be vested in the Issue of Law; Knowledge of the Law;'General Assembly, is the power to make laws; a “law" is a rule of civil conduct prescribed right, for in such case the mistake is really by the supreme power of a state; a "rule" is one of fact. Marshall v. Lane, 27 App. D. distinguished from whim, caprice, compact, C. 276, 280. agreement, or discretion, and "prescribed"
3 WD8.& P.2D SER.-3
To have the force of “law," a rule must means that the rule shall be manifested and possess the quality of uniformity and unipublished, so as to be known as a rule of civ- versality and must operate upon all improve il conduct. Merchants Exchange of St. ments of the entire political community afLouis v. Knott, 111 S. W. 565, 571, 212 Mo. fected by it alike. "Laws" are not like gar616.
ments which citizen and judge may put on “Law” is something more than mere will and off at will. A law for a section of the exerted as an act of power. In the lan- state is not a law of the land, and modificaguage of Mr. Webster in his famous definition of the common law to meet the condition: “It is the general law, the law which tions and wants of individuals in localities hears before it condemns, which proceeds up. I would not constitute modifications to meet on inquiry to render judgment after trial so the conditions and wants of the people. that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, Nothing less than the welfare of the whole property and immunities under the protec- people can be considered, and the sovereigntion of the general rules which govern soci- ty of society at large must be behind the ety.” It is not every act of legislation in adoption and enforcement of any rule or it form that is law. Jamison v. Wimbish, 130 is not law. Clark v. Allaman, 80 Pac. 571, Fed. 351, 358 (quoting Hurtado v. People of 580, 71 Kan. 206, 70 L. R. A. 971 (citing 1 California, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 110 U. S. 535, 28
Black. Com. 45). L. Ed. 232). The phrase, “which may by law be of Agriculture for the inspection, disposition,
Regulations prescribed by the Secretary brought before him," used in a statute defining the offense of bribery, and making it etc.
, of cattle, sheep, etc., and the carcasses a material element thereof that the offered and meat food products of cattle sheep, etc., bribe shall be on a question which may by 1906, c. 3913, 34 Stat. 674, authorizing such
not inconsistent with Act Cong. June 30, law be brought before the person sought to
regulations, had the force of "law.” State be bribed in his official capacity, means a law in force at the time of the offered bribe. A. (N. S.) 677, 130 Am. St. Rep. 998.
v. Peet, 68 Atl. 661, 663, 80 Vt. 449, 14 L. R. State v. Butler, 77 S. W. 560, 572, 178 Mo. 272.
“ 'Law' is a statement of the circumIt is not every act, legislative in form, stances, in which the public force will be that is "law." "Law” is something more brought to bear upon men through the courts. than mere will asserted as an act of power. But the word commonly is confined to such It must be not a special rule for a particular prophecies or threats when addressed to perperson or a particular case, but, in the lan- sons living within the power of the courts. guage of Mr. Webster, “the general law, a A threat that depends upon the choice of the law which hears before it condemns, which party affected to bring himself within that proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judg- power would be called law in the ordinary ment only after trial, so that every citizen sense. We do not speak of blockade running shall hold his life, liberty, property, and im- by neutrals as unlawful. And the usages of munities under the protection of the general speech correspond to the limit of the atrules which govern society," and thus ex- tempts of the lawmaker, except in extraordicluding, as not due process of law, acts of narý cases. It is true that domestic corporaattainder, bills of pains, and penalties, acts tions remain always within the power of the of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and domestic law.” Acts done by domestic coracts directly transferring one man's estate poration outside of the United States, which to another, legislative judgments and de- largely depend for their efficacy upon the crees, and other similar special, partial, and co-operation, in a conspiracy to drive a rival arbitrary exertions of power under the forms out of business, of soldiers and officials in of legislation. Arbitrary power, enforcing Costa Rica, acting under governmental sancits edicts to the injury of the persons and tion, in territory over which that state exerproperty of its subjects, is not law, whether cises a de facto sovereignty, cannot be made manifested as the decree of a personal mon
the basis of the action to recover threefold arch or of an impersonal multitude. In re damages authorized by the Sherman AntiMcNaught, 99 Pac. 241, 247, 1 Okl. Cr. 528 Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat, 209, 210, (quoting with approval from Hurtado v. Cal. c. 647) $ 7, on behalf of those injured in their ifornia, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. business by reason of violations of that statEd. 232).
ute. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit The rule that equity will not reform a 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047.
Co., 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 512, 213 U. S. 347, 356, deed on the ground of mistake where the mistake is one of law applies only where the Under Const. art. 6, § 23, making the word "law" is used in the sense of general county court a tribunal of limited jurisdiclaw, or law of the country, and does not ap- tion, and after designating certain matters ply where it is used in the sense of a private of which it shall have cognizance adds and