Euclid Avenue line. Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 27 Sup. Ct. 202-210, 204 U. S. 116, 51 L. Ed. 399. MAIN SEA "Main sea" and "high sea" are synonymous. United States v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co., 173 Fed. 426, 428. MAIN SHAFT The word "shaft," as used in connection with or applied to factories, is a revolving bar to convey the force which is generated by some prime mover to the different working machines, and a "line or main shaft" is a bar of considerable length, and usually bearing a number of pulleys by which power is transmitted to countershafts. HohensteinHarmetz Furniture Co. v. Matthews, 92 N. E. 196, 199, 46 Ind. App. 616. MAIN STEM The term "main stem," as used in the New Jersey statute relating to taxation of railroads, is expressly defined to include the roadbed not exceeding 100 feet in width with its rails and sleepers and structures thereon not including passenger or freight buildings. The original statute made passenger depots a part of the main stem. United New Jersey K. & Canal Co. v. Parker, 69 Atl. 239, 243, 75 N. J. Law, 771. Under Act 1888 (Gen. St. p. 3325, § 214) as amended (P. L. 1906, p. 220, c. 122), defining the "main stem" of a railroad for purposes of taxation as "the 'roadbed' not exceeding one hundred feet in width with its rails and sleepers, and all structures erected thereon and used in connection therewith, not including, however, any passenger or freight buildings erected thereon," does not extend beyond the "roadbed," although such "roadbed" be less in width than 100 feet. The court said: “Roadbed' signifies the bed or foundation upon which rests the superstructure of rails and sleepers. Giving due effect to the word 'main' in the phrase 'main stem,' the 'roadbed' that is to constitute 'main stem' must be deemed the bed or foundation of the principal tracks of the railroad at the place in question. The width of 100 feet, as used in the statute, is a measure of limitation, not of extension; and the fact that a railroad company at any place on its line owus land of the width of 100 feet or more does not extend 'main stem' to the width of 100 feet, unless the 'roadbed' of its principal tracks at the place in question extends to that width." In re New York Bay R. Co., 67 Atl. 1049, 1051, 75 N. J. Law, 389 (quoting and adopting definition In re United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Co., 67 Atl. 1075, 75 N. J. Law, 385). The act of 1888 (Gen. St. p. 3325, par. 214), relating to the taxation of railroad and canal property, declares that the "main stem" 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-14 of a railroad, the assessment of which shall be made by the state authorities, shall include "the 'roadbed,' not exceeding 100 feet in width with its rails and sleepers, (and) depot building used for passengers connected therewith." A supplement to such act (P. L. 1906, p. 220) declares that "main stem" shall hereafter be held to include the "roadbed" not exceeding 100 feet in width with its rails and sleepers, and all structures erected thereon and used in connection therewith, not including, however, any passenger or freight The term "roadbuildings erected thereon. bed" is of plain import and significance, the bed or foundation on which rests the superstructure of rails and sleepers. By giving due effect to the word "main" in the phrase "main stem," the "roadbed" that is to constitute "main stem" must be deemed the bed or foundation of the principal tracks of the railroad at the place in question. In re United New Jersey R. & Canal Co., 67 Atl. 1075, 1076, 75 N. J. Law, 385. Act April 8, 1906 (P. L. 1906, pp. 122, 220), providing a method for the taxation of railroad property, defines the "main stem" of a railroad as the roadbed, "not exceeding 100 feet in width, with its rails and sleepers, and all structures erected thereon and used in connection therewith, not including, however, any passenger or freight buildings erected thereon." The statute has made a distinction between the strictly essential right of way of a railroad, the existence of which is indispensable to its operation and the remaining land of the company used for railroad purposes, and this distinction rests upon the ground, not that these different classes of property are put to different uses, but upon the dependence of the several companies upon local police protection, and, as compensation for that protection, the local municipal governments are permitted to tax that part of the railroad property not included within the "main stem" of the railroad. Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. State Board of Assessors, 67 Atl. 672, 674, 680, 681, 75 N. J. Law, 120. A "main stem," as the term is used in P. L. 1884, p. 142, as amended by P. L. 1888, p. 269, providing for the taxation of railroads, includes the roadbed not exceeding 100 feet in width, with its rails and sleepers, depot buildings used for passengers connected therewith, and must always exist in every incorporated railroad operated for the transportation of freight and passengers, or either. Jersey City v. State Board of Assessors, 68 Atl. 227, 228, 74 N. J. Law, 720. Land on which railroad tracks are main tained, which originally formed a part of the main line, and which were left out of the main line by a straightening of tracks, but are continued in operation for railroad purposes, do not form parts of the "main stem" of the principal line of the railroad, and are not branch railroads having their own main stem, but are in contemplation of law the same as a "siding." Jersey City v. State Board of Assessors, 69 Atl. 200, 201, 75 N. J. Law, 571. MAIN TRACK A short piece of railroad track used only for freight, to which defendant's trains were deflected by a switch, admitting them to defendant's freight depot, and ending at a post, was not defendant's "main track," within Laws 1907, p. 475, § 1, relating to railroad crossings, and providing that any railroad company desiring to cross the main track of another railroad company should, before constructing any such crossing, apply to the railroad and warehouse commission for permission so to do, and comply with certain proceedings therein specified. Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jacksonville Ry. & Light Co., 91 N. E. 1024, 1027, 245 Ill. 155. In the Revenue Act, § 89 (Laws 1903, pp. 414-418, c. 73), relating to assessment of railroads, and providing that the valuation of each mile shall be determined by dividing the whole value by the number of miles of the "main track" of each road or line, the words "main track" are clearly used to distinguish from side or second track, and turnout, spur, and warehouse tracks, and not to distinguish the main line from the branch line. State ex rel. Platte County v. Sheldon, 113 N. W. 208, 210, 79 Neb. 455. MAINLAND The word "mainland,” in Revisal 1905, § 3474, forbidding anchoring of a floathouse for fishing or hunting wild fowl in shoal water not more than 300 yards from the mainland on the west side of Currituck Sound, means the principal land, as opposed to island. State v. Barco, 63 S. E. 673, 674, 150 N. C. 792. MAINS Water mains as personal property, see By the word "mains," in Laws 1890, c. 566, p. 1148, § 65, providing that any owner or occupant of any premises within 100 feet of any main laid down by any gas light corporation may require it to supply him with gas, were intended those pipes through which the company distributed the gas that was designed to be taken therefrom into the buildings to be lighted. Moore v. Champlain Electric Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 37, 39, 88 App. Div. 289. MAINTAIN See Establish and Maintain. The word "maintain" has been defined as meaning to support that which has already been brought into existence. Kendrick & Roberts v. Warren Bros. Co., 72 Atl. 461, 464, 110 Md. 47. "Maintain" is defined to mean to hold or keep in a particular state or condition, especially in a state of efficiency; to support, sustain, not to suffer to decline. Kovachoff v. St. Johns Lumber Co., 121 Pac. 801, 803, 61 Or. 174. The power to "maintain and operate" waterworks and electric light plants is not necessarily incident to or implied in the power to "purchase or construct" waterworks or electric light plants. The word "maintain" does not mean to provide or construct, but to keep up and preserve. State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Wilder, 98 S. W. 465, 467, 200 Mo. 97. Where a boom company agreed with a riparian owner, during the continuance of a license granted such company by the owner to use the river and maintain therein piles and booms convenient in its business and releasing the company from all claims for future damages to plaintiff's land by acts of defendant in the management of its business, to maintain a boom of logs along the bank on the owner's land to protect the banks from injury, the word "maintain," as used in the contract, meant to keep up in a particular state or condition, and did not bind the company to indemnify the landowner against loss, where such maintenance became impossible for a time because of an unprecedented flood, which carried away the boom, where the company had constructed a boom and exercised due care in its maintenance, and renewed it within a reasonable time after the flood. Coleman v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 131 N. W. 641, 642, 114 Minn. 443, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1109. Civ. Code, § 551, which provides that no canal can be laid out, constructed, or maintained so as to obstruct any public highway, and that the one so maintaining or using such a canal must repair the bridges, etc., was enacted in its present form in 1905. Before that it provided that every water or canal corporation must construct and keep in good repair at all times for public use across their canal, flume, etc., all the bridges that the county may require. This section was based on prior statutory provisions, passed nearly half a century before. Pol. Code, § 2694, provides that when highways are laid across canals on public lands those using the canals must prepare them so that the highway may cross without danger, and section 2737, providing penalties for obstructing or injuring highways, contains provisions for bridging ditches which cross pre-existing highways. Held that, in view of these provisions the original act did not impose upon the owners of canals the duty of bridging them whenever the public should lay out a road over them, and that the present section does not impose that duty, for the word "maintain," which is the basis of the claim, should be construed merely as a prohibition against maintaining a canal in such a way that it would injure an existing highway. City of Madera v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 115 Pac. 936, 938, 159 Cal. 749. As clean commissioners to build, construct, repair, and As continue an action The word "maintained," as used in section 54, c. 66, R. S., means to prosecute to a conclusion an action already begun. Shurtleff v. Redlon, 82 Atl. 645, 648, 109 Me. 62. The verb "maintain" in pleading has a distinct technical signification. It signifies to support what has already been brought The cleaning of streets is "repairing" or into existence. Under a statute requiring "maintaining" them within Laws 1893, P. partnerships transacting business under a 252, c. 264, authorizing the street and park designation not showing the persons interestmaintain highways in the city, in view of ed to file a certificate stating the names of all the members, and to publish it once a week Laws 1893, c. 59, requiring towns to keep for four weeks, etc., and providing that pertheir highways in good repair, suitable for sons doing business as partners contrary to travel thereon, and creating a liability for the statute shall not maintain any action fine and responsibility for damages suffered until they have filed the certificate and made by travelers from defects in highways; for the publication therein required, where an the presence of rubbish, dirt, and ashes in a action is brought by a partnership, the firm street may cause it to be in a bad state of rename of which does not indicate all the partpair and in an unsuitable condition for travel, and any act that is reasonably necessary ners, failure to file the required certificate is to put or keep the street in good repair suit-matter of defense, and must be set up in the answer by way of abatement; but if the able for travel thereon is "repairing" or “maintaining" the street. Connor v. Ctiy of Manchester, 60 Atl. 436, 437, 73 N. H. 233. As commence an action The word "maintained" in the Employers' Liability Act, providing that no action for injuries thereunder shall be "maintained" unless notice of the time, place, and cause of injury is given to the employer, is synonymous with the word "begun" or "commenced" and the statute makes the giving of such notice a condition precedent to the bringing of an action under it. Grasso v. Holbrook, Cabot & Daly Contracting Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 101, 103, 102 App. Div. 49 (citing Burbank v. Inhabitants of Auburn, 31 Me. 590; Boutiller v. Steamboat Milwaukee, 8 Minn. 97, 105 [Gil. 72]; Smith v. Lyon, 44 Conn. 178; Byers v. Bourret, 64 Cal. 73, 28 Pac. 61; Mertz v. City of Brooklyn, 11 N. Y. Supp. 778, affirmed 128 N. Y. 617, 28 N. E. 253). The word "maintain" in a statute in reference to actions comprehends the institution as well as the support of the action, though it may be used to express a meaning corresponding to its more restricted definition. National Mines Co. v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court Humboldt County, 116 Pac. 996, 1000, 34 Nev. 67. A prohibition against "maintaining" an action implies a prohibition against beginning it, for the beginning of the action is one of the necessary steps in maintaining it. A foreign corporation, incapacitated from suing at the time of an institution of a suit by it on the ground that it has not obtained the license required by Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1025, 1026 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 888, 890), cannot cure the incapacity by thereafter taking out a license. Amalgamated Zinc & Lead Co. v. Bay State Zinc Min. Co., 120 S. W. 31, 34, 221 Mo. 7, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 492. requirement as to the filing and publication are complied with before the defense is interposed, it will be sufficient, even though the publication was not completed at the time the action was commenced. Nicholson v. Auburn Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 92 Pac. 651, 6 Cal. App. 547 (quoting California Savings & Loan Soc. v. Harris, 43 Pac. 525, 111 Cal. 133, 138). The statute requiring foreign corporations to file a designation of a person on whom process may be served within 60 days after commencing business within the state, and providing that unless it does so it shall not "maintain” any action in the courts of the state, does not deprive foreign corporations of the right at any time to commence an action for the protection of its property or the enforcement of its rights, and it is within its power at any time after the conmencement of the action to comply with the statute and thereafter maintain such action. Black v. Vermont Marble Co., 82 Pac. 1060, 1062, 1 Cal. App. 718. It was held in Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern, 31 S. W. 772, 129 Mo. 381, 32 L. R. A. 420, that the word "maintain" meant literally "to hold by the hand," and in its ordinary use, "to uphold," "to sustain," "to keep up"; and in pleading it means "to support what has already been brought into existence." TriState Amusement Co. v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 90 S. W. 1020, 1022, 192 Mo. 404, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 688, 111 Am. St. Rep. 511, 4 Ann. Cas. 808. Under a statute providing that "no action shall be 'maintained'" by a foreign corporation so long as it fails to comply with the law, when considered in connection with other provisions of the act imposing penalties on officers and corporations for failing to comply with the law, and providing that a failure to comply shall not affect the valid ity of contracts made by such corporations, ages of the city. Green River Asphalt Co. an action by a foreign corporation must be v. City of St. Louis, 87 S. W. 985, 986, 188 stayed during the period of its noncompli- Mo. 576. ance with the law, on noncompliance being properly pleaded in abatement; the word "maintain" carrying a different meaning from "institute" or "begin," and implying that an action has been begun before it can be maintained. National Fertilizer Co. v. Fall River Five Cents Sav. Bank, 82 N. E. 671, 672, 196 Mass. 458, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, 13 Ann. Cas. 510. The words "may maintain an action," as generally used, mean may successfully maintain an action. Greentree v. Wallace, 93 Pac. 598, 599, 77 Kan. 149 (citing and distinguishing In re Massey, 42 Pac. 365, 56 Kan. 120). As having control and custody of place A hotel porter who, for a guest of the hotel, received and stored in a room of the house a barrel of bottled beer belonging to the guest, and who afterwards, as required by the guest, iced the liquor and served it at the guest's room, where it was drunk by him and his friends, was guilty of maintaining a place where persons were permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquor as a beverage, contrary to the provisions of Laws 1901, c. 232, § 1 (Gen. Stat. 1909, § 4387). State v. Ross, 121 Pac. 908, 909, 86 Kan. 799. As erection The word "maintain" ordinarily means to preserve something which is already in existence; but, considering that, by the use of the words "unless one of them chooses to let his land lie without fencing," Civ. Code, § 1301, declaring that coterminous owners are mutually bound equally to maintain the boundaries and monuments between them and the fences between them, unless one of them chooses to let his land lie without fencing, applies to land not fenced, it is comprehensive enough, in the light of the subjectmatter, to include the erection, as well as the maintenance, of the fences. Hoar v. Hennessy, 74 Pac. 452, 454, 455, 29 Mont. 253. Keep synonymous As keep in repair The word "maintain," within Gen. St. 1902, § 388, requiring widows to "maintain" and keep in repair the property set apart to them as dower, does not mean "to provide" or "construct," but means to "keep up, not to suffer to fail or decline"; "keep in repair" and "maintain" as used in the statute being synonymous. Ferguson v. Rochford, 79 Atl. 177, 178, 84 Conn. 202, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1212. The word "maintain" is practically the same thing as "repair," which means to restore to a sound or good state, after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction, and, when used in reference to railroad right of way, includes the idea of keeping the right of way in such a condition that it can be used for the purpose for which it was intended. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Bryan (Tex.) 107 S. W. 572, 576 (citing Verdin v. City of St. Louis [Mo.] 27 S. W. 447). As make See Make. As operation The word "maintain," as used in a contract by which the owners of an adjoining office building agreed on a common entrance and hallway on the center line dividing the premises, and to pay the expense of keeping up and “maintaining" common conveniences including an elevator, was held to include the operation of such elevator, and not simply to mean to put it in and have it stand idle at the behest of one of the parties, which was contrary to the construction given the contract by sharing the expense of operation. Globe Ins. Co. v. Wayne, 80 N. E. 13, 18, 75 Ohio St. 451. Permanence Defendant railroad in May, 1848, covenanted with plaintiffs' predecessors, their heirs and assigns, to construct and maintain a turnout and side track at Dorsey's Run, to take up and set down at the siding by defendant's passenger cars all persons going to and from the farm then occupied by the first parties and to leave at the siding to be unloaded all freight weighing at least 3,000 pounds shipped to the first parties on which Where plaintiff, under a contract with the cost of transportation had been paid at abutting property owners, constructed a the place of loading. Defendant complied pavement and agreed to "maintain and keep with its covenant until 1907, when it conit in repair" for a period of five years, and structed a cut-off on its main stem by which after the pavement was completed it was a large part of the right of way over plaintorn up and damaged by the bursting of a tiff's land was abandoned, when it discontinwater main beneath the surface of the street, ued the turnout, and refused longer to mainplaintiff's contract to "maintain and keep tain a station at that point. Held, that the in repair" did not impose on it the duty of word "maintain" as used in such covenant repairing a damage of the kind in question, did not require defendant to continue the but merely contemplated such repairs as turnout and station permanently, and that use and wear might render necessary. Hence the length of time during which the covenant in repairing the pavement plaintiff was a had been complied with constituted a submere volunteer and could not recover dam-stantial performance thereof, so that the railroad company was not liable for dam- | law, which provides for the creation as well ages for its breach. Whalen v. Baltimore as maintenance of a road system. & O. R. Co., 76 Atl. 166, 167, 112 Md. 187. As rebuild or reconstruct The word "maintain" in a contract for the extension of a railway branch from a railroad company's railroad to the mines of a mining company, whereby the mining company agreed to construct the substructure, and the railroad company to lay the track of the branch railroad, and to "maintain" and operate the same, requires the railroad company to reconstruct a bridge constructed by the mining company after the bridge was washed away by an extraordinary freshet, though the bridge would become the mining company's property after being completed under the contract which contemplated that the structure should remain the mining com- | pany's property. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States Iron Co., 101 S. W. 414, 419, 118 Tenn. 194. As supplying food Laws 1903, p. 14, c. 13, appropriating money for "maintaining" the executive residence, does not authorize the employment of any part of the sum so appropriated for the purchase of provisions to be used there. Bailey v. Kelly, 79 Pac. 735, 70 Kan. 869. MAINTENANCE The Kingston city charter created a board of water commissioners, with power, with the consent of the common council, to construct and maintain a waterworks system. Section 98 provided that the moneys derived therefrom should be applied to the payment of the cost of maintaining, operating, and extending the waterworks, and to the payment of principal and interest on bonds as they fall due. The board, by section 99, was given power to keep the system in operation independent of the city council, and to fix and collect water rates, and make and enforce rules and regulations. By section 101 the moneys derived from water rates and penalties were required to be paid to the city treasurer, to be credited to the water fund and applied to the payment of expenses of ordinary maintenance and management, the balance, if any, to the payment of principal and interest on bonds, and any surplus still remaining to be used for any lawful city purpose. Held, that additional filters, requiring an expenditure of $16,235, was not an ordinary "maintenance" expense, and that the board had no power to incur such expense without the consent of the city council. Coykendall v. Harrison, 134 N. Y. Supp. 446, 450, 150 App. Div. 46. Creation of road system Const. art. 8, § 9, providing that the Legislature may pass local laws for the "maintenance" of public roads without the local notice ordinarily required for special laws, is applicable to the Shelby county special road Cooks (Tex.) 135 S. W. 139, 141. Establishment of highway Ex parte Const. art. 3, § 56, subd. 5, declares that the Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, pass any local or special laws authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining of roads. Article 11, § 2, declares that the laying out, constructing, and repairing of county roads shall be provided for by general laws. Article 8, § 9, declares that the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax for the further maintenance of the public roads, and that the Legislature may pass local laws for the maintenance of public roads or highways without the local notice required by special or local laws. Section 9, art. 8, was added to the other provisions by amendment. Held, that the word "maintenance" as used in article 8, § 9, included the laying out and constructing of roads, and hence Acts 24th Leg. (Laws 1895) p. 213, c. 132, creating a road system of Dallas county, was not unconstitutional. Dallas County v. Plowman, 91 S. W. 221, 222, 99 Tex. 509. As rebuild or reconstruct Ky. St. § 1840, giving the fiscal court power to appropriate county funds for the maintenance of highways, and section 4306, giving the fiscal court general charge and supervision of the public roads with authority to repair same, the fiscal court had power to reconstruct a turnpike road. Hanlon v. Cleary, 133 S. W. 953, 954, 142 Ky. 46. State institution The provision for "maintenance," in Laws 1907, p. 18, c. 23, making appropriations for the Institution of the Feeble-Minded at Grafton, does not include employe's wages, fuel, etc., for which specific sums were appropriated, but does include the cost of food and clothing of inmates; there being no speState v. cific appropriation for these items. Lewis, 119 N. W. 1037, 1039, 18 N. D. 125. MAINTENANCE (Of Manual Training School) the husband of testatrix to found an instituA will recited that it was the purpose of tion wherein sound business principles might be taught, and where pupils might be fitted that to carry out his wishes she made a dofor manufacturing and business careers, and nation to prepare, construct, and maintain a manual training school to teach cooking, sewing, and domestic economy to girls, and all things of mechanical and other technical work to young men, and to teach both boys and girls such things as are usually taught in modern manual training schools, and required the city to raise a specified sum for the purpose, and provided that thereupon the property should be transferred to the city to perpetually maintain the school. Held, that |