Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1128, de

"Manslaughter" was properly defined as

fining "manslaughter" as voluntary homicide, "the unlawful killing of a human being withcommitted under the immediate influence out malice, without that black condition of * * * but in sudden heat of of sudden passion arising from adequate the heart, cause, if either sudden passion or adequate passion, on a legal provocation offered by cause, is lacking, the homicide is not man- deceased. slaughter. Burns v. State (Tex.) 145 S. W. 356, 364.

That is to say, if deceased assaulted defendant, and defendant became hot and passionate, and in that condition of the heart he struck and killed deceased, in sudden heat and passion, the law denominates that sort of killing 'manslaughter.'' State v. Hunter, 63 S. E. 685, 687, 82 S. C.

153.

[ocr errors]

"Manslaughter" exists where one person unlawfully kills another without malice, as where one in a sudden affray, in the heat of blood, or in a transport of passion, without malice, inflicts a mortal wound, without time for reflection or for the passion to cool. State v. Brelawski (Del.) 84 Atl. 950, 952.

The true nature of "manslaughter" is that it is a homicide mitigated out of tenderness to the frailty of human nature. Every man, when assailed with violence or great rudeness, is inspired with a sudden impulse of anger, which puts him upon resistance If during before time for cool reflection. that period he attacks his assailant with a weapon likely to endanger life, and death ensues, it is regarded as done through heat of blood, and violence of anger and not through malice. The same rule applies to a homicide in mutual combat, which is attributed to sudden and violent anger occasioned by the combat, and not to malice. Where two meet, not intending to quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs up, in which blows are given on both sides, it is a mutual combat, without much regard to who is the assailant; and if no unfair advantage be taken in the outset, and an occasion is not sought for the purpose of gratify-ed ing malice, and one seizes a weapon and strikes a deadly blow, it is regarded as homicide in the heat of blood, and under our statute is manslaughter in the first degree. Robinson v. Territory, 85 Pac. 451, 456, 16 Okl. 241.

In a prosecution for homicide, where the court discussed at length the difference between murder and "manslaughter" resulting in defense of one's dwelling, and gave numerous illustrations so that the jury could not have been misled, an instruction that "it is 'manslaughter' if sudden heat and passion be aroused because of the wrongful trespass of another upon his home, and if he slays in sudden heat and passion that is 'manslaughter," if not technically correct, is harmless error. State v. Kibler, 60 S. E. 438, 440, 79 S. C. 170.

One who provokes a difficulty without any intention of killing or doing any serious bodily harm, and suddenly and without deliberation and under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause kills another, is guilty of "manslaughter." Cornelius v. State, 112 S. W. 1050, 1055, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 173.

A charge defining "manslaughter" as voluntary homicide committed under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, but neither justified nor excused by law, defining the meaning of its phrases, and stating what was necessary to reduce voluntary homicide to the grade of is not erroneous. Pratt v. manslaughter, State, 127 S. W. 827, 831, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 167.

Where the evidence showed that accused struck decedent, riding in a wagon, with a six-foot binding pole, and that decedent was either knocked off the wagon or fell from it and was fatally injured by a wheel running over him, the court properly charged on manslaughter in the language of the statute, and that the jury could convict accused if they

believed that he struck decedent and knock

him off the wagon, or caused decedent to fall from the wagon, and that a wheel ran over him, and that he died in consequence of such striking and being run over. more v. State, 122 S. W. 493, 494, 92 Ark. 205.

Gil

In the prosecution of an officer for killing deceased while resisting arrest, an instruction that if defendant in good faith believed that he had a right to execute a capias pro fine under which he was seeking to arrest deceased on Sunday, then they should find defendant guilty of manslaughter, was erroneous. Kammerer v. Commonwealth, 125 S. W. 723, 724, 137 Ky. 315,

An instruction that if accused was in such a state of excitement that his reason was dethroned, that he was driven by an uncontrollable impulse so that he was not morally or legally accountable for his conduct, so that he did not realize his crime or what he was doing or where he was, and had gone able to recover himself and his senses, then he would be guilty of no higher crime than manslaughter, was erroneous, as the degree of mental disturbance required was equivalent to insanity. People v. Poole, 123 N. W. 1093, 1094, 159 Mich. 350, 134 Am. St. Rep. 722.

some distance from the scene before he was

Under Rev. St. U. S. § 5341, declaring that every person who unlawfully and willfully but without malice shoots at or otherwise injures another, of which shooting or other injury the person dies, is guilty of manslaughter, an instruction defining manslaughter and omitting the word "willfully"

was erroneous. O'Barr v. United States, 105 | ing, stabbing, wounding, shooting, or otherPac. 988, 989, 3 Okl. Cr. 319, 139 Am. St. wise injuring him, resuting in his death, Rep. 959. without malice. State v. Collingsworth, 92 N. E. 22, 82 Ohio St. 154, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, 137 Am. St. Rep. 775; Miller v. State, 107 Pac. 948, 3 Okl. Cr. 575.

A charge on manslaughter in the language of the statute that every person who shall unlawfully kill any human being, without malice, express or implied, either voluntarily upon a sudden heat or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, shall be guilty of manslaughter is sufficient; the statute containing no technical terms, and being plain and unambiguous, and easily understood by a juror of ordinary intelligence. State v. Quinn, 105 Pac. 818, 821, 56 Wash. 295.

Defendant, a frail feeble man 62 years of age, after having been severely beaten by deceased, went to his residence, obtained a pistol, and, returning, fired two shots, the second of which struck deceased while he was advancing. Deceased took the pistol away from defendant, and beat him with it into insensibility, after which deceased died from his wound. Held, that an instruction that if defendant with a deadly weapon or instrument reasonably calculated to produce death by the mode or manner of its use, in a sudden transport of passion aroused by adequate cause, and not in defense of himself against an unlawful attack reasonably producing a rational fear or expectation of death or serious bodily harm, shot deceased as charged, he was guilty of manslaughter, was proper and warranted by the evidence. Sartin v. State, 103 S. W. 875, 876, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 571.

Defendant, keeper of a bagnio, had trouble with a man therein, and he went out, being immediately followed by deceased and his party. The testimony for the state was that the defendant then called for a pistol, aimed it towards the party, and fired, saying, "Run you * * * run," and that on her going inside, being asked if they ran, she said, "Yes." She and her witnesses tes tified that no shot was fired from the house. Held, that "negligent homicide" was not in the case, but "manslaughter," of which she was convicted, was the lowest grade of homicide of which she could be found guilty; so that any error in the instruction thereon was harmless. Clifton v. State, 84 S. W. 237, 239, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 472.

The mere belief by defendant that he was in danger of having some injury inflicted upon him, without any reasonable grounds for entertaining such belief, has never been recognized by the courts of this state or any other state to which our attention has been called as being sufficient to reduce the grade of the crime from "murder" in the first or second degree to "manslaughter." State v. Clay, 100 S. W. 439, 442, 201 Mo. 679.

"Manslaughter," as defined by the statutes of the United States, consists in the unlawful and willful killing of another by strik

Same-Cooling time

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, either express or implied, and is committed when the death wound is given by accused without malice, on sudden provocation, in the heat of blood or in a transport of passion, on sufficient provocation without time for reflection and deliberation and for the blood to cool. State v. Moore (Del.) 74 Atl. 1112, 1114, 1 Boyce, 142.

If there should appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation given and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and punished as murder. People v. Bissett, 92 N. E. 949, 951, 246 Ill. 516.

In determining whether a homicide is reduced from murder to manslaughter, the question is not only whether accused's passion, engendered by a sufficient provocation, did in fact cool, but also whether the time intervening between the giving of the provocation and the killing was sufficient for the passion of a reasonable man to cool; an affirmative answer to either question precluding a reduction to manslaughter. A killing committed upon a provocation given 9 or 10 months before is not reduced to manslaughter by the passion engendered by such provocation. Ex parte Fraley, 109 Pac. 295, 296, 3 Okl. Cr. 719, 139 Am. St. Rep. 988.

To reduce homicide from the degree of murder to that of manslaughter it must have been committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, and, where a person who is sufficiently wronged by another to arouse in him that heat of passion which, if life were taken immediately, would make the crime manslaughter, after sufficient cooling time has intervened, kills deceased, the homicide will be deemed the result of deliberation; and where defendant was informed by his wife that she had committed adultery with deceased, the first time under violence, searched for deceased, took a journey by train to his home, and shot him 17 hours after he had been first informed, there had been a sufficient cooling time and his acts could not be said to have been committed in such "heat of passion" as would reduce the homicide to manslaughter. People v. Ashland, 128 Pac. 798, 801, 20 Cal. App. 168.

Same-Intent

To reduce homicide to manslaughter, it is not necessary that the intent to kill be formed in a sudden transport of passion, on adequate cause, but it is enough that the mind is excited and not capable of cool re

The rule is well settled that to constitute "manslaughter" it is not necessary that the perpetrator should have intended and willed the death of the person killed. One who willfully uses a deadly weapon upon another will be deemed to intend the necessary and probable consequences of his act. writers divide manslaughter into two degrees, voluntary and involuntary. Tyner v. United States, 103 Pac. 1057, 1058, 2 Okl. Cr.

flection from some adequate cause. Kann- sudden passion, arising from an adequate macher v. State, 101 S. W. 238, 242, 51 Tex. cause, but neither justified nor excused by Cr. R. 118. law. By the expression under the immediate influence of sudden passion is meant: (1) That the provocation must arise at the same time of the commission of the offense, and that the passion is not the result of a former provocation. (2) That the act must be directly caused by the passion arising out of the provocation. It is not enough that the mind is merely agitated by passion arising from some other provocation. (3) The passion intended is either of the emotions of the mind known as anger, rage, sudden resentreflection." Sue v. State, 105 S. W. 804, 809, ment, or terror rendering it incapable of cool 52 Tex. Cr. R. 122.

689.

The text

Intent is not an essential element of the statutory definition of "manslaughter" when committed by culpable negligence, and charges predicated upon the theory that intent is in every case essential to the statutory crime of "manslaughter" are properly refused. Kent v. State, 43 South. 775, 774, 53 Fla. 51. Sand. & H. Dig. § 1660, providing that the killing of a human being without design to effect death, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, unless it be under circumstances that would constitute excusable or justifiable homicide, shall be adjudged manslaughter, is not applicable to a killing with a pistol; the statute being evidently intended to cover a case of homicide committed unintentionally, but with such wanton savagery and cruelty, and in such an unusual manner, as to imply recklessness of design. In one sense, it is true, all killing is cruel; but, in the sense of this statute, killing with such a common or effective instrument of death as a pistol cannot be regarded as cruel; still less is this manner of death unusual. Tanks v. State, 75 S. W. 851, 852, 71 Ark. 459.

In

"Manslaughter' is where one person unlawfully kills another without malice. order to reduce the crime to manslaughter, the provocation must be very great-so great as to produce such a transport of passion as to render the person for the time being deaf to the voice of reason." State v. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966, 971, 5 Pennewill, 24; State v. Tilghman (Del.) 63 Atl. 772, 773, 6 Pennewill, 54; State v. Johns (Del.) 65 Atl. 763, 766, 6 Pennewill, 174; State v. Wiggins (Del.) 76 Atl. 632, 635, 7 Pennewill, 127.

"To reduce unlawful killing from 'murder' to 'manslaughter,' two things must concur: First, conditions must be shown to exist which would be calculated to produce, in the mind of a person of ordinary prudence and self-control, such rage, fury, or terror as would render the mind of the defendant incapable of forming a premeditated design to effect the death of the person slain, or of any other human being; second, it must also be shown that the defendant was in fact, at the in-time of the homicide, laboring under such rage, fury, or terror." Ex parte Smith, 99 Pac. 893, 900, 2 Okl. Cr. 24.

In "manslaughter" there may be an tent to kill existing in the mind of the slayer at the time the fatal shot is fired. Keigans v. State, 41 South. 886, 887, 52 Fla. 57.

Where the intent was merely to inflict chastisement, and death results from some peculiarity in decedent's constitution or other unexpected incident, the killing is manslaughter only. Rosemond v. State, 110 S. W. 229, 230, 86 Ark. 160.

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing

of another without malice, and under certain conditions this crime may be established, though the killing has been both unlawful and intentional. State v. Baldwin, 68 S. E.

148, 151, 152 N. C. 822.

If the intention to kill was formed in defendant's mind, through passion, with adequate cause, and the homicide occurred while the mind was in that condition, it was no higher offense than manslaughter. Dixon v. State, 103 S. W. 399. 401, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 555.

Same-Provocation

"Manslaughter' is voluntary homicide committed under the immediate influence of

To reduce a homicide from murder to "manslaughter," it must be committed in a heat of passion, on a reasonable provocation, without malice and without premeditation, and under circumstances that will not be justifiable or excusable homicide. The passion which will reduce homicide to the degree of manslaughter is an excited state of mind pro

son.

duced by some lawful provocation, such as a blow or an assault of any kind upon the per"Manslaughter," in the fourth degree, includes every homicide not justifiable or excusable which was manslaughter at common law, and which is not excusable or justifiable, or declared by statute to be manslaughter in some other degree. State v. Weakley, 77 S. W. 525, 527, 178 Mo. 413 (quoting and adopting the definitions in Rev. St. 1899, § 3477).

Killing, the result of passion produced by fight, is "manslaughter" if the person upon whom an assault is made with violence resent it immediately by killing the aggres

sor, and act therein in heat of blood and not exclusively in his own defense. State v. Quick, 64 S. E. 168, 169, 170, 150 N. C. 820 (citing State v. Miller, 17 S. E. 167, 112 N. C. 878; State v. Crane, 95 N. C. 619; State v. Tackett, 8 N. C. 210).

The mere belief by defendant that he was in danger of having some injury inflicted upon him, without any reasonable grounds for entertaining such belief, has never been recognized by the courts of this state or any other state to which our attention has been called, as being sufficient to reduce the grade. of the crime from "murder" in the first or second degree to "manslaughter." Clay, 100 S. W. 439, 442, 201 Mo. 679.

State v.

A slight assault does not excuse the killing of an assailant with a deadly weapon, so as to reduce the offense from the grade of murder to that of manslaughter. State v. Wiggins (Del.) 76 Atl. 632, 635, 7 Pennewill, 127; Same v. Borrelli (Del.) 76 Atl. 605, 607, 1 Boyce, 349.

When words of decedent are accompanied by acts showing a purpose to commit violence on accused, as by raising and pointing at him a gun, accused is entitled to an instruction on manslaughter. State v. Crawford, 66 S. E. 110, 115, 66 W. Va. 114.

If the prisoner willingly engaged in a fight with the deceased, and the deceased threw his hand to his hip pocket, and advanced upon the prisoner in a threatening manner, and the prisoner, being willing to fight, seized a pistol, and shot the deceased, and the deceased died from the wound then inflicted by the prisoner, the prisoner would be guilty of "manslaughter," provided the appearance and manner of the deceased were such as to cause the prisoner to believe that the deceased was armed with a deadly weapon, and that the prisoner did believe he was armed with a deadly weapon and was about to harm him with it. State v. Exum, 50 S. E. 283, 289, 138 N. C. 599.

If a convict, while attempting to prevent his punishment by the warden, which amounted to an assault, slew a fellow convict aiding the warden, who was the warden's abettor in committing the assault, the homicide may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter; and it was error to omit to charge on that offense in a prosecution of the convict for murder. Westbrook v. State, 66 S. E. 788, 791, 133 Ga. 578, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 591, 18 Ann. Cas. 295.

Where decedent slapped accused, but did not accompany the act by angry or insulting words, a charge on manslaughter that, if accused killed decedent under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from the act of decedent rendering the mind of accused incapable of cool reflection, he was guilty of manslaughter only, properly submitted the issue of manslaughter. Best v. State, 125 S. W. 909, 913, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 327.

Provocation caused by words only is not sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder to "manslaughter." Petty v. State, 89 S. W. 465, 467, 76 Ark. 515.

Testimony of a statement made by deceased to defendant and to some of defendant's sisters, who were present, that they were bitches, or damn bitches, does not raise the issue of insulting conduct toward a family relative of defendant. Johnson v. State, 84 S. W. 824, 826, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 523.

immediate influence of passion arising in his Where accused killed another under the mind from information given him by his wife to the effect that deceased had used insulting language to her, defendant believing and in good faith acting on the information, such information was to him an adequate cause, reducing the crime to manslaughter, whether the insults had been in fact offered or not. Melton v. State, 83 S. W. 822, 824, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 451.

In a prosecution for manslaughter, wherein it appeared accused killed deceased while endeavoring to gain possession of a house occupied by the deceased, there was evidence that accused, just before the killing, sent his wife to demand possession, and that when she did so deceased asked her if she was going to take the place of her husband, or if she was attending to his business, and said that there was no law that could put him out, and that then her husband called her, and deceased and his brother followed her, cursing accused and calling him vile names. not to raise the issue of manslaughter by reason of insulting conduct towards her, so as to require a charge thereon. Gay v. State, 125 S. W. 896, 901, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 472.

Held

In a prosecution for homicide, an instruction was erroneous which required that, before defendant would be entitled to a reduction of his offense to manslaughter, the jury must believe both that he was led to commit the homicide from learning that decedent had insulted his wife, and also that the decedent had used violent language to and threatened him with bodily harm, since, where the law makes any given fact adequate cause for homicide, a defendant is entitled to an unequivocal instruction that, if such fact is proven, it is adequate cause, and where any one or more issues are raised by the evidence, either of which, if found to be true, would as a fact constitute adequate cause, the jury blend the two and require that the affirmative should be so instructed, and it is error to of both be proved. Barbee v. State, 124 S. W. 961, 967, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 129.

Where a person committing a homicide did so in the belief that decedent had insulted defendant's sisters, the homicide was "manslaughter," if committed upon the first meeting after defendant was apprised of the outrage, whether decedent actually committed.

the insult or not, if the homicide was commit- | wounding, or shooting at or otherwise injurted while defendant was acting under the be- ing another person in any fort, arsenal, etc., lief that decedent was guilty and while labor- of which striking, etc., such person dies. ing under a passion aroused by that belief "Manslaughter' has been defined to be the which rendered his mind incapable of cool re- killing of another without malice, express or flection. Gillespie v. State, 109 S. W. 158, implied, which may be voluntary upon sudden 159, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 167. heat, or involuntary in the commission of some lawful act. Any unlawful and willful killing of a human being without malice is manslaughter, and thus defined it includes a negligent killing which is also willful. 'Manslaughter' occupies the middle ground beexcusable, or justifiable, homicide on the one hand, and murder on the other." United States v. Hart, 162 Fed. 192, 194, 195.. Gross carelessness in the handling of firearms which results in killing a human being is at least "manslaughter." State v. Clardy, 53 S. E. 493, 500, 73 S. C. 340.

If, when he killed decedent, accused was incapable of cool reflection because of decedent's insulting language and conduct toward accused's wife, knowledge of which had just come to him, or if the unwarranted ejection of accused from decedent's house, accompa-tween nied by kicks from decedent, infuriated accused beyond cool reflection, resulting in the killing, the killing was "manslaughter." Holcomb v. State, 113 S. W. 754, 756, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 486.

“If a husband finds his wife committing adultery and under the provocation instantly takes her life, the homicide is only 'manslaughter.'" Thomas v. State, 43 South. 371, 374, 150 Ala. 31 (citing Hooks' Case, 13 South. 767, 99 Ala. 166; McNeill v. State, 15 South. 352, 102 Ala. 121, 48 Am. St. Rep. 17; Dabney v. State, 21 South. 211, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. St. Rep. 92; Williams v. State, 30 South. 484, 130 Ala. 107, 112).

A charge that to reduce a killing to "manslaughter," where passions have been suddenly aroused on a sufficient provocation, it must have been done under the influence of passion promptly acted upon, is not erroneous. Harrison v. State, 40 South. 568, 570, 144 Ala. 20.

The unlawful killing of another without alice is "manslaughter," as where one kills another in a sudden quarrel, in the heat of blood, or in a transport of passion, without alice, inflicts a mortal wound, without time for reflection or for the passions to cool; but to reduce the offense to manslaughter the provocation must be very great, so great as to produce such a transport of passion as to render the person for the time being deaf to the voice of reason. State v. Brooks (Del.) 84 Atl. 225, 228.

Voluntary or involuntary killing

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of another, without malice, upon a sudden heat, or inadvertently, but in the commission of some unlawful act. Boche v. State, 122 N. W. 72, 75, 84 Neb. 845.

V.

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, and without premeditation, and is either voluntary or involuntary. State Blackburn (Del.) 75 Atl. 536, 539, 7 Pennewill, 479; State v. Morahan (Del.) 77 Atl. 488, 489, 7 Pennewill, 494; State v. Woods (Del.) 77 Atl. 490, 491, 7 Pennewill, 499.

"Manslaughter," as defined by Rev. St. § 5341, is the offense of unlawfully and will fully, but without malice, striking, stabbing, 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-18

Under Pen. Code, defining "manslaughter" as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and dividing it into two kinds: (1) Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; (2) involuntary in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution or circumspection-in a prosecution for assault in the first degree, it was error to instruct that, if the jury believed that defendant would have been guilty of manslaughter in case death had resulted, then they should find him guilty of assault in the first degree, since intent is not always a necessary element in the crime crime of assault in the first degree. State of manslaughter, but is the essence of the v. Schaefer, 88 Pac. 792, 793, 35 Mont. 217.

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, and is of two kinds-voluntary (that is, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion); involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act, which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. The instruction was in the language of Pen. Code, § 192. People v. Lee, 108 Pac. 738, 739, 13 Cal. App. 48.

"Manslaughter," as defined by Pen. Code, § 192, is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, first, voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; second, involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due care and circumspection. The causing of death while attempting to commit an abortion does not constitute manslaughter under the statute. Huntington v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 90 Pac. 141, 144, 5 Cal. App. 288.

The approved definition of "manslaughter" as the killing of another without malice, either express or implied, "either unlawfully upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »