474). "Larceny" and "false pretenses" are dis- Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111, 13 Am. Rep. tinguishable, in that in larceny the owner does not intend to part with his property to accused, though he may intend to part with possession; while in false pretenses he does intend to part with his title. People v. Grider, 110 Pac. 586, 588, 13 Cal. App. 703. The distinction between "false pretenses" and "larceny" is that in the former the owner parts with the possession and title of property by reason of false and fraudulent representations knowingly and designedly made, while in the latter the owner of the property stolen must not have intended to part with the title to it. People v. Proctor, 82 Pac. 551, 552, 1 Cal. App. 521. One who went to a wholesale cigar store, and, giving an assumed name, falsely represented that he had come to get cigars for a retail dealer, and thereby procured the cigars and converted them to his own use, was guilty of "larceny," since the wholesaler intended to deliver him merely the possession of the goods for the retailer, and not to sell them to him personally, and was not guilty of "obtaining property by impersonating another," within the meaning of Rev. St. 1899, § 1900. State v. Kosky, 90 S. W. 454, 457, 191 Mo. 1. Where defendant induced R., who had "Where, by means of fraud, conspiracy, previously been employed by a dray company or artifice, possession of the property is ob- authorized to receive goods for a consignee tained with felonious intent, and the title of certain shoes, and who was known to the still remains in the owner, 'larceny' is es- servants of the carrier holding such goods tablished, while the crime is 'false pretenses' | for delivery, to go to the freight depot of if the title, as well as possession, is absolute- the carrier in Illinois after his employment ly parted with." People v. Delbos, 81 Pac. 131, 132, 146 Cal. 734 (quoting and adopting definition in People v. Rae, 6 Pac. 1, 66 Cal. 425, 56 Am. Rep. 102). Where possession of personal property is obtained from the owner by fraud, trick, or device, and the owner intends to part with both possession and the title when he surrenders control of the property, the offense is obtaining property by "false pretenses"; but if the possession is fraudulently secured, and the owner does not intend to part with the title, the offense is "larceny." Beckwith v. Galice Mines Co., 93 Pac. 453, 455, 50 Or. 542, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 723. "If the possession has been obtained by fraud, trick, or device, and the owner of it intends to part with his title when he gives up possession, the offense, if any, is obtaining money by 'false pretenses.' But where the possession has been obtained through a trick or device, with the intent, at the time the party receives it, to convert the same to his own use, and the owner of the property parts with the possession and not with the title, the offense is larceny.'' Where a person gave money to another as a stakeholder on a bet, such delivery having been brought about by fraud and artifice of the stakeholder, who intended to appropriate the money in any event, and who did so, the offense was "larceny." State v. Ryan, 82 Pac. 703, 706, 47 Or. 338, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 862 (quoting and adopting the statement in People v. Tomlinson, 36 Pac. 506, 507, 102 Cal. 19, 23). If the owner of property part with not only the possession but with the right of property also, the offense of the party obtaining the property will not be larceny, but will be that of obtaining goods by "false pretenses." Zink v. People, 77 N. Y. 114, 128, 33 Am. Rep. 589 (adopting definition in by the dray company had terminated, and procure a load of shoes from the carrier, and R. obtained such shoes, and delivered them to a person other than the consignee in Missouri, such act constituted "larceny," and not "false pretenses," and was therefore punishable under Rev. St. 1899, § 2362, providing that every person who shall steal the property of another in any other state and shall bring the same into Missouri may be convicted and punished for larceny as though the property was stolen in Missouri. State v. Mintz, 88 S. W. 12, 16, 189 Mo. 268. If According to Pen. Code, § 528, "larceny" includes every act which was larceny at common law, and in addition such acts as formerly constituted "false pretenses" and "embezzlement." At common law, if a person honestly and in good faith received possession of personal property in trust, and thereafter converted the same to his own use, he was guilty of "embezzlement." he obtained possession of the property by fraud, the owner intending nevertheless to part with the title as well as the possession, the offense was obtaining property under "false pretenses." If the possession was wrongfully or fraudulently obtained, without the owner's consent, and without color of title, and with a felonious intent of converting the property to the use of the taker or another, the offense was "larceny." People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 99 N. Y. Supp. 138, 144, 145, 113 App. Div. 329 (citing People v. Miller, 62 N. E. 418, 169 N. Y. 350, 88 Am. St. Rep. 546). Prosecutor applied to defendant for a position, who introduced him to A. to arrange the terms of his employment. A. required prosecutor to deposit $50 as a guaranty of his honesty, to be returned on termination of his employment; but defendant on the next day told prosecutor that, as $400 or $500 would pass through prosecutor's hands every day, he must deposit $150 more, | much a crime to steal one person's property which he did. Defendant pretended to give as another's. The ownership of the property him a receipt for this money, which, instead, is not an essential ingredient of the crime, was a bill of sale for a one-half interest in so long as it appears that the title to the the rooming house business conducted by the same is not in the accused. The crime is concern. Prosecutor worked for $15 per complete when it appears that the property week for three or four weeks, during which feloniously taken or appropriated was not time he drew $15.75, and, becoming dissatis- the property of the accused. People v. Mead, fied, demanded the return of his money, 109 N. Y. Supp. 163, 164, 125 App. Div. 7. which defendant refused to pay him, and "Larceny' is the felonious stealing, takthen prosecutor discovered that his receipt ing, carrying, leading, or driving away the therefor was a bill of sale. Held that, prose-personal property of another," and an indictcutor never having intended to part with the ment charging defendant with willfully, etc., title to the money so deposited, defendant, taking from the person and possession of having acquired the same by fraud, with the prosecutors said money, was insufficient in felonious intent to convert it to his own not charging that the property was not that use, was guilty of "larceny," and not "false of defendant. People v. Cleary, 81 Pac. 753, pretenses." State v. Buck, 84 S. W. 951, 1 Cal. App. 50. 952, 186 Mo. 15, 2 Ann. Cas. 1007 (citing Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325; People v. Morse, 2 N. E. 45, 99 N. Y. 662; People v. Dunmar, 13 N. E. 325, 106 N. Y. 502; People v. Miller, 62 N. E. 418, 169 N. Y. 339, 88 Am. St. Rep. 546; People v. Gottschalk, 20 N. Y. Supp. 777, 66 Hun, 64). As felony See Felony. Force and arms Though an indictment charged that accused "with force and arms" stole a horse, those words should have been omitted from the instructions, for, neither force nor arms being an element of the offense, their use in the indictment was unnecessary. Walklate v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 118 S. W. 314, 315. Gambling distinguished One who has taken an estray and is in possession thereof has such property interest therein that the taking of it from him may be "larceny"; so, also, one in possession of stolen property purchased from the thief; so, also, a thief, in possession of property he has stolen, as against another than the owner. Maxwell v. Territory, 85 Pac. 116, 10 Ariz. 1. Pen. Code. § 484, defines "larceny" as the felonious stealing, etc., of personal property of another. Held, that the phrase "personal property of another," as SO used, means property in the possession of another who is entitled, as baflee or otherwise to retain possession for some benefit or profit to himself to the exclusion of all others, and not absolute ownership as defined by Civ. Code, § 679, so that a taking of heifer by the general owner thereof from the possession of an agister entitled to hold the same under a lien for pasturage, with the intent to deprive the latter thereof, constituted "larceny." People v. Cain, 93 Pac. 1037, 1039, 7 Cal. App. 163. The obtaining of money under pretext of betting at cards and the best hand win-a ning, but where in fact prosecuting witness had no chance to win, and was the only player who actually risked anything, is with in Comp. Laws 1907, § 4355, defining "larceny" as the felonious taking of the property of another, and such a game cannot be held to constitute gambling merely. State v. Donaldson, 99 Pac. 447, 449, 35 Utah, 96, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1164, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1041. As infamous crime See Infamous Crime. As misdemeanor See Misdemeanor. Property of another To constitute "larceny," the thing stolen must be the property of another; but either general or special ownership may be sufficient. State v. Roswell, 133 S. W. 99, 100, 153 Mo. App. 338. "Larceny" consists in two essential elements: First, the misappropriation; and, second, the accompanying intent. Evidence of ownership is therefore admissible, even necessary, in proving the misappropriation, since one may not usually wrongfully appropriate his own property. But it is as Robbery as including Robbery distinguished Riot synonymous See Riot. Steal See Steal. Theft synonymous "Larceny" is the felonious stealing and carrying away, etc., of the personal property of another, every larceny including a trespass to the possession, which cannot exist unless the property was in the possession of the person from whom it is charged to have been stolen. People v. Hoban, 88 N. E. 806, 807, 240 Ill. 303, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1132, 16 Ann. Cas. 226. * * * "To constitute 'larceny' there must be a trespass in the taking. It is not necessary that the taking be by force or stealth. If possession is obtained by fraud with intent to convert the property to the use of the taker, and it is so converted, 'larceny' may be charged." Where E. and defendants conspired to steal the funds of a labor union, and to that end procured the election of E. as recording secretary of the union, and pursuant to his duty as such recording secretary he drew money from a bank to be forwarded to the district and national organizations, and carried the money on his person until late in the evening, when pursuant to the conspiracy he pretended to have been held up and robbed, the crime was not "larceny" because of the absence of a felonious taking. State v. Cothern, 115 N. W. 890, 891, 138 Iowa, 236. "At common law and under the statute, in larceny' there must be a trespass. Where the ownership of property is not parted with and by a fraud or trick the possession of the property is obtained and is converted to the use of the taker without the consent of the owner, and at the time of resorting to the trick or fraud to obtain the possession it was intended to take the property and permanently deprive the owner of it, this would constitute larceny' at common law as well as under the statute." State v. Copeman, 84 S. W. 942, 945, 186 Mo. 108 (citing 1 Bish. New Cr. Law, § 585; State v. Murphy, 90 Mo. App. 548; Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322, 23 Am. Rep. 123; State v. Vickery, 19 Tex. 326). LARCENY AFTER TRUST DELEGATED If a person, fraudulently intending to get possession of the money of another and appropriate the same to his own use, by false representations induces the owner to deliver the money to him for the purpose of being applied for the owner's use or benefit, and then appropriates it in pursuance of the original intent, he is guilty of both "larceny" after trust delegated and simple larceny, and may be prosecuted for, and convicted of, either offense. Martin v. State, 51 S. E. 334, 123 Ga. 478. LARCENY BY BAILEE See, also, Bailee. The language of Mills' Ann. St. § 1256, defining “larceny" by a bailee converting money, etc., "he shall be deemed guilty of larceny in the same manner as if the original taking had been felonious, and on conviction shall be punished accordingly," makes the conversion by a bailee with intent to steal the exact equivalent of a felonious stealing, taking, and carrying away. Quinn v. People, 75 Pac. 396, 397, 32 Colo. 135. LARCENY BY FALSE PRETENSES LARCENY FROM THE HOUSE House as element of, see House. Under Pen. Code 1895, § 178, providing that "larceny from the house" is the breaking or entering any house with intent to steal, or after breaking or entering said house stealing therefrom anything of value, the offense can be committed in four different ways. It may consist in the breaking of a house with intent to steal, provided the offense is not burglary; entering any house with intent to steal; breaking a house and stealing therefrom, where it can be accomplished without entry or entering and stealing. Section 182 defines two classes of "larceny from the house" and distinguishes them. It provides that "any person breaking and entering any house or building (other than a dwelling house or its appurtenances) with intent to steal, but is detected and prevented from carrying such intent into effect or in stealing any of the articles therein contained." The section then provides that "any person breaking or entering any such house or building and stealing therefrom any money, goods, chattels, wares or merchandise or any other article of value shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This second division of the section is subdivided into thefts where there is a breaking and entering in order to accomplish the theft, and where there is no breaking, but merely an entrance into the building and a theft is accomplished. But in both cases a theft must actually be committed. Under the first portion of section 182, as in the first clause of section 178, where a house other than a dwelling house and its appurtenances is broken and entered with intent to steal, and the offender is detected, he is guilty of "larceny from the house," though nothing be taken. Glaze v. State, 58 S. E. 1126, 1127, 2 Ga. App. 704. LARCENY FROM THE PERSON Included in robbery, see Robbery. The crime of "larceny from the person" (B. & C. Comp. § 1800) is a compound larceny consisting of simple larceny (section 1798) aggravated by the circumstance of taking the property from the person of another in which the value of the property is not an ingredient of the offense, as in case of simple larceny. State v. Reyner, 91 Pac. 301, 302, 50 Or. 224. of The act of pocket picking is the offense "larceny of the person." State v. Whitten, 92 N. E. 79, 80, 82 Ohio St. 174. The two elements peculiar to "larceny" from the person in the nighttime are that it must be "from the person" and "in the nighttime"; and, upon information for larceny from the person in the nighttime, a verdict of larceny from "a" person in the nighttime is insufficient. State v. McGee, 80 S. W. 899, 900, 181 Mo. 312. lust, depending upon the purposes or feelings of the person who is guilty of such indecency or impropriety. Indecency of conduct may tend to prove lasciviousness, but when lasciviousness is proven an unchaste character is thereby established. State v. Hummer, 104 N. W. 722, 724, 128 Iowa, 505. lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, print, or Rev. St. § 3893, declares every obscene, other publication of an indecent character, or notices giving information for obtaining such publications, to be nonmailable matter, and prescribes a punishment for the use of the mails to transmit or circulate the same. Held, that the words "obscene," "lewd," and "lascivious," as used in such section, signify that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, having the same meaning as is given them at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel. Hanson v. United States, 157 Fed. 749, 750, 85 C. C. A. 325. A complaint for injury to a pedestrian while passing along a sidewalk on a dark night by running into a stone, in alleging that the city had permitted a "large" stone, unguarded and unprotected, to remain along the sidewalk, at the edge thereof, for a long "Lasciviousness" is defined as wantontime prior to the accident, and that it was the city's duty to guard against the danger. 722,723, 128 Iowa, 505 (citing Ex parte ness or lewdness. State v. Hummer, 104 N. by erecting barriers, is insufficient; it not showing the size or location of the stone, or how long it had been there, so as to make it clear that it was the city's duty to maintain barriers. The word "large," as here used, like "along" and "edge," is a relative term. It does not indicate the size or character of the stone, except in a comparative sense. City of Vincennes v. Spees, 74 N. E. 277, 280, 35 Ind. App. 389. LARGE CONSUMER Doran, 32 Fed. 76; United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 732; United States v. Durant, 46 Fed. 753; State v. Lawrence, 27 N. W. 126, 19 Neb. 307). LAST See Same as Last. LAST ADJUSTED VALUATION Under Act April 12, 1905 (P. L. 142), providing for the levy of a road tax on "the last adjusted valuation" for county purposes, there is no such valuation until the county commissioners have corrected the assessor's return, and the board of revision has given the taxpayers opportunity to object. H. C. Frick Coke Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 71 Atl. 930, 931, 222 Pa. 451. The term "large consumer," used in a contract between a city and a water company providing that the cost of furnishing water to manufacturers and large consumers was to be estimated according to the size of the establishment, does not mean persons taking water for ordinary family use, where such persons are fully covered by a schedule based on houses having a certain number of rooms and occupied by different numbers of fami- The "last county assessment," contemlies, but contemplates concerns like manu-plated by Kirby's Dig. § 5683, providing that factories, which differ more or less from instances specifically provided for. Berends v. Bellevue Water & Fuel Gaslight Co., 82 S. W. 983, 984, 119 Ky. 8. LARRY A "larry" is a kind of car used to haul coal from a coal mine tipple to coke ovens, and from which larry ovens are charged with coal. Hairston v. United States Coal and Coke Co., 66 S. E. 473, 66 W. Va. 324. LASCIVIOUS See, also, Lewdness. Character usually cannot be characterized as lascivious, wanton, or lewd unless it was intentionally calculated to incite to lust. It is thus distinguished from indecency and impropriety, which may or may not indicate LAST ASSESSMENT no single improvement shall be undertaken which exceeds in cost 20 per cent. of the value of the property in the improvement district as shown by the "last county assessment," includes the valuation added by the county board of equalization, and where the value is thus increased before the board of improvement of a city reports the estimated cost of an improvement, and before the passage of an ordinance levying the assessment to pay for the improvement, such increased value must be considered. Board of Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Texarkana v. Offenhauser, 105 S. W. 265, 268, 84 Ark. 257. LAST CLEAR CHANCE See, also, Discovered Negligence; Discovered Peril; Humanitarian Doctrine. The doctrine of the "last clear chance," generally attributed to the case of Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. Rep. 546, in which the owner of a donkey, who negligently turned it out on the highway with its feet hobbled, was allowed, nothwithstanding his own negligence, to recover from a person driving along the highway who carelessly ran into and killed it, is that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequences of the injured party's own negligence. Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 94 Pac. 437, 438, 14 Idaho, 327, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254, 125 Am. St. Rep. 161. "The last clear chance doctrine" arises where plaintiff has been negligent in placing himself in a position of danger, but that negligence has spent its force at the time he received an injury owing to the negligence of defendant. Scholl v. Belcher, 127 Pac. 968, 975, 03 Or. 310. Under the "last clear chance doctrine," one is liable for injury negligently inflicted upon another, though the injured person by his own negligence put himself in the place of danger, if the person inflicting the injuries saw the peril in time to have avoided the accident by using ordinary care. Cerrano v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 126 Pac. 37, 40, 62 Or. 421. The "last clear chance" to avoid injury is the last opportunity to avoid the danger, by one of the parties learning of it, and knowing that the safety of the other depends solely upon his conduct, and the rule does not apply where the act of the injured party and the defendant are substantially concurrent. Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Bolin, 78 N. E. 210, 213, 215, 39 Ind. App. 169. The "last clear chance" doctrine, which is the rule that, notwithstanding the injured person's original negligence, the defendant is liable if, by the exercise of ordinary care, he might have discovered plaintiff's peril in time to have avoided the injury, is in conIflict with the contributory negligence rule. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Lilley, 93 N. W. 1012, 1016, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 286. "Last clear chance" is the doctrine that though the plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence, and although that negligence may in fact have contributed to the accident, yet, if the defendant could, in the result, by the exercise of proper care and diligence, have avoided the mischief which happened, the plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him. McClanahan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co., 35 South. 902, 906, 111 La. 781. defendant is liable. Matz v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 117 S. W. 584, 591, 217 Mo. 275. The doctrine of "last clear chance" is not limited to cases where the peril of the person injured has been actually discovered by those causing the injury, but extending to covered by the exercise of reasonable care on cases where the peril could have been distheir part. The duty to exercise due care to avoid the consequence of another's negligence arises when the circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent person would have reason to apprehend its existence. Nichols v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 98 Pac. 808, 814, 44 Colo. 501. The "last clear chance" doctrine is somewhat of an exception to the general rule of law, by which an injury caused by the joint negligence of the wrongdoer and the person injured is not actionable. Murphy v. Wabash R. Co. (Mo.) 128 S. W. 481, 485. The doctrine of the "last clear chance" does not involve the recognition of liability in case of concurrent negligence, and does not involve a case of comparative negligence, but requires one to use reasonable care not to injure another in the condition in which the latter has placed himself, though the latter is guilty of negligence in putting himself in a place of danger avoidable by reasonable N. W. 1118, 1119, 148 Iowa, 200. precautions. Welsh v. Tri-City Ry. Co., 126 The exception to the general rule making contributory negligence a defense, known as the "last chance doctrine," does not apply where there is no negligence of the defendant supervening subsequently to that of the plaintiff, as where his negligence is continuous and operative down to the moment of the injury, or where his negligence or position of danger is not discovered by the defendant in time to avoid the injury. Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 164 Fed. 41, 43, 90 C. C. A. 459. The rule of "the last clear chance" implies that the one charged with negligence knew the person injured was in a place of danger and negligently failed to avoid injuring him; but his testimony that he did not have such knowledge is not conclusive. Such knowledge may be shown by proof that the person injured was in a situation of imminent danger, and so situated that the one injuring him, if he used his senses as human beings ordinarily do, must have known the danger. Zitnik v. Union Pac. R. Co., 136 N. W. 995, 997, 91 Neb. 679. If the negligence of both parties coThe doctrine of "last clear chance" canoperate there is usually no liability, except not be applied where both parties are confor the "humanitarian or 'last chance' doc- temporaneously and actively in fault, and trine," which means that, though the in- by their mutual carelessness an injury enjured party may have been negligent in plac-sues to one or both of them. Rowe v. Southing himself in a position of peril, yet if ern California Ry. Co., 87 Pac. 220, 221, 4 defendant, by ordinary care, did see, or Cal. App. 1 (citing Holmes v. South Pac. could see, him in time to have averted injury, Coast Ry., 31 Pac. 834, 97 Cal. 169). |