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Amendatory Act of 1872, No. 31, p. 79, prescribing the "manner" of adopting children, was intended to cover the whole subject-matter. It says so expressly in its title, "An act providing for the manner of adopting children." Succession of Dupré, 41 South. 324, 326, 116 La. 1090.

person, of one who is "manifestly intending" | adopting People ex rel. Ahrens v. English, or endeavoring by violence or surprise to 29 N. E. 678, 139 Ill. 622, 15 L. R. A. 131). commit a felony on the person of the slayer. "To manifestly intend' an act implies more than mental resolution to do the act. The mental resolution must find some form of expression before it becomes manifest. In cases involving force, the slightest manifestation of intent to do the act would be an attempt in the accomplishment of the act." Taylor v. State, 49 S. E. 303, 307, 121 Ga. 348.

MANIPULATE

Where a petition in an action for injuries to a servant by defects in an elevator alleged that the cable would often catch

and become fast so that it would not respond to the usual and proper force necessary to move it, that at the time of the injury plaintiff found the cable fast, and while attempting to "manipulate" it the cable, because of the elevator's defective condition, suddenly became loose, and caused the elevator to suddenly and violently start, etc., the term "manipulate" should be construed as including both the ordinary pull first applied by plaintiff in his effort to move the elevator and the more forcible one which followed, so that an instruction that if, when plaintiff undertook to use the elevator, the cable had become caught owing to its defective condition, so that it became necessary for him to pull on the cable, and while so pulling the cable suddenly loosened and moved, causing him to fall, etc., was not erroneous as presenting issues not specified in the petition. Zongker v. People's Union Mercantile Co., 86 S. W. 486, 488, 110 Mo. App. 382.

MANNER

See Best Manner; Due Manner; Forcible Manner; Good and Workmanlike

Manner; In a Manner; In Due Manner; Same Manner. Any manner, see Any.

In like manner, see Like Manner.

No general definition of the word "manner," as used in a contract or statute, can be framed. Its meaning must be determined in the light of the particular contract or statute in which it is used. "The manner' of doing a thing has reference to the way of doing to the method of procedure-and the element of time does not seem to be involved." Melsheimer v. McKnight, 46 South. 827, 829, 92 Miss. 386 (quoting definition in

Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 80 N. W. 484, 59 Neb. 170).

"The word 'manner' is usually defined as meaning 'way of performing or executing, method, custom, habitual practice,' etc." Livesley v. Litchfield, 83 Pac. 142, 143, 47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920 (quoting and

The use of the word "manner," in Laws 1907, p. 426, c. 267, § 1 (Gen. St. 1901, § 5974), empowering the board of railroad commissioners to determine whether there is any necessity for a railroad crossing by a street car line and, if so, the place thereof, and in other respects the "manner" of such crossing, fairly implies the right to make any reasonable requirement having relation to the safe crossing of both roads. State v. Parsons St. Ry. & Electrical Co., 105 Pac. 704, 705, 81 Kan. 430, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082 (citing 33 Cyc. p. 296).

Under Rev. St. Ohio 1880, §§ 3270, 3281, 3283, which invest railroad companies directly with the right to appropriate and use the streets of a city for railroad purposes by condemnation proceedings, unless the company and the municipal authorities agree "upon the manner, terms, and conditions upon which the same may be used or occupied," construed in the light of the settled rule in Ohio that municipal corporations possess such powers only as are expressly granted by statute or are implied as essential to the exercise of granted powers, and of section 3375, authorizing railroad companies for hauls of less than 30 miles to receive such rates as may be from time to time fixed by the company or by law, the power given to a municipal corporation by section 3283 to agree upon the manner, terms, and conditions upon which streets may be used is limited to such agreement as relates directly to such use and occupation, and a provision in an ordinance prescribing rates to be charged by a belt line road for hauls over its entire line, less than 30 miles long, as a condition to granting right of way over the streets for a part of its line, is ultra vires and void. T. B. Townsend Brick & Contracting Co. v. Central Trust Co. of New York, 187 Fed. 63, 67, 109 C. C. A. 381.

As extent

The term "extent" does not ordinarily mean "manner." Hence under Laws 1901, p. 294, c. 125, § 3, providing that, if any purchaser of public land shall fail to reside upfeit it and all payments to the same extent on and improve it in good faith, he shall foras for non payment of interest, the mere failure to reside on and improve the land does not work a forfeiture ipso facto, as was had under Laws 1895, c. 47, § 11, p. 67, providing that, if such purchaser shall fail to reside upon and improve in good faith public land purchased by him, he shall forfeit it in the

same manner as for nonpayment of interest. Adams v. Terrell, 107 S. W. 537, 538, 101 Tex. 331.

As method or way

The word "manner" in the Australian ballot law, regulating the "manner" of holding elections, has the ordinary meaning of mode, method, way of effecting a result. Getty v. Holcomb, 99 Pac. 218, 219, 79 Kan.

224.

the way in which it shall be enjoyed, whether directly or in trust, immediately or at a postponed date, and other like matters, and hence the provision of her will excluding two grandchildren in a per capita distribution of the fund was invalid. Cameron v. Crowley, 65 Atl. 875, 877, 72 N. J. Eq. 681.

The word "manner" means the handling of a thing, and, as used in the constitutional provision which directs the allowance of appeals from justices "in such manner as may from judgments of justices shall be allowed by such handling of the subject as may be prescribed by law. Duncan v. Baltimore &

be prescribed by law," means that appeals

Ann. Cas. 1912B, 272.

In Const. art. 7, § 6, providing that each county may sell or dispose of its lands in whole or in part in manner to be provided by the commissioner's court of the county, "'manner' is the controlling word in the phrase and designates what the commission-0. R. Co., 69 S. E. 1004, 1006, 68 W. Va. 293, er's court might provide for. Webster defines 'manner' as 'mode of action, way of performing or effecting anything, method'; and the courts have given to that word its signification as defined by Webster." Logan v. Stephens County, S3 S. W. 365, 367, 98 Tex. 283 (citing People ex rel. Ahrens v. English, 29 N. E. 678, 139 Ill. 629, 15 L. R. A. 131; Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 54, 15 Am. Rep. 563; Brown v. O'Connell, 36 Conn. 447, 4 Am. Rep. 89).

Rev. St. 1899, § 5498, provides that it is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of the grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or of a petit jury in the trial of a case, or of any court or judge while acting within their legitimate province in a lawful manner, by habeas corpus. Held, that the word "manner" had reference to the method of acting, and not to the degree of perfection or correctness in the results arrived at, unless the judgment pronounced was absolutely void. Hovey v. Sheffner, 93 Pac. 305, 30S, 18 Wyo. 254, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 125 Am. St. Rep. 1037, 15 Ann. Cas.

318.

Webster defines "manner" as: "Mode

of action; way of performing or effecting anything: method; style; form or fashion." The Century Dictionary, as: "The way in which an action is performed; method of doing anything; mode of proceeding in any case or situation; mode; way; method." In a statute the expression in permitting introduction of an instrument whether proved or acknowledged in such "manner" or not was intended to have the same force and effect as the same expression had in an old statute which was superseded, where it had been held to apply not only to the formality of certifying what was done by the officer but as well to the power of the officer to take the acknowledgment. Bledsoe Haney, 122 S. W. 455, 457, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 285.

V.

The word "manner," in a will authoriz ing testator's daughter by her will to dispose of a fund to and among his grandchildren in such shares and in such manner as she shall think right and proper, does not imply a power of selecting, but has reference to

The petition in an action for injuries to a servant by derailment of a train alleged that plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendant's negligence, in that the engine and train were old, worn, out of repair, and unsuited for the purposes for which they were being used, and also in the manner and way the engine and cars were being operated. Held, that the words "manner and way" imported either the speed of the train, or something connected with the management and operation thereof, and that the words to that which was being done by the em"were being operated" necessarily referred ployés on the engine and cars at the time of the accident, so that such allegations were insufficient to justify the submission of an issue of negligence on defendant's part in directing the train to be run over the road as fast as 10 miles an hour. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Poole (Tex.) 133 S. W. 239, 240.

The word "manner," in the specifications of an article sought to be patented that “in making brushes by my improved method above described, the brush-back or frame may be made of any desired material and in any known 'manner,'" refers to the form and shape of the brush-back or frame when which it is made. Universal Brush Co. v. completed, and not solely to the way in Sonn, 146 Fed. 517, 520.

An information charging that defendant unlawfully, in the presence and hearing of D., did curse and swear at him, and did abuse him "in a manner" reasonably calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, sufficiently charged an offense under Pen. Code 1895, art. 599, prohibiting any person from abusing another, "under circumstances" reasonably calculated to provoke a breach of the peace. Trezevant v. State, 84 S. W. 828, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 502.

Of appointment or expulsion

The legislative authority given by Const. Or. art. 6, § 7, to prescribe the time and "manner" in which municipal officers may be elected or appointed, does not include the power to determine the qualifications of a

legal voter authorized to vote for such offi- ' cers. Livesley v. Litchfield, 83 Pac. 142, 144, 47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920.

In insurance law, § 70, providing that the charter of an insurance company shall state the mode and "manner" in which its corporate powers are to be exercised, the

In Const. §§ 15, 16, art. 7 (Bunn's Ed. §§ 187, 188), providing that appeals shall be taken from the county court to the Supreme the district court, the word "manner" as so Court in the same "manner" as appeals from used, as well as in different provisions of

the Constitution and the statutes, may mean "time" or would include "time." Atchison,

"manner" of electing its directors, officers, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Love, 99 Pac. 1081,

etc., the word "manner," while more comprehensive in its meaning and uses than either the word "method" or "mode," may with much reason be held to mean in that connection the procedure of electing directors and officers, rather than a definition of the classes in whom the suffrage should lie. Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 96 N. Y. Supp. 10, 27, 109 App. Div. 252.

Gen. St. 1901, § 7502, provides that all property not expressly exempted shall be subject to taxation "in the manner provided in this act." Laws 1907, c. 408, § 1, defines the word "property" as used in the act relating to taxation to include every kind of property subject to ownership. Held, that the clause "in the manner provided in this act" relates to the method of imposing taxes upon property already declared to be subject to taxation, and does not limit the taxation to the kinds of property specially named in the act, and the finished product of manufacturers, not being exempted, is taxable though not mentioned in the act. State v. Holcomb, 106 Pac. 1030, 1033, 81 Kan. 879, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 251.

As applicable to time

The word "manner," in Court and Practice Act 1905, p. 139, § 490, providing that notice of the filing of bills of exceptions shall be given to the adverse part "in such manner" as the court shall by rule prescribe, is broad enough to include "time." Court and Practice Act 1905, p. 139, § 490, provides that notice of the filing of bills of exceptions shall be given to the adverse party "in such manner" as the court shall by rule prescribe, and section 34 authorizes the Supreme and superior court to promulgate rules regulating practice in matters not expressly provided for by law. Superior Court Rule 32 declares that notice in writing of the filing of a bill of exceptions shall be given by the party filing the same to the adverse party within two days thereafter, which shall be served on the adverse party's attorney of record in the manner specified. Held, that a failure to serve notice of the filing of a bill of exceptions within the time prescribed by rule 32 was a jurisdictional defect justifying a dismissal of the bill under section 491, p. 140, declaring that, in any case of default in taking such procedure, judgment shall be entered or sentence imposed as if notice of intention to prosecute a bill of exceptions had not been filed. Smith v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 65 Atl, 610, 611, 28 R. I. 91.

1086, 23 Okl. 192.

Whether the word "manner" or the phrase in the same manner may include the elements of time has been answered by the courts both in the affirmative and in the negative. The word as used in the phrase "in the same manner," in Act Cong. March 3, 1905, c. 1479, § 12, does not include the element of time. Porter v. Brook, 97 Pac. 645, 647, 648, 21 Okl. 885.

The phrase "manner of performance" as used in the labor law (Laws 1906, p. 1395, c. 506) § 3, limiting a day's work on public work by or for municipal corporations to eight hours, and prohibiting municipal officers from paying "for work done upon any contract, which in its form or manner of performance violates the provisions of" said section, refers among other things, to the number of hours per diem that laborers are allowed to work. People ex rel. Williams Engineering & Contracting Co. v. Metz, 85 N. E. 1070, 1073, 193 N. Y. 148, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201, order affirmed on rehearing (1909) 86 N. E. 986, 194 N. Y. 145.

Act Cong. Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 2, provides for the exclusion from the United States of various classes of persons, including idiots, insane persons, beggars, persons afflicted with dangerous contagious diseases, persons having been convicted of crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists, anarchists, prostitutes, or persons coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution, and persons who are supported by or receive part of the proceeds of prostitution. Section 3 in the original act, and as amended (Act March 26, 1910, c. 128, § 2), relates exclusively to the importation of aliens for the purposes of prostitution, or other immoral purposes, the holding of such persons for such purposes in pursuance of such importation, and aliens found inmates of houses of prostitution after they have entered the United States, or who derive benefit from the earnings of the same. Sections 20 and 21 provide that such persons shall be deported if proceedings therefor are begun within three years, and both sections 2 and 3 contain the remedy to be applied, viz., deportation "in the manner provided" in sections 20 and 21. Held, that the words "in the manner provided" did not include the three-year limitations contained in sections 20 and 21, and, Congress having eliminated such limitation from section 3, aliens within such section were subject to deportation,

though arrested after they had been in the country more than three years. Chomel v. United States, 192 Fed. 117, 118, 112 C. C. A. 461.

of voting

The constitutional authority given the Legislature to prescribe the "time and manner" in which municipal officers may be elected or appointed does not include the

power to determine what shall constitute a

legal voter. Livesley v. Litchfield, 83 Pac. 142, 143, 47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920.

State v. Reese (Del.) 79 Atl. 217, 221, 2 Boyce, 434; State v. Collins (Del.) 62 Atl. 224, 226, 5 Pennewill, 263; State v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147, 148, 5 Pennewill, 192; State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077, 1079, 5 Pennewill, 339; State v. Miele (Del.) 74 Atl. 8, 10, 1 Boyce, 33; State v. Tinkler, 83 Pac. 830, 831, 72 Kan. 262; State v. Phinney, 89 Pac. 634, 13 Idaho, 307, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 12 Ann.

Cas. 1079; State v. Uzzo (Del.) 65 Atl. 775777, 6 Pennewill, 212; State v. Lance, 63 S. E. 198, 200, 149 N. C. 551; State v. Short (Del.) 82 Atl. 239, 242, 2 Boyce, 491; Mixon

MANNER DIRECTED OR PRESCRIB- v. State, 68 S. E. 315, 316, 7 Ga. App. 805.

ED BY LAW

Under Code 1904, art. 93, § 33, which de- | clares that in granting administration with the will annexed the residuary legatee or legatees shall be perferred, and directs the orphans' court to proceed in the manner directed by law with respect to executors within the state before administration with the will annexed shall be granted to any other person, the phrase "in the manner directed by law" relates to the provisions of sections 32 and 33, relative to notice; and, where the executor named in the will declined to act, the residuary legatee was the person next entitled, and a person who, in addition to a bequest of the residue of the estate after the death of another, was given a remainder in a specific part of the estate, is a "residuary legatee," and hence on petitions by such legatee and by a creditor the court could not Mcgrant administration to the creditor. Caughey v. Byrne, 80 Atl. 653, 654, 115 Md. 85.

The term "manner prescribed by law," as used in the Constitution of Washington, giving the owner of property sought to be condemned the right to have the amount of his compensation determined by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases, in the "manner prescribed by law," means that the law in force at the time the condemnation proceedings are instituted, and not that in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is to be resorted to in determining whether a jury trial is waived or not. Chelan County v. Navarre, 80 Pac. 845, 847, 38 Wash. 684.

MANSLAUGHTER

"Manslaughter" is defined to be the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, and without premedState v. Brinte (Del.) 58 Atl. 258, itation.

262, 4 Pennewill, 551.

The term "manslaughter" has become a generic term, covering two specific offenses or degrees of homicide, punishable, the one under the statute by confinement in the penitentiary, and the other under the common law, by fine and imprisonment in jail. The common-law learning of the text-writers upon the offense of "manslaughter" can have no place in the definition of the two degrees of homicide which have been carved out of manslaughter by the effect of our statute, however apt such learning may have been under the ancient practice, when the punishment of both grades was a matter resting in the discretion of the judge. Brown v. Commonwealth, 92 S. W. 542, 544, 122 Ky. 626.

Rev. St. 1899, § 1825, declaring any one who shall administer drugs to, or shall employ an instrument on, a pregnant woman, with intent to destroy the foetus or child of said pregnant woman, guilty of manslaughter, is invalid in so far as it attempts to declare manslaughter, which necessarily imports a homicide to have been committed, when the death of neither the child nor the mother results from the act charged. State v. Hartley, 84 S. W. 910, 185 Mo. 669, 105 Am. St. Rep. 608.

As felonious homicide

See Felonious Homicide.
Voluntary killing

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice either express or implied, and must be voluntary upon See Assault with Intent to Commit Man- a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provoslaughter; Involuntary Manslaughter; cation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible. Duckworth v. State, 97 S. Voluntary Manslaughter. Willful manslaughter, see Willful-Will- W. 280, 281, 80 Ark. 360; State v. Primrose (Del.) 77 Atl. 717, 719, 2 Boyce, 164; State fully. See, also, under the Immediate Influence v. Brown, 60 S. E. 945, 946, 79 S. C. 390; of Sudden Passion.

"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, either express or implied. State v. Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036, 1038, 5 Pennewill, 126; State v. Ireland, 83 Pac. 1036, 1038, 72 Kan. 265;

State v. Borrelli (Del.) 76 Atl. 605, 607, 1
Boyce, 349; Commonwealth v. Curcio, 65 Atl.
792–794, 216 Pa. 380; State v. Foster, 45 S.
E. 1, 3, 66 S. C. 469.

"Manslaughter" is where one person kills another without malice, as in a sudden af

A killing wholly the result of passion

fray, in the heat of blood, or in a transport of passion, without cooling time or time for and without malice is manslaughter. Brewreflection. State v. Russo (Del.) 77 Atl. 743, er v. State, 49 South. 336, 339, 160 Ala. 66. 746, 1 Boyce 538; State v. Roberts (Del.) 78 If there was a sudden, impulsive killing, Atl. 305, 310, 2 Boyce, 140; State v. Adams due to passion suddenly aroused-furor brev(Del.) 65 Atl. 510, 511, 6 Pennewill, 178; is-it was "manslaughter." State v. Taylor, State v. Underhill (Del.) 69 Atl. 880, 882, 650 S. E. 247, 252, 57 W. Va. 228. Pennewill, 491; State v. Jackson (Del.) 82 Atl. 824, 825. Manslaughter is where the homicide is willful and unlawful, but is committed un"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing der such circumstances of provocation or alof a human being without malice, express leviation as to rebut the implication of malor implied, and without any mixture of de-ice. State v. Harmon (Del.) 60 Atl. 866-868, liberation whatever. It must be voluntary, 4 Pennewill, 580. upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the "The distinguishing quality of 'manpassion irresistible. In "voluntary man- slaughter' is that the mind must be so agislaughter" there must be a serious and high- tated by reason of the conduct that it is inof cool ly provoking injury inflicted upon the per- capable reflection." Venters V. son killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible State, 83 S. W. 832, 836, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 280. passion in a reasonable person, or an at"Manslaughter" is defined by the stattempt by the person killed to commit a seri- ute in Indian Territory as a voluntary act ous personal injury on the person killing. upon a sudden heat of passion caused by The killing must be the result of that sud-provocation apparently sufficient to make the den, violent impulse of passion supposed to be irresistible. People v. Bissett, 92 N. E. 949, 951, 246 Ill. 516.

Where the act of killing another is done in sudden heat and passion, or sudden affray, and without previous malice and not in necessary self-defense, accused is guilty of manslaughter. Combs v. Commonweath (Ky.) 112 S. W. 658, 659.

"Manslaughter" is voluntary homicide committed under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate 'cause, but neither justified nor excused by law. Sue v. State, 105 S. W. 804, 809, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 122.

A homicide in sudden passion excited by sufficient provocation without malice is "manslaughter," not because the law supposes that the passion made the slayer unconscious of what he was about to do, but because it presumes that passion disturbs his reason. McBryde v. State, 47 South. 302, 305, 156 Ala.

44.

Every killing upon a rash and inconsiderate impulse is not "manslaughter"; an adequate cause rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection being essential to reduce an unlawful killing to manslaughter. Potts

v. State, 118 S. W. 535, 538, 56 Tex. Cr. R.

39.

To reduce a killing which would otherwise be murder to manslaughter, there must, under the statute, have been both passion and adequate cause to produce it. Hatchell v. State, 84 S. W. 234, 236, 47 Tex. Cr. R. BSO.

Under Pen. Code, § 254, homicide is manslaughter," when perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in heat of passion. State v. Stumbaugh, 132 N. W. 666, 668, 28 S. D. 50.

passion irresistible, and it is further described as a killing in the commission of an unlawful act without malice or in the prosecution of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection. Carney v. United States, 104 S. W. 606, 7 Ind. T. 247.

"Intentional killing is 'manslaughter' if it is committed under and by reason of a passion caused by what the law deems sufficient provocation. The law does not merely look to see if a man was provoked and enraged, and, if so, reduce his crime to manslaughter; but it also looks at the provocation, and does not excuse him at all if it was inadequate to excite his passion. The provocation must be sufficient, in the eye of the law, or it is murder." State v. White, 51 S. E. 44, 50, 138 N. C. 704 (quoting and adopting definition in Clark, Cr. Law, p. 198).

An instruction that "manslaughter" is the unlawful killing of another without malice, express or implied, and that the person committing the act must not be in fault, is not erroneous, where the judge further charged, in other words, that the killing must be on sufficient provocation. State v. Reeder, 51 S. E. 702, 703, 72 S. C. 223.

"Manslaughter" is the killing of another in the heat of passion without malice by the use of a dangerous weapon without authority of law and not a necessary self-defense. This was the definition given by the trial court and held not erroneous on appeal. Moore v. State, 38 South. 504, 505, 86 Miss. 160.

Where one, under the influence of sudden passion arising from some adequate cause, and not actuated by malice, while not acting in self-defense, and intending to kill another, kills a different person, the offense is manslaughter. McCullough v. State, 136 S. W. 1055, 1056, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 126.

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